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This thesis investigates the role and effect of corporate governance and political 
connections on determining executive compensation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA). Given that the framework of Saudi corporate governance is significantly 
influenced by the Anglo-American model, the thesis aims to evaluate the validity of this 
model in constraining executive compensation in emerging economies such as Saudi 
Arabia. The KSA has a unique institutional setting: high ownership concentration, high 
use of political connections, an absolute monarchical political system and the use of 
Islamic law. Moreover, the thesis examines the impact of political connections on the 
arrangements for executive pay and emphasises the principal-principal conflict in family 
controlled-firms. To achieve these objectives, deductive and inductive methods are 
employed and three empirical studies are conducted using a sample of 114 non-financial 
Saudi listed firms during 2008-2015. 
Unlike the situation in the Anglo-American economies, pay structure in the KSA is found 
to be limited to fixed and short-term performance-based compensation (i.e. bonus). This 
is because long-term incentive methods such as stock options are not allowed for 
regulatory reasons. Furthermore, although the Saudi corporate governance regulations 
have been enforced since 2006, the data shows a boom in average executive 
compensation levels exceeding 100% during the period 2008 to 2015 with a weak link to 
firm performance. Meanwhile, the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is 
found to be inadequate to curb managerial incentives in the KSA due to the absence of 
other effective formal institutions (e.g. an effective legal system). Surprisingly, 
independent board directors and remuneration committees, which are key 
recommendations of corporate governance best practice, are found to be associated with 
higher levels of executive compensation. Moreover, while the model suggests that 
concentrated ownership could close the gap between shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests, thereby shrinking agency costs, the results show the opposite; i.e. ownership 
concentration is a root cause of principal-principal problems and leads to generous 
executive pay.  
Meanwhile, other informal institutions are observed to influence compensation policy. 
The study finds that the phenomenon of political connections is prevalent in Saudi Arabia 
especially in non-family firms and is significantly related to higher levels of executive pay. 
These connections are derived from the domestic culture of Saudi Arabia which is 
significantly influenced by wasta (personal relationships). The findings also reveal that 
there are significant differences between family-controlled firms and their non-family 
counterparts in terms of corporate governance attitudes and the use of political 
connections. However, the practices of executive compensation are virtually the same in 
both type of firms. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that the adoption of corporate 
governance models developed in other country contexts, with no consideration to the 
cross-country institutional differences, leads to undesirable consequences and facilitates 
higher executive remuneration.  
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1.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW  
During the past two decades, the topic of corporate governance and executive 
compensation has received considerable attention from academics, practitioners and 
regulators (Al-Najjar, 2017; Conyon, 2014; Bebchuk et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2010; Jensen et 
al., 2004; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This focus is a consequence of global corporate 
scandals, especially in the US such as Enron in 2001 and WorldCom in 2002. These scandals 
raise questions regarding business ethics and the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
constraining managerial opportunism (Janakiraman et al., 2010). Hence, this has raised 
awareness for the need for more transparency and credibility in terms of corporate 
governance and has led to several major reforms in corporate governance regulations 
(Girma et al., 2007). Cadbury (1992, p. 15) defines corporate governance as “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled”. In other words, it is the system that governs 
relationships among a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders to ensure that the company resources are employed optimally and efficiently 
to achieve the company objectives (OECD, 2015a). 
The main debate in the literature concerning corporate governance and executive 
compensation is centred around the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers (Young et al., 2008; Jensen et al., 2004). It is argued that managers are self-
interested and seek to maximise their own wealth rather than company value (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). As a remedy, some researchers argue that executive compensation should 
be used as a governance mechanism through which managers are incentivised to achieve a 
company’s objectives and thereby reduce the gap between the interests of the shareholders 
and managers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, other researchers argue that executive 
compensation can be problematic if abused (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In this context, if 
managers are able to extract high non-merit compensation, shareholders’ welfare is 
threatened by managerial expropriation (Van Essen et al., 2015). To overcome this issue, 
corporate governance regulations are reviewed periodically in terms of best practice 
experience to ensure that top executives are paid on a merit basis using appropriate 
performance criteria (Sapp, 2008). 
Although the issue of executive incentives has received a great deal of discussion in 
recent years, it is still controversial. For example, after the 2008 financial crisis, the US 
introduced the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 as a further attempt to clip the wings of CEOs 
following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Conyon, 2014). The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
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introduced major reform to corporate governance and executive remuneration, such as the 
provision of ‘say on pay’, which gives shareholders the right to vote on the remuneration 
awarded to senior managers (Conyon, 2014). Furthermore, in late 2016, the UK 
government published a green paper on corporate governance reform (BEIS, 2016). A key 
part of the green paper discusses and criticises current levels of executive pay and provides 
suggestions on how to control them. The frequent reforms of corporate governance in 
developed countries provides evidence on the difficulty of governing executive 
compensation. Undoubtedly, the situation in emerging economies, which have a less 
effective legal framework and weak property rights, is more complicated (Young et al., 
2008). 
The practice of corporate governance in emerging economies is still in a rudimentary 
stage, and has been imported predominantly from the West (Pierce, 2008; Young et al., 
2008). In the 2000s, as a response to international demands, many emerging economies 
imported and adopted Anglo-American (shareholder) frameworks of corporate 
governance, which did not take into account cross-country institutional differences 
(Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010; Sun et al., 2010). A brief look into corporate governance in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region reveals that its practice is still in its infancy. 
Oman was the first country in the region to enact corporate governance regulations and 
was followed by Egypt in 2005, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in 2006, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2007 (Koldertsova, 2011). Corporate governance in the KSA, which 
is the focus of this study, was initiated in late 2006, when the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) introduced a code for the first time. The code follows a ‘comply or explain’ approach 
and is significantly influenced by the Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
(Fallatah and Dickins, 2012). However, the adoption of the Western model implicitly 
assumes that the formal underpinning institutions in relation to corporate governance 
found in developed countries also exist in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). This is 
not the case in Saudi Arabia, where the “formal institutions such as laws and regulations 
regarding accounting requirements, information disclosure, securities trading, and their 
enforcement are either absent, inefficient, or do not operate as intended” (Young et al., 
2008, p. 198). 
Thus researchers argue that adopting the Western corporate governance model, 
which is based on the premise of principal-agent conflict, in emerging economies could 
make the situation more costly and problematic (North, 1990; Wright et al., 2005). For 
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example, ownership concentration, which is suggested as an effective mechanism to 
enhance governance quality in developed economies (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), is a root cause of principal-principal conflict in emerging countries. 
Therefore, instead of resolving the issue in the Saudi context, the adoption of the Western 
corporate governance model can exacerbate the principal-principal problem (Faccio et al., 
2001; Young et al., 2008). Furthermore, the adoption of such a model disregards the 
informal domestic institutions, which may influence business policy (Young et al., 2008).  
These informal institutions include “relational ties, business groups, family connections and 
government contacts” (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). 
Saudi Arabia has an institutional setting that differs from most other countries, with 
the exception of its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbours (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). For instance, the ownership concentration is high and 
dominated by state and family investment. In this context, Young et al. (2008) argue that 
firms with controlling shareholders results in the emergence of principal-principal conflict. 
Furthermore, the political system in the KSA is based on an absolute monarchy, in which 
the legal setting is derived from the sharia (Islamic law) (Pierce, 2008). In addition, the 
demographic structure in Saudi Arabia differs significantly from the majority of countries, 
and is based on a tribal system which is influenced by an orientation to collectivism (The 
Hofstede Centre, 2014). Such characteristics make wasta (the Arabic term for personal 
connections) and political ties key elements in accomplishing business transactions and in 
shaping business policy (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013; Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). These 
features represent the key divergences between the KSA as an emerging economy and 
developed economies. Hence, governance regulations should take into account these 
domestic challenges. 
Although Saudi corporate governance regulations (SCGRs) have been enforced since 
2006, there was a boom in executive compensation in the country between 2008 and 2015. 
A review of the statistical trends among the highest-compensated executives reveals that 
executive compensation increased by more than 100% in that time in most listed firms, 
while the growth in company profits has been significantly lower. Etihad Etisalat Co 
(Mobily) is ranked highest in Saudi Arabia with regard to growth in executive compensation 
from 2010 to 2013 inclusive. However, this led to a massive scandal in late 2014 when 
manipulation of its financial statements was detected. Consequently, “the company restated 
profits for 2013 and the first half of 2014” (Smith, 2015), cutting them by USD381 million 
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combined. In January 2015, it posted a shock fourth-quarter loss of USD608 million. This 
manipulation saw accounts switch from a USD1.8 billion profit in 2013 to a USD0.24 billion 
loss in 2014 (Tadawul, 2015). As a consequence, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Khalid 
Al-Kaf was dismissed and by February 2015 Mobily had lost approximately USD13 billion 
(nearly 65%) of its market value in comparison to May 2014 (Smith, 2015). 
Adopting a hypothetico-deductive approach through the use of three empirical 
studies, this thesis investigates the effects of both the formal and informal institutions on 
executive pay-setting in the emerging economy of the KSA. More specifically, it examines 
the role of corporate governance and political connections in determining executive 
compensation, as well as analysing the practices of executive compensation in family and 
non-family firms. Based on a sample of 114 non-financial Saudi listed firms in the period 
2008 to 2015, the study finds that, in general, the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance is inadequate in being able to curb managerial incentives in the KSA due to the 
cross-country institutional differences and the absence of effective formal institutions. For 
example, the thesis finds that pay structure in the KSA is restricted to fixed and short-term 
performance-based compensation, because long-term incentives, such as stock options, are 
not permitted for regulatory reasons. Indeed, this restriction exacerbates the difficulty of 
linking executive compensation with the company’s long-term performance, which is a 
priority of the Anglo-American model. Furthermore, the data reveal that independent board 
directors and remuneration committees, which are key instruments in corporate 
governance best practice, are associated with higher levels of executive compensation in 
the KSA. Moreover, while the Anglo-American model suggests that concentrated ownership 
could close the gap between shareholders’ and managers’ interests, thereby shrinking 
agency costs, the results show the opposite; i.e. ownership concentration is a root cause of 
principal-principal problems and leads to more generous executive pay.  
Furthermore, informal institutions are also observed to influence compensation 
policy. The study finds that the phenomenon of political connections is prevalent in Saudi 
Arabia, especially in non-family firms, and is significantly related to higher levels of 
executive pay. These connections are derived from the prevailing culture in Saudi Arabia, 
which is strongly influenced by wasta. The findings also reveal that there are significant 
differences between family-controlled firms and their non-family counterparts in terms of 
corporate governance attitudes and the use of political connections. However, the practices 
of executive compensation are virtually the same in both type of firms. Overall, the thesis 
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demonstrates that the adoption of corporate governance models developed in other 
country contexts, with no consideration to the cross-country institutional differences, leads 
to undesirable consequences and facilitates higher executive remuneration in the KSA.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The main aim of this study is to provide a deep insight into the practices of executive 
compensation in Saudi Arabia. More specifically, it investigates the role and effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms and political connectedness in determining executive 
pay and how these factors interact in family and non-family firms. It also seeks to find out 
whether the current corporate governance regulations, which follow the Anglo-American 
model, properly fit the Saudi context, though there are significant different institutional 
characteristics across the two contexts. To fulfil these goals, the study conducts three 
empirical studies.  
The first study seeks to achieve two objectives: a) to investigate the role of a set of 
various corporate governance mechanisms in controlling levels of executive compensation; 
b) to examine the validity and generalisability of the Anglo-American model in emerging 
economies like Saudi Arabia. This deep investigation helps to draw a comprehensive view 
of the current norms of corporate governance and their consequences for the practices of 
executive compensation. The second study aims to go further beyond the formal 
institutions and thus investigates the role of another contextual informal institution, 
namely political connections, in enhancing the quality of governance through constraining 
executive compensation. This study sheds light on other factors that emerged from the 
context and would have significant impact on business policy in general and governance 
norms in particular. The final study re-investigates the norms of corporate governance and 
political connectedness in different sets of firms, namely family and non-family, which 
allows an understanding of how firms act when large family shareholders are involved in 
the decision-making process and the consequences of this involvement for executive 
compensation practices. 
1.3 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND QUESTIONS 
Although the topic of corporate governance and executive compensation has 
received considerable attention during the past two decades (Reddy et al., 2015; Conyon, 
2014; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Core et al., 1999), these studies are primarily centred on 
the Western economies. Thus, there is still a significant dearth of such research in emerging 
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economies in general, and in the Arab world in particular which has different organisational 
culture and management attitudes (Ali, 1995). This dearth of studies has led regulators to 
import and adopt patterns of corporate governance that were developed in the West with 
almost no consideration to cross-country institutional differences (Young et al., 2008). For 
example, formal institutions (e.g. laws, legal enforcement, property rights, and so on) in the 
Western economies are effective in general and are considered when developing 
governance mechanisms (Young et al., 2008). However, the case is different in emerging 
economies which generally suffer from weak legal enforcement and property rights 
(Rashid, 2013). In such contexts, informal institutions (e.g. personal connections, culture, 
norms and so on) are found to play a significant role in shaping business policy (Faccio, 
2010). Accordingly, as the current regulations of Saudi corporate governance follow the 
Anglo-American model, the study is motivated to raise the following question: Is the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance generalizable in emerging countries? 
Another motivation for the researcher to carry out this study is the vigorous debate 
around the importance of executive incentives as a key mechanism by which to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2009; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). The best practice framework of corporate governance encourages firms to 
design well-structured executive compensation with a strong link to firm performance 
(Jensen et al., 2004; Murphy, 1999). However, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that 
executive compensation can be also a problematic factor if misused and this exacerbates 
the agency costs. In turn, corporate governance regulators suggest several mechanisms that 
help to design merited executive compensation: separating the roles of CEO and board 
chairperson; appointing independent members to the board of directors; and establishing 
a remuneration committee (Conyon and He, 2011; Girma et al., 2007; Core et al., 1999). 
However, these recommendations might not be appropriate for emerging countries where 
concentrated ownership and personal connections can influence board independence 
(Young et al., 2008). For example, despite the enforcement of corporate governance 
regulations from late 2006, there is a noticeable boom in executive compensation in Saudi 
Arabia from 2008 to 2015. That is to say, executive compensation increased by more than 
100% in most listed firms, while the growth in certain firms, such as the Etihad Etisalat Co 
(Mobily), was threefold (Arqaam, 2014). This fact makes the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in controlling managerial incentives questionable. Thus, the study raises the 
following question:  
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Do corporate governance mechanisms restrain the opportunism of top managers in Saudi 
Arabia by reining in their compensation?  
Furthermore, Estrin and Prevezer (2011) and Young et al. (2008) state that in the 
absence of effective formal institutions as is the case in emerging countries, informal 
institutions exist as substitutive elements. One key informal institution that exists 
significantly in immature countries is personal networks among business elites and the 
government (Faccio, 2010). The situation in Saudi Arabia supports this argument since 
several studies (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013; Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011) find that wasta plays 
a dominant role in the business field, with a strong influence in decisions related to human 
resources such as appointments, promotions and compensation. Indeed, political 
connections are a vital channel of wasta through which firms can obtain benefits from the 
government (Goldman et al., 2009; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). Goldman et al. (2009) 
argue that politically connected members are incentivised by their political status. Thus, 
they enhance corporate governance and constrain managerial opportunism, otherwise they 
incur high political costs. However, as Saudi firms are in general dominated by families (Al-
Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015; The World Bank, 2009), political connections, if exploited, may 
harm non-family parties such as minority shareholders. For example, because 
appointments in Saudi Arabia are influenced by wasta (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013), 
potentially controlling shareholders appoint their relatives or close friends, with no 
consideration as to their qualifications, to senior executive positions (Tlaiss and Kauser, 
2011). These appointments are at the expense of minority shareholders who suffer from 
both a weak firm performance, since the firm is managed by unqualified-executives, and 
the extraction of higher non-merit executive compensation (Young et al., 2008). In this 
regard, political connections can be exploited to reduce regulatory oversight on the firm 
and to prevent legal sanctions that may result from the exploitation of minority 
shareholders (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). Accordingly, to assess the influence of 
political connections on the settings of executive compensation, the study raises the 
following question:  
Do political connections enhance governance quality through controlling executive 
compensation? 
The lack of understanding in the literature concerning family business attitudes to 
corporate governance is another motivation for this thesis. Although the attitudes of family 
businesses have been extensively studied (Morresi and Naccarato, 2016; Martin et al., 2016; 
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Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015; Cheng et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2007), the literature still lacks 
an understanding of the behaviours of family firms towards corporate governance, and 
more specifically their influence on executive pay-setting. Typically, decision-making in 
family businesses is controlled by specific members, unlike non-family firms where various 
parties are involved and decision-making follows systematic procedures ensuring a 
minimal conflict of interest among stakeholders (Alriyadh, 2013). There is generally less 
conflict of interest in entirely family owned-firms. However, this is not the case in joint-
stock companies where families hold a high proportion of voting rights and thereby control 
decision-making, while minority shareholders become subject to controlling shareholders’ 
decisions (Young et al., 2008). This issue is severe in emerging countries that lack effective 
legal protection for investors and where other informal institutions shape business policy 
(Rashid, 2013; Young et al., 2008). As the private sector in Saudi Arabia is family-dominated 
in general (Alriyadh, 2013), this study extends the understanding of whether or not the 
practices of corporate governance and the need for political connections in family-
controlled firms differ from their non-family counterparts and how this affects levels of 
executive compensation. These issues raise the following two questions:  
a) Do the structures of corporate governance and the need for political connections differ 
between family and non-family firms? and b) What are the implications of this variation for 
executive compensation practices in family and non-family firms? 
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The research is expected to contribute in several ways to certain areas of the 
literature including executive compensation, corporate governance, political connections 
and family business. First, to the best of researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first that 
investigates the relationship between a comprehensive set of governance and political 
connections variables through the lens of principal-principal conflict on the one hand and 
the level of executive compensation on the other in the Arab world or in the MENA region 
in general. Although Irani and Gerayeli (2017) and Fallatah (2015) analyse the impact of 
certain corporate governance mechanisms on managerial remuneration in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, respectively, there are differences in the comprehensiveness of the variables used 
between these studies and this thesis. In addition, the studies of Irani and Gerayeli (2017) 
and Fallatah (2015) are subject to several limitations, which this thesis overcomes, as is 
shown in the following chapters. 
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While prior studies only focus on total incentives of the CEOs (Shah et al., 2009; Firth 
et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Lin, 2005) partly due to disclosure limitation, this study adopts 
a holistic view of the overall remuneration package granted to the top executives rather 
than only to CEOs. This is possible because Saudi firms are required by law to disclose 
information about the top five highest paid executives (CMA, 2010). Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
has no legislation that allows for the issuing of stock options because of regulatory 
purposes. Thus, firms are less able to use long-term managerial incentives. This limitation 
enables the study to analyse the challenges facing boards of directors when designing 
executive remuneration in contexts where the means to use performance criteria is highly 
constrained. 
Furthermore, with regards to corporate governance, while most countries use the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Conyon, 2014; Kaplan, 2012; Sapp, 2008; 
Core et al., 1999), only a few studies investigate the validity and generalizability of adopting 
this model in emerging economies, which have different institutional characteristics from 
the West (Young et al., 2008). For example, ownership concertation in Saudi Arabia is high 
with family and state ownership domination, and also personal connections (wasta) play a 
significant role in the business field. Another crucial difference is that governance policy in 
Saudi Arabia is significantly influenced by sharia (Islamic law); thus, governance 
recommendations should consider these domestic challenges. Therefore, this thesis, which 
uses a dataset from Saudi Arabia, provides evidence on the generalizability of the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance in developing contexts.  
Relatedly, most existent literature concentrates on the traditional agency problem 
between shareholders and managers (Al-Najjar, 2017; Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999). In 
contrast, this thesis extends the understanding of agency problems that exist among other 
parties (controlling and minority shareholders) and provides insights into principal-
principal conflict which exists in emerging countries (Young et al., 2008). Even though 
principal-principal conflict is prevalent in the globe, its significance and character differ 
from one context to another. For example, while market-oriented economies may suffer 
from a conflict between institutional investors and minority shareholders with the 
existence of effective regulatory supervision, the case is different in emerging economies 
since most dominant shareholders are usually families (i.e. the conflict is among individual 
investors) and the role of external governance is absent. Therefore, understanding the 
conflict among individual shareholders enables the investigation of new related areas, such 
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as the influence and role of a blockholder chairperson on pay-setting for top management. 
Although some studies use chairperson ownership as a proxy by which to measure and 
observe attitudes of board chairpersons on pay arrangements of executives (Alagla, 2012), 
this thesis employs a more direct and accurate variable namely blockholder chairman. This 
ensures that the chairperson has high stakes in terms of equity and voting power. 
Otherwise his/her influence among other controlling parties is considered insignificant, 
especially as most Saudi firms are dominated by large shareholders (Al-Ghamdi and 
Rhodes, 2015). 
Additionally, as the development of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still in 
its embryonic stage since it was only established in late 2006, this allows the investigation 
of the effectiveness of the recommendations of international best practice of corporate 
governance from the first stage of enforcement, when only few firms have complied, to full 
compliance at present. Four related key recommendations are examined in this thesis: to 
have a large proportion of independent members on the board of directors (Jensen et al., 
2004; Core et al., 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990); to limit multi-directorships (Armstrong 
et al., 2012; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Sapp, 2008); to establish a remuneration committee 
that is responsible for executive compensation matters (Méndez et al., 2011; Girma et al., 
2007); and to separate the roles of board chairperson and CEO (Conyon and He, 2011; Firth 
et al., 2007; Core et al., 1999). This provides comparative results with practices in mature 
economies and indicates the implications of following governance mechanisms on 
managerial incentives. 
With respect to the literature concerning political connections, this thesis offers a 
second empirical study which investigates the effect of firms being politically connected 
on the setting of executive compensation. The study adds several significant contributions 
to the literature of political connections and extends the understanding of how executive 
compensation is determined in the emerging economy of the KSA. First, as mentioned 
earlier, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no research that analyses the 
phenomenon of political connections and their implications on managerial incentives, 
either in the Arab economies or in the MENA region in general. Thus, this research is 
expected to fill a significant gap in the related literature and provide understanding on the 
attitudes of politically connected firms towards an important governance mechanism, 
executive compensation. 
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Furthermore, the literature concerning political connections is focused on the vital 
resources that political connections can bring to a firm (Civilize et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 
2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, there is a dearth of studies that investigate the 
implications of political connections from a governance perspective, in particular the ability 
of political connections to control non-merited executive compensation. Although Chizema 
et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. (2017) investigate the relationship between political 
connections and managerial pay in emerging economies, neither piece of research captures 
the influence of political connections on controlling shareholders. However, my research 
analyses the behaviours of political connections towards the arrangements concerning 
executive remuneration through the lenses of both principal-agent conflict and principal-
principal conflict. The Saudi context, which is an arena for both types of conflict, helps to 
achieve this aim and to observe the interaction between political connections and large 
shareholders and the effect of this relationship on executive pay levels. 
Relatedly, the study uses a sample from Saudi Arabia, which has unique 
characteristics—an absolute monarchy system, the existence of the Shura Council, and a 
high domination of family and state investment. This enables the research to develop a 
contextualised definition of political connections. Despite the fact that the literature 
contains numerous definitions for political connectedness, none is suitable for monarchical 
contexts such as Saudi Arabia. Hence, the definition developed by this study fills a 
significant gap with regards to the identification of political connectedness in this type of 
political system. Thus, the definition enjoys high generalizability to any country that have 
similar institutional features to Saudi Arabia, such as countries of the GCC. 
Moreover, the thesis contributes to the existing body of literature concerning family 
business in the areas of corporate governance and political connections. The third 
empirical model analyses the practices of executive compensation in both family and non-
family firms. The context of Saudi Arabia and the dataset enables the researcher to classify 
firms into two distinct categories: family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms. 
This classification allows the investigation of the difference in behaviour between the types 
of firms towards executive compensation arrangements. Specifically, it shows how 
corporate governance practices and the need for political connections vary between the 
two types and the implications of these variations for the practice of executive 
compensation. In addition, corporate governance literature tends to focus on managerial 
opportunism and its consequences on agency costs (Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999; Jensen 
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and Murphy, 1990). However, this research sheds light on how controlling shareholders 
and politically connected members also influence agency costs.  
1.5 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
To answer the research questions properly, it is essential that the research uses a 
justified structure and follows certain steps and procedures that are formed in the research 
philosophy. Saunders et al. (2012) refer to these procedures as layers of a research onion. 
Figure 1.1 shows the layers which comprise (from the outer to the inner layer) philosophy, 
approach, methodological choice, strategies, time horizons, and data collection techniques. 
Each layer contains a number of approaches from which the researcher should choose the 
most appropriate one for his/her research objectives. This section discusses the research 
philosophy that is related to the development and nature of knowledge in terms of the 
layers of philosophy and approach, while the other research layers are explained in later 
sections.  
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2012) 
Figure 1.1: Research philosophy in the ‘research onion’ 
14 | P a g e  
 
The choice of the most relevant research philosophy depends primarily on the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological underpinnings of the research (Bryman, 
2016). Ontology is simply defined as the “claims and assumptions that are made about the 
nature of social reality, what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these 
units interact with each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what 
we believe constitutes social reality” (Blaikie, 2009, p. 8). In other words, ontology is related 
to the central question of whether social phenomenon is observed and analysed objectively 
or subjectively. Objectivism “is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena 
and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” (Bryman, 2016, 
p. 22). In contrast, subjectivism (or constructionism) is defined as “social phenomena and 
categories are not only produced through social interaction but they are in a constant state 
of revision” (Bryman, 2016, p. 22). In other words, constructionism asserts that social 
phenomena and their perceptions are continually being changed by the interactions with 
social actors. Applying these definitions to the research phenomenon, namely corporate 
governance and executive compensation, the ontological position of the research stands 
between objectivism and subjectivism, since the existence of the phenomenon and its 
related meanings are not totally independent of social actors and are partly affected by 
human influence. Indeed, if another researcher re-investigates the phenomenon using the 
same method and sample, they will get the same results; however, a different sample or 
time-frame may lead to different findings since, as already mentioned, the phenomenon is 
partly affected by human influence. Furthermore, the interpretations of the findings are 
subjective and dependent on the understanding and view of the researcher towards the 
phenomenon. 
The second element of research philosophy is epistemology, which is defined as “the 
possible ways of gaining knowledge of social reality, whatever it is understood to be” 
(Blaikie, 2009, p. 8). Epistemology is the part of philosophy related to the theory of 
knowledge and has two positions, namely positivism and interpretivism (Saunders et al., 
2012; Moser, 2002). Positivism is “working with an observable social reality and that the 
end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced 
by the physical and natural scientists” (Remenyi and Williams, 1998, p. 32). In positivism, 
the purpose of theories is to generate testable hypotheses which can confirm or develop 
the theory through the findings which accept or reject the hypothesis (Bryman, 2016). In 
this context, the findings are expected to develop the theories (Saunders et al., 2012). On 
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the other hand, interpretivism “is a term given to an epistemology that contrasts with 
positivism” (Bryman, 2016, p. 26). Under this epistemological position, reality is subjective 
and influenced by researchers’ perceptions since they are part of the phenomenon (Moser, 
2002). Consequently, this research adopts an objective and subjective ontological position 
and perceives the phenomenon of corporate governance and executive compensation 
through the lens of the existing theories, namely agency theory and institutional theory. As 
the research hypotheses are developed to confirm or reject the theoretical assumptions, the 
research follows positivist epistemology. However, the interpretations of the findings are 
subject to the researcher’s perceptions towards the phenomenon; therefore, the research 
also employs interpretivist epistemology in this part. 
The third element of research philosophy is methodology which is comprised of two 
nouns method and ology; thus, it is a branch of knowledge that concerns the process of 
research (Berg and Lune, 2011). Saunders et al. (2012) suggest that there are two dominant 
approaches in the social research discipline, namely deductive and inductive approaches. 
In the deductive approach, researchers develop and employ a theory to build a testable 
hypothesis first, then collect data and obtain findings to confirm or revise an existing 
theory, while in the inductive approach, researchers first observe phenomena and collect 
data and then develop or generate a theory as a result of data analysis (Saunders et al., 
2012). In short, the deductive approach attempts to confirm or reject perceptions of an 
existing theory, whereas the inductive approach attempts to build or create a novel theory 
(see Figure 1.2).  
 
 
In the social sciences, it seems very unlikely that research would be purely 









Source: Adapted from Bryman (2016). 
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inductive or purely deductive. Consequently, this research employs both deductive and 
inductive approaches as a methodological position. The deductive position is chosen since 
the research questions are related to the development of existing theories and require the 
formulation of hypotheses from existing theories in order to test the existing assumption. 
The existing literature provides a solid background to formulate a set of hypotheses and 
examine extant theoretical assumptions, while the inductive approach is used to analyse 
and interpret the results in order to gather them, to develop and extend the existing 
theories that explain the phenomenon. In this context, the research employs the 
quantitative approach, since it is the most relevant technique to its nature and questions. 
In conclusion, this research adopts objectivist and subjectivist ontological positions 
and positivist and interpretivist epistemological positions that are appropriate for the 
nature of the research. That is to say, the research aims to establish if there is a 
relationship between the practice of corporate governance and the level of executive 
compensation. Moreover, it seeks to evaluate how and why this relationship exists, based 
on contextual appreciation, existing theories and prior findings, to establish good 
understanding of the phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. In relation to the methodological 
paradigm of the research, a hypothetico-deductive model and inductive approach are 
selected as the former allows the testing of pre-formulated hypotheses to confirm or 
revise existing theories and the latter helps to develop and extend existing theories. To do 
so, the quantitative technique of collecting data is employed as it is the most relevant and 
reliable approach for testing the research hypotheses. The main source of data is collected 
through secondary data (i.e. information published in the annual reports of companies), 
capturing eight-time horizons (longitudinal/panel data). The research philosophy is 








Objectivism & Subjectivism 
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Figure 1.3: Research Philosophy 
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1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section presents the structure of the thesis and provides an overview of the 
contents. The general structure of the thesis is based on the style of empirical essays and 
thus is comprised of three empirical studies. 
Chapter Two provides an overview of different aspects of the KSA that are 
relevant for the thesis. This includes the economic background, the legal framework and 
the influence of sharia, the development of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia along 
with an international comparison, and a brief introduction to the ownership structure in 
Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Three is the first empirical topic which analyses corporate governance 
and executive compensation. The chapter identifies the relationship between corporate 
governance and executive compensation in the KSA. It also reviews previous studies and 
builds the theoretical groundwork for the analysis. In addition, it develops the research 
hypotheses, illustrates the method, and explains how the study sample is selected. Finally, 
it discusses the results and develops the conclusions of the first empirical study.  
Chapter Four is the second empirical study which analyses political connections 
and executive compensation. In this chapter, the interaction between political 
connections and business elites in the KSA is highlighted. Moreover, the chapter develops 
a contextual-based definition of political connections that takes into consideration the 
government type and the different political elites that exist in Saudi Arabia. A survey of 
political connections’ literature is presented including a discussion concerning the 
literature gaps. As the theoretical framework of political connections is significantly 
different from the previous chapter, a separate section for theories related to political 
connections is developed. The section on research method identifies the research design, 
the related hypotheses and the data collection method. Last, the chapter discusses the 
research outcomes and sums up the conclusions of the second empirical study.  
Chapter Five is the third empirical study which investigates the practices of 
executive compensation in family and non-family firms. Specifically, the chapter 
discusses the differences concerning corporate governance practices and the use of 
political connections in family and non-family firms and their implications for pay-
setting. It assesses previous studies relating to family businesses and their attitudes with 
respect to corporate governance and political connections. The chapter also sets the 
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research hypotheses and illustrates the method. This is followed by a presentation and 
interpretation of the empirical results; these show the differences in attitudes between 
family and non-family firms with respect to executive pay arrangements. Finally, the 
research conclusions are drawn. 
Chapter Six provides a summary of the research questions and methods as well as 
a brief report of the findings of each of the empirical studies. Moreover, it discusses the 
conclusions of the thesis and how they contribute to the existing body of knowledge 
concerning corporate governance, political connections, family business, and executive 
remuneration. This is followed by a summary of the implications for the practice of 
governance across the three empirical studies. Finally, the chapter acknowledges the 
study’s potential limitations and provides recommendations for future research. 
  














  OVERVIEW OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
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2.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Saudi Arabia, officially known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is an absolute 
monarchical Arab state, the laws of which are based primarily on Islamic law (sharia) 
(MFA, 2013). Geographically, Saudi Arabia is the fifth-largest state in Asia and second-
largest state in the Arab world after Algeria. The political economy of Saudi Arabia 
changed on 3 March 1938 when oil was discovered in the Eastern Province (OPEC, 2016). 
This and later findings of oil make Saudi Arabia one of the largest oil producers and 
exporters, controlling the world's second largest oil reserves, and the sixth largest gas 
reserves. It has the largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
and is the only Arab country to be part of the G-20 major economies (World Economic 
Forum, 2016). This global standing makes Saudi Arabia an important place for doing 
business. In order to keep pace with the economic boom since the discovery of oil, many 
legal and economic reforms have been made.  
However, in recent years the Saudi government has realised that it has become 
trapped in the ‘resource curse’. The phrase ‘resource curse’ is commonly used to refer to 
resource-rich countries that have not properly benefited from their natural wealth 
(Humphreys et al., 2007). Even though having reserves of oil is a blessing and helps to 
bring cash inflows with less effort, it can crowd out unrelated industries like 
manufacturing and agriculture and this comes at the expense of the economy in general 
(Humphreys et al., 2007). Despite the fact that the Saudi economy has benefited from the 
oil revenues and has had significant growth during the last three decades, it is still mostly 
dependent on oil production which is unsustainable and has high risk of price volatility. 
Accordingly, the Saudi government has adopted several initiatives to diversify its 
revenues and reduce the risk and uncertainty of oil prices, but none has succeeded as 
intended and the economy is still highly reliant on oil exports (EIA, 2013). However, in 
2016 the government announced a comprehensive strategic plan, the so-called ‘Saudi 
Vision 2030’, in order to minimise the reliance on oil (Bloomberg, 2016b). Indeed, this 
optimistic vision, if successfully implemented, is expected to reshape business policy in 
Saudi Arabia and the national economy in general. 
Structurally, Saudi Arabia has unique institutional settings that significantly differ 
from other economies, which means that the experience gained in the West or in the East 
is not necessarily applicable in the Saudi context (Young et al., 2008). For example, in 
terms of formal institutions, unlike the developed economies, the enforcement of 
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legislation is weak, albeit improving (World Economic Forum, 2016). Furthermore, Saudi 
law is heavily influenced by sharia, in which certain transactions are not permitted e.g. 
usury, stock options, betting and any financial transaction that is based on uncertainty or 
injustice (CIFA, 2000; Chapra, 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Indeed, these domestic norms 
influence business policy including governance recommendations. For instance, while 
the shareholder model of corporate governance suggests a link between managerial 
compensation and long-term performance through granting stock options (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003; Murphy, 1999), this is not permitted in Saudi Arabia for regulatory reasons. 
Additionally, the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is concentrated in the hands of 
certain families and state agencies (Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015; Fallatah, 2015), while 
ownership is more diffuse in the US and the UK (Rashid, 2013). This indicates that there 
is less separation between ownership and control in Saudi Arabia, particularly in family-
controlled firms.  
With respect to informal institutions, the demographic characteristic of Saudi 
Arabia increases the role of the tribe and the influence of wasta on business policy and 
practices and the employment environment in general (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). From 
the perspective of employers, wasta might be considered as a stewardship role by 
managers towards their extended family, tribe and friends, and a moral obligation to 
maintain or gain legitimacy in their community (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). However, 
this can lead to the hiring of unqualified managers and allow them to control decision-
making for themselves (Young et al., 2008). As a result, the organisation may be exposed 
to poor performance and squander minority shareholders’ wealth. The following sub-
sections discuss the key characteristics of the Saudi context in detail. 
2.2 THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
Understanding the legal system of a country gives an overview of how regulations 
are set and their impact on practices. The Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia states 
in Articles 1, 6, 7 and 8 that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country and its constitution is 
derived from the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna of Prophet Mohammed (the teachings and 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) and is ruled by King Abdulaziz’s sons and grandsons 
in accordance with Islamic law (Shura, 1992). Consequently, there is no written 
constitution and any new legalisation must be consistent with sharia before it is applied.  
In accordance with the Qur’an [verse 3:159] “and consult them in the matter”, the 
Saudi legal process and decision-making are subject to consultation with an importance 
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placed on reaching consensus (Alturki, 2006). The Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura) 
consists of 150 members who are nominated and appointed by the King (Shura, 1992). 
The Majlis Al-Shura is responsible for studying the policies and laws raised by the Council 
of Ministers and providing recommendations for such policies and laws. Its 
responsibilities also cover other obligations as follows (Shura, 1992): 
“a) Discuss the general plan for economic and social development and give view. 
 b) Revising laws and regulations, international treaties and agreements, 
concessions, and provide whatever suggestions it deems appropriate. 
 c) Analyzing laws. 
 d) Discuss government agencies’ annual reports and attaching new proposals 
when it deems appropriate”. 
 
The Council of Ministers consists of a Prime Minister (the King), first and second 
Deputy Prime Ministers (first and second Crown Princes), 21 Minsters with ministerial 
portfolios, seven Ministers of State, and other consultants of the king (Shura, 1992). All 
members of the Council of Ministers are appointed by the monarch. Moreover, the Council 
of Ministers performs as an executive and legislative simultaneously. In other words, all 
laws must be approved by the Council of Ministers before they became active. The Council 
of Ministers usually refers proposed laws (by governmental institutions) to the Majlis Al-
Shura to review and comment upon; however, the final decision of the implementation is 
subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers (Alturki, 2006). The Council’s 
responsibilities include (Shura, 1992): 
“a) Monitoring the implementation of regulations, By-laws and resolutions.  
 b) Creating and arranging public institutions.  
 c) Following up on the implementation of the general plan for development.  
 d) Forming committees for the oversight of the ministries and other”. 
2.2.1 Sharia 
Sharia is an Arabic word which can be literally defined as ‘water resource’ 
(Almaany, 2014). However, the Islamic meaning of Sharia refers to the approach of life 
which contains instructions, guidelines, principles, orders and prohibitions that God 
prescribed to his servants through the Holy Qur’an and Sunna of his Prophet Mohammed 
peace be upon him (PBUH) (Alkahtani, 2013). Sharia has a major impact on Muslims in 
all aspects of life. This effect covers daily financial transactions which are explained in 
detail by the sharia. Consequently, understanding sharia in depth is necessary to 
comprehend Saudi laws and culture.  
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2.2.1.1 The Sources of Sharia 
Sharia is based on two primary sources; the Holy Qur’an and Sunna of Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH) which are universally accepted by all Muslims. However, there are 
other secondary sources, which are derived from the Qur’an and the Sunna, namely ijma 
(consensus of opinions) and the qiyas (analogical deduction) (Al-Zuhaili, 1989). These 
sources are subject to religious scholars’ ijtihad. Ijtihad refers to the opinion that the 
Islamic scholar reaches according to his own knowledge and understanding of the Qur’an 
and Sunna in matters that are not explicitly mentioned or clearly explained in the primary 
sources such as modern financial transactions (Alsanosi, 2010). The following sections 
give a brief introduction on each source. 
a) The Holy Qur’an (God’s words) 
The Holy Qur’an is the main and the most important source of Islamic 
jurisprudence as it contains the words of God sent down to his Messenger Mohammed 
(PBUH) during the 23 years until his death.  The Qur’an has 114 chapters and 6,236 
verses and all Muslims believe that it is complete and perfect ( 16:89). Moreover, they 
believe that the Qur’an is valid for anytime and anyplace as God said: “And We have sent 
down to you the Book (the Qur’an) as an exposition of everything, a guidance, a mercy, 
and glad tidings for those who have submitted themselves (to God as Muslims)” ( 16:89). 
The Qur’an’s subjects address all aspects of life including, in order, “unity with God, 
modes of worship, judicial proceedings, political and governmental issues, crimes, 
punishments, marriage, divorce and financial transactions” (Alkahtani, 2013). 
b) The Sunna (Prophet Mohammad’s Traditions and Customs) 
The Sunna, which is an Arabic word that literally means a route (method), is the 
second source of sharia (Almaany, 2014). However, the technical Islamic meaning 
denotes to all that has been ascribed about Prophet Mohammed (PBUH), which includes 
his utterance, deeds, or reports (Alkahtani, 2013). The Sunna significantly adds to the 
Qur’an by explaining its instructions in full and that Muslims are ordered by God to follow 
the Prophet Mohammed’s guidelines (PBUH) (Al-Zuhaili, 1989). The command to follow 
the Prophet is mentioned in multiple places in the Qur’an; in one of these verses for 
instance, God said “And whatsoever the Messenger (Muhammad) gives you, take it; and 
whatsoever he forbids you, abstain (from it)” (  59:7). 
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c) Ijma 
Ijma (consensus) is the first and most significant secondary source of sharia (Al-
Zuhaili, 1989). Ijma refers to the general agreement among respected Islamic scholars 
regarding a matter that is not explicitly mentioned or clearly explained in the primary 
sources (Alsanosi, 2010). If all respected Islamic scholars agree about a certain issue, 
Muslims are required to follow this ijtihad because Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said, “my 
community shall never agree on an error” (Nisaboori, p. 975). In other words, God will 
not make Muslim scholars reach a consensus of opinion if their judgement is wrong. 
Therefore, if all well-respected Islamic clerics reach agreement on a particular ruling, 
Muslims should accept and follow this judgment. However, throughout Islamic history, 
only a few issues have been resolved by consensus (Alsanosi, 2010). In modern times, it 
is difficult to reach agreement among Islamic scholars due to their large numbers around 
the world. Alternatively, local ijma (within a particular country) can work and this helps 
an Islamic country to set local rules (Aksoy, 2005), as in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
However, local ijma (according to the definition) is not binding for Muslims and is not 
considered as a consensus of community opinion as mentioned in the Prophet 
Mohammed’s speech. 
d) Qiyas 
The last important source of Islamic jurisprudence is the qiyas (analogy), which 
refers to the process of making a jurisprudential ruling on a new situation (an emerging 
issue) based on analogy with a known ruling that has similar characteristics and purpose 
(Alsanosi, 2010). In the case of a lack of textual evidence from the primary sources of 
sharia or ijma in relation to a certain matter, scholars resort to the qiyas. The qiyas is 
subject to the cleric’s knowledge and understanding of the main sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Thus, rulings differ from one scholar to another, and therefore from one 
country to another. Accordingly, the qiyas is not binding for Muslims and its acceptance 
depends on self-conviction regarding the inference provided by the scholar. A good 
example of the qiyas is the prohibition of wine. As the reason behind forbidding wine is 
to prevent the intoxication of an individual, scholars generalize the ruling to all other 
intoxicating substances whatever their type or name. 
In summary, Islamic jurisprudence is based on two primary sources in order; 
namely the Holy Qur’an and Sunna of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). However, if there is 
no textual evidence of a ruling in the primary sources regarding a specific issue, Islamic 
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scholars utilise two other secondary sources in order; namely ijma and the qiyas. Both of 
the ancillary sources are derived and deduced from the Qur’an and Sunna. 
2.2.1.2 Maqasid Alsharia  
Maqasid alsharia refers to the objectives and rationale of sharia. Islamic scholars 
define Maqasid alsharia in different ways; however, all of them deliver the same meaning. 
Imam Al-Ghazali (1992, cited in (Dusuki and Bouheraoua, 2011, p. 3), defines sharia’s 
objectives as “to promote the well-being of all mankind, which lies in safeguarding their 
faith (dīn), their human self (nafs), their intellect (‘aql), their posterity (nasl) and their 
wealth (māl). Whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is 
desirable”. Therefore, the main and comprehensive purpose of sharia rulings is to guard 
and maintain public interests (maslaha) in all aspects of life.  
Maqasid alsharia has been classified into five primary objectives (known also as 
five necessaries) namely “wealth (mal), unity with God (tawheed), the human self (nafs), 
the intellect (aql) and posterity (nasl)” (Alkahtani, 2013).  
• Public Interest (maslaha) 
Maslaha literally means benefit or interest, while there is a more narrow term 
almasaleh almursalah which means unrestricted interests (Elvan Syaputra et al., 2014). 
Basically, almasaleh almursala considers public interest rather than merely individual 
interest and is used when there is no specific and clear text in the main sources of sharia: the 
Qur’an and the Sunna which deal with such matters (Alsanosi, 2010). In other words, it seeks 
to obtain a benefit or prevent harm to the public interest within the frame of sharia 
objectives. Almasaleh almursala is considered as a source of legislation in Islam (Alsanosi, 
2010). Thus, it is widely used in modern financial and trading transactions and it is the 
basis of most current regulations in Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia (Alsanosi, 
2010). Corporate governance is just such a kind of regulation that should protect public 
interest. In this context, the governance regulations are supposed to consider all the 
stakeholders’ interests, such as those of the shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, 
government and the whole community.  
a) Wealth (mal) 
As the Islamic objective: wealth (mal) is most directly related to the research 
questions, the study analyses this single objective in detail. The objective of wealth seeks 
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to preserve individual and public wealth. Thus, sharia frames the financial transactions 
that help to attain this target. Wealth from the sharia’s perspective is broad and contains 
all things that can be owned, attained, and used for usual benefits (Al-Zuhaili, 1989, p. 
40). In Islam, ownership of everything in the universe, including all types of properties, 
is with God; however, God gives humans the right to use some of these properties and 
makes them successors on earth (Hasan, 2009). This statement is mentioned in the 
Qur’an in various verses, for example:   
“To Him belongs all that is in the heavens and all that is on the earth, and all 
that is between them, and all that is under the soil”, and in another verse, “And 
it is He Who has made you generations coming after generations, replacing each 
other on the earth. And He has raised you in ranks, some above others that He 
may try you in that which He has bestowed on you. Surely your Lord is Swift in 
retribution, and certainly He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” ( 20:6, 24:33, 
6:165). 
There are different levels of property rights in the sharia. Some properties are 
owned only by God such as the universe. Other property rights are the oceans and 
common land, which are owned by all humans. The final type of property rights is 
possession by individuals (Hasan, 2009). Sharia sets out the duties and responsibilities 
imposed upon humans who own a particular property (Alsanosi, 2010). Islam gives 
individuals the right of acquisition, utilisation, and disposal of a property, based on two 
substantial conditions: the first is that the property must be obtained through 
‘permissible means’, and the second is that the property must not be utilised in a way that 
harms other parties (Alsanosi, 2010). ‘Illegitimate means’ of obtaining wealth includes 
gambling (maysir), bribery, stealing, cheating, forgery, coercion, by lying or any bad 
conduct that would cause harm to others (Alsanosi, 2010). An example of bad conduct is 
a monopolisation of people’s basic needs such as food, since this conduct causes harm for 
others especially the poor (Badawi, 2014). Therefore, humans are accountable for the 
way in which he/she conducts their wealth; that is, from where he/she earned it and 
where he/she spent it. This accountability was explicitly reported by Prophet Mohammed 
(PBUH) when he said “The feet of the servant will not move before his being asked about 
four (things): His life, how did he spend it? His deeds, what did he do with it? His money, 
how did he earn it and where did he spend it? His body, how was it worn out?” (as 
reported by Al-Tirmidhi, [2417]). 
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In order to preserve individual wealth and to attain justice and equality among the 
involved parties, sharia encourages the use of contracts. Furthermore, it identifies 
prohibitions that must be avoided when dealing with wealth and the rights of others to 
that particular wealth. Islam prohibits certain financial transactions that include usury or 
interest (riba), gambling (qimar) and uncertainty (gharar) due to the potential harm that 
may affect one party only. For example, the interest (riba) that conventional banks apply 
on some loans due to default is not accepted in Islam since it benefits the bank and harms 
the other party, ‘borrowers’ (Alkahtani, 2013). Moreover, Islam imposes a right of others 
(certain parties) on certain wealth, which is the paying of alms (zakat), as long as the 
underlying asset meets certain conditions. Since these instructions are important to 
determine the validity of financial transactions and their compliance with sharia, the 
following sections shed light on each principle separately. 
▪ Undertaking of Contracts 
Sharia takes into consideration the importance of contracts in protecting the rights 
of involved parties. Therefore, Muslims are asked to fulfil their contractual obligations in 
many places in the Qur’an and the Sunna. For example, God said: “You who believe! Fulfil 
(your) obligations” (The Noble Qur'an [5:1]), “And fulfil the Covenant of Allâh (Bai‘ah: 
pledge for Islâm) when you have covenanted” (The Noble Qur'an [16:93]) and “Verily! 
Allâh commands that you should render back the trust to those to whom they are due”  
(The Noble Qur'an [4:58]).  
Even Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) exhorted Muslims to fulfil their commitments and 
warned those who break agreements, when he said  
“There are four characteristics, whoever possesses them all is a pure hypocrite, 
and whoever possesses one of them has one of the characteristics of hypocrisy, 
until he abandons it: when he is entrusted, he betrays; when he speaks, he lies; 
when he makes a covenant, he proves treacherous; and when he disputes, he 
resorts to obscene behaviour” (As reported by Al-Bukhari [2459]).     
In addition, he said, “Give the worker his wages before his sweat dries” (as reported 
by Al-Qazwini [1995]), which means to give others their rights on time without 
procrastination.   
▪ Prohibition of Usury or Interest (riba) 
One of God’s names in Islam is ‘The Utterly Just’; hence, sharia aims to impose 
equality and justice among people regardless of their power or affluence, especially the 
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poor who lack the power and influence to protect their own rights. Before the mission of 
the Prophet Mohammed, the elite of Mecca were lending money to people and stipulating 
to have interest if they did not repay the dues on the maturity (Alkahtani, 2013). The 
interest may increase as long as the capital is not repaid. Sharia argues that riba is 
iniquitous and harmful for society since it unjustly takes money from the poor and gives 
it to the rich (Al-Zuhaili, 1989). Ultimately, this concentrates wealth in the hands of the 
rich. In other words, the poor get poorer which the rich get richer. With time, this would 
impact on the range between social classes and thereby societal hierarchy (Alkahtani, 
2013).   
The interest on loans is prohibited because it is not consistent with the social 
justice that Islam seeks to achieve. Instead, several alternative methods of financing 
(sharia-compliant), which are based on profit and loss sharing (PLS), have been 
suggested to provide fair financing for beneficiaries, such as mudarabah (“trustee finance 
contract or passive partnership”) and musharakah (equity participation contract) 
(Febianto, 2012). Other sources of Islamic financing that are also based on PLS include 
sukuk (Islamic bonds) and direct equity investment, such as the purchase of common 
shares of stock. In such transactions, the capital provider acts as a capital partner: along 
with the principal of the financing, the provider gains a pre-agreed percentage of the 
profits or bears the same percentage of losses if there are any (Febianto, 2012). 
Accordingly, as there is risk sharing in Islamic financing, such transactions and the 
relationship between the provider and the beneficiary are controlled within an 
appropriate effective governance system that ensures all parties’ interests are protected 
(Dar and Presley, 2000). This raises the necessity of a sharia board in financial 
institutions that comprises Islamic scholars who review products of financing and ensure 
that they do not contradict the Islamic ethical standards (Suleiman, 2000). 
▪ Prohibition of Gambling (qimar) 
As discussed earlier, sharia seeks to build a society upon fairness and justice; 
hence, legalising a comprehensive fair financial system is necessary to preserve and 
protect the rights of all parties engaged in any financial transaction. One trading 
transaction that sharia forbids is qimar (gambling). Qimar (known also as maisir) refers 
to the easy transference of money among parties when playing games of chance 
(gambling), such as raffles and lotteries (Alkahtani, 2013). The purpose behind the 
prohibition of qimar can be attributed to the loss or damage that would occur to one party 
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because of the high level of uncertainty (gharar). Moreover, it could induce enmity 
between the engaged parties.  
▪ Prohibition of Uncertainty (gharar) 
Unlike conventional economic laws which do not proscribe the potential harm that 
can result from uncertainty, Islamic law takes into consideration the negative 
consequences that could occur for one party as a result of trading under uncertainty. 
Therefore, it forbids trading under the uncertainty principle. Gharar can be defined as the 
case where there is uncertainty regarding a matter, and where it is possible that there are 
two outcomes, of which one is very risky and significantly harmful (Aldemiati, 2013). The 
reason for prevention is attributed to the significant loss or damage that would affect one 
party on one hand, and the unfair increase in the wealth of the other party on the other 
hand (Alkahtani, 2013). An example of gharar in modern financial transactions is stock 
options, because the transaction is based on uncertainty and the seller can agree to sell a 
stock that in some cases, he does not have at the time of the contract (Alshubaili, 2014; 
CIFA, 2000). 
▪ Paying of Alms (zakat) 
Sharia not only clarifies the prohibited aspects of trading wealth, but also 
proscribes the duties imposed on wealth for the benefit of society, such as zakat (alms). 
Zakat literally means the increase or the growth; however, it can be defined technically 
as the estimated amount that Islam imposes to help the deserving (Al-Qaradawi 1994). 
In the Islamic view, zakat is a mean by which wealth is redistributed, thereby, building an 
economy that is based on special care to the poor and the dispossessed.  
Zakat is very important in Islam and is considered to be one of the five pillars of 
Islam. It is a compulsory for all Muslims to give zakat as long as certain conditions are 
met and it is allocated to certain categories of people who deserve it. Zakat is set at 2.5% 
of the total zakat base (GAZT, 2014). Many Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, and Pakistan, have created institutions to collect zakat from Muslims. In Saudi 
Arabia, the General Authority of Zakat & Tax is responsible for collecting zakat from 
Muslim investors of the GCC countries, as well as taxes from non-Muslims, which is 
estimated as 20% of the net income (GAZT, 2014). Sharia through the imposition of zakat 
aims to protect Islamic society from political and economic instability that would occur 
as a result of serious deprivation (Alkahtani, 2013). Thus, the primary goal of zakat is to 
reduce the gap between the rich and poor; which can help eliminate hatred and envy 
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among the poor towards the bourgeois class. Moreover, it can reduce crime as the poor 
have less need to commit crimes such as robbery or forgery. 
The brief background about the legal system and the property rights in sharia 
enhances the understanding of business policy in Saudi Arabia and shows how financial 
transactions and corporate governance regulations are subject to such norms. Although 
there is a high degree of harmony between Saudi Arabia and the Anglo-American contexts 
in terms of the norms of commerce, there are still major differences in certain economic 
transactions, especially ones that are based on usury or uncertainty. One example is the 
use of stock options, which is not legal in Saudi Arabia because of regulatory and religious 
reasons (CIFA, 2000). In this context, there is a challenge in adopting the international 
best practice recommendations that encourage linking executive compensation with 
long-term firm performance through offering stock options. 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Saudi Arabia, like other emerging countries, has suffered for a long time from weak 
financial disclosure and almost total ignorance of corporate governance mechanisms. The 
demand for introducing corporate governance regulations in emerging economies has 
been inflamed by stakeholders, in particular, after the financial scandals that occurred in 
the US by Enron (2001) and Worldcom (2002). Saudi authorities were hesitant, because 
they argued that enacting such regulations could negatively affect the share prices at a 
time when the stock market was becoming more liquid. However, the failure to enact 
corporate governance regulations by the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), was one 
of the main reasons that made the level of transparency in Saudi Arabia extremely low. 
In turn, this contributed to the stock market collapse in 2006, usually referred to as ‘the 
stock collapse 2006’.  
In order to absorb the public outrage that resulted from the collapse, the CMA 
introduced the first version of the Saudi corporate governance regulations (SCGRs) in late 
2006. The first version was introduced as a guideline with the option to comply. However, 
firms were required to include a table of compliance in their annual reports that shows 
which of the code articles had been implemented and if not implemented, the forms had 
to provide the reasons and justifications why they were not implemented. However, firms 
have been gradually enforced to comply with the code articles and by 2010 most of the 
articles were mandatory (CMA, 2010).  
32 | P a g e  
 
The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (2010) consists of five main parts. The first 
part contains preliminary provisions and clear definitions of certain terminologies such 
as the meaning and conditions of being an independent director. The second part gives 
details of shareholders’ rights and issues related to general assemblies. The third section 
contains the policies and procedures related to transparency and disclosure 
requirements. The fourth part presents and explains the duties, responsibilities, and 
formation of the board of directors and its sub-committees. Finally, the fifth part includes 
information related to the implementation. 
2.3.1 Board of Directors 
The Saudi code emphasises the importance of the board of directors as a primary 
mechanism of internal governance; thus, it identifies the issues related to the board of 
directors in a separate section. Before explaining the duties and responsibilities of the 
board of directors, it is worth outlining the transparency requirements related to the 
board of directors which all Saudi listed firms are obliged to disclose. The code requires 
the board of directors’ report to comprise information about the board members 
including their names, their classifications (executive, non-executive, independent 
member), names of other firms that a director serves in concurrently, and their 
compensation. Moreover, a firm must release a table that shows the Articles which the 
firm complied with; otherwise, they should state the reasons for not applying those 
Articles thus far. Furthermore, the report must declare any punishment or penalty or 
preventative restriction imposed by the CMA or any other supervisory, regulatory, or 
judiciary body (CMA, 2010). 
2.3.1.1 Duties of board of directors 
The code identifies the functions of the board of directors as follows (CMA, 2010): 
a) To determine the strategic and main goals of the company and to oversee the 
implementation of them, including: 
• To set the comprehensive strategy of the company, the main plans of 
implementation, and policy of risk management; 
• To determine the optimal capital structure for the company's strategies and 
financial objectives; moreover, to approve annual budgets; 
• To supervise major capital expenditure for the company, and issues related to 
the assets such as possession or disposal; 
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• To set performance goals and means to monitor the implementation; and 
• To review the organisational and functional structures of the company 
periodically. 
b) To set systems and mechanisms of internal control and supervise them, including: 
• To set a written policy that governs conflicts of interest and addresses any 
potential conflicts among the members of the board of directors, executive 
management, and shareholders, including misuse of the company's assets and 
facilities, and misconduct resulting from transactions with persons concerned; 
• To ensure the safety of the financial and accounting systems, including 
regulations related to the preparation of financial reports; 
• To ensure that the current control systems are appropriate to manage the 
company's risks; and 
• To review the effectiveness of internal control procedures in the company 
annually. 
c) To set a private governance system—that is not inconsistent with Saudi corporate 
governance code—and generally supervise it, examine it, and adjust it when needed. 
d) To set clear and specific policies, standards, and procedures for membership in the 
board of directors, and implement them after being approved by the general 
assembly. 
e) To set a written policy governing the relationship with stakeholders in order to 
protect them and save their rights. The policy must cover, especially, the following: 
• Mechanisms of compensating the stakeholders in the case where their rights 
have been violated according to the regulations and contracts; 
• Mechanisms for settling complaints or disputes that may arise between the 
company and stakeholders; 
• Appropriate mechanisms to maintain good relations with clients and 
suppliers, and protect their confidentiality; 
• Rules of professional conduct for managers and employees in the company to 
comply with the proper professional and ethical standards and regulate their 
relationship with the stakeholders; and 
• The company's social contribution. 
f) To set policies and procedures which ensure that the company respects rules and 
regulations and its commitment to disclose important information to shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders. 
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2.3.1.2 Responsibilities of board of directors 
The code also clarifies the responsibilities that rest squarely on the shoulders of the board 
of directors as follows (CMA, 2010): 
• Without violating the competences of the General Assembly, the board of directors is 
responsible for all powers and authorisations necessary to manage the company. The 
ultimate responsibility remains upon the shoulders of the board of directors, even if 
other sub-committees have been established or other bodies have been delegated to, 
and the board of directors should avoid issuing general authorisations or 
authorisations with unlimited validity; 
• The responsibilities of the board of directors must be clearly stated in the Company's 
Articles of Association; 
• The board of directors must perform its duties in a responsible manner, in good faith, 
with serious diligence; and its decisions should be based on sufficient and adequate 
information from the executive management, or from any other reliable source; 
• A member of the board of directors represents all shareholders, and he/she should be 
committed to perform in the general best interest of the company, not in the best 
interests of the group that he/she represents or which voted in his/her favour for the 
appointment to the board of directors; 
• The board of directors is responsible for granting and determining authorisations to 
the executive management, and the procedures of taking any action and the validity 
of such delegations. Moreover, it determines the matters that are reserved for 
decision by the board of directors. The executive management raises periodic reports 
about their practices in relation to those delegated authorisations; 
• The board of directors must make sure of setting procedures to orientate new board 
members to the company's business, particularly financial and legal aspects, and train 
them if necessary; 
• The board of directors must make sure that sufficient and adequate information about 
the company is available to all members of the board of directors in general and to 
Non-Executive Directors in particular, in order to enable them to carry out their duties 
and their tasks effectively; 
• The board of directors shall not sign loan agreements whose maturities exceed three 
years, or sell the company’s real estate or mortgage them, or discharge company's 
debtors from their obligations, unless it has been authorised to do so by the 
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company's Articles of Association. If the company's Articles of Association has no 
provisions in this regard, the board of directors shall not do so without approval from 
the General Assembly, unless those acts are lying in the scope of the company 
business. 
2.3.1.3 Formation of the board of directors 
Formation of the board of directors must be subject to the following (CMA, 2010): 
a) The Association of Articles of the company decides the number of members of the 
board, provided that such number is between three and eleven. 
b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the board of directors for the 
duration stated in the Association of Articles of the company, provided that such 
duration must not exceed three years. Members' re-appointment is allowed unless the 
Association of Articles of the company provides otherwise. 
c) The majority of the board of directors shall be non-executive members. 
d) It is prohibited to combine the positions of chairman of the board and any executive 
position such as the Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer or the General 
Director. 
e) The number of independent directors shall not be less than two members or third of 
the board of directors, whatever is greater. 
f) The Association of Articles of the company must specify the manner in which Board 
membership terminates. The General Assembly can, at any time, dismiss all or some 
members of the board, even if the Association of Articles of the company provides 
otherwise. 
g) On termination of a member of the board of directors by any means of termination, 
the company must promptly notify the Capital Market Authority and stock market 
with a statement of the reasons for the termination. 
h) A member of the board of directors shall not perform as a member of the board in 
more than five joint stock companies simultaneously. 
i) A legal person, who is entitled under the Association of Articles of the company to 
appoint representatives to the board of directors, is not allowed to vote for 
nominating other members of the Board. 
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2.3.1.4 Conflict of interest within the board 
Preventing conflict of interests within the company is at the core of the board of 
director’s mission. Conflict of interests may not only arise between management and 
shareholders, but also may exist between a board member and the company. Therefore, 
the Saudi code focuses on this aspect and determines the procedures and policies that 
would control such conflict of interest as follows (CMA, 2010): 
• A board member shall not, without prior approval from the General Assembly (to be 
renewed each year), gain any personal interest (whether directly or indirectly) in any 
business or contract done for the company, with the exception of business and 
contract being done on a competition basis and that member being the best bidder.  
• Additionally, the member must notify the board of directors of any personal interest 
he/she may have in the business and contracts that are completed for the company’s 
account. If so, the member is not permitted to vote for the related resolution neither 
in the board of directors nor in the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Chairman of 
the board of directors shall notify the General Assembly when any business or 
contract that a member of the board has a personal interest in takes places, and 
attaches with the notification a special report from the external auditor thereon. 
• A board member shall not, without prior approval from the General Assembly (to be 
renewed each year), participate in any business that may compete with the company’s 
activities, or to trade in on one of the company's activities. 
• The company shall neither grant cash loans for any member of the board of directors, 
nor guarantee any loan that is granted for a member from a third party, with exception 
of banks and other fiduciary companies. 
2.3.2 Board Subcommittees 
Due to the time limits on membership of the board of directors and to ensure 
sufficient use of board members’ expertise, the board of directors typically establishes 
subcommittees and delegates them to undertake certain tasks (Conyon, 2014). The 
committee members are appointed and overseen by the board of directors (Baker and 
Anderson, 2010). Furthermore, the committees are required periodically to raise reports 
to the board that show the progress and results of their delegated activities. These reports 
are usually recommendations and advice while the ultimate approval is retained by the 
board of directors. However, there are a number of matters on which committees are 
delegated to make decisions (De Lacy, 2005).  
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In order to enhance the quality and meet the minimum needs of governance 
requirements among listed firms, the Saudi governance code requires all firms to 
establish at least two subcommittees under the board of directors; the audit committee 
and the nomination and remuneration committee. However, some firms have voluntarily 
established extra committees such as the executive committee, the governance 
committee, the risk management committee, and the investments committee. Moreover, 
firms are encouraged by the code to establish any necessary committees that would help 
the board to accomplish its missions effectively. The General Assembly is responsible, 
upon the board of directors’ recommendations, to issue the rules for appointing the 
committee members and to determine their office duration and the procedures to be 
followed by the committees (CMA, 2010).  
In essence, the subcommittees are where the ‘real work’ of the board is fulfilled (De 
Lacy, 2005); therefore, it is essential to understand the role and responsibilities of each 
committee in-depth. 
2.3.2.1 Audit committee 
Although the establishment of audit committee was referred as a recommendation 
in the introduction of the code in 2006, many firms voluntarily complied with the code 
and established an audit committee. However, by 2008 all firms were compelled by law 
to form an audit committee (CMA, 2010); otherwise, they are subject to regulatory 
penalties.   
• Formation of audit committee 
According to the code, all seats on the audit committee must be occupied by non-
executive directors. Moreover, the number of the committee members shall not be less 
than three; one of them, at least, must be a specialist in financial and accounting matters 
(CMA, 2010).  
• Duties and responsibilities of audit committee 
The code outlines the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee as follows (CMA, 
2010):  
a) To oversee the internal audit of the company, in order to verify its effectiveness in the 
implementation of the business and the tasks set by the board of directors. 
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b) To study the internal control system and to raise a written report including the 
committee's recommendations in this respect. 
c) To study the reports of the internal audit and to follow-up the implementation of the 
corrective actions for the notes contained therein. 
d) To raise recommendations to the board of directors to appoint, dismiss, or determine 
fees of external auditors; the independence of the external auditor should be taken 
into consideration when raising such recommendations. 
e) To oversee the activities of the external auditor and to approve any activity of the 
scope of audit work assigned to them during their audit duties. 
f) To review the audit plan and make any comment thereon. 
g) To review the comments of the external auditor on the financial statements and to 
follow up the actions taken thereupon. 
h) To review interim and annual financial statements before they are submitted to the 
board of directors and to provide an opinion and recommendation thereon. 
i) To review the used accounting policies and provide advice and recommendations to 
the board of directors in respect thereof. 
2.3.2.2 Nomination and remuneration committee 
Unlike the US and UK which encourage establishing a separate committee 
responsible for executive remuneration matters, the Saudi code requires firms to form a 
committee that performs the functions of both compensation and nomination matters. 
Moreover, with regards to the formation of the committee, the code neither requires the 
presence of independent directors nor prohibits executive directors from taking part in 
such a committee. On the contrary, the code does not mention any matters related to the 
formation of this committee; it leaves the composition to the board of directors. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that unlike many Western economies, in Saudi 
Arabia there is no requirement for the remuneration committee to consult an external 
independent party with respect to executive perks’ packages. 
• Duties and responsibilities of nomination and remuneration committee 
The code outlines the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee as follows (CMA, 
2010):  
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a) To recommend nominees of Board membership to the board of directors according to 
the approved policies and standards; taking into account not nominating any person 
who has been previously convicted of any offence impacting honour or honesty. 
b) To annually review the needs of appropriate skills for Board membership and to 
prepare description of the capabilities and qualifications required for such 
membership, including the required time to devote in such office. 
c) To review the structure of the board of directors and raise recommendations if 
changes are needed. 
d) To identify weaknesses and strengths of the board of directors, and recommend 
remedies that are compatible with the interest of the company. 
e) To ensure on an annual basis the independence of independent directors and the 
absence of any conflict of interests if a member holds Board memberships in other 
companies. 
f) To draw clear policies for indemnities and remuneration of board of directors and 
senior executives; and taking into account when setting such policies, the standards 
related to performance. 
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FROM A SHARIA PERSPECTIVE 
The principles of corporate governance are not new to Islam as sharia captures the 
main aim of conventional corporate governance, which is the protection of the 
shareholders’ rights and interests. However, Islamic corporate governance (ICG) extends 
this protection to cover other stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, 
creditors, needy people and the whole of society (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Consequently, 
ICG is primarily based on the stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance but is 
subject to Islamic rules (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010; Hasan, 2009). For example, one group 
of stakeholders that is considered in the Islamic world is the poor, who are eligible for 
Zakat (Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012). Although the ICG performs in a similar way to 
conventional corporate governance, it differs in its consideration of the public interest.  
ICG is grounded on the ethical and moral framework of the sharia to ensure justice, 
honesty, fairness and equality of treatment for all parties involved (Mirakhor, 2000; Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009). Bhatti and Bhatti (2010) argue that Muslims are supposed to be 
collectivist and focused on the community rather than individualistic. Accordingly, ICG is 
based on the stewardship model in which the major actors are perceived as stewards who 
represent the stakeholders and are inspired by the spirit of partnership (Bhatti and 
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Bhatti, 2010). This theorisation contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon model which is based on 
agency theory, in which agents are assumed to behave opportunistically with self-interest 
motivations and must therefore be monitored (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Moreover, the fundamental Islamic faith of the Unity of God (tawhid) plays a 
significant role in ICG (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). That is to say, the strong belief in 
accountability and answerability not only to stakeholders but also to God, the ultimate 
authority in life and on the day of judgement, has a significant influence on every 
individual Muslim (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). This extends the scope of governance far 
beyond the conventional corporate governance regimes. Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) conducts 
a comparative study between the principles of ICG and OECD and concludes that although 
the two versions are similar, the Islamic model has a wider scope of stakeholders and 
stronger self-accountability. With regard to the governance structure, unlike the Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance system which is based on a one-tier board containing both 
executive and non-executive directors, the ICG has a two-tier system: the board of 
directors and a sharia supervisory board (Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012; Bhatti and 
Bhatti, 2010; Hasan, 2009) see Figure 2.1. 
In the Islamic environment, the process of decision-making is subject to 
consultation (shura) with the important aim of reaching consensus provided that no 
harm is done to any stakeholders (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Furthermore, sharia demands 
high transparency of all necessary information on transactions and operations conducted 
inside the organisation (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). This requirement emanates from the fact 
that Muslims are required to tell the truth and be fair and just in all aspects of life. The 
wide scope of accountability towards stakeholders and God, the Ultimate Authority, and 
the tenet that all resources are provided by God in the form of trust raises the expectation 
of sharia compliance in such a way that organisations are inspired to achieve high levels 
of accurate disclosure (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010).  
▪ The Role of Sharia Supervisory Board 
The role of the sharia supervisory board is to review financial products in financial 
institutions and determine the sharia compliance of these products and the investments. 
Therefore, the board performs in an advisory capacity for the board of directors on 
Islamic matters to ensure that all transactions are compliant with sharia, including 
products, services, marketing advertisements and sources of funds (Hasan, 2009). The 
Islamic financial services board (IFSB) standards state that sharia compliance is central 
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to assuring the integrity and credibility of the institutions offering Islamic financial 
services; therefore, the existence of the sharia board in Islamic institutions is essential, 
even for legitimating purposes; otherwise, the institution will not have the public’s trust. 
In Saudi Arabia, only Islamic financial institutions are found to be compliant with 
the recommendations of ICG. This is because the majority of transactions conducted by 
conventional banks are not usually consistent with Islamic law. In addition, these 
institutions affect a large segment of society. Thus, Islamic banks need to apply ICG to 
legitimate their existence and to reassure the beneficiaries that their transactions and 
operations lie within the scope of Islamic requirements. This includes the prevention of 
riba. Consequently, non-financial firms have less need to establish a sharia supervisory 
board since their loans are obtained from Islamic-governed banks. 
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2.5 SAUDI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VS INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Even though most Saudi firms have ostensibly complied with the SCGRs, the 
practices of corporate governance in KSA are still immature (The World Bank, 2009). This 
can be attributed to the domination of blockholders in the Saudi private sector. The 
control exercised by large shareholders over Saudi firms swims against the tide of good 
corporate governance practices. That is to say, because blockholders are able to access 
internal information, they feel less obliged to comply with certain requirements such as 
the involvement of independent directors and the demand for high transparency 
(Banghøj et al., 2010). Hence, it was irrational for the CMA to copy corporate governance 
regulations from another country without taking into consideration the unique 
characteristics of the Saudi context, such as culture, ownership structure, market 
liquidity and regulations. It can be seen from Table 2.1 that SCGRs apply rules collected 





Board of Directors 
Management 
Company 




Sharia Supervisory Board 
Figure 2.1: Islamic Model of Corporate Governance 
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Nevertheless, SCGRs follow the common regulatory approach of ‘comply or 
explain’ which holds that one size does not fit all; some of its Articles are mandatory. In 
an attempt to limit the power of controlling shareholders, SCGRs require companies to 
follow the cumulative method of voting that gives minorities a greater opportunity to 
appoint representatives. However, as this method of voting is inconsistent with Saudi 
Company Law (1965), firms felt justified in declining to follow such a system. 
Consequently, hardly any companies applied cumulative voting until 2012, when the 
Ministry of Commerce (Alriyadh, 2012), which has a higher authority than the CMA, 
required firms to use the cumulative voting approach in their General Assemblies. The 
use of cumulative voting was deemed necessary in the Saudi case in order to restrict 
blockholders’ control. In contrast, other authorities such as in Germany and in some 
American states give firms the option to choose the most appropriate voting method for 
the company’s interest (OECD, 2012). 
Structurally, SCGRs are based on a one-tier board system which is identical to the 
Anglo-Saxon model (Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012). However, unlike other developed 
countries such as the US, UK and Germany, the Saudi code (2010) limits the size of board 
of directors to between three and eleven members, in order to eliminate the 
disadvantages of large boards and the free-rider problem (Lin, 2005). Furthermore, 
SCGRs adopts three types of membership classification: independent, non-executive, and 
executive directors (CMA, 2010). Although other systems such as those in the US and 
Germany categorise board members as executive and non-executive directors, not all 
non-executive directors enjoy real independence (Chen et al., 2011). 
SCGRs mandatorily require firms to establish two subcommittees: the nomination 
and remuneration committee and the audit committee. However, this approach, 
especially the combination of nomination and remuneration committee, does not match 
the international form of board subcommittees’ structure. For example, in the US and UK 
there are two separate committees, one for remuneration and the other for nominations. 
Even the independence requirements for remuneration and nominations committees 
differ among the three countries. While the US and the UK require completely 
independent directors to serve on these committees (FRC, 2014; Conyon, 2014), SCGRs 
do not mention the independence of such a committee. Consequently, SCGRs do not 
prevent executives from participating in the decision-making process related to their 
compensation or the nomination of other members of the board of directors. Indeed, this 
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amalgamation of the two committees leads to conflicts of interest between the executive 
team and shareholders. 
Table 2.1 shows a comparison between Saudi Arabia and three developed 
countries, the US, the UK, and Germany, in terms of the main characteristics of their 
corporate governance mechanisms, market characteristics and executive compensation 
practices. Although the market characteristics of Saudi Arabia are similar to those of 
Germany in many aspects, especially the ownership structure and market orientation, the 
KSA structurally follows the Anglo-Saxon model. However, it differs from the US and the 
UK in that CEOs are not allowed to serve as board chairmen simultaneously. Moreover, 
executive incentives mechanisms in Saudi Arabia are limited, while other developed 
countries have different short- and long-term packages (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 
Conyon, 2014).  
In summary, there are significant differences in substance between the 
characteristics of the Saudi context and its Anglo-American counterparts; thus, Saudi 
Arabia should develop its own model that fits its unique formal and informal institutions.  
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Table 2.1: An International Comparison of Corporate Governance Systems 
  United States United Kingdom Germany Saudi Arabia 
GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
    
 Compliance approach Mandatory Comply or Explain Comply or Explain Comply or Explain, however, 
some of the Articles are 
mandatory 
 Influential party Shareholders Shareholders Stakeholders Shareholders 
 Cumulative voting Mandatory in some States No Allowed Mandatory 
 Conflict of interests Principal-agent Principal-agent Stakeholders Principal-principal 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
    
 Structure One-tier One-tier Two-tier One-tier 
 Size Not specified Not specified Not specified Three to eleven members 
 Members’ classifications - Executive 
- Non-executive 
- Executive 






- Non-executive  
- Independent non-
executive  
 Independence Majority of members 
must be non-executive 
directors 
- At least half the board, 




- A smaller company 
should have at least two 
independent non-
executive directors 
Majority of members must 
be non-executive directors 
Two independent non-
executive members or one 
third of the board, whatever is 
greater, providing the majority 
members of the board to be 
composed of non-executive 
directors. 
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 CEO duality Allowed – with a 
recommendation to 
separate the two 
positions 
Allowed – with a 
requirement to report the 
reason 
Not allowed Not allowed 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
    
 Establishment Mandatory Recommended Recommended Mandatory 
 Size At least three members - At least three members 
- Two for small companies 
Not specified At least three members 
 Independence All members must be 
non-executive 
All members must be non-
executive 
- The chairman shall be 
independent 
- The board chairman 
cannot be the committee 
chairman 
- All members must be non-
executive 
NOMINATION COMMITTEE 
    
 Establishment Mandatory Recommended Recommended Mandatory 
 Size At least three members Not specified Not specified Not specified 
 Independence All members must be 
non-executive 
Majority of members should 
be independent non-
executive directors 
The committee shall be 
composed exclusively of 
shareholder representatives 
- Not specified. 
- Executive members are 
allowed to serve on the 
committee 




    
 Establishment Mandatory Recommended Not mentioned Mandatory 
 Size At least three members - At least three members 
- Two for small companies 
N/A Not specified 
47 | P a g e  
 
 Independence All members must be 
non-executive 
Majority of members should 
be independent non-
executive directors 
N/A - Not specified. 
- Executive members are 
allowed to serve on the 
committee 




    
 Efficiency Strong  Semi-strong  Semi-strong  Weak  
 Liquidity High High Low Low 
 Corporate control 
(takeover) 
Active Active Inactive Inactive 
 Orientation Outsider Outsider Insider Insider 
OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS 
    
 Concentration Low Low High High 
 Dominant investors Institutions Institutions Banks and families Families and state 
 Dominant investors’ 
behaviours 
Profit-oriented Profit-oriented Growth-oriented Growth-oriented 
 Ownership and control 
relationship 
Separated Separated Associated Associated 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION  
    
 Compensation consultant Yes Yes Yes No 
 Incentives Long- and short-term Long- and short-term Long- and short-term Short-term only (i.e. salary and 
bonus) 
 
Source: (Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015; Fallatah and Dickins, 2012; The World Bank, 2009) 
 
  
48 | P a g e  
 
2.6 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICIES 
Even though executive compensation levels in Saudi Arabia have increased 
dramatically during the last decade, no research has investigated the reasons behind this 
boom. A quick statistical glance at the trends among the best compensated executives 
between 2008 and 2015 demonstrates that compensation per executive has increased by 
more than 100% on average in most listed firms, while the growth of managerial pay in 
some companies has tripled, such as the Mobily company (Arqaam, 2014).  
Unlike the options available to boards of directors in Western contexts, the setting 
of executive remuneration in Saudi Arabia is restricted to a few methods, on regulatory 
grounds. That is to say, there is no legislation that allows firms to repurchase their own 
stock from the market.  
2.6.1 Components of Executive Pay 
The Saudi corporate governance code states that executive pay can be designed to 
include one or more of the following: monthly base salary, allowances or proportion of 
profits, periodic or annual bonus related to performance, short- and long-term incentive 
plans and any other kind of benefits including non-pecuniary ones (CMA, 2010). Each of 
these incentive methods is discussed in detail in the following subsections. 
• Base salary 
Base salary is the preferred method of compensation from an employees’ 
perspective (Murphy, 1999), because it guarantees minimum income regardless of the 
employee’s performance. Moreover, it is characterised by being free from the risk of 
fluctuation when compared with other constituents of pay. In Saudi Arabia, base salary 
in general is the most dominant component of executive. This may be attributed to the 
fact that most listed firms are controlled by families; therefore, there is less pressure to 
link executive pay to performance, as the family has the power to access and monitor 
managerial activities closely (Banghøj et al., 2010). 
• Annual bonus plans  
An annual bonus is typically granted to employees based on their individual 
performance, and is set as a percentage of the company’s net profit. However, the case for 
executives can be different as often executives are set periodic or annual bonuses 
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according to attaining a predetermined objective or special achievement. An annual 
bonus is typically and primarily determined according to accounting profits (Murphy, 
1999). In Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that annual bonus plans are the only available 
method for boards of directors to link managerial remuneration to firm performance, 
only a minority of Saudi firms place much attention to this important component. 
• Other pecuniary and non- pecuniary packages 
This category comprises all other unclassified components of compensation such 
as short- and long-term incentive plans and any other kind of benefits, including 
non-pecuniary ones such as cars, house, travel tickets, etc. 
2.6.2 Who Sets Executive Pay? 
Murphy (1999) illustrates in detail the process of recruiting expert executives and 
how they are compensated. The research states that for new executives, a company’s 
human resources department is responsible for offering them suitable compensation 
packages. If the department agrees with an executive on a particular plan, the decision is 
then passed to the nomination and remuneration committee to review and make a 
recommendation thereon. If the committee does not approve the incentive plan, they will 
return it to the human resources department for revision. However, if the committee 
approves a proposed plan, they would make a recommendation and raise it with the 
board of directors, which retains the right of ultimate approval on such decisions. This 
scenario is related to new executives. However, in the case of current executives, the 
nomination and remuneration committee takes on the responsibility of negotiating their 
compensation and incentive plans. In all cases, the board of directors retains the right to 
approve any packages related to top management. For an illustration of the process of 
setting executive compensation, see Figure 2.2. 
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2.7 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
In general, well-structured ownership and the presence of blockholders, especially 
institutional ones who have experience and capability (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012), is 
thought to help to enhance governance quality and to closely monitor managerial 
activities to ensure that they act in the best interests of shareholders (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003). However, unlike developed countries, where institutional investors are present in 
most listed firms, different arrangements apply in Saudi Arabia, which is classified as an 
emerging economy. In Saudi Arabia, the CMA discloses information about all investors 
who hold 5% or more of the total shares of the company (Tadawul, 2015). Data show that 
 A current executive 





 A candidate executive 









Figure 2.2 : The process of setting executive compensation  
 
Source: Adapted from Murphy (1999) 
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certain families control nearly 60% of listed firms and the state owns approximately 20% 
of the market value of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Aleqtisadiah, 2014).  
Most research on corporate governance has focused on Western economies with 
diffused ownership, such as the US and the UK (Al-Najjar, 2017; Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 
1999). However, the distinct structure of ownership in Saudi Arabia, which is highly 
concentrated in the hands of certain families and government bodies, allows for the 
investigation of corporate governance practices into the principal-principal conflict. This 
investigation enhances our understanding of the effect of controlling shareholders on 
corporate governance practices in underdeveloped economies. Thus, the research is 
expected to add a significant contribution to the existing knowledge of corporate 
governance practices in emerging economies.  
The domination of family ownership in Saudi Arabia can be attributed to several 
reasons. One important reason is that most family firms were operated privately for a 
long time before their conversion to joint stock companies through the route of an initial 
public offering (IPO); thus, those families retain the majority of shares themselves 
(Alsanosi, 2010). Moreover, since there is no legislation to issue various classes of shares 
that provide different voting rights, families consider it better to retain the majority of 
shares in their own hands in order to ensure their ability to control the company (Young 
et al., 2008).  
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Saudi government has made significant 
efforts to encourage and convince private establishments to convert to joint stock firms 
or at least to closed joint-stock companies, as this move would help to expand firms’ 
activities, reduce risks and ensure sustainability, especially for family firms which face 
succession problems (Tadawul, 2015). This direction has increased since Saudi Arabia 
became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2005. As a result the number of 
joint stock companies has more than doubled from 73 in 2000 (Ministry of Commerce, 
2001) to 160 in 2014 (Tadawul, 2015).  
However, although many private establishments have been converted into joint 
stock companies during the last decade in Saudi Arabia, a large number of firms have still 
not changed their ownership structures. For example, the Minister of Commerce has 
stated that 95% of Saudi private firms are still owned and controlled by families 
(Alriyadh, 2013). This reluctance to convert can be attributed to the regulatory 
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requirements imposed by governmental supervisory institutions and to the potential loss 
of control when other investors are engaged in decision-making. 
The domination and presence of certain large family shareholders in most Saudi 
firms underpins the notion that there is no real separation between management and 
control in emerging economies such as Saudi Arabia (Rashid, 2013). Hence, the board of 
directors is expected to be dominated by blockholders and their relatives and friends 
(Baydoun et al., 2012). Thus, the decision-making process will tend to follow the 
blockholders’ wishes. One might suppose that the high ratio of ownership concentration 
would be useful for governing managerial activities; however, it negatively affects the 
management mission. Under this strong control, the management has less discretion and 
there are complex restrictions on their decisions (Conyon and He, 2011). Moreover, 
minority shareholders’ interests can be neglected by large shareholders (Young et al., 
2008). Accordingly, it can be inferred that a principal-principal conflict may arise in KSA. 
Furthermore, Saudi royal family members hold blocks of shares in many Saudi 
firms. This kind of ownership is unique to Saudi Arabia and other monarchical countries 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The royal family members have strong connections 
with governmental institutors and suppliers; thus, their investment in a firm gives that 
firm greater advantages in many aspects of the firm’s activities, including sales and 
financing matters (Al-Hadi et al., 2016). The state is also significantly involved in the 
control of many firms; usually the largest ones (Baydoun et al., 2012). The presence of 
state ownership among listed firms could be a substitute for financial institutions, which 
are forbidden by the Saudi Banking Control Law to own in excess of 10% of company 
shares (SAMA, 1966).  
Accordingly, the domination of families over the stock market is considered as one 
of the key challenges of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. Although this domination 
reduces the gap of interest between shareholders and managers and thereby mitigates 
principal-agent conflict, it leads to divergence of interests among shareholders 
themselves and increases principal-principal conflict. That is to say, family controlling 
shareholders consider the firm as their own heritage and may perceive minority 
shareholders and their representatives as prying into their own business. This situation 
leads to a divergence of interests among the two types of investors and increases agency 
costs that, in certain cases, may exceed the ones caused by principal-agent conflict 
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(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Young et al., 2008). Such dominant investors have a natural 
penchant towards the family and seek to benefit them, rather than to care about all other 
shareholders. This argument is supported by the fact that Saudi Arabia has been assessed 
as 75% collectivist (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). In addition to this, as wasta plays an 
influential role in the human resource field, there is a high likelihood that such firms may 
appoint unqualified family-related managers to senior positions and compensate them 
generously as a duty towards the family members. However, this will be at the expense 
of minority shareholders who are unable either to access these intangible benefits or 
obtain higher financial returns due to the poor performance of family-related managers 
(Young et al., 2008). 
In contrast, foreign ownership among listed firms is almost non-existent in the 
KSA. This is a consequence of the restrictions of Saudi regulations on non-Gulf investors, 
since foreign investors were forbidden from trading shares in the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(SSE) before 2013. From 2015, however, the Saudi Council of Ministers has approved a 
decision allowing foreign investors to trade and own stocks of listed companies providing 
they do not exceed 20% (Alarabiya, 2013). This decision may change the ownership 
structure in the Saudi listed firms during the next decade. Even though foreign investors 
were forbidden from purchasing shares directly in the SSE before 2013, they were 
allowed to possess up to 49% of the non-traded shares (Alsharq, 2014). In other words, 
Saudi investors must own the majority of the corporate shares. Investors from the GCC 
countries are excluded from this restriction, because by law they are implicitly treated as 
Saudi investors (Alarabiya, 2013; Alriyadh, 2007; Reuters, 2014). Even though this 
decision is expected to increase the presence of foreign investment in SSE after its 
implementation, it is of no consequence for this research.  
2.8 POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The political economy of a context has a significant influence on the norms of 
corporate governance. The heterogeneous characteristics of political economy between 
countries explain why there are several models of corporate governance (Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005). Therefore, the particularities of Saudi political economy should be 
addressed and considered carefully in order to develop a successful implementable 
governance system. First, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state and its constitution and law are 
derived from and based on sharia (Pierce, 2008). Under Islamic law, there are some 
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restrictions on trade transactions (see section 2.2.1) which provide a unique Islamic 
framework that all Muslim investors must trade within. Additionally, the political system 
in the KSA is based on an absolute monarchy where the executive government is the only 
party that legislates and supervises business policy. Although the Shura Council plays a 
legislating and supervising role, its influence is limited and it lacks sufficient 
authorisation and independence. Putting these together, i.e. sharia law and the absolute 
monarchy system, it can be seen that the main pillars of the formal institutions that the 
Anglo-American model has considered when developing the shareholder model of 
corporate governance are absent in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, ownership in Saudi Arabia is highly concentrated in family and state 
hands. In this context, Young et al. (2008) argue that firms with controlling shareholders 
result in the emergence of principal-principal conflict. Moreover, the demographic 
structure and customs in Saudi Arabia differ significantly from the majority of countries 
and are based on a tribal system which is influenced by an orientation to collectivism 
(The Hofstede Centre, 2014). Such characteristics make wasta and political ties key 
elements in accomplishing business transactions and in shaping business policy 
(Budhwar and Debrah, 2013; Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). Therefore, the unique nature of 
political economy of Saudi Arabia enhances the need for proper governance mechanisms 
that organise the relationships among all the most influential parties, i.e. family 
shareholders, state investments’ representatives, minority shareholders and executive 
managers. 
2.9 SAUDI VISION 2030 
Since the discovery of petroleum on 3 March 1938, Saudi economy has become 
strongly dependent on oil revenues which account for more nearly 90% of its exports 
(OPEC, 2016). This despite the fact that the Saudi government has made many attempts 
to diversify its economy and reduce the reliance on oil (OPEC, 2016). In this context, on 
25 April 2016, the cabinet approved and announced a new strategic plan namely ‘Saudi 
Vision 2030’ which draws the future of Saudi Arabia after oil era (Bloomberg, 2016b). 
The main objective of the Saudi Vision 2030 is to diversify the economy away from oil by 
2030. In order to achieve the vision’s objective, several initiatives and programs have 
been developed which can be referred to as the executive programs of the vision (Saudi 
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Vision 2030, 2016). Indeed, this optimistic vision, if successfully implemented, is 
expected to reshape business policy in Saudi Arabia and the national economy in general. 
For instance, one of the vision’s programs is the Regulations Review program 
which aims to revise the current legal framework and all regulations to keep pace with 
other major developments that will occur in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). The 
program was preceded by the release of a new company law in 2015 to replace the old 
version which was enacted in 1965 (MCI, 2015). The new law acknowledges the 
importance of corporate governance regulations and strengthens its enforcement. 
Moreover, in the same year, other new laws that could impact on the business 
environment were introduced including the non-governmental organizations’ law and 
the law concerning fees on non-developed lands. These imply that Saudi Arabia is 
restructuring and indeed will be subject to other major reforms of regulations until 2030. 
Unlike the previous national plans, the Saudi Vision 2030 has an improved 
likelihood of success for several reasons. First, the vision is a set of comprehensive 
initiatives that cover economic, developmental, legal, social, educational, health and 
security aspects of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). Therefore, each sector will 
attempt to achieve its allocated goals in order to avoid being accused of failure. Second, 
the vision is led directly by the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who is the son of 
King Salman and the chairman of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs. 
Hence, the vision is expected to receive considerable focus by the highest authorities, 
ensuring that the concentration of all government bodies on the achievement of the 
vision. Finally, the vision has attracted a great deal of attention both domestically and 
globally with the government empathising the importance of this vision for the country’s 
future. Afterwards, the efforts were followed by practical actions as a sign of seriousness 
that the vision will be implemented and achieved as intended. For example, in 2016 the 
government has taken austerity actions to rationalise public expenditure which is part of 
the vision’s executive programs namely the Fiscal Balance program (Saudi Vision 2030, 
2016). These actions lead to a temporary cancellation of bonus payments for state 
employees for the fiscal year 2016, a permanent reduction of 20% and 15% in the salary 
of ministers and Shura Council members respectively (Reuters, 2016). Furthermore, in 
late 2016 the government announced gradual cuts of subsidies on energy and water from 
2017 to 2020 (Bloomberg, 2016a). Concurrently, it will initiate a cash-payment program 
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to compensate those eligible for subsidies from the middle-class and needy citizens 
(Saudi Vision 2030, 2016). 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a general overview regarding the institutional settings in the 
KSA. It identifies the principles of sharia and shows how they influence the Saudi legal 
system. Moreover, it highlights the regulations applicable to Saudi corporate governance 
and provides a comprehensive comparison with the most well-known international 
corporate governance models. 
Relatedly, it can be concluded that institutional settings and corporate governance 
regulations in Saudi Arabia are still immature, in contrast to the situation in developed 
economies. Furthermore, the ownership structure and market orientation in Saudi 
Arabia is close to that of Germany where the stakeholder model of corporate governance 
has been seen the best fit. However, the KSA adopts the shareholder model, which is 
primarily designed to govern firms that operate in market-oriented economies, such as 
the Anglo-American countries.  
In addition, Saudi regulators have expended considerable efforts to convert 
international practices of corporate governance. However, there are key challenges 
related to the context of the KSA, such as sharia, cultural norms (e.g. wasta) and 
ownership concentration, which reduce the possibility of full convergence. However, 
these constraints should not be considered to be barriers to adopting the international 
best practices of corporate governance because most aspects of corporate governance 
are adaptable to and consistent with the Saudi regulations. However, there are a number 
of domestic norms that should be taken into consideration when setting corporate 
governance regulations in Saudi Arabia; these include high ownership concentration and 
the lack of availabity of stock options preventing firms from using this method of 
compensating top executives. Consequently, Saudi regulators should adjust corporate 
governance mechanisms to address these domestic issues, otherwise the regulations will 
not work as intended. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the US model of capitalism has received a great deal of criticism for its 
inability to constrain executive compensation (Bebchuk et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2010). 
Reacting to these criticisms, especially in the light of the scandals of Enron and WorldCom 
earlier this century and the financial crisis in 2008, the US authorities have introduced 
two major reforms of corporate governance codes, namely the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 and The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010. At the same time, as a response to international 
demands many emerging economies have imported and adopted Western agency-based 
frameworks with no consideration of the cross-country institutional differences (Sun et 
al., 2010; Young et al., 2008). One example of these economies is the KSA, which is 
influenced by the ‘Anglo-American model’ that emphasises the maximisation of 
shareholders’ welfare (Fallatah and Dickins, 2012). 
This research is motivated by the boom in executive compensation during the 
years 2008 and 2015. This increase can be viewed as shareholder expropriation, 
especially if it is not synchronous with improved company performance. A review of the 
statistical trends among the highest-compensated executives reveals that executive 
compensation has increased by more than 100% in most listed firms, while the growth 
in companies has been significantly lower. In the case of the Saudi Arabian-based Etihad 
Etisalat Co (Mobily), it was only threefold (Arqaam, 2014).  
Importantly, it is worth noting that Mobily has been ranked highest in Saudi Arbia 
with regard to growth in executive compensation during the period 2010 to 2013 
inclusive. However, this led to a massive scandal in late 2014 when manipulation of the 
financial statements was detected. Consequently, “the company restated profits for 2013 
and the first half of 2014” (Smith, 2015), cutting them by USD381 million combined. In 
January 2015, it posted a shock fourth-quarter loss of USD608 million. This manipulation 
has seen the accounts switch from a USD1.8 billion profit in 2013 to a USD0.24 billion loss 
in 2014 (Tadawul, 2015). As a consequence, the CEO Mr. Khalid Al-Kaf was dismissed and 
by February 2015 Mobily had lost approximately USD13 billion (nearly 65%) of its 
market value in comparison to May 2014 (Smith, 2015). This case, in addition to other 
global scandals related to excessive managerial rewards, support the view of Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) who argue that executive compensation can be a problem if misused. 
That is to say, as executive compensation is introduced as a remedy that would reduce 
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the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers, it may increase agency 
costs if being granted to managers without a proper link to firm-performance. 
In this context, and in order to investigate the effectiveness of the current 
regulations of corporate governance in controlling executive compensation practices, this 
research aims to answer two main questions: a) Do corporate governance mechanisms 
restrain the opportunism of top managers in Saudi Arabia by reining in their compensation? 
and b) Is the Anglo-American model of corporate governance generalizable in emerging 
countries? 
The research contributes to the international corporate governance literature in 
several ways. First, while most countries are adopting the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance (Conyon, 2014; Kaplan, 2012; Sapp, 2008; Core et al., 1999), there 
has been few investigations into the validity and generalizability of adopting this model 
in emerging economies, which have different institutional characteristics from their West 
counterparts (Young et al., 2008). Therefore, this research uses a dataset from Saudi 
Arabia, which has a unique institutional setting. For example, because ownership 
concentration in Saudi Arabia is high with family-owned and state-owned companies 
dominating, personal connections (wasta) play a significant role in the business field. 
Another crucial difference is that governance policy in Saudi Arabia is significantly 
influenced by sharia (Islamic law); thus, governance recommendations should take 
account of these domestic challenges. Second, as the majority of research concentrates on 
the traditional agency problem between shareholders and managers (Al-Najjar, 2017; 
Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999), this research extends the understanding of agency 
problems that exist among other parties (controlling and minority shareholders) and 
provides insights into principal-principal conflict which exists in emerging country 
contexts. Therefore, new important issues are investigated, such as the influence of a 
blockholder chairman on pay-setting for top management. Finally, the study adds to the 
literature related to the role of independent directors and remuneration committee, 
which are key concerns of international corporate governance best practice, and 
demonstrate that in practice some firms comply with the governance regulations in form 
but not in substance. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows; section 2 develops the relevant 
theoretical base; section 3 reviews critically the literature and highlights the literature 
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gaps; section 4 describes the research method and formulates the hypotheses; section 5 
presents and discusses the empirical results; finally, section 6 provides the research 
conclusions and limitations. 
3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The economy of Saudi Arabia has unique cultural and religious characteristics that 
differ from other countries, which increases the importance of developing an appropriate 
theoretical landscape that suits the Saudi context. The process of setting executive 
compensation in Saudi Arabia is affected by several factors including culture, personal 
connections, regulations and religion. For example, there is no legalisation in Saudi 
Arabia that allows firms to re-purchase its own stock in the market as is permitted in 
developed countries such as the US or the UK. Such restrictions complicate the process of 
linking executive compensation to firm performance. Furthermore, a brief review of the 
current code of corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia highlights a critical 
loophole regarding the structure of the nomination and remuneration committees. Unlike 
in the US where a compensation committee can only be comprised of independent 
directors, the Saudi code does not prevent executives from being members and even 
dominating the committee. This significantly compromises the committee’s 
independence and gives executives the ability to control their pay package.  
Accordingly, and in order to understand how corporate governance affects 
executive pay arrangements in depth, the research sheds light on the four most relevant 
theories that could explain the relationship between corporate governance and executive 
compensation in Saudi Arabia, namely agency theory, the managerial power model, the 
optimal contracting model and institutional theory. Although many other models exist, 
the four theories have been selected due to their relevance to the context of Saudi Arabia. 
Agency theory is the basis of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, which 
Saudi Arabia adopts; thus, the theory helps to build a good understanding of how 
regulators consider the relationship between shareholders and managers in terms of the 
protection of interests. Furthermore, two sub-models of agency theory related to 
executive compensation are also used, namely the managerial power model and the 
optimal contracting model. The two models provide a better understanding of how 
executive compensation is designed and determined. The final model, namely 
institutional theory, has been adopted due to its relevance to the Saudi context and its 
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importance in explaining the cross-country institutional differences that would have a 
significant influence on corporate governance norms. Basically, the institutional model 
looks into the role of both formal and informal institutions in shaping business policy; 
hence, it complements the whole picture of the relationship between corporate 
governance and executive compensation. 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory assumes that managers are self-serving and behave 
opportunistically in a way that maximises their own utility at the expense of other 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, by exploiting the firm’s resources for their own ends. 
In contrast, shareholders seek to maximise their wealth through higher profits and 
increased share prices. These conflicting goals of the two parties are likely to lead to extra 
costs, known as ‘agency costs’, which are incurred in order to align the objectives of top 
management with those of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there 
could be zero agency costs if shareholders take complete control of the company’s 
activities. However, in reality there is a negative relationship with ownership 
concentration as the more diffuse the ownership is the higher the agency costs become. 
In other words, the agency costs are subject to the level of separation between ownership 
and control. In order to reduce agency costs, agency theorists suggest providing well-
structured performance-based managerial incentives that include stock options to 
increase managers’ ownership in the firm (Jensen and Warner, 1988; Conyon and He, 
2012).  
This suggestion might work effectively in Western countries; however, in Saudi 
Arabia firms are less able to design packages for executives using stock options for 
regulatory reasons. That is to say, as Saudi firms are not allowed by law to repurchase its 
own shares; thus, they cannot buy shares and grant them to employees. This, indeed, 
complicates the objectives of a board of directors in linking executive compensation with 
long-term firm performance. Therefore, the only available option for Saudi boards to link 
managerial pay to firm performance is by an annual bonus, which tends not to be linked 
to long-term performance but is related to past performance. Furthermore, Jensen et al. 
(2004, p. 50) warn that “while remuneration can be a solution to agency problems, it can 
also be a source of agency problems”. For example, managers may extract private benefits 
at the expense of shareholders through receiving high non-merit compensation. 
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Furthermore, if incentives are strongly based on accounting measures, this may lead to 
accounting manipulation or the adoption of certain methods that increase short-term 
profits (Rashid, 2013). 
The traditional agency model (the so-called principal-agent conflict) assumes that 
ownership concentration is diffuse and managers have considerable discretion and 
control over decisions-making (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, these assumptions 
are not relevant in the majority of cases in Saudi Arabia where many firms are family 
controlled. In these firms, which represent nearly 60% of Saudi listed firms, there is no 
real effective separation of ownership and control. Therefore, managers are less likely to 
have the discretionary ability to expropriate the firm’s resources (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b). Thus, the principal-agent model is inadequate to explain the opportunism 
phenomena in such firms (Young et al., 2008).  
In fact, a conflict between controlling and minority shareholders is likely to 
represent the real situation in family-controlled firms (Young et al., 2008); this is referred 
to as the principal-principal conflict or Type II agency problem (Jiang and Peng, 2011). In 
this setting, blockholders may expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by extracting 
tangible and intangible private benefits (Basu et al., 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For 
instance, controlling families may appoint unqualified family members or close relatives 
to key positions and overlook better qualified outside managers (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Gilson, 2006; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). In such situations, family-
related managers may set high non-merit-based compensation at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Rashid, 2013; Su et al., 2010). Thus, small shareholders are unable either 
to access these intangible benefits or obtain higher financial returns due to the poor 
performance of family-related managers (Young et al., 2008). Therefore, it can be argued 
that although concentrated ownership plays a substitutive role for the poor external 
governance mechanisms and mitigates the Type I agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b; Li et al., 2007; Lin, 2005; Banghøj et al., 2010; Conyon and He, 2012), principal-
principal conflict can arise. In certain cases, the agency costs of the principal-principal 
conflict are higher than those resulting from principal-agent conflict (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003; Young et al., 2008). 
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3.2.2 Optimal Contracting Model vs Managerial Power Model 
The literature regarding the issue of executive compensation is dominated by two 
complementary models known as the ‘optimal contracting model’ and the ‘managerial 
power model’ (Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 2003; Cheng and Firth, 2006; 
Van Essen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2015). Both models have been developed as attempts 
to understand and explain the practices of executive compensation within organisations. 
Fundamentally, the two approaches are derived from the agency theory supposition that 
managers are opportunists with guile and are self-interest maximisers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Even though both theories hold the same basic assumption with regard 
to managerial behaviour, each approach has its own perspective with respect to the ways 
and processes of setting executive compensation.  
The optimal contract model is defined as “one that maximizes the net expected 
economic value to shareholders after transaction costs (such as contracting costs) and 
payments to employees” (Core et al., 2003, p. 27). This theory is based on three further 
assumptions: (1) the board of directors is independent; (2) there is an efficient market of 
qualified executives; and (3) the shareholders are able to determine contractual terms 
(Janakiraman et al., 2010). The optimal contract model assumes that the setting of 
executive compensation is subject to arm’s length bargaining between an independent 
board of directors and managers which unifies agent-principal interests and mitigates 
the agency costs (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Ntim et al., 2015). Therefore, the executives 
cannot influence decisions that relate to their compensation, because directors are 
completely independent from the top management and are more loyal to shareholders 
(Ntim et al., 2015). Based on this view, managerial pay should have a significant 
relationship to firm performance.  
However, the explosion in executive pay levels during the 2000s, even after the 
financial crisis of 2008, was weakly linked to managerial performance (Chen et al., 
2010b). The failure of executive compensation to be linked to firm performance rekindled 
the debate regarding the effectiveness of executive compensation to reduce agency costs 
(Chen et al., 2010b). For example, a significant volume of research finds weak links 
between executives’ perks packages and firm performance (Murphy, 1999; Ntim et al., 
2015; Elsilä et al., 2013; Kabir et al., 2013; Tian, 2013). This irrational boost to managerial 
compensation during the past two decades demonstrates that the optimal contracting 
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model is inadequate for interpreting the intricate dimensions of executive compensation 
practices (Edmans and Gabaix, 2009). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) state that the arm’s 
length model can be applied with executive candidates from outside the company; 
however, this is not the case when negotiating incumbent executives. They argue that as 
managers’ goals diverge from those of shareholders, the board of directors also suffers 
from the agency problem. This occurs because the board of directors is linked with top 
management in a way that influences their independence in order that the former can 
attain personal objectives such as re-appointment. The affiliation between a board of 
directors and executives may give a better understanding of why managerial pay grows 
at a faster rate than company performance.  
On the other hand, the managerial power model, which is a complementary 
approach rather than a substitute for the optimal contracting model, aims to shed light 
on a further part of the picture of executive compensation arrangements. Managerial 
power is defined as the extent that top managers can impact decisions that relate to their 
compensation (Chen et al., 2011). Managers can gain power through different means such 
as holding a large number of shares (i.e. they have strong voting rights), performing as 
CEO and chairman at the same time, and participating in nominating and retaining 
members of the board of directors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2012). If 
executives are able to set their own compensation, they will be less concerned with firm 
performance, which therefore exacerbates the agency problem (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004; Van Essen et al., 2015). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) predict that the level of pay-for-
performance sensitivity is determined and affected by the ability of an executive to 
influence his/her compensation package. Findings from East Asia (Li et al., 2007; Chen et 
al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2012) support this model since powerful 
executives are found to extract higher compensation when the board of directors is weak. 
In Saudi Arabia, the corporate governance model is inside-oriented (i.e. internal 
director control), since ownership concentration is high and there is an absence of 
effective external governance (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013; Asiri and Alzeera, 2013; 
Harrison and Moore, 2012; The World Bank, 2009). In addition, the data show that 85% 
of firms’ boards have at least one blockholder director. Thus, in family-controlled firms, 
managers have less influence and control over boards of directors. Consequently, the 
executive compensation process is not expected to be subject to managerial power, 
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unless the manager is part of the family which owns the firm. In such situations, the 
family-related manager may enjoy favourable treatment from family controlling 
shareholders and thereby is expected to be able to extract higher non-merit 
compensation. Similarly, in companies where ownership is diffused and blockholders are 
absent, managers may have the required level of power to influence their own 
remuneration. This is because SCGRs allow executives to sit on remuneration and 
nomination committees (CMA, 2010). Therefore, top managers can participate in and 
influence the process of nominating new directors, as well as retaining existing directors. 
This loophole in SCGRs can undermine directors’ independence and support excessive 
compensation for executives. Moreover, due to market inefficiency in relation to qualified 
executives in the KSA, there is a strong likelihood that the negotiation process regarding 
executive remuneration in general has many constraints that put significant pressure on 
directors to provide waivers to candidates; thereby removing the arm’s length principle 
from the negotiation process.  
3.2.3 Institutional Theory 
In reaction to the gaps in the explanatory nature of agency theory, researchers 
argue that no single agency-based governance model can be espoused in all contexts and 
adequately accommodate cross-country differences (La Porta et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 
2007; Porta et al., 1997; Young et al., 2008). Institutional theory argues that adopting the 
Western corporate governance model, which is based on principal-agent conflict, in 
emerging economies would make the situation more costly and problematic (North, 
1990; Wright et al., 2005). For example, ownership concentration, which is suggested as 
an effective mechanism to enhance governance quality in developed economies (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), is a root cause of principal-principal 
conflicts in emerging countries. Therefore, instead of resolving the issue in the Saudi 
context, it may exacerbate the principal-principal problem (Faccio et al., 2001; Young et 
al., 2008).   
The agency model implicitly assumes that the formal underpinning institutions in 
relation to corporate governance found in developed countries also exist in emerging 
economies (Young et al., 2008). However, this is not the case in Saudi Arabia, where the 
“formal institutions such as laws and regulations regarding accounting requirements, 
information disclosure, securities trading, and their enforcement are either absent, 
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inefficient, or do not operate as intended” (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). As the main 
objective of an enterprise is to survive, economic success is not sufficient to achieve this; 
besides, firms need to establish legitimacy with the surrounding institutions (Suchman, 
1995; Zucker, 1987). Therefore, there is a potential scenario that firms may ostensibly 
comply with corporate governance requirements as a response to the institutional 
change, i.e. for legitimating purposes (Dacin et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, since external governance in emerging economies is still weak (Peng, 
2004; Peng et al., 2003), families prefer to retain controlling shares in order to play a 
substitutive internal role (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). This, in turn, may explain the high 
ownership concentration found in Saudi Arabia (The World Bank, 2009). While the board 
of directors (the most prominent internal mechanism) is often considered to be the 
‘rubber stamp’ for dominant shareholders, minority shareholders’ rights are under their 
thumb and may be expropriated (Young et al., 2008). 
Therefore, in the Saudi context, the informal institutional environment tends to 
play a greater role in addressing corporate governance norms than the formal 
institutional environment (Peng and Heath, 1996; Young et al., 2008). These informal 
institutions include “relational ties, business groups, family connections, and government 
contacts” (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). Consequently, the corporate governance model 
imported from developed countries may “resemble [it] in form but not in substance” 
(Peng, 2004; Young et al., 2008). Given the fact that human resource management in KSA 
is influenced by tribal ties and family connections (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013), there is 
reason to believe that the controlling shareholders may appoint relatives or close friends 
to key positions; these, in turn, are able to set high non-merit compensation (Young et al., 
2002). 
3.3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Generally, the literature review shows that most studies have been conducted in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries (Conyon, 2014; Kaplan, 2012; Sapp, 2008; Core et al., 1999). 
This is partly due to data availability in these countries. Developed economies enjoy 
higher quality of information transparency and shareholder protection than do emerging 
countries, which suffer highly from information asymmetry (Young et al., 2008). Thus, 
the need for new regulations and disclosure requirements is entirely different for 
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emerging countries compared to their developed counterparts. Moreover, the adoption 
of a set of governance regulations that has worked successfully in a developed country 
context may not produce the same results if implemented in an emerging economy 
(Young et al., 2008). In this context, to provide a structure for the existing literature 
review, the two variables, board of directors and ownership structure, are divided into 
two contextual categories. The first includes empirical studies conducted in developed 
contexts while the second will look at research carried out in emerging economies. 
3.3.1 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is considered as the most important mechanism of internal 
governance (Ramaswamy et al., 2000). In essence, the board members are elected and 
appointed by shareholders to monitor management actions and to ensure that they act in 
the best interests of shareholders. However, in order to perform the board functions 
properly, Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that the directors should be free from any 
collusion with top management and therefore dominated by non-executive directors. 
This approach should ensure that top executives are paid fairly based on performance 
criteria rather than on a subjective basis (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The following sub-
sections review studies that investigate the relationship between different 
characteristics of board of directors (i.e. board independence, role duality, blockholder 
chairman, and existence of a remuneration committee) and executive compensation. 
3.3.1.1 Developed Countries 
During the past three decades, a considerable number of studies (Core et al., 1999; 
Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Conyon, 2014) have been 
conducted in the US. One study that comprehensively examines the role of corporate 
governance in curbing executive compensation is that of Armstrong et al. (2012). This 
study uses a sample consisting of 2,110 firms from the Russell 3000 index for the year 
2006. The findings show that the average CEO compensation in that year was 
USD4,974,377. Additionally, CEO pay is found to be higher when the directors are busy 
and the chairman is an insider. This conclusion supports the notion that the decisions of 
a weak board are critically influenced by top managers (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). 
Contrary to the agency theory assumption that outside directors help to restrain 
managerial opportunistic behaviours (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the results of 
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Armstrong et al. (2012) show that independent directors have a positive and significant 
impact on the total CEO compensation. The study also reports that experienced CEOs earn 
more compensation than those who are newly appointed. However, having a CEO aged 
69 years or more is negatively and significantly related to lower compensation.  
Although the study of Armstrong et al. (2012) investigates multiple dimensions of 
corporate governance that impact CEO compensation, it suffers from a methodological 
limitation. The study uses cross-sectional analysis, as the sample is based only on the year 
2006. However, my research extends the timeframe to eight years and utilises panel data 
analysis which is a more robust approach that can capture the features of both cross-
sectional and time series analysis. 
Conyon (2014) uses a more recent US dataset from companies listed on the S&P 
500 for the period 2008-2012 to examine the effect of non-independent directors 
(affiliated) on executive compensation. The author selects this specific period to observe 
the influence of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) on executive compensation practices. 
Contrary to expectations, the findings show that the compensation level increased since 
2010, even though the level of independent directors on the remuneration committees 
reached nearly 98%. Conyon (2014) attributes this growth to the fact that the 
compensation levels were quite low before the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) as a consequence 
of the 2008 financial crisis. The results also show that the proportion of affiliated 
directors is associated with lower executive compensation. Furthermore, the findings 
confirm that a larger board is associated with higher remuneration. This finding matches 
those of Petra and Dorata (2008) and Ozkan (2007) who find similar relationship 
between board size and CEO compensation. 
Using a sample from the same context as Conyon (2014), Fahlenbrach (2009) 
examines the role of corporate governance in hindering excessive CEO compensation and 
whether or not there is a linkage between CEO compensation and firm performance. The 
results reveal that CEOs cash compensation was equal to approximately 30% of the total 
compensation. This implies that 70% of the total compensation comprises other variable 
forms that could include equity-based compensation such as stock options and restricted 
stock which suggest a strong link between executives’ pay and firm performance. In terms 
of compensation determinants, the study shows that when the CEO simultaneously chairs 
the board, he/she receives higher compensation. This finding is consistent with Sapp 
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(2008) who observes a positive and significant correlation between CEO duality and 
executive pay level in Canada. Surprisingly, Fahlenbrach (2009) also finds board 
independence was positively and significantly correlated with higher compensation; 
while the results showed a negative impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
This latter outcome may lack accuracy since the study defines board independence 
as total non-executive directors divided by board size. However, not all non-executive 
directors are independent from managerial affiliation; for example, ‘gray’ directors are 
those who can have a conflict of interest. Fahlenbrach (2009) attributes the use of this 
approach to the database because it only categorises directors into executive and non-
executive directors. However, my research is less likely to encounter such a limitation, 
because Saudi regulations require firms to classify directorship status into three types, 
namely executive, non-executive (affiliated), and independent. Thus, this study is 
expected to deliver more accurate results in relation to the aspect of board independence 
and total compensation. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) investigates the consequences of applying the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) regarding board independence and its sub-committees. Their 
sample consists of 865 firms from the S&P 1500 for the years 2000-2005. The findings 
show that CEO compensation decreased after the announcement of the Act; specifically, 
compensation in firms that were non-compliant with the new regulations before 2002 
dropped by 17.5% more than those in firms that already had a majority of independent 
directors on the board and sub-committees (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, p. 246). 
This outcome is not surprising due to the outrage following the scandals of large US 
companies such as Enron (2001) and WorldCom (2002) (Janakiraman et al., 2010). The 
form of the compensation also changed; for example, the use of bonuses increased from 
an average of 12% in 2000 to an average of 22% in 2005, relative to the total 
compensation, while options’ incentives decreased from 64% in 2000 to 32% in 2005 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, p. 240). Therefore, the corporate governance reform 
of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) reduced CEO compensation in general and reinforced the 
linkage of remuneration with short-term firm performance (bonus compensation). 
A more recent study from the US is Andrews et al. (2017). This study investigates 
the implication of the change in the SEC disclosure requirements on the frequency of 
executive perquisites. Using a sample from the S&P 1500 listed firms in the period 
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immediately after the SEC change, i.e. 2006, the study finds that companies with weak 
corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. However, as the 
scope of the study is limited to the period immediately after the SEC was initiated the 
expanded disclosures, the findings lack generalizability. 
In the context of the UK, Ozkan (2007) examines the relationship between different 
components of CEO remuneration and board characteristics such as board size and 
proportion of non-executive directors. Analysing 414 publically traded firms between the 
years 2003 and 2004, the results reveal that board size has a positive and significant 
relationship with CEO pay. Furthermore, having a larger proportion of non-executive 
directors is found to be associated with higher CEO rewards. This indicates that insider 
non-executive directors are affiliated with management. Thus, they are less likely to 
design well-structured compensation, unlike independent (outsider) directors, who are 
expected to be free from such predispositions and able to make decisions objectively. 
However, Ozkan (2007) does not investigate other important characteristics of board of 
directors such as CEO duality, board independence, and the role of the compensation 
committee, which are considered to have a direct impact on the decisions related to CEO 
pay. To avoid such limitations, my research includes these variables to comprehensively 
capture the board impact on executive remuneration.  
Furthermore, Alagla (2012) investigates the determinants of CEO compensation in 
the UK. His study is based on 237 non-financial FTSE 350 firms for the period 2004-2008. 
It finds that both non-executive and independent directors are related to higher CEO 
compensation. This unexpected result is inconsistent with agency theory, which suggests 
that external directors are less connected with managers and are thus better able to 
monitor executives’ actions. It supports the finding reported by Ozkan (2007), who 
observes a positive association between non-executive directors and CEO remuneration 
in the UK. However, in terms of remuneration committee, the study observes a negative 
and significant relationship between the committee independence and managerial 
incentives. The finding supports Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), who find that when 
the committee has a higher independence, managers are less likely to receive high 
compensation. Consistent with the perspective of stewardship theory perspective, which 
assumes that when managers are given trust they act in the best interest of shareholders 
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(Donaldson and Davis, 1991), the results demonstrate that CEO duality significantly 
reduces all short-term compensation. 
A more recent study from the UK is Al-Najjar (2017). This study analyses the 
impact of board of directors on CEO pay based on a sample of travel and leisure firms in 
the FTSE 350. The outcomes show that board independence is significantly associated 
with higher CEO incentives. This conclusion is consistent with Alagla (2012) who 
observes a similar relationship in the UK context. Moreover, board size is found to have a 
negative and significant impact on CEO remuneration. However, this finding conflicts 
with other studies (Méndez et al., 2011; Chalmers et al., 2006; Randøy and Nielsen, 2002), 
which document that larger boards are more likely to be influenced by top management 
and therefore associated with higher executive compensation. It is worth noting that the 
study sample is limited to UK travel and leisure firms; hence, it lacks generalizability. 
Based on a sample of 271 German companies for the period 1989-1993, Edwards 
et al. (2009) investigates the association between management and supervisory board 
sizes on the one hand and managerial compensation on the other. The results show that 
the average compensation per executive during that period was approximately €280,000 
(Edwards et al., 2009, p. 11). Moreover, executives are found to be more highly paid when 
the supervisory board contains a large number of members. This finding supports the 
argument that large boards weaken the monitoring function (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). 
It is also consistent with Petra and Dorata (2008) and Ozkan (2007). In contrast, 
management board size is found to have a negative and significant effect on executive 
remuneration. One possible reason for this is that large management boards require 
more compensation that shareholders are usually unwilling to pay. However, this study 
uses an old sample that does not reflect the impact of German corporate governance 
reforms in the 2000s. Moreover, it is limited to boards’ size and does not investigate other 
board characteristics. My study uses a most recent dataset, 2008-2015, and considers 
other key characteristics of board of directors. 
In the context of Greece, Chalevas (2011) investigates the interaction between a 
set of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on the one hand, and 
executive cash compensation on the other. The sample is based on unbalanced data 
consisting of 386 firm year observations for 2000 to 2003. As the Greek corporate 
governance code was introduced in 2002 (Chalevas, 2011), the author aims to assess the 
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consequences of applying corporate governance requirements and to compare them with 
pre-2002 practices. Consistent with the Greek corporate governance code, which states 
that firms should compensate their managers in line with their performance, the study 
observes a high degree of pay-for-performance sensitivity since 2002. However, the 
results reveal no evidence of a relationship between board size, CEO duality, or the 
existence of a compensation committee and managers’ rewards.  
However, the study has certain methodological limitations. For example, it applies 
cross-sectional analysis for each year separately and does not use panel data analysis, 
which captures both cross-sectional and time-series effects. Furthermore, the author 
does not conduct a separate investigation into the bonus element of managerial 
compensation, which is believed to be granted as a reward for managerial performance. 
My research should not suffer from such limitations because it utilises panel data analysis 
and analyses the different components of executive compensation, especially bonuses. 
Using a sample of 77 Spanish firms between 2005-2009, Méndez et al. (2011) 
examine the role of independent directors and the size of board of directors in 
determining executive compensation. The statistics reveal that the average 
compensation per executive was approximately €1,000,000. In addition, board 
independence is observed to be positively associated with managerial pay, although the 
coefficient was statistically insignificant. Méndez et al. (2011) interpret this finding by 
pointing out that no real independence exists among boards of Spanish firms since 
executives normally participate in the process of choosing independent directors. The 
study also shows a positive and significant relationship between board size and level of 
executive reward. This finding confirms the notion that large boards suffer from a lack of 
coordination and consensus among their members, which leads to a low level of 
governance quality and, thus, the emergence of the free-rider problem (Ozdemir and 
Upneja, 2012). 
Randøy and Nielsen (2002) use a European dataset to analyse the relationship 
between some corporate governance mechanisms and CEO compensation. Their sample 
consists of 104 Swedish firms and 120 Norwegian firms that traded publicly in 1998. The 
results show that the average CEO total compensation was nearly USD310,000 and 
USD178,000 in Sweden and Norway respectively. In terms of variable compensation, only 
42% of Swedish firms granted bonus packages to their CEOs, while the average 
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percentage of bonus to total compensation was only 23% (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002, p. 
64). However, there was no disclosed information about bonus packages with respect to 
Norway. Consistent with agency theory, the findings show that the size of the board of 
directors has a positive and significant impact on the level of executive. This result also 
supports the findings of Core et al. (1999) who observe that larger boards are associated 
with higher CEO compensation in the US. Furthermore, Randøy and Nielsen (2002) 
demonstrate that having foreign directors will bid up managerial compensation. The 
authors argue that most foreign members in Swedish and Norwegian boards are usually 
from the US where CEOs receive the highest compensation in the world. Hence, they 
perceive the levels of compensation in Norway and Sweden low. 
However, the study of Randøy and Nielsen (2002) suffers from a number of 
limitations. First, their sample covers only one year, 1998. Therefore, their results could 
change if their sample was based on a longer period. Second, the sample is quite old and 
does not reflect the updated reforms of corporate governance codes. For instance, the 
first corporate governance codes were introduced in 2001 and 2004 in Sweden and 
Norway respectively (NSA, 2004; SSA, 2001). However, my research, as mentioned 
earlier, extends the timeframe to eight years which allow the use of panel data analysis 
that capture features of both time series and cross-sectional effects. The timeframe also 
captures the impact of the latest Saudi corporate governance regulations (CMA, 2010). 
Utilising a set of 125 large and medium-sized private firms in Denmark in 2007, 
Banghøj et al. (2010) examine the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and CEO characteristics, and total CEO cash remuneration. Questionnaires 
were used to collect the information on CEO compensation. Denmark has a two-tier board 
structure and, according to the Danish corporate governance code, CEOs are not allowed 
to chair the supervisory board but can be members of it (Banghøj et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the authors use the presence of the CEO on the board as an alternative proxy 
of CEO duality to measure CEO dominance and influence over the board of directors. Even 
though 34% of Danish private firms’ CEOs sit on supervisory boards (Banghøj et al., 2010, 
p. 497), the findings show that CEOs’ membership of supervisory boards does not 
increase their pay level. Consistent  with the argument that a large number of directors 
weakens the monitoring function of the board (Jensen, 1993), the results reveal that 
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board size is positively correlated with CEO remuneration. However, the findings show 
no linkage between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
Similar to Randøy and Nielsen (2002), Banghøj et al. (2010) also has sampling 
limitations. One of the limitations is that the timeframe of the sample is based only on one 
year, 2007, preventing the use of panel data analysis. Additionally, the study investigates 
only private firms, which differ from publically traded firms; i.e. private firms have high 
ownership concentration and most of them are family-controlled. Thus, there is less need 
for governance regulations (Banghøj et al., 2010). 
In Canada, Sapp (2008) is one of the most comprehensive studies to investigate the 
effect of various corporate governance mechanisms (including board of directors, 
compensation committee, ownership structure, and CEO characteristics) on CEO and 
other executives’ compensation. Using 400 firms during the period 2000-2005, the 
results show that the overall compensation in Canada followed an upward trend and 
there was a tendency to base compensation on performance. Even though having more 
directors who sit on other boards was related to more variable structure of 
compensation, it found to be associated with higher CEO pay level. On the other hand, the 
number of independent directors is found to have a negative impact on managerial 
incentives. This outcome is consistent with agency theory that outsider directors are less 
likely to be influenced by top managers; thus, they can effectively monitor management 
and ensure that their interests are aligned with shareholders. In support of the 
managerial power model which argues that when an executive has power, he/she is more 
likely to influence decisions related to his/her compensation, the results show that CEO 
duality has a positive and significant impact on CEO compensation level. In terms of the 
remuneration committee, the research surprisingly finds that independent directors who 
serve in the compensation committee are more likely to award executive managers 
higher compensation. This positive correlation between independent directors and 
executive compensation contradicts agency theory, which argues that independent 
directors are less loyal to management and can control their moral hazard (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
Another comprehensive study, conducted in Australia by Chalmers et al. (2006), 
investigates the effect of corporate governance and economic characteristics on five 
structures of CEO compensation. The sample is based on 200 large Australian listed firms 
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that traded during the period 1999 to 2000. The findings reveal that external directors 
have a positive and significant association only on fixed compensation, while ‘gray’ 
directors are found to be correlated with higher CEO bonuses and options. Consistent 
with Banghøj et al. (2010) and Conyon (2014), large board size is reported to weaken the 
board as there was a positive and significant impact on both CEO fixed and bonus 
compensation. CEO duality was found to be negatively related to volume of shares issued. 
This indicates that when CEOs have power, they utilise their influence to receive other 
remuneration components rather than shares which are exposed to the risk of price 
volatility.  
Meanwhile, in New Zealand Reddy et al. (2015) analyse the relationship between 
corporate governance quality and CEO compensation. Based on a sample of non-financial 
firms between 2005 and 2010, the authors find that larger boards lead to higher levels of 
compensation granted to CEOs. This finding supports previous conclusions that when the 
board consists of large number of directors, decisions related to managerial perks are 
more likely to be influenced by CEOs (Méndez et al., 2011; Chalmers et al., 2006; Randøy 
and Nielsen, 2002). However, the author does not find any significant relationship 
between board independence and CEO remuneration. 
In East Asia, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) investigate the role of several corporate 
governance mechanisms in suppressing executive remuneration. Using a sample of 200 
large Japanese manufacturing firms for the years 1997 to 2007, the findings show that 
directors who are appointed by firms have a positive impact on executive remuneration, 
while independent directors and bank-appointed directors are found to be uncorrelated 
with executive pay. This finding is consistent with that of Sakawa et al. (2012) who utilise 
a more recent Japanese sample in 2010, and find that bank-appointed directors have no 
impact on executive bonuses or stock options. Higher firm performance, specifically 
profitability, is found to be linked with executives’ short-term incentives (Sakawa et al., 
2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). Additionally, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) find that 
larger firms are correlated with higher executive remuneration. However, this finding is 
not consistent with that of Sakawa et al. (2012) who find a negative relationship between 
the two variables. 
Based on a sample of 336 listed firms in Hong Kong for the period 1994 to 2002, 
Cheng and Firth (2006) examine the relationship between board independence and 
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different executive compensation forms. The descriptive results show that more than 
50% of firms do not have blockholders (Cheng and Firth, 2006, p. 554). Due to the 
disclosure requirements in Hong Kong, firms only provide information about executive 
compensation without naming the recipients (HKECL, 2003). Therefore, the study uses 
three different approaches to measure executive compensation: highest remunerated 
director, average executive compensation, and the top five paid executives. The findings 
show that independent directors reinforce the link between compensation and firm 
performance. However, there is no evidence that board independence enhances 
governance quality”, i.e. the results showed no relationship between board independence 
and all the compensation variables used in this study. The researchers attribute the 
disappointing result to the domination and power of executive directors in Hong Kong 
firms. 
It is obvious from the findings that different characteristics of board of directors 
have different impacts on executive compensation in developed countries. For example, 
CEO duality in some contexts is found to be an opportunity to extract higher managerial 
perks (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Sapp, 2008; Chalmers et al., 2006); however, in other 
countries, including the UK, there is evidence that role duality increases stewardship of 
management and leads to lower executive compensation (Alagla, 2012). Furthermore, 
the findings of some research show that when there are more independent directors, top 
managers are more likely to be compensated generously (Alagla, 2012; Armstrong et al., 
2012; Méndez et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2007). However, this finding is not conclusive since 
Cheng and Firth (2006) do not find evidence that outsider members have any relationship 
with managerial incentives in Hong Kong. Similarly in relation to the remuneration 
committee, Alagla (2012) report a negative and significant impact between the 
independent members of the committee and executive compensation, while Sapp (2008) 
observes the opposite. However, Chalevas (2011) find no evidence of a correlation. 
Therefore, it can be concluded from this discussion that the impact of the board of 
directors on executive compensation is unclear and its effectiveness is subject to 
contextual and institutional characteristics (Reddy et al., 2015). 
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3.3.1.2 Emerging Countries 
A number of studies have been carried out on the topic in different emerging 
economies, with a predominance of East Asian contexts (Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and 
He, 2012; Lin et al., 2011).  
Using a sample of 1,175 Taiwanese high-tech businesses for the years 2004 to 
2006, Lin et al. (2011) investigates the role of the board of directors in enhancing control 
through preventing excessive executive rewards. The research finds that board control is 
not significantly associated with pay-setting. They attribute this result to the low 
proportion of shares owned by directors and question if outside directors have real 
independence. This finding is inconsistent with Lin (2005), who also conduct a study in 
Taiwan and find a negative and significant association between board control and CEO 
compensation. One possible cause of these contradictory findings could be attributable 
to the fact that Lin (2005) use CEO compensation as a dependent variable, while Lin et al. 
(2011) utilise average executive remuneration. In addition, these different results might 
be a consequence of compliance with Taiwanese corporate governance which was 
introduced in 2002, because the study of Lin (2005) is based on a sample for the period 
1997 to 1999, while the sample of Lin et al. (2011) covers the years 2004 to 2006. 
Furthermore, Lin et al. (2011) find a positive link between firm performance and 
executive pay. This finding matches the those of Conyon (2014); however, Edwards et al. 
(2009) do not find any link between firm performance and CEO pay.  
However, the two studies of Lin et al. (2011) and Lin (2005) have a methodological 
drawback. For instance, they do not transform values that were highly right skewed (e.g. 
compensation, assets, sales) to their natural logarithm. Therefore, their results might 
suffer from high heteroscedasticity problems (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). To avoid such 
methodological problems, my research transforms all large positive values to their 
natural logarithm. 
China is the dominant focus among emerging countries in relation to examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation, because data 
regarding executive compensation has been available to the public since the end of the 
1990s (Conyon and He, 2012; Lin et al., 2011). Chen et al. (2010b) investigate the effect 
of a set of corporate governance mechanisms on executive compensation and analyse if 
the compensations was linked to firm performance. Their sample is based on 502 Chinese 
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listed firms for the years 2001 to 2006. They find that when a CEO chairs the board 
executives are more likely to receive higher remuneration. However, this finding does not 
match the conclusions by Conyon and He (2011), who find no evidence of such a 
relationship, though their sample timeframe is similar to Chen et al. (2010b). 
Additionally, Chen et al. (2010b) find that return on equity (ROE) is significantly and 
positively linked with executive pay level, which indicates that firm performance is a 
central criterion in determining executive rewards in China. However, the existence of a 
compensation committee is found to increase the executive compensation level. This 
surprising finding matches those of Conyon and He (2011) and Conyon and He (2012). 
The existence of a compensation committee is supposed to enhance the monitoring 
function of governance; however, Chen et al. (2010b) attribute this unexpected result to 
the use of external benchmarks. 
Another comprehensive study conducted in China is that by Conyon and He (2012). 
This study uses a larger sample that consists of 2,104 firms for the period 2000 to 2010 
to investigate the association between different corporate governance variables and CEO 
remuneration. Their results show that when a CEO simultaneously holds the position of 
board chairman, he/she earns higher compensation. Moreover, the study demonstrates 
that a larger board is significantly correlated with higher CEO pay. The basic idea behind 
this result is that when a board has more members, there will be a potential problem of 
free-riding and more coordination difficulties among directors (Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 
1993); thus the monitoring role upon CEO compensation is less effective. This finding is 
consistent with Western studies, for example Core et al. (1999) and Conyon (2014). The 
results also show that both return on assets (ROA) and stock returns have a positive and 
significant impact on CEO pay level, which complies with the Chinese corporate 
governance code that encourages a link between executive compensation and 
performance (CSRC and SETC, 2001), This result is similar to Chen et al. (2011) and 
Conyon and He (2011). However, the study shows no relationship between supervisory 
board size and board independence on the one hand, and CEO compensation on the other. 
Utilising a sample of 1,458 Chinese firms during the years 1999 to 2009, Chen et al. 
(2011) analyse if corporate governance is able to constrain excessive managerial perks. 
They find that CEO duality and executives who are members of political parties are 
associated with higher remuneration. This outcome supports the argument proposed by 
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the managerial power approach, that when managers have more power they can 
influence board decisions (Chen et al., 2011). Moreover, board independence shows a 
positive impact on executive pay. This can be attributed to managerial control over 
independent directors which makes their role less effective. Larger boards are also found 
to be associated with higher executive rewards. This conclusion is consistent with other 
findings in China, e.g. Conyon and He (2012). 
In Africa, specifically South Africa, Ntim et al. (2015) analyse 291 non-financial 
firms that traded in the years 2003 to 2007 and observe a positive and significant 
association between board size and executive compensation. This outcome supports the 
conclusions of Conyon and He (2012) and Shah et al. (2009). In addition, a strong link is 
found between top managers’ pay and firm performance. In contrast, the results show no 
effect between other corporate governance characteristics, such as board meetings, non-
executive directors, CEO duality, and executive remuneration. However, although, Ntim 
et al. (2015) capture the role of non-executive directors, they do not test the role of 
independent non-executive directors. The reason is because disclosure limitations in 
South Africa make it more difficult to distinguish between independent and affiliated 
directors. However, my study overcomes this limitation, because Saudi firms are obliged 
to classify non-executive directors into two types: affiliated and independent.  
Utilising a sample of 51 IPO-firms from five different West African countries1 
between 2000 and 2001, Hearn (2013) find that when the compensation committee is 
dominated by gray directors, CEOs are paid lower salaries. However, their presence does 
not affect the total executive compensation. In contrast, the study shows that 
independent directors are more willing to pay executives higher remuneration. Although 
this finding matches some prior studies (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Armstrong 
et al., 2012), it is inconsistent from an agency theory viewpoint, which argues that 
director independence is an effective mechanism to mitigate agency costs by restricting 
executive compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Finally, the results do not find any 
relationship between board size and managerial pay. However, the study fof Hearn 
(2013) suffers from some obvious drawbacks. For instance, it uses a very small sample 
from five different countries. What is more, it does not control for the country effects, 
because each country has a unique culture and different governance code (Renders et al., 
                                                        
1 Nigeria, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast. 
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2010). Another limitation is that the sample is a mixed sample from both financial and 
non-financial firms, but these sectors differ from each other in several important aspects, 
such as different regulations and accounting standards (Wang and Shailer, 2015).  
Recently, Irani and Gerayeli (2017) conducted a study to investigates the 
relationship between various aspect of corporate governance and CEO compensation. 
The study analyses a sample of 95 Iranian firms for the period 2010-2014 and finds that 
board independence has no effect on CEO compensation. It only observes a negatively 
significant relationship between managerial and institutional ownership and CEO 
compensation. However, this study suffers from certain methodological problems. For 
example, it defines executive compensation as “the compensation of board to loss or gain 
of company” (Irani and Gerayeli, 2017, p. 288). However, corporate boards may be 
comprised by other non-executive directors making the employed proxy less reliable. 
Furthermore, this proxy reflects the compensation as a ratio to total firm income. Thus, 
it measures the sensitivity of pay-for-performance rather than compensation as an 
amount. 
Ramaswamy et al. (2000) examines the relationship between corporate 
governance and CEO remuneration. Their study was based on 150 Indian manufacturing 
firms for the years 1992 and 1993. Even though insider directors were found to be 
positively correlated to CEO pay levels, and CEO duality was found to be negatively 
correlated to CEO pay levels, the relationships were statically insignificant. The findings 
also reveal that older CEOs were awarded higher compensation; however, a CEO who 
served longer in a firm received lower remuneration. These results indicate that 
recruiting a new, experienced and older CEO is more costly than retaining a current 
younger CEO. Ramaswamy et al. (2000) attribute these findings to cultural influence, as 
in India an older person is seen as wiser. However, Ramaswamy et al. (2000) lacks 
generalizability since it is based on a limited sample that only captures manufacturing 
sector. Moreover, it uses a very old sample, while in contrast, my study will use a wide-
ranging sample that covers all non-financial firms operating in Saudi Arabia during the 
period 2008 to 2015. 
In Pakistan, Shah et al. (2009) uses a sample of 114 non-financial firms for the 
period 2002 to 2006 and observes that larger sized boards were significantly associated 
with larger CEO compensation. This finding supports the notion that when a board 
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consists of a large number of directors, free-riding problems among directors emerge 
(Davis, 1991). The positive relationship matches finding in Western-based research 
(Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008). Furthermore, consistent with an agency 
theory perspective, the study showed that independent directors are an effective tool 
through which to improve the quality of board control i.e. it negatively influences the level 
of CEO remuneration. Unlike developed economies, such as the US and the UK, where CEO 
compensation is usually linked to performance (Ozkan, 2011; Conyon, 2014), the results 
show that Pakistani decision-makers do not use firm performance criteria to assess 
executive compensation. The study did not find any significant correlation between CEO 
duality (32% of Pakistani firms have CEO duality) and CEO pay. 
In the context of Bangladesh, Rashid (2013) investigates the relationship between 
a set of corporate governance mechanisms and executive remuneration. Based on 94 non-
financial firms for the period 2000 to 2009, the study findings reveal that higher numbers 
of independent directors correlate with higher executive compensation. This outcome 
supports other research in emerging markets (Hearn, 2013; Chen et al., 2011). Thus, the 
role and effectiveness of independent directors in protecting shareholders’ wealth, in 
emerging economies, might not be as effective as in developed countries. Moreover, both 
CEO duality and board size show no significant impact on executive pay level. These 
findings are inconsistent with agency theory which hypothesizes that these mechanisms 
are substitutive instruments of the absence of shareholder direct control (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
3.3.1.2.1 Saudi Arabia 
To the author’s best knowledge, Fallatah (2015) is the only research to investigate 
the relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation in the Saudi 
context. Based on a sample of non-financial firms in the period 2008 to 2012, Fallatah 
(2015) finds that in general board control has no clear impact on executive’s 
remuneration decisions. However, the study observes a significant sensitivity in pay-for-
performance, implying that top executives are paid according to their performance. 
Although the study by Fallatah (2015) appears to be similar to this research, there 
are differences in terms of the method, theoretical development and contribution to 
knowledge. For example, while the sample of Fallatah (2015) covers the years 2008 to 
2012, my longitudinal study includes a further three years to 2015. Furthermore, my 
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study analyses more variables in relation to the board of directors and ownership 
structure that have not been examined previously in Saudi Arabia, such as the 
characteristics of board chairperson and director ownership. Moreover, given that 
Fallatah (2015) employs only principal-agent model, my research develops more 
relevant contextual theoretical models that increase the understanding of the principal-
principal conflict and the institutional settings in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Fallatah 
(2015) has several problematic issues related to the definitions of the variables and data 
reliability. For instance, there is inconsistency within the paper with respect to the 
definitions of large shareholders’ ownership and government ownership. That is to say, 
although the paper defines ownership of large shareholders as the total shares held by an 
individual or institution to the total issued shares (i.e. a ratio), elsewhere the paper 
defines it as a dummy variable (i.e. binary) that equals one if there is an individual or 
institutional investor that owns more than 5% of the firm’s total shares and zero 
otherwise. The same scenario occurs with the variable of government ownership. The 
data reliability of Fallatah’s research is another critical issue. For example, Fallatah 
(2015) surprisingly shows that 66% of firms experience CEO duality (i.e. a single 
individual occupies both positions of CEO and board chairman concurrently) which is not 
consistent with the actual situation in the Saudi market, as my data shows only 15% of 
firms have CEO duality. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics in Fallatah’s research 
reveals that the mean of firm leverage is 42.42%, while the maximum firm leverage is 
13.82%! Indeed, the inconsistency of the research method within the paper and the 
unreasonable data reduces the validity and reliability of Fallatah’s findings.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that board of directors in general have less control 
over managerial compensation in emerging economies (Lin et al., 2011; Lin, 2005). The 
independence of board of directors (Rashid, 2013; Chen et al., 2011) is found to be 
ineffective and associated with higher managerial perks. Furthermore, while some 
research (Conyon and He, 2012; Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010b) report a positive 
and significant relationship between CEO duality and executive remuneration, others 
(Ntim et al., 2015; Conyon and He, 2012; Shah et al., 2009) did not find evidence of such 
association between the two variables. These findings demonstrate that the role of board 
of directors is immature in emerging economies in contrast to developed counterparts. 
Moreover, remuneration committees do not function as intended since they are found to 
increase executive compensation (Conyon and He, 2012; Chen et al., 2011; Conyon and 
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He, 2011). This indicates that emerging economies require customised rather than 
generic governance settings that consider the context of the institutional challenges such 
as the control of blockholders and the weakness of external governance. 
3.3.2 Ownership Structure 
Ownership concentration can reduce information asymmetry between top 
management and large shareholders (Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009). Moreover, large 
shareholders are assumed to have the ability to access their firm and the incentive to 
monitor managerial actions (Ramaswamy et al., 2000). On the basis of these assumptions, 
many empirical studies examine the association between different types of ownership 
(such as institutional, state and family ownership) and executive compensation (Sakawa 
et al., 2012; Chalevas, 2011; Méndez et al., 2011). The following subsections review the 
key studies that investigate this relationship. 
3.3.2.1 Developed Countries 
Based on a US sample, Janakiraman et al. (2010) analyse the association between 
ownership structure and executive compensation. The results show that the presence of 
top institutional investors supports the linkage of executive compensation with firm 
performance in small manager-owned companies more than in large manager-owned 
companies. In addition, the presence of top-five investors was found to have a negative 
and significant impact on the level of managerial pay in small manager-owned companies 
but a positive and significant impact on the level of managerial pay in large manager-
owned companies. These findings are consistent with the managerial power perspective, 
which argues that firms that are controlled by managers experience a reduction in the 
monitoring function that institutional investors are assumed to practise (Janakiraman et 
al., 2010). To find out if these findings are driven by the clientele effect (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003), the authors divided the sample into pre- & post-SOX (2002). They found 
that, after 2002, managerial ownership was negatively related to executive compensation 
even in large manager-owned companies. Janakiraman et al. (2010) attribute this change 
to the outrage constraint that occurred after the scandal of Enron 2001. 
Fahlenbrach (2009) investigates the effect of institutional investors on CEO 
compensation and its sensitivity to firm performance in the US. The author found that 
both institutional and pension fund ownerships are associated with lower pay-for-
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performance sensitivity. In addition, top institutional investors were shown to have a 
negative impact on the level of CEO remuneration. These findings are consistent with the 
substitution hypothesis, which assumes that firms with stronger monitoring quality 
provide less compensation relative to performance; i.e. when firms have weaker 
governance, they tend to link CEO compensation to firm performance in order to mitigate 
the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. However, there is no 
evidence of any such relationship existing between pension funds ownership and 
compensation level. 
In the UK, Ozkan (2007) investigates the role and effect of different ownership 
structures on CEO remuneration. She observes that both institutional investors and 
blockholders can play an important role in preventing excessive CEO perks. In addition, 
director ownership was found to be correlated to lower CEO pay. This finding matches 
other Western results in Méndez et al. (2011) on Spain and Sapp (2008) on Canada. Ozkan 
(2007) also documents that, when CEOs own more shares, they receive less equity-based 
compensation; i.e. they prefer cash remuneration to equity-based compensation, which 
is vulnerable to the risk of share price volatility. This conclusion is supported by Alagla 
(2012), who finds a negative association between CEO ownership and equity-based 
compensation on the one hand and a positive relationship between CEO ownership and 
short-term remuneration on the other hand. 
Similarly, Alagla (2012) used a sample of 237 UK firms over the period 2004 to 
2008 and found that, when the chairman holds more equity, the CEO gains a lower level 
of compensation. In contrast, CEO ownership is observed to be correlated to higher CEO 
salary and short-term compensation. This finding is inconsistent with Ozkan (2007), who 
observed a negative correlation between CEO equity and his/her pay level. In terms of 
institutional ownership, it is found to have a negative influence on CEO bonus; however, 
there is no evidence that it might influence other components of CEO compensation. 
In the context of Spain, Méndez et al. (2011) find a negative link between executive 
ownership and their remuneration. This is consistent with the assumption that 
managerial ownership aligns managers’ interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). It is also consistent with other empirical findings reported by Ozkan 
(2007) and Sakawa et al. (2012) who also observe that when executives own more equity, 
they demand for less compensation. This can be attributed to the fact that they will 
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receive dividends for their shares; thus, they are less concern about their managerial 
compensation.  
Chalevas (2011) demonstrates that institutional blockholders rein in the excessive 
perks of top managers. The research uses a sample of Greek firms to investigate the role 
of corporate governance mechanisms before and after the enforcement of the Greek 
corporate governance law in 2002. The findings show that the corporate governance 
requirements weaken executive power and help institutional investors to practise their 
monitoring function over pay-setting without pressure from managers. This finding is in 
line with Ozkan (2007), Lin et al. (2011), and Fahlenbrach (2009) who find that 
institutional investors play an effective role in constraining managerial perks. Although 
institutional ownership is found to be significantly correlated with lower executive 
compensation, the results show that neither individual investors nor the number of 
blockholders have any impact on executive remuneration level. Moreover, the results 
provide no evidence that managerial ownership is associated with lower total 
compensation. 
Using a sample of 104 Swedish and 120 Norwegian firms, Randøy and Nielsen 
(2002) find a negative and significant relationship between CEO ownership and their 
compensation; i.e. when CEOs own more shares, they tend to receive less compensation. 
This finding matches those of Méndez et al. (2011) and Sakawa et al. (2012) who find a 
similar relationship. It also supports agency theory perspective, which argues that, when 
managers hold more stock, their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In the context of Denmark, Banghøj et al. (2010) use a sample of 125 private firms 
to examine whether any relationship exists between ownership structure and CEO 
remuneration. Even though 36% of executives held shares in their companies, managerial 
ownership was found to have no relationship with CEO pay. Moreover, ownership 
concentration, which is high among Danish private firms, at approximately 70% (Banghøj 
et al., 2010, p. 497), had no significant impact on CEO remuneration. The absence of 
blockholder effects can be attributed to the fact that the sample only captured private 
firms which are usually controlled by certain families. Hence, if this ownership increases 
or decreases, these firms are still controlled by families. 
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Sapp (2008) uses a Canadian sample and found that CEO ownership is related to 
higher level of pay but has a weaker link with performance. This finding is consistent with 
the managerial power standpoint which argues that when managers have effective 
power, they will exploit it to increase their own compensation. The finding also supports 
other empirical studies (Li et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011) which found 
that when executives own more shares, they are more likely to receive higher 
remuneration. Regarding director ownership, the results show that both CEOs and other 
executives receive lower remuneration when directors own more shares. This outcome 
is consistent with those of Ozkan (2007) and Ntim et al. (2013) who observe a similar 
relationship between director ownership and executive pay level. This outcome is 
because of the directors’ incentives to protect their equity from opportunistic managers. 
Reddy et al. (2015) analyse the relationship between ownership structure and CEO 
compensation. Based on a sample of 390 New Zealand company-year observations for 
the period 2005 to 2010, the study found evidence that institutional investors are 
associated with higher CEO perks. This finding is not consistent with agency theorists 
who argue that institutional investment helps to improve the quality of corporate 
governance and thereby control managerial incentives (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; David 
et al., 1998). Furthermore, it contradicts the findings of others studies (Chalevas, 2011; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). However, the research did not find an association between director 
ownership or blockholders, and CEO pay. 
In Japan, Sakawa et al. (2012) found that bank ownership (average ownership 
26%) had a positive impact on bonus and stock options incentives. Even though a lender 
can play a principal role in monitoring management decisions (Triantis and Daniels, 
1995), unlike in Japan, Saudi banks are not allowed to own more than 10% of another 
joint-stock company (SAMA, 1966). Thus, they are less likely to take part in companies’ 
boards. Additionally, foreign ownership is found to be associated with higher executive 
short-and long-term incentives. This finding is consistent with Colpan and Yoshikawa 
(2012) and Randøy and Nielsen (2002) who also find a positive relationship between 
foreign investors and executive bonuses. This correlation can be attributed to the fact 
that most of these foreign investors are from the US and the UK, who are familiar with 
high executive compensation (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002). 
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In Hong Kong, Cheng and Firth (2006) note that having blockholders is an effective 
tool for enhancing governance quality as it reduces executive compensation. This result 
is consistent with the conclusion of Ozkan (2007) who finds that blockholders are 
associated with lower CEO pay level in the UK. The study also reports a negative and 
significant relationship between non-executive director ownership and managerial 
remuneration. This finding supports the view of agency theory, which maintains that 
director ownership strengthens the monitoring function and consequently constrains 
managerial excess. However, this study concentrates the different types of blockholders 
(such as state and institutions) in one variable, even though the nature and purposes of 
those owners may differ. For instance, individual investors and pension funds are profit-
seekers, whereas government investment can have purposes other than the 
maximisation of wealth. 
This review highlights that certain types of ownership, in particular institutional 
and director (Chalevas, 2011; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Sapp, 2008) and in certain countries 
such as Japan bank and foreign investment (Sakawa et al., 2012), predominate the 
literature related to developed countries. In contrast, state and individual ownership are 
found to have no significant presence in mature economies. In terms of the impact of 
ownership structure, there is almost a consensus that director ownership plays an 
effective governance role in developed economies in a way that enhances the control over 
managerial incentives (Méndez et al., 2011; Sapp, 2008; Ozkan, 2007). The presence of 
blockholders is also found to have a negative impact on executive perks (Sakawa et al., 
2012; Ozkan, 2007), although (Chalevas, 2011) did not find this effect in Greece. 
Additionally, the literature reveals that institutional investors can take part in 
governance function by preventing top managers from extracting high non-merit 
compensation (Chalevas, 2011; Ozkan, 2007). 
3.3.2.2 Emerging Countries 
In Taiwan, Lin et al. (2011) finds that institutional ownership reinforces 
governance quality and negatively affects the level of managerial pay. However, this 
finding is not supported by Lin (2005) who does not find any significant association 
between the two variables. This might be due to the difference in the timeframes, as the 
latter study uses a sample before the enforcement of the first Taiwanese corporate 
governance code (2002), while the former uses a sample after the code was applied. 
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Additionally, neither study found a relationship between ownership concentration and 
executive remuneration. 
In far east Asia, specifically in China, Conyon and He (2012) find that blockholders 
mitigate agency problems by reducing CEO compensation. In contrast, the presence of 
foreign investors is found to be associated with higher CEO compensation. This evidence 
is in line with findings of Li et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011). However, Conyon and He 
(2012) do not find a significant relationship between state ownership and CEO 
remuneration. This finding supports that of Li et al. (2007). 
In contrast, Chen et al. (2011) find that when government has a high stake in a 
company, managers of that company are less likely to be rewarded generously. This 
negative correlation implies that when Chinese authorities hold more shares in a certain 
firm, they put more effort into monitoring executive actions and, therefore, prevent 
excessive perks for executives. Moreover, the study shows executive ownership to have 
a positive and significant effect on remuneration. This relationship is not consistent with 
an agency theory perspective, which points out that when executives own more stock 
their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However, the finding supports the perspective of managerial power model which argues 
that when executives hold more stock, they have the power to control the board and 
influence decisions related to their compensation (Lambert et al., 1993).  
Recently, Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016), who use a sample of 770 Indian firms 
between 2002 and 2013, find a negative and significant association between the number 
of blockholders and CEO remuneration. Furthermore, institutional ownership was found 
to be associated with higher CEO compensation, This finding is not consistent with the 
view posited by agency model that the presence of institutional investors enhances the 
monitoring function of the board (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). In the same context, 
Ramaswamy et al. (2000) observe that individual blockholder ownership can be an 
effective tool in limiting managerial excesses in terms of executive compensation. This 
outcome is in line with Core et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2007).  
Ntim et al. (2015) use a sample of 291 South African publicly traded firms and find 
that institutional ownership enhances governance quality by reducing executive pay 
levels. This finding supports the notion that institutional ownership can be a substitutive 
tool for weak governance (Chalevas, 2011), because they have more incentive and ability 
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to monitor decisions related to executive remuneration. Supporting of findings of Sapp 
(2008) and Ozkan (2007), Ntim et al. (2015) finds that when directors hold more equity 
in a company, managers of that company earn lower level of remuneration. However, in 
West African economies, Hearn (2013) shows that both state and director ownerships 
have a positive effect on CEO salary, while, in terms of total CEO compensation, only 
family ownership was found to be associated with higher compensation.   
3.3.2.2.1 Saudi Arabia 
In the Saudi context, to the researcher’s best knowledge, Fallatah (2015) is the only 
study that investigates the relationship between ownership factors and executive 
compensation. Based on a sample of non-financial firms in the period 2008 to 2012, 
Fallatah (2015) does not find any significant relationship between state ownership or 
other large shareholders and executive remuneration. Although the study by Fallatah 
(2015) appears to be similar to this research, there are differences in terms of the 
method, theoretical development and contribution to knowledge. For example, while the 
sample of Fallatah (2015) covers the years 2008 to 2012, this longitudinal study includes 
a further three years to 2015. Furthermore, the present study analyses more variables in 
relation to the ownership structure that have not been examined previously in Saudi 
Arabia, such as director ownership. Moreover, given that Fallatah (2015) employs only 
the principal-agent model, the present research develops more relevant contextual 
theoretical models that increase the understanding of the principal-principal conflict and 
the institutional settings in Saudi Arabia. With respect to research methods, the research 
of Fallatah (2015) suffers from a number of methodological drawbacks that may affect 
the accuracy of the findings. First, the study measured state ownership as a dummy 
variable that equals one if the company has any government investment and zero 
otherwise. However, this approach does not consider the variation in the state 
investments within and across organisations. In other words, there is no difference 
whether the state owns 1% or 99%, while in practice different percentages could lead to 
different implications according to the level of control given by the shareholding. 
However, my research measures state ownership as percentage rather than using a 
binary variable. Second, Fallatah (2015) also defines large shareholders as a dummy 
variable that equals one if the company has an individual or institutional investor that 
owns more than 5% and zero otherwise. This definition does not differentiate between 
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the behaviours of individual and institutional investors towards the decisions of 
managerial perks. Thus, my study uses more specific definitions and classifies investors 
separately into three types: individuals, state and pension funds.  
Accordingly, as highlighted, companies in emerging economies can have different 
ownership structures from their counterparts in developed countries. The evidence 
demonstrates that companies in emerging economies are dominated by certain investors, 
specifically state and family (Conyon and He, 2012; Chen et al., 2010a; Lin, 2005). The 
divergence in ownership structure has implications for business policy as each type of 
investors can have different objectives for the company. Therefore, corporate governance 
regulations should consider these institutional differences between emerging and 
developed economies and customise mechanisms that fit the domestic context. For 
example, while best practice of corporate governance in developed economies suggest 
ownership concentration as a remedy for principal-agent conflict, this suggestion may 
not work in emerging countries because it leads to a conflict between the principals 
themselves with an absence of effective formal institutions. 
Furthermore, even the findings that are thought to be conclusive in the literature 
pertaining to developed countries, are found not to so in some emerging countries. For 
instance, while the negative and significant impact of director ownership on executive 
remuneration is almost universally accepted by academics in developed countries 
(Méndez et al., 2011; Sapp, 2008; Ozkan, 2007), Hearn (2013) reported that in five West 
African countries and state director ownership increases managerial compensation. 
Moreover, state ownership, which can be significant in emerging economies, is found to 
have a significant influence on compensation policy in developing economies (Young and 
Tsai, 2008; Chen et al., 2011). In contrast, the situation in developed economies is totally 
different since state investment in those markets is virtually absent. Consequently, as 
mentioned earlier the important differences between emerging and developed 
economies in terms of ownership structure must be considered when designing 
governance mechanisms; otherwise the regulations will not work effectively. 
In conclusion, although the debate on corporate governance’s ability to constrain 
executive compensation has received intensive consideration by researchers over the 
past three decades (Conyon, 2014; Conyon and He, 2012; Core et al., 1999; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b), the findings are inconclusive. This indicates that the existing literature 
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still has a number of gaps. For example, the role and effect of the chairman, who is 
considered to be more powerful than other directors and who has the right to cast an 
additional vote in some countries, have only been investigated on two dimensions, i.e. 
CEO/chairman role duality and the chairman independence. However, none of the studies 
has examined the role of chairmen as blockholders in decision pertaining to executive 
remuneration. Moreover, although studies analyse the relationship between multi-
directorships of board members and executive compensation (Armstrong et al., 2012; 
Sapp, 2008), none has yet considered the impact of chairman multi-directorships on 
decisions relating to executive compensation. 
Additionally, most research is conducted in developed countries, while emerging 
countries receive less attention, partly due to disclosure limitations. Although a number 
of studies have been carried out in various developing economies (Ntim et al., 2015; 
Rashid, 2013; Conyon and He, 2012; Lin et al., 2011), to the best of my knowledge, the 
research of Fallatah (2015) is the only study that investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance and executive compensation in the Arab world, and specifically in 
Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, my study uses a more comprehensive set of corporate 
governance mechanisms and investigates additional dimensions that are not captured by 
(Fallatah, 2015). For example, while the research of Fallatah (2015) is centred around the 
traditional agency model (principal-agent), my study develops a more relevant 
contextual-based theoretical framework that reflects a deeper understanding of the 
domestic institutional settings of Saudi Arabia, which creates setting for principal-
principal conflict. Accordingly, my study adds a valuable contribution to the current 
literature by filling these gaps. By doing so, the research extends the understanding of the 
association between corporate governance and pay-setting, particularly in contexts that 
suffer from principal-principal conflict. Table 3.1 presents summary of main research to 
date.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of Key Research  






Reddy et al. 
(2015) 
- Total CEO compensation 
- Total CEO cash compensation 
 
1. Board size 
2. Board independence 
3. Role duality 
4. Institutional ownership 
5. Blockholders 
6. Director ownership 
A sample of 390 New 
Zealand firm-year 
observations over the 
period 2005 to 2010 
- GLS 1) Institutional investors and board size have positive and significant impacts on CEO 
compensation. 
2) There is no relationship between director ownership, blockholders, or board 
independence and executive compensation. 
Al-Najjar 
(2017). 
- Total CEO compensation 1. Board size 
2. Board independence 
3. Board meetings 
 
A sample of 237 UK 
non-financial firms 
from FTSE 350 for the 
period 2004 to 2008   
- Fixed effects 1) There is a negative and significant relationship between board size and CEO pay 
2) Independent directors are more likely to pay CEOs’ higher compensation. 
3) No association is found between board meetings and CEO compensation. 
Fallatah (2015)  - CEO compensation 1. Board size 
2. Board independence 
3. Role duality 
4. State ownership 
5. Large blockholders 
A sample of Saudi non-
financial listed firms for 
the period 2008 to 
2012 
- Fixed effects 
- 2SLS 
1) Generally, board characteristics and ownership structure are not significantly 
associated with decisions related to executive compensation. 
2) There is a high sensitivity of pay-for-performance 
Sapp (2008) - Total compensation 
- Total cash compensation 
- Total variable compensation  
1. Director tenure 
2. Board independence 
3. Multiple directorships 
4. Family-related directors 
5. Directors ownership 
6. Controlling shareholder 
7. Compensation committee 
independence 
8. CEOs sit on compensation 
committee 




A sample of 400 
Canadian firms for the 
period 2000 to 2005 
- Random effects  
- Fixed effects  
1) A weak board is associated with higher executive compensation. 
2) Director ownership has a negative effect on executive pay; however, CEO ownership is 
positively and negatively related to executive remuneration. 
3) Independent directors are less likely to reward other executives high compensation. 
4) CEO duality, compensation committee independence, multi-listings in both Canada and 
the US have positive and significant relationships with CEO compensation. 
5) There is no evidence that relationships exist between CEO compensation and 





- Total CEO compensation 1. Board meetings 
2. Board size 
3. Board independence 
4. Multi-directorships of independent 
directors 
5. Institutional ownership 
6. Blockholders 
A sample of 770 Indian 
firms for the period 
2002 to 2013   
- OLS  
- Fixed effects 
1) Institutional investors increase CEO compensation, while the number of blockholder is 
associated with lower CEO pay. 
2) If independent directors have multi-directorships, CEOs are more likely to earn higher 
compensation. 
3) There are no relationships between board meetings, size, or independence and CEO 
pay. 
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Cheng and Firth 
(2006) 
- Total CEO pay  
- Executive directors pay  
- Top five executives pay  
- Bonus per executive 
 
1. Non-executive director ownership  
2. Blockholder ownership  
3. Board independence 
4. Independent director ownership 
A sample of 336 firms 
listed in Hong Kong for 
the period 1994 to 
2002 
 
- Fixed effects 1) Both non-executive directors who own more shares and large blockholders are more 
likely to pay executives less compensation. 
2) There is no evidence that either independent directors or independent director 
ownership affects the level of executive remuneration. 
3) Independent directors invoke greater pressure to link compensation to firm 
performance. 
 Méndez et al. 
(2011) 
- Total compensation 
- Variable compensation 
- Variation of total 
compensation 
 
1. Board independence 
2. Compensation committee 
independence 
3. Board size 
4. Compensation committee size  
5. Ownership concentration 
6. Ownership of board non-executive 
directors 
7. Ownership of board executive 
directors 
 
A sample of 77 Spanish 
firms for the period 
2005 to 2009 
- OLS  1) Board independence has a positive impact on executive compensation, whereas 
independent directors on compensation committee are related with lower managerial 
remuneration. 
2) Larger sizes of both board and compensation committee tend to weaken the 
governance quality by providing more compensation to executive. 
3) Ownership of executive directors who serve either on board or on remuneration 
committee is associated with lower compensation. 
4) Large shareholders and non-executive director ownership have negative but 
insignificant effect on executive rewards. 
5) Change in shareholder wealth is one of the main drivers of executive compensation in 
Spain.   
Randøy and 
Nielsen (2002) 
- Total compensation 1. Board size 
2. Foreign board membership 
3. CEO tenure 
4. CEO ownership 
A sample of 224 listed 
firms, which 120 are 
from Norway and 104 
are from Sweden for 
1998 
- OLS  1) Large board of directors and foreign directors found to be related with higher CEO pay. 
2) CEO ownership has a negative and significant relationship with CEO compensation. 
3) There is no evidence that CEO tenure has any impact on the CEO compensation. 
4) Large firms are more likely to grant CEOs higher rewards.  
Edwards et al. 
(2009) 
- Total compensation per 
manager 
1. Management board size 
2. Supervisory board size 
3. Ownership concentration 
A sample of 271 firms 
listed in Germany for 
the period 1989 to 
1993. 
 
- OLS  
- LAV  
 
 
1) Supervisory board size has a positive and significant effect on managerial 
compensation. 
2) Management board size is associated with lower levels of executive pay. 
3) There is a positive and significant linkage between firm performance (ROE) and 
executive remuneration. 
4) The findings show that ownership structure has little impact on the sensitivity of pay-
for-performance. 
Armstrong et al. 
(2012) 
- Total CEO compensation 1. Board size 
2. Board independence 
3. Board old  
4. Board busy 
5. Chairman independence 
6. Directors appointed by the CEO 
7. Activist shareholders 
A sample of 2,110 firms 
listed in the US for the 
year of 2006. 
 
- OLS  
- Fixed effects  
1) Independent and busy directors have a positive and significant impact on CEO 
compensation. 
2) An independent chairman constrains CEO pay. 
3) New and older CEOs are related with lower compensation. 
4) There is no evidence of any relationship between board size, board old, stock price, or 
founder CEO and CEO remuneration. 
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Conyon (2014) - Total compensation 
- Total realised compensation 
1. Board size 
2. Non-independent directors on 
board 
3. Non-independent directors on 
compensation committee 
 
Various sample of 
S&P500, S&P Mid-Cap 
and S&P Small-Cap 
firms listed in the US 
for the period of 2008 
to 2012. 
 
- OLS  
- Fixed effect  
1) There is no evidence that non-independent directors are associated with higher 
executive compensation.  
2) A large board weakens the governance quality with regard to executive compensation. 
3) Executive compensation is largely based on firm performance (shareholder returns 
and ROA). 
4) Executive remuneration is elastic to firm sales by about 35%. 
5) Female executives receive less compensation than males. 




- Total CEO compensation 
- Equity based compensation 
- Non-equity based 
compensation 
1. Independence of board of directors 
2. Independence of compensation 
committee 
3. Independence of nominating 
committee 
A sample of 865 US 
firms from S&P 1500 
for the period 2000 to 
2005 
- Fixed effects 
 
1) CEO compensation decreases after the promulgation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(2002). 
2) Board of directors, compensation committees, and nomination committees which 
consist of majority of independent directors have a negative and significant impact on 
CEO compensation. 
3) After 2002, CEO compensation has been significantly linked to firm performance. 
 Janakiraman et 
al. (2010) 
- Total cash compensation 
- Total direct compensation  
1. Top-five managerial ownership 
2. Top-five institutional ownership 
A sample of 1,350 US 
firms for the period 
1993 to 2008 
- Multivariate 
linear regression 
1) Top-five institutional investors are negatively associated with executive compensation 
in small managerial ownership companies. 
2) Top-five institutional investors are positively associated with executive compensation 
in large managerial ownership companies. 
3) Top-five institutional investors have a positive effect on pay-for-performance 
sensitivity in small managerial ownership companies. 
4) Top-five institutional investors have a negative effect on pay-for-performance 
sensitivity in large managerial ownership companies. 
5) Managerial ownership has a negative and significant effect on executive pay after 2002 
due to the outrage constraint.  
Fahlenbrach 
(2009) 
- Total CEO compensation 
- CEO Ownership 
1. Board size 
2. CEO duality  
3. Board independence 
4. Institutional ownership 
5. Pension fund ownership 
6. CEO tenure 
 
A sample of 11,029 US 
firm-year observations  
over the period 1993 to 
2004 
- Fixed effects  
 
1) CEO duality and CEO tenure positively and significantly affect CEO compensation. 
2) Institutional ownership, pension funds ownership, board size, and board 
independence are associated with lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
3) Firms that have high institutional ownership concentration are associated with lower 
CEO pay. 
4) Managers who occupy both positions of CEO and chairman are correlated with higher 
remuneration. 
 
Chalevas (2011) - Total cash compensation per 
executive 
1. Board size 
2. CEO duality 
3. Existence of compensation 
committee 
4. Managerial ownership 
5. Institutional ownership 
6. Individual ownership 
7. Blockholder number 
8. Existence of  audit committee 
A sample of 386 Greek 
firm-year observations 
over the period 2000-
2003 
- OLS  
- 2SLS   
1) The enforcement of corporate governance code creates a linkage between executive 
compensation and firm performance. 
2) Institutional ownership and existence of independent audit committee have a negative 
and significant effect on executive remuneration. 
3) Firm size and firm growth positively impact managerial pay. 
4) There is no evidence that board size, CEO duality, existence of compensation 
committee, managerial ownership, or blockholder number have correlation with 
executive remuneration. 
 
Banghøj et al. 
(2010) 
- Total cash compensation 1. The presence of CEO on board 
2. Board size 
3. Insider directors 
4. Ownership concentration 
5. Executive ownership 
 
A sample of 125 large 
and mid-size Danish 
private firms for 2007 
- 2SLS   
- 3SLS   
1) There is positive and significant relationship between board size, CEO education, and 
firm size and total CEO cash compensation. 
2) There is no evidence that insider directors, ownership concentration, or managerial 
ownership influence CEO remuneration level. 
3) Pay-for-performance sensitivity is found to be weak among Danish private firms. 
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Sakawa et al. 
(2012) 
- Total of incentives (bonuses 
and stock options) 
- Cash bonuses 
- Stock options 
1. Executive ownership 
2. Bank ownership 
3. Foreign ownership 
4. Outside director 
5. Bank directors 
6. Executive tenure 
A sample of 200 large 
Japanese firms for 2010 
- Tabit model 1) Executive ownership and executive tenure have a negative and significant effect on 
executive incentives. 
2) Outside directors are associated with higher stock options. 
3) Bank ownership, foreign ownership, and ROA positively and significantly impact both 




- Total bonus per executive 1. Bank-appointed directors 
2. Corporate-appointed directors 
3. Foreign ownership 
4. Independent directors 
A sample of 200 large 
Japanese firms for the 
period 1997 to 2007 
- Fixed effects  1) Corporate-appointed directors, foreign ownership, ROE, firm size, CEO age, and CEO 
succession show positive and significant relationship with executive bonuses. 
2) There is no evidence that bank-appointed directors or independent directors have any 
impact on executive bonus. 
3) Foreign investors are found to be profit seekers, while corporates are found to be 
growth seekers. 
 
Chalmers et al. 
(2006) 
- Fixed CEO compensation 
- CEO bonuses 
- CEO options 
- CEO shares issued 
- Total CEO compensation 
1. CEO duality 
2. Board size 
3. Outside directors 
4. Gray directors 
5. Existence of compensation 
committee 
6. CEO ownership 
7. CEO option holdings 
8. Outside director ownership 
9. Number of blockholders 
 
A sample of 200 large 
Australian firms for the 
period 1999 to 2002 
- OLS  1) CEO duality has a negative and significant effect on CEO shares issued. 
2) Board size is associated with higher CEO fixed and bonus compensation. 
3) Outside directors have no impact on any components of CEO compensation except for 
a negative influence on the fixed aspect. 
4) There is evidence that CEO ownership can mitigate the agency problem by reducing 
executive remuneration. 
5) Larger and more profitable firms are correlated with higher compensation. 
6) There is no evidence that outside director ownership or number of blockholders 
influence the level of executive pay. 
 
Lin et al. (2011) - Total executives’ compensation 1. Board of directors 
2. Institutional ownership 
3. Blockholders 
4. Firm performance 
A sample of 1,175 
Taiwanese high-tech 
businesses for the 






1) Institutional ownership is negatively and significantly correlated to executive 
remuneration. 
2) Firm performance and firm size show a positive impact on managerial pay. 
3) Neither board of directors nor ownership concentration have any effect on executive 
rewards. 
Lin (2005) - CEO cash compensation 1. Board of directors 
2. Blockholders 
3. Firm performance 
4. CEO power 
A sample of 485 
Taiwanese firms for the 






1) Board control is negatively and significantly related to CEO pay. 
2) Firm size shows a positive impact on CEO remuneration. 
3) These are no relationships between blockholders, CEO power, or firm performance, 
and CEO compensation. 
Li et al. (2007) - CEO cash compensation 1. CEO duality  
2. Board size  
3. Supervisory board size  
4. Outside directors 
5. CEO ownership  
6. Legal person ownership  
7. State ownership  
8. Foreign ownership 
 
A sample of 206 
Chinese firms for the 
period 2000 to 2001 
- OLS  
- IRLS  
1) Independent directors, CEO ownership, and foreign ownership are associated with 
higher executive pay. 
2) Firm size positively and significantly influences executive remuneration. 
3) There is no relationship between CEO duality, board size, supervisory board size, legal 
person ownership, state ownership, or firm performance and executive 
compensation. 
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Conyon and He 
(2011) 
- Executive cash compensation 
- Change in pay 
1. Ownership concentration 
2. Board independence  
3. Board size 
4. CEO duality 
5. Existence of a compensation 
committee 
A sample of 1342 
Chinese firms for the 
period 2001 to 2005 
- OLS 
- Random effects 
- Fixed effects 
1) Existence of compensation committee has a positive impact on executive pay. 
2) Existence of ownership concentration has negative impact on executive pay. 
3) ROA, firm size, and growth opportunity are the main derivers of executive 
compensation. 
4) There is no significant correlation between board size, independent directors, or CEO 
duality and executive pay. 
 
Conyon and He 
(2012) 
- CEO cash compensation 1. CEO duality 
2. Board size 
3. Supervisory board size 
4. Independence of board of directors 
5. Existence of a compensation 
committee 
6. State ownership 
7. Foreign ownership 
8. Blockholder ownership 
 
 
A sample of 2104 
Chinese firms  for the 
period 2000 to 2010 
- OLS 
- Fixed effects 
1) Board size and existence of compensating committee are related to excessive 
remuneration. 
2) Foreign ownership has a positive impact on CEO compensation. 
3) Blockholders have a negative impact on CEO compensation. 
4) ROA, stock return, and firm size are associated with higher CEO pay. 
5) There are no significant relationships between supervisory board size, independent 
directors, or state ownership and CEO remuneration. 
Chen et al. 
(2010b) 
- Executive cash compensation 1. CEO duality 
2. CEO ownership 
3. CEO is the largest shareholder 
4. Board independence 
5. Supervisory board size 
6. Blockholders 
7. Existence of a compensation 
committee 
8. Foreign ownership (dummy) 
A sample of 502 
Chinese firms  for the 
period 2001 to 2006 
- Fixed effects 1) Managerial power (CEO duality, high executive ownership) is associated with higher 
executive pay. 
2) Foreign investors and existence of compensation committee have a positive impact on 
executive remuneration.  
3) Blockholders have a negative effect on executive pay level. 
Chen et al. 
(2011) 
- Executive cash compensation 1. Executive ownership 
2. State ownership 
3. Foreign ownership 
4. Party (political power) 
5. Board size 
6. Board Independence 
7. CEO duality 
 
 
A sample of 1458 
Chinese firms for the 
period 1999 to 2009 
- OLS 
- Fixed effects 
1) Executive and foreign ownership have a positive impact on executive compensation. 
2) State ownership has a negative impact on executive compensation. 
3) Political executive, CEO duality, and executive gender are associated with higher 
remuneration. 
4) Board size and independent directors positively and significantly affect executive pay. 
5) Executive compensation is positively and significantly linked to firm performance 
(ROA, EPS, and Tobin’s Q). 
Shah et al. 
(2009) 
- CEO total compensation 1. Board size 
2. Board independence 
3. CEO duality 
4. Shareholder activism 
5. Audit committee independence 
6. Institutional ownership 
7. Ownership concentration 
8. Ownership structure 
 
A sample of 114 non-
financial Pakistani 
firms for the period 
2002 to 2006 
- GLS 1) There is a positive relationship between board size and CEO compensation. 
2) There is a negative relationship between board independence and CEO compensation. 
3) Ownership concentration has a positive effect on CEO remuneration. 
4) There is no relationship between, CEO duality, institutional ownership from one hand, 
and CEO pay for other. 
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Ntim et al. 
(2015) 
- CEO cash compensation 
- CEO non-cash compensation 
- CEO total compensation 
- Executive cash compensation 
- Executive non-cash 
compensation 
- Total executive compensation 
 
1. Board size 
2. Board meetings 
3. Non-executive directors 
4. Blockholders 
5. Institutional ownership 
6. Director ownership 
7. Compensation committee 
independence 
8. CEO duality 
A sample of 291 non-
financial South African 
firms  for the period 
2003 to 2007 
- Fixed effects 
- 3SLS 
1) Board size has a positive impact on executive compensation. 
2) Both institutional and director ownership have a negative and significant effect on 
executive remuneration. 
3) There is no evidence of any relationships between board meetings, non-executive 
directors, CEO duality, or blockholders and executive pay level. 
Hearn (2013) - Executive base salary 
- Total executive compensation 
1. Gray committee 
2. Board size 
3. Board independence 
4. Director ownership 
5. State ownership 
6. Family ownership 
A sample of 51 firms  
from five different 
West African countries 
for the period 2000 to 
2011 
 
- OLS 1) Gray committee, state ownership, and director ownership have positive impacts on 
executive salary. 
2) Board independence positively and significantly affects both managerial salary and 
total compensation. 
3) Firm ownership is associated with higher executive remuneration. 
Rashid (2013) - Total cash compensation 1. CEO duality  
2. Board size 
3. Board independence 
4. Director ownership  
5. Institutional ownership 
6. Executive pay 
A sample of 94 non-
financial Bangladeshi 
firms  for the period 
2000 to 2009 
- OLS 
- Fixed effects 
1) There is a positive and significant relationship between independent directors and 
executive pay level. 
2) The results showed no evidence that board size, CEO duality, institutional ownership, 
or director ownership have any effect on executive compensation. 
Ramaswamy et 
al. (2000) 
- Total CEO compensation 1. Insider directors 
2. CEO duality 
3. Family ownership 
4. State ownership 
5. Public ownership 
6. Institutional ownership 
7. CEO age 
8. CEO tenure 
 
A sample of 150 
manufacturing Indian 
firms  for the period 
1992 to 1993 
- OLS 1) There are negative and significant relationships between family ownership, public 
ownership, and institutional ownership and CEO compensation. 
2) An older CEO is associated with higher compensation, while CEO tenure shows a 
negative correlation with CEO remuneration. 
3) No correlation exists between insider directors, CEO duality, or state ownership and 
CEO pay. 
Alagla (2012) - CEO salary 
- CEO Bonus 
- CEO short-term compensation 
- CEO total compensation 
1. Board size 
2. Non-executive directors 
3. Independent directors 
4. CEO duality 
5. Chairman independence 
6. Compensation committee size 
7. Compensation committee 
independence 
8. Other CEOs on Compensation 
committee  
9. CEO ownership 
10. Chairman ownership 
11. Institutional ownership 
A sample of 237 UK 
non-financial firms 
from FTSE  350  for the 
period 2004 to 2008   
- GLS 
- Fixed effects 
- OLS 
1) There is a positive relationship between board size, non-executive directors, 
independent directors for one hand and CEO compensation from other. 
2) CEO duality, compensation committee size, compensation committee independence 
have a negative and significant effect on CEO remuneration. 
3) Other CEOs on compensation committee positively influence short-term and total CEO 
compensation. 
4) Compensation committee pay and CEO ownership have a positive and significant 
impact on CEO pay level. 
5) Chairman equity found to be associated with lower CEO rewards. 
6) Institutional ownership has a negative impact only on CEO bonus 
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Ozkan (2007) - CEO cash compensation 
- CEO equity-based 
compensation 
- CEO total compensation 
1. Board size 
2. Non-executive directors 
3. Four largest institutional 
ownership 
4. Total Institutional ownership 
5. Block-holder ownership 
6. Directors ownership 
7. CEO ownership 
A sample of 414 UK 
firms for the years 
2003 to 2004 
- OLS 
- Tobit regression 
1) Both board size and non-executive directors have a positive relationship with CEO 
compensation. 
2) Institutional ownership and blockholders are negatively associated with CEO pay level. 
3) CEO ownership is related to lower CEO equity-based compensation. 
4) Director ownership has a negative and significant impact on CEO remuneration. 
Firth et al. 
(2007) 
- CEO cash compensation 1. State ownership 
2. Outsider blockholders 
3. Foreign share 
4. Non-executive directors 
5. Board size 
6. CEO duality 
7. Stock returns 
A sample of 549 
Chinese firms for the 
years 1998 to 2000 
 
- OLS 1) State ownership and outsider blockholders have a negative and significant effect on 
CEO cash compensation. 
2) Foreign investors are associated with higher CEO compensation. 
3) A larger board is more likely to reduce CEO remuneration. 




- Executive salary 1. Ownership concentration 
2. Corporate ownership 
3. Foreign ownership 
4. Bank ownership 
5. Family ownership 
A sample of 100 
German firms for the 
period 1970 to 1986 
 
- Fixed effects 
- GMM 
1) All ownership structures (including corporate, foreign, bank, family, and ownership 
concentration) have a negative and significant impact on executive salary. 
2) Firms with lager sales reward executives with higher salaries. 
3) There is no link between firm performance and executive salary. 
Basu et al. 
(2007) 
- Total cash compensation 1. Outside directors 
2. Board size 
3. Family-controlled firms 
4. Managerial ownership 
5. Main bank 
6. Keiretsu membership 
 
A sample of 174 large 
Japanese firms for the 
period 1992 to 1996 
- Cross-sectional 
regression 
- Pooled regression 
1) Outside directors have a negative impact on executive compensation. 
2) Both family controlled-firms and managerial ownership were associated with higher 
executive pay. 
3) There is a positive link between executive compensation and firm performance. 
4) Older and more experienced executives receive higher remuneration. 
5) There is no relationship between board size and compensation level. 
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3.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.4.1 Hypotheses Development 
3.4.1.1 Composition of Board of Directors 
The board of directors is considered by some to be the most effective instrument, 
of all the internal corporate governance mechanisms, for safeguarding shareholders’ 
interests Ramaswamy et al. (2000). The importance of the board of directors emanates 
from the agency theory viewpoint which argues that managerial activities must be 
controlled and monitored (Lin, 2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, others, such as 
stewardship theory proponents, argue that the role of the board of directors is wider than 
solely monitoring top management (Davis et al., 1997). The responsibilities of the board 
also include coordinating and connecting the views of shareholders and management. It 
is also a supportive tool helping management to set strategic plans.  
According to corporate law and corporate governance regulations, one major 
responsibility of the board of directors is to design appropriate managerial incentives to 
align shareholders’ and executives’ interests (Lin, 2005). This mission is usually 
delegated to the remuneration committee, which negotiates compensation issues with 
top executives and puts forward recommendations to the board of directors for approval 
(Conyon, 2014). As the composition of the board and its committees is influential, 
corporate governance recommendations typically distinguish between insider 
(executive) and outsider (non-executive) directors (Chen et al., 2011). This is because 
non-executive directors are expected to be more loyal to shareholders and less influenced 
by the management team, hence providing a better monitoring performance.  
Although many theorists believe that board size is also an indication of governance 
quality (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Core et al., 1999; 
Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008), in the KSA the board size is specified at between three and 
eleven members. This contrasts with other countries such as the UK, the US, Germany and 
Japan, where the board size is left to discretion of the company. Therefore, all firms in 
Saudi Arabia have small boards of directors. Consequently, it is pointless to include this 
variable in the research, while other less researched variables, such as the role of board 
chairman, deserve inclusion.  
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a) Board Independence 
Given the fact that corporate board structure in KSA is based on a one-tier system 
that is similar to the system commonly used in Anglo-Saxon countries, there is the 
potential for interlocking connections between executive and non-executive directors 
(Core et al., 1999). However, not all non-executive directors are necessarily independent, 
because some non-executive directors can have indirect interests or business 
relationships with the company or the managerial team (Chen et al., 2011; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Core et al., 1999). In this context, SCGRs distinguishes between the non-
executive directors who are affiliated with top managers and independent directors who 
have no affiliations with the managers. Thus, firms have to classify board members into 
three categories, namely executive, non-executive and independent (CMA, 2010). A 
number of studies also follow distinguish between non-executive directors and 
independent directors by using different denotations such as non-independent directors, 
affiliated directors or ‘gray’ directors (Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). 
In the literature, board independence is widely used as a proxy for board 
effectiveness (Ntim et al., 2015; Jensen et al., 2004; Core et al., 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that independent directors are free from CEO 
influence; thus, their judgements about CEO performance are unbiased and neutral. 
Although independent directors have no direct financial interests in the company, they 
have other motivations, such as curbing managerial opportunism in order to create a 
good reputation in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Ozerturk, 2005). By 
doing so, they may increase their own reputation and enhance their opportunities to find 
positions on other corporate boards, which results in greater personal benefits. 
Consequently, those who propose that the board of directors be preponderantly 
composed of independent directors axiomatically expect a negative relationship between 
board independence and executive compensation. 
However, some critics argue that widening the number of outsider members to the 
board of directors may have adverse and undesirable consequences (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1997; Conyon, 2014; Li et al., 2007). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1997) point 
out that independent members have no interest in the firm’s equity; thus, they have no 
adequate motivation to strictly monitor top management activities. Furthermore, Li et al. 
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(2007) add that outsider directors may have limited knowledge of and expertise in the 
firm’s activities; hence, they will be unable to perform their monitoring role properly. 
Additionally, as discussed previously, not all independent directors enjoy real and full 
independence; there are various factors that may affect directors’ attitudes. For instance, 
directors may be former employees of the company and have a close relationships with 
the incumbent managers; the CEO may have taken part in the appointment of 
independent directors, who may reciprocate the favour by setting higher managerial pay; 
or directors may have hidden associations with senior managers (Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 1999). Accordingly, those who critique the presence of 
independent directors predict a low quality of governance and, hence, higher managerial 
remuneration. 
Theoretically, there are two counter-models, one of which supports the role of 
board independence with regard to executive compensation, while the other criticises 
this role. The first model is ‘optimal contracting’, which postulates that independent 
directors ensure that the negotiation process of executive compensation between the 
board of directors and top executives is subject to the arms-length principle (Core et al., 
2003; Janakiraman et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 2015). Therefore, the higher the number of 
independent directors, the lower the executive pay. However, the other model, 
‘managerial power’, takes an opposing view. It argues that the negotiation process of 
executive remuneration is subject to the ability of managers to influence their 
compensation decisions (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). According to this model, 
independent directors are more easily captured and controlled by powerful managers, 
particularly if those executives are able to participate in the decisions on directorship re-
nomination (Ozerturk, 2005). In this case, independent directors would prefer to go along 
with executive pay arrangements rather than challenge them, especially as there are 
practically no repercussions for independent directors if they approve such payments 
(Chalevas, 2011). Consequently, greater board independence may strengthen the 
managerial dominance over the board’s decisions, which will lead to higher executive 
pay. 
Empirically, numerous researchers have examined the effect of board and 
remuneration committee independence on executive compensation and have obtained 
mixed findings, albeit with predominantly positive associations. In the US and Canada, 
102 | P a g e  
 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sapp (2008) found that independent directors 
negatively and significantly impact managerial pay, although other studies in Anglo-
Saxon contexts (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Armstrong et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Chalmers et al., 2006; Ozkan, 2007) found adverse outcomes, i.e. higher board 
independence leads to higher executive pay. Furthermore, a few studies have observed 
that board independence plays no significant role on managerial compensation in the US 
(Conyon, 2014; Petra and Dorata, 2008), in the UK (Conyon and Peck, 1998), and in 
Canada (Schiehll and Bellavance, 2009).  
In emerging and East Asian countries where large shareholders predominantly 
control corporate decisions and serve on the board, the role of independent directors 
appears to be ineffective. For example, studies carried out in Japan (Sakawa et al., 2012), 
China (Chen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2007), Bangladesh (Rashid, 2013) and West Africa 
(Hearn, 2013) find a positive relationship between outsider directors and managerial 
remuneration. In contrast, two studies, one in Japan (Basu et al., 2007) and one in South 
Africa (Ntim et al., 2015), found independent directors to be an effective mechanism for 
curbing executive compensation, while many other researchers found no association 
between independent members and managerial pay decisions (Cheng and Firth, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2010b; Firth et al., 2007; Conyon and He, 2011; 2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 
2012). 
Nevertheless, although outsider-independent directors are conceptually perceived 
as an effective instrument for constraining managerial opportunistic activities (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), there is evidence that independent directors have less impact and 
effectiveness “in contexts where large family-owned conglomerates control significant 
sectors of the economy” (Ramaswamy et al., 2000, p. 175). Saudi Arabia is a prime 
example where certain families control approximately 57% of listed firms and generally 
own 95% of the private sector (Alriyadh, 2013). Moreover, nearly 85% of Saudi corporate 
boards have at least one blockholder director; therefore, there is no real separation 
between ownership and control. Although, in KSA, executive directors are allowed to sit 
on the nomination committee and participate in the process of nominating board 
members, independent directors know that their renewal decisions are in the hands of 
blockholders who control the decision-making. Thus, they would prefer to support 
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decisions approved by large shareholders rather than collude with top management 
(Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). 
However, this dominance of powerful families over decision-making may also limit 
the effectiveness of outsider directors’ efforts to protect minority shareholders’ interests 
for various reasons. First, independent directors have less motivation to perform their 
stewardship role in the presence of a powerful dominant blockholder. Additionally in 
accordance with institutional theory, in such a context there is potential for independent 
directors being ostensibly elected solely to fulfil the SGCR requirements and legitimate 
the firm’s existence (Young et al., 2008). On the basis of these arguments, it can be argued 
that independent directors play no effective role in constraining executive compensation 
in KSA. Consequently, the research formulates the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positively significant relationship between board independence and executive 
compensation. 
b) Role Duality 
One important dimension of board composition that is widely discussed by 
researchers is CEO duality (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Li et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Conyon and He, 2011; Shah et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2007; Chalevas, 2011; Conyon and 
Peck, 1998). CEO duality refers to the situation where the CEO holds the position of board 
chairman simultaneously (Core et al., 1999). This combination of positions in the hands 
of a single person increases the power of the CEO not only over the management but also 
over the board of directors. Power can be defined here as “the capacity of individual 
actors to exert their will” (Shah et al., 2009, p. 151). Therefore, the CEO will serve as an 
executive manager and a supervisor of managerial activities simultaneously. Recently, 
CEO/chairman duality has received considerable attention from researchers and has 
been utilised as a reliable measurement for CEO power (Ntim et al., 2015; Conyon and He, 
2012; Rashid, 2013).  
This duality of roles leads agency theorists to believe that granting excessive power 
to management will probably increase the agency costs through the implementation of 
higher managerial pay (Jensen, 1993; Core et al., 1999). Moreover, Jensen (1993) argues 
that the self-pecuniary goals of the CEO conflict with the duties of the chairperson of the 
board of directors, who is in charge of assessing and paying top executives. Therefore, 
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executive remuneration level is determined according to the power of the CEO over pay 
decisions (Ramaswamy et al., 2000).  
The rationale behind the assumption that CEO duality will strengthen CEO control 
over the board of directors can be attributed to several factors. First, when the CEO serves 
as chairperson, he/she will be able to communicate directly and frequently with other 
directors of the board (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). Hence, board independence may be 
severely impaired (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994; Chalevas, 2011). Furthermore, role 
duality will constrain the board of directors from performing their primary duty, which 
is to hold the management to account. For example, Goyal and Park (2002) observe very 
low sensitivity between CEO turnover and firm performance when the CEO acts as the 
chairperson of the board of directors at the same time. Thus, having two different people 
in the roles should increase the objectivity of CEO compensation (Ramaswamy et al., 
2000).  
However, proponents of stewardship theory challenge the pessimistic view of the 
agency model with regard to CEO behaviour (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Some scholars argue that leaders can perform their 
stewardship role correctly, if they have been granted trust, proper authority and 
discretion (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). They believe that the orientation of the 
manager’s utility is collective rather than individual, because the success of the firm 
equates to his/her own success (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In other words, if the 
company achieves a superior performance, the CEO will indeed earn more rewards in 
recognition of his/her efforts. Structurally, therefore, the CEO can be granted the required 
authority if he/she also chairs the board of directors (Lin, 2005; Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). 
The outcomes of most empirical studies confirm the view of agency theory towards 
CEO duality; i.e. when the CEO also serves as the board chairman, he/she will extract 
higher compensation (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Sapp, 2008; Chen 
et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2012; Core et al., 1999). Moreover, Petra 
and Dorata (2008) observe a low ratio of performance pay to total CEO compensation 
when the CEO also chairs the board. Other studies, however, find no significant 
association between the two variables (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Li et al., 2007; Ntim et 
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al., 2015; Conyon and He, 2011; Shah et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2007; Chalevas, 2011; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998).  
In contrast, the stewardship model does not appear to explain the reality of 
executive compensation. For example, only two studies found a negative and significant 
relationship between CEO/chairman duality and CEO compensation. The first study 
(Chalmers et al., 2006) observes that when the CEO has higher power, he/she earns lower 
compensation in the form of shares. However, this finding can be interpreted in a 
different way; i.e. because the CEO was able to influence his/her pay decisions, he/she 
preferred to receive lower compensation related to firm performance. Thus, the result 
may support the agency theory argument. Meanwhile, the other study (Rashid, 2013) 
finds that CEO duality negatively and significantly affects CEO remuneration. This can be 
attributed to the fact that Bangladesh (the location of the study) is a developing country 
where families have absolute control over firms; thus, CEOs who also chair the boards are 
usually family members who have blocks of shares and seek organisational profits rather 
than self-utility through higher compensation. 
The situation in Saudi Arabia is fairly similar to that of Bangladesh; i.e. family 
members are present in most firms’ boards and managements. Despite the fact that SRCG 
mandates that firms diversify the positions of CEO and board chairperson, 15% of board 
chairpersons perform executive functions and hold positions in other names rather than 
CEO. Hence, this study uses an alternative method to measure executive power, i.e. the 
combination of the position of chairperson with any other executive post. As most 
chairpersons are family members, their power is increased. Therefore, it can be argued 
that, practically speaking, there is no separation between ownership and control in the 
KSA. In addition, blockholders can maximise their wealth much more effectively by 
achieving higher organisational profits than by earning higher executive compensation 
(Ozkan, 2007; Cheng and Firth, 2006). Accordingly, the study develops the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negatively significant relationship between role duality and executive 
compensation. 
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c) Blockholder Chairman 
The position of board chair is of paramount importance, not only for its prestigious 
features but also for its influential role (Nada and Andrew, 2007; Ding et al., 2015). That 
is to say, it grants its occupier the power and authority to set meetings’ agendas and 
supervise the processes of hiring, firing, and compensating top executives (Jensen, 1993; 
Petra and Dorata, 2008). Moreover, the chairperson’s position is considered to be more 
powerful than those of other directors as it carries the legal right to cast an additional 
vote in certain countries, such as Germany and The Netherlands (Commission, 2013; 
Douma, 1997). For these advantages, large shareholders usually compete for chairing 
board of directors. 
The author failed to find any empirical study that examines the relationship 
between a blockholder chairman and managerial pay. However, Alagla (2012), who uses 
a UK sample, finds that the greater the proportion of chairperson ownership, the lower 
the CEO remuneration. In other words, when the chairperson holds more shares and, 
hence, greater power, his/her monitoring effectiveness over CEO compensation 
increases. Moreover, Conyon and He (2004) found a negative and significant relationship 
between the presence of a blockholder on the remuneration committee and CEO pay level 
in the US. 
In Saudi Arabia, where power distance is scored at 95% by The Hofstede Centre 
(2014), the chairperson receives high levels of respect by all parties including the board 
of directors, management, the public, and other stakeholders. Hence, large shareholders 
normally utilise their voting rights and influence to win this prestigious and powerful 
position. This attitude is supported by the fact that 70% of Saudi corporate boards are 
chaired by blockholders. The combination of occupying such a position and holding a 
block of voting rights increases the chairman’s control over all other parties including the 
executive team. Therefore, if the chairman holds both dimensions of power, his influence 
and contribution in restricting executive compensation are expected to be greater. 
Accordingly, the research formulates the following hypothesis: 
H3: If the board of directors is chaired by a blockholder, top managers will receive 
significantly lower compensation. 
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d) Chairman Multi-Directorships 
Due to the importance of the chairperson’s position, it is worth studying other 
characteristics in depth such as chairman directorships on other company boards. The 
debate regarding this matter has revealed two opposing perspectives. Fama and Jensen 
(1983b) argue that when a director holds multi-memberships of other corporate boards, 
he/she will gain more knowledge and experience. In so doing, his/her monitoring 
performance will be greatly improved; therefore, this will lead to a reduction in the level 
of executive compensation. Moreover, sitting on other companies’ boards gives the 
director more opportunities to use benchmarking criteria for managerial compensation. 
In contrast, Ozdemir and Upneja (2012) argue that serving on other corporate boards 
leads to reduced supervisory efficiency. Their argument matches that of Petra and Dorata 
(2008) who also believe that multi-directorships will reduce the time and effort allocated 
to each company. 
Although no single study has examined the relationship between chairman multi-
directorships and executive compensation, some researchers have investigated the 
multi-directorships held by board members, including the chairman. For example, Core 
et al. (1999), who uses a US sample, finds that when outside directors have seats on four 
or more boards, the CEO receives higher perks packages. This outcome is also supported 
by the findings of other studies (Armstrong et al., 2012; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Sapp, 
2008). In Saudi Arabia where the majority of corporate boards are chaired by large 
shareholders, approximately 70% of board chairmen are members of other companies’ 
boards. This may signify that large shareholders have strong connections and influence 
on other companies. However, with respect to executive compensation practices, these 
large multi-directorships held by chairmen are expected to positively affect the 
supervisory function of the board, thereby reducing executive remuneration level. 
Consequently, this study formulates the following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a negatively significant relationship between chairmen with multi-
directorships and executive compensation. 
e) Existence of a Remuneration Committee 
Executive compensation is considered as a remedy for the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen et al., 2004); however, the design and 
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implementation of compensation policies can be also a source of conflict if not being well-
designed (Méndez et al., 2011). To avoid conflict, good corporate governance regulations 
recommend that boards of directors transfer the responsibility for pay-setting to a 
remuneration committee comprised wholly or mainly of independent members (Girma 
et al., 2007; Méndez et al., 2011). According to the optimal contracting model, the 
negotiation process between board of directors and top executives is assumed to be 
rational and unbiased (Chen et al., 2010b). In this sense, the influence of managers over 
their own compensation decisions is tenuous. Therefore, the remuneration committee is 
expected to enhance the design and effectiveness of managerial incentives and thereby 
close the gap of interests between managers and shareholders (Chen et al., 2010b).  
However, in Saudi Arabia, there is no requirement for the independence of the 
remuneration committee. Furthermore, CEOs and other senior executive are allowed to 
participate in the remuneration committee. From the view of managerial power model, 
the presence of affiliated directors or executive members leads to higher levels of 
executive pay and, in general, poorly structured incentive packages (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2009). In contrast, institutional theory argues that companies in emerging economies 
often are dominated by large shareholders and operate in weak institutional settings. 
Hence, there is a likelihood that a remuneration committee is only established to meet 
regulatory requirements, while in practice the board of directors is solely responsible for 
decisions related to executive pay (Young et al., 2008). Empirically, most studies 
investigate the impact of the presence of a remuneration committee on pay-setting have 
been conducted in East Asia and find that remuneration committees in fact increase 
executive compensation (Conyon and He, 2012; 2011; Chen et al., 2010b). Therefore, the 
study develops the following hypothesis: 
H5: There is a positively significant relationship between the existence of a remuneration 
committee and executive compensation. 
3.4.1.2 Ownership Structure: 
a) Director Ownership 
Agency theory argues that management interests need to be aligned with those of 
the shareholders; moreover, the interests of the board of directors should be matched 
with those of the shareholders in order to ensure their focus on firm performance and 
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their real independence from management (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In this context, 
Minow and Bingham (1995, p. 497)cited by Muth and Donaldson (1998), state that 
“nothing makes directors think like shareholders more than being shareholders”. 
Shareholding will transform board members from delegated directors into shareholders; 
hence, they are expected to fulfil their supervisory commitment in a more effective way. 
However, a significant holding of company shares by the board members may cause 
principal-principal conflict, especially in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008), i.e. a 
conflict of interests between large shareholders and minority ones. Furthermore, Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) argue that when director ownership exceeds a certain proportion, 
there is a risk of them colluding with management to take decisions that may not 
maximise corporate value. In other words, these decisions may benefit only the large 
shareholders, such as decisions related to mergers or takeovers (Ozdemir and Upneja, 
2012). 
Several empirical studies support the role that director ownership can play in 
enhancing governance quality by limiting executive perks. These studies observe a 
negative and significant association between the level of equity held by board members 
and managerial pay (Méndez et al., 2011; Sapp, 2008; Ntim et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2011). 
However, other research fails to find any significant impact either from share ownership 
of the entire board (Rashid, 2013; Hearn, 2013) or share ownership by outsider directors 
(Cheng and Firth, 2006; Chalmers et al., 2006; Core et al., 1999) on executive 
compensation arrangements. Consequently, based on the previous findings and due to 
fact that most Saudi corporations have a large shareholder on the board, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
H6: There is a negatively significant relationship between director ownership and executive 
compensation. 
b) Pension Fund Ownership 
One of the effective mechanisms believed to reduce agency costs is institutional 
equity. This type of ownership has recently received a great deal of attention with regard 
to its role in resolving agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control (Rashid, 2013; Lin et al., 2011; Chalevas, 2011; Ozkan, 2007). The rationale 
behind the reduction in agency problems is related to the size of the stake that 
institutional bodies usually hold in a company (Ozkan, 2007). Institutional investors tend 
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to own more equity than individuals. Thus, they have greater incentives to monitor 
executive actions, especially those related to their compensation. This argument may be 
true, because the benefits that institutional investors gain from performing the 
supervisory function are more likely to exceed the costs incurred (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986). 
Furthermore, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) argue that institutional investors may 
have objectives such as growth rather than earning immediate profits. In other words, 
institutional investors can be classified as growth-seekers rather than profit-seekers. 
Therefore, they would prefer to link executive compensation to long-term rather than 
short-term performance (David et al., 1998). Moreover, Qi et al. (2000) posit that 
institutional investors have experts who are able to supervise managerial actions more 
effectively than individual investors. Recently, many empirical studies have investigated 
the relationship between institutional ownership and managerial pay level and most find 
support for the above argument. For example, Ntim et al. (2015) find that when 
institutional ownership increases, executive managers earn less remuneration. Other 
studies find similar results (Ozkan, 2007; Lin et al., 2011; Chalevas, 2011; Fahlenbrach, 
2009; Ramaswamy et al., 2000). However, other researchers find no significant 
association between the level of institutional shareholding and managerial compensation 
in emerging countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan (Rashid, 2013; Shah et al., 2009). 
The term ’institutional ownership’ in academic research usually refers to the 
equity held by financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies or by mutual 
funds (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Brickley et al., 1988); however, this study uses the 
term ‘institutional ownership’ to refer to shares owned by public pension funds only. This 
unique classification is used because the Saudi Banking Control Law prevents financial 
institutions from owning in excess of 10% of a company’s shares (SAMA, 1966). 
Therefore, unlike other countries, the presence of financial institutions in the SSE is rare; 
and even if they do participate, they do not have a controlling share. In contrast, public 
pension funds hold more equity in the SSE. Public pension funds are considered 
‘pressure-resistant’ investors because they have no direct business relationship with the 
management (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). Accordingly and based on the empirical 
results of prior studies, this research formulates the following hypothesis: 
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H7: There is a negatively significant relationship between pension fund ownership and 
executive compensation. 
c) State Ownership 
State investment in the Saudi Stock Market is high in comparison with advanced 
countries; indeed, the state owns approximately 20% of the market value (Aleqtisadiah, 
2014). Because the state is an important player in the Saudi market, this allows it to 
influence market trends and attitudes. Even though the heads of public pension funds are 
appointed by the central government in Saudi Arabia, the investments of pension funds 
espouse different objectives and motives from those of the state in many aspects (Li et 
al., 2007). For example, the state controls a number of giant corporations that are 
believed to provide essential facilities, such as telecommunications companies or for 
economic and security purposes such as companies operating in the energy sectors. 
Therefore, their primary investment goals are not profitability or growth, unlike pension 
funds. Moreover, the state attempts to play an indirect substitutive role of market-maker 
to stabilise the stock market, which is different from pension funds which aim to 
maximise the funds’ welfare.  
However, Li et al. (2007) argue that top executives in state-influenced companies 
may waste much time in pleasing government officials rather than concentrating their 
efforts on achieving the firm’s goals. This may negatively affect minority interests and 
hence lead to the emergence of the principal-principal conflict (agency problem type II) 
(Conyon and He, 2012). Furthermore, the authors add that state representatives on firms’ 
boards have difficulty in distinguishing between their functional duties as investors’ 
representatives and their administrative role as government officials. 
Most studies (Conyon and He, 2012; Li et al., 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Chen 
et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2007; Hearn, 2013) that examine the role of state ownership are 
conducted in emerging countries, because the structure of ownership in developed 
contexts is usually based around institutional and foreign investments (Khan, 2006; Li, 
1994). Various academic research in China, where the state has a dominant share of the 
stock market, finds that state ownership is negatively and significantly associated with 
managerial rewards (Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). However, Hearn (2013) 
observes that when state ownership increases, managers earn higher compensation. 
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Nevertheless, others find no relationship between state investment and executive 
remuneration (Conyon and He, 2012; Li et al., 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000).  
In the KSA, due to the regulatory restrictions that ban financial institutions from 
investing in the SSE, state ownership may play a substitutive monitoring role that is 
carried out by financial bodies in other markets. Moreover, the Saudi government 
attempts to be a role model for other large investors in protecting minority interests from 
any malicious decisions made by management, such as unmerited excessive 
compensation. Consequently, this study formulates a hypothesis as follows: 
H8: There is a negatively significant relationship between state ownership and executive 
compensation. 
3.4.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This section provides details about the sources of data used in the research and the 
sample’s time frame. Because there is no electronic database available for the information 
of Saudi firms such as in the developed countries such as the US and the UK, the collecting 
Saudi data is time-consuming. Therefore, all data were collected manually from company 
annual reports through the Tadawul database (www.tadawul.com.sa).  
The context of Saudi Arabia is chosen for several reasons. First, the political regime 
in Saudi Arabia is stable; hence, there is no concern about the effect of political instability 
on the results. Second, since one of the study’s objectives is to analyse the role of 
blockholders on the practices of executive compensation, the ownership structure in 
Saudi Arabia enable us to achieve this goal. Last, data are accessible, because the 
transparency of information in Saudi Arabia is much higher than other emerging 
monarchical countries.  
The initial sample contains all 160 listed firms in the SSE in 15 different industries 
as at December 2015 (www.tadawul.com.sa) and starts in the financial year 2008. This 
period has been chosen for two key reasons. First, data are available and accessible 
following the enforcement of corporate governance regulations and their disclosure 
requirements began in 2008. Moreover, this period provides the most recent 
investigation in the literature with respect to the determinants of executive 
compensation, which helps to fill the gap and improve the understanding of pay setting 
practices. 
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However, due to the characteristics of heterogeneity between financial and non-
financial firms and being subject to different regulatory requirements (Wang and Shailer, 
2015), the study uses only non-financial firms. This method is supported by previous 
studies (Sakawa et al., 2012; Rashid, 2013; Méndez et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; Shah et 
al., 2009). Therefore, after excluding financial firms, the total examinable sample is 114 
firms over the eight-year period of 2008-2015. In addition, a number of firm-year 
observations have been excluded because: 13 were missing disclosure, 56 firms were not 
yet listed, and 24 firms were facing bankrupt issues. Consequently, the final unbalanced 
sample is 819 firm-year observations. 
3.4.2.1 Analytical Procedures 
This section discusses in detail the statistical methods applied by the thesis to 
investigate the study’s hypotheses. The econometric methods in this discipline can be 
classified into two main types; parametric and non-parametric estimations (Gujarati, 
2003). The best choice of which should be utilised depends on the type, nature, and other 
characteristics of the data (Alagla, 2012). However, before discussing the econometric 
methods, a number of issues related to the data should be highlighted. 
First, due to the lack of transparency and disclosure practices in some Saudi firms, 
there were some missing data, particularly relating to corporate governance and 
executive compensation. In order to eliminate issues with statistical tests, 13 
observations which contained missing information were excluded from the total sample. 
Second, in order to mitigate the potential bias that outliers may cause in the 
regression analysis (Sapp, 2008; Randøy and Nielsen, 2002; Edwards et al., 2009), the 
study has winsorised the “data by replacing the top and bottom 2.5% of observations with 
the values of the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles” following the method of Sapp (2008). 
Moreover, the use of appropriate estimation techniques, such as random or fixed effects 
regressions with a robust standard error, help to overcome the problem of outliers 
(Iskander, 2008), thereby delivering more accurate and reliable results. 
Finally, the CMA has suspended the shares in three security companies from 
trading in the SSE for issues related to bankruptcy and fraud. The three companies are 
Al-Baha Investment and Development Company, Bishah Agriculture Development 
Company, and Etihad Atheeb Telecommunication Company. Therefore, this study also 
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eliminated these companies from the total sample as their figures and performance are 
abnormal and their particular circumstances may significantly affect the findings. This 
elimination led to the exclusion of 24 observations. Accordingly, after all these exclusions, 
the study has a final sample of 819 firm-year observations. 
Although parametric tests are believed to deliver more accurate and robust 
outcomes than non-parametric tests (Judge et al., 1985), Gujarati (2003) argues that 
parametric estimations cannot be employed unless the data meet four assumptions 
namely normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of error terms. 
Accordingly, violating one of these assumptions would lead to inaccurate and misleading 
results; in which case, applying non-parametric tests can be an alternative to overcome 
such limitations (Balian, 1982). The four assumptions of parametric tests are explained 
as follows: 
1. Normality: to use parametric tests, data is assumed to be normally distributed. The 
normality assumption can be tested through different methods, the most common of 
which are by skewness and kurtosis. Gujarati (2003) states that data can be normally 
distributed if the values of skewness and kurtosis are within ±1.96 and ±3 respectively. 
2. Linearity: the model under this supposition assumes that the relationship between an 
independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) is linear. Therefore, any 
violation to this assumption will under-estimate the true relationship (Ayyangar, 
2007).  
3. Homoscedasticity: this assumption requires that the variance of errors is equal across 
all levels of the independent variables (X). Otherwise, there is an indication of 
heteroscedasticity, which means the findings will be seriously distorted (Berry and 
Feldman, 1985). 
4. Independence of Error Terms: error terms of all explanatory variables must be 
independent from each other and serially uncorrelated. Otherwise, there will be a 
problem of autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2003). 
Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that the data does not statistically suffer from 
a multicollinearity problem. Multicollinearity refers to the phenomenon when there is an 
approximate linear relationship between two or more of the independent variables in the 
same multiple regression model (Kennedy, 2003). In other words, two or more of 
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explanatory regressors are highly correlated to each other. Consequently, the model 
might give inappropriate results (Brooks, 2014). 
3.4.2.2 Diagnostic Analysis of OLS Assumptions and Analytical Procedures 
Following the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions discussed above and in 
order to decide which estimation methods should be used to investigate the study’s 
hypotheses, a number of tests were conducted. According to the results which are 
discussed below, the data does not meet the required criteria of the parametric tests; 
thereby parametric techniques are deemed not to be an appropriate method for the 
study data. Therefore, non-parametric tests are applied to examine the relationships 
among the study variables. 
First, the assumption of normality has been primarily tested by utilising the tests 
of skewness and kurtosis. The findings reveal that most of the variables are right skewed 
(further detail can be found in the following chapter) and therefore they are not normally 
distributed. For further robustness checks, other normality tests were applied including 
through a graphical methods histogram and Q-Q plot, as well as numerical methods such 
as Shapiro-Wilk test (Maldajian and El Khoury, 2014). All tests demonstrate that most of 
the study variables do not meet the normality assumption. 
With regards to the assumption of homoscedasticity, the most common method, 
namely ‘Breusch-Pagan Test’, was used (Alagla, 2012; Maldajian and El Khoury, 2014). 
The results indicate that the heteroscedasticity problem was present. Thus, in order to 
mitigate such problems, it is statistically suggested to transform the dependent variables 
to their natural logarithm (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). Data transformation is a possible 
solution to overcome the problems of violating the assumptions of parametric tests. 
Therefore, following previous studies in executive compensation (Conyon, 2014; Rashid, 
2013; Ntim et al., 2015; Hearn, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2010b; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Edwards et al., 2009; Sapp, 2008; Basu et al., 2007; Randøy and 
Nielsen, 2002), this study transforms the values of all the variables of executive 
compensation, firm size, and firm age to their natural logarithm. 
After doing so, the data was retested against the assumptions of parametric tests, 
which resolved the heteroscedasticity problem. However, assumptions such as normality 
were still violated. According to Greene (2008) and (Baltagi, 2008), OLS estimation 
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becomes inefficient and should not be used if the normality assumption is not met; 
otherwise, the findings will be biased and misleading. Consequently and in order to 
overcome such bias and problems, this study will employ non-parametric tests following 
other key studies (Elston and Goldberg, 2003; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2011; 
Ntim et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, two well-known approaches were applied to detect if any 
multicollinearity problem exists in the model, namely the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
and Spearman’s rank correlation. The results reveal that no serious multicollinearity 
exists among the explanatory variables (further details can be found in the following 
chapter). 
Finally and in order to decide which regression techniques are the most 
appropriate for the study models, the following sub-section will identify and discuss the 
differences between two basic methods of panel data usually utilised to test the 
relationships within or between observations. The two approaches are commonly known 
in such area of research as the least squares dummy variable (fixed effect) and the 
generalized least squares (random effect) (Baltagi, 2008). 
❖ Fixed-Effect vs Random-Effect 
Fixed effect regression is an appropriate approach to deal with panel data when 
there is a belief that the impact of the variables varies over the time. Fixed effect examines 
the relationship variables within a particular observation such as country, company, etc. 
Under fixed effect regression, each observation has its own characteristics that may or 
may not affect or bias other the outcome variables; thus, fixed effect controls for any 
omitted variables or unobserved heterogeneous characteristics among variables over the 
time. Moreover, fixed effect assumes that if the omitted regressor does not change over 
time, then the changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to other effects rather 
these fixed effects (Conyon, 2014). 
In contrast, random effect, which also works effectively with panel data, assumes 
that the variation across observations is random and uncorrelated to other explanatory 
variables within the same model (Greene, 2008). Random effect is more suitable if there 
is reason to believe that the model in general has not omitted any influential predictor 
variable. The most appropriate technique for a particular model can be determined 
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according to the Hausman’s test (1978) which is one of the most powerful suggested tests 
with regard to fixed effect and random effect estimates (McKnight and Weir, 2009). This 
test basically checks if there is a correlation between the errors (u) and the predictors; 
the null hypothesis means that there is no correlation. 
The outcomes shown in Table 3.11 (in the section of data discussion) demonstrate 
that fixed effect regression is the most appropriate technique to investigate the study 
hypotheses for all variables except the BONUS variable. The dependent variable BONUS 
has censored data and unique characteristics. Since many firms did not provide details of 
the bonus packages for their managers over the observed years 2008-2015, the data has 
zeros that exceed 20% of the total observations. Therefore, as this dependent variable is 
limited, it needs a special regression technique that can overcome such limitations.  
The Tobit regression approach is a powerful test that deals with censored data 
such as the BONUS variable. This model was proposed by Tobin (1958) and aims to 
estimate the relationship between a non-negative dependent variable and an explanatory 
variables over time. By using this method, the model can specify lower and/or upper 
censoring values; thereby, it assumes that the lower is the minimum value and the upper 
is the maximum value. In the BONUS case, the Tobit model censors zero values and 
estimates more accurate unbiased coefficients (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). The use of 
Tobit regression is consistent with prior studies that encountered similar limited 
dependent variables, such as option packages (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Sakawa et al., 
2012; Ozkan, 2007). 
Given the above discussion, the study uses the fixed effect model for the dependent 
variables namely SALARY, TOTAL CASH, and TOTAL PAY, whereas, the Tobit model is 
applied for the BONUS variable. For further checks, the study uses several robustness 
and sensitivity tests.  
3.4.3 Measurements of executive compensation 
Identifying the various components of executive compensation and measuring 
them reliably is one of the most methodological challenges in the literature related to 
executive compensation. In terms of the nature of executive pay, the inconsistent use of 
terminology for each component of compensation, makes the issue of compensation 
identification more challenging. For example, while some firms use the term ‘bonus’ to 
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refer to short-term compensation that is granted for previous performance, other firms 
use the term ‘short-term incentives’ for the same component (Alagla, 2012). Thus, the use 
of a clear and systematic method of identifying and classifying executive pay components 
is an essential condition in ensuring accuracy and reliability of executive compensation 
measurements. Indeed, failure to do this makes comparability with the prior literature 
difficult.  
Previous studies (Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008; Ntim et al., 2015) have used different 
classifications of executive compensation based on its nature. There are two common 
classifications in the literature; the first classifies compensation based on time-horizon 
criteria i.e. short-term and long term incentives, while the second uses pecuniary criteria 
i.e. cash and non-cash incentives. Accordingly, as the use of long-term incentives in Saudi 
Arabia are virtually absent (i.e. there is no compensation in the form of stock options) 
and most Saudi firms disclose the compensation of top executives in the form of salary, 
bonus, and other compensation, this research adopts the classification that is based on 
pecuniary criteria (i.e. cash and non-cash pay).  
Studies such as (Eichholtz et al., 2008; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; Alagla, 2012) 
define cash compensation as all pecuniary incentives that are awarded by a firm and 
received by executives in one fiscal year including salary, bonuses, benefits, allowances, 
etc. Compared with non-cash or equity-based incentives, cash compensation packages 
are easily measured and clearly disclosed in the firms’ annual reports. In the detailed 
analysis, this study investigates the impact of corporate governance on three components 
of cash compensation, namely salary, bonus and total cash compensation. Measurements 
of salary and bonus are taken from the remuneration report of the relevant firm for a 
specific fiscal year. Whereas, total cash compensation is measured as the sum of salary, 
bonus and all other reported cash compensation (i.e. benefits, allowances, perquisites, 
etc.) that are earned by the senior executives during the year. 
Meanwhile, although non-cash pay, such as equity-based compensation or other 
non-cash incentives, are widely used in the West (Chalmers et al., 2006; Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2009), this type of compensation is rarely practiced in the Saudi context. 
Only a few firms provide non-cash compensation and is almost always granted in the 
form of expenses, such as travel costs and accommodation, or granted in the form of 
privileges, such as cars and housing. The levels of these compensations are disclosed and 
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classified separately in the remuneration report as non-cash compensation in the form of 
a cash equivalent. Therefore, a comparison of cash and non-cash elements is easily 
achieved, as is the total compensation level. The last variable related to executive 
compensation is the total compensation, which is the sum of all compensation whether 
in the form of cash or non-cash compensation, that is received by an executive in a fiscal 
year. 
3.4.4 Models’ Specifications 
The first empirical model is developed to investigate the hypotheses of the 
relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation settings. The 
model contains four dependent variables that allow the effect on various constituents of 
executive compensation packages, namely SALARY, BONUS, TOTAL CASH, and finally 
TOTAL PAY to be examined (see Table 3.2). The study is not investigating other types of 
compensation such as options, because such rewards are not legal under Saudi law. Based 
on the results of Hausman tests, the research formulates the fixed-effect models of the 
dependent variables SALARY, TOTAL CASH, and TOTAL PAY as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑷𝑨𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊 
Where; 
𝜷𝟎  = Intercept 
𝜷𝒊𝒕   = Coefficient of slope parameters 
𝑿𝒊𝒕   = Independent variable i at time t, and 
𝒖𝒊   = Error term 
 
While, the Tobit model for the BONUS component is formed as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺𝒊𝒕 = {  
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗ =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊         𝒊𝒇     𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺  𝒊𝒕
∗ > 𝟎





𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕  is the observed dependent variable and 𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗  is a latent 
dependent variable that is observed for values greater than 0 and censored 
otherwise. 
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Table 3.2: Variable Definitions 
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables 
  
ln_PAY it The natural logarithm of average compensation per executive for 
firm i in year t, including three different components (variables): 
- TOTAL PAY (cash & non-cash) 
- TOTAL CASH (salary & bonus) 
- SALARY 
ln_BONUS it The natural logarithm of average bonus compensation per 
executive for firm i in year t. 
Independent variables 
BRDIND The proportion of independent directors to total board members. 
DUAL  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman simultaneously 
holds an executive position and 0 otherwise. 
CHRBLK A dummy variable that equals 1 if the board chairman is a 
blockholder and 0 otherwise. 
CHRMDs A dummy variable that equals 1 if the board chairman has 
membership on board of directors of other firms. 
REXIST A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration 
committee and 0 otherwise. 
DIROWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the members of 
board of directors. 
PFOWN  The proportion of ordinary shares owned by public pension funds. 
STATEOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the Saudi 
government. 
Control variables 
FSIZE The natural logarithm of the total assets. 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets. 
FAGE The natural logarithm of total number of years since the firm has 
been listed on the stock exchange. 
ROA Net profit in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The study utilities the most common descriptive statistics which include the mean, 
median, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis. These statistics provide a 
comprehensive view of the state and direction of the study variables in KSA. Furthermore, 
the average values (the mean) of the variables for the pooled sample are analysed, taking 
into consideration the differences between industries and years. 
According to Gujarati (2003) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), the data can be 
normally distributed if the values of skewness and kurtosis are within ±1.96 and ±3, 
respectively. By applying these criteria to the study data, there is evidence that the data 
does not meet the normality assumption required by parametric tests. For example, 
Table 3.3 shows that all skewness and kurtosis values of executive compensation 
variables exceed the value of 1.96 and 3, respectively, even after the transformation of 
the remuneration variables into their natural logarithm. Furthermore, Table 3.6 also 
demonstrates that independent variables such as DUAL, RCEXIST, DIROWN, PFOWN, 
STATEOWN, FSIZE, and LEV do not meet the criteria of skewness as they are highly right 
skewed. Similarly, most independent variables are found to have values of kurtosis that 
exceed 3.  
3.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Executive Compensation 
Table 3.3 displays the descriptive statistics of all the executive remuneration 
variables (i.e. TOTAL PAY, TOTAL CASH, SALARY and BONUS). All compensation 
components are presented in Saudi Arabian Riyals (SAR) which has a fixed exchange rate 
equal to approximately 0.267 US dollars (USD). As can be seen in Table 3.3, the average 
of total compensation (TOTAL PAY) is SAR1,511,352 (approximately USD403,530) with 
a median of SAR1,029,433 (USD274,858) and a range from SAR12,000 (USD3,204) to 
SAR28,100,000 (USD7,502,700). This demonstrates that managers in KSA are rewarded 
significantly higher compensation than their counterparts in China, who receive nearly 
USD66,336 (Conyon and He, 2012, p. 580). This can be attributed to the socialist system 
applied in China which significantly reduces the variance in labour wages. 
However, the level of executive remuneration in KSA is significantly lower than in 
Western countries such as the US, UK and Spain where managers earn nearly USD3.0 
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million (Conyon, 2014, p. 76), USD2.4 million (Alagla, 2012), and USD1.1 million (Méndez 
et al., 2011, p. 62) respectively. This significant difference between managerial pay in KSA 
and the West can be attributed to several factors, such as the existence of a highly 
competitive labour market, the usage of benchmark standards, living costs levels, and 
linking incentives to firm performance. Table 3.3 also shows details of other 
compensation components. As can be seen, the average TOTAL CASH, SALARY, and 
BONUS compensation are SAR1,498,481, SAR983,414, and SAR515,067, respectively, 
while the median TOTAL CASH, SALARY, and BONUS compensation are SAR1,029,433, 
SAR800,275, and SAR170,000, respectively.  
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Executive Compensation Variables  
Variable Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
TOTAL PAY 
(SAR) 
1,511,352 1,029,433 12,000 28,100,000 6.53 77.85 
TOTAL CASH  1,498,481 1,029,433 12,000 28,100,000 6.65 80.39 
SALARY  983,414 800,275 9,000 28,100,000 16.15 370.08 
BONUS  515,067 170,000 0 12,900,000 6.30 59.32 
 
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1 display the mean of executive compensation variables 
based on the industry type. The study follows the industrial classification reported in 
Thomson One Banker database which classifies Saudi firms into five main sectors, namely 
General Industrials, General Retailers, Utilities, Services, and Real Estate. As can be seen, 
managers in the Utilities sector receive the highest remuneration (TOTAL PAY). This 
sector also appears to use pay-for-performance criteria, because only in this sector do 
BONUS packages exceed the fixed compensation (SALARY). A brief glance at the 
ownership structure in Figure 3.4 reveals that the State investment (STATEOWN) is the 
main dominant investor in the Utilities sector; hence, this might be preserved as an 
indication that, the greater the state investment, the stronger the link between 
managerial pay and firm performance.  









TOTAL PAY 1,386,594 1,469,802 2,460,424 1,505,968 1,399,638 
TOTAL CASH 1,376,275 1,446,245 2,455,247 1,504,598 1,401,200 
SALARY 989,688 857,489 1,122,364 1,038,310 1,083,685 
BONUS 385,290 587,546 1,343,997 468,785 310,993 
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On the other hand, the Real Estate sector grants the lowest BONUS perks and the 
second highest SALARY. According to Figure 3.4, the Real Estate industry has a low 
ownership concentration; therefore, this may indicate the management has control over 
the pay-setting process. Finally, and in general, the other sectors (General Industrials, 
General Retailers and Services) show similar trends to each other in terms of the 
magnitude of executive remuneration variables. 
Table 3.5 and Figure 3.2 present the change in the average of executive 
remuneration variables during the period 2008-2015. Since 2008 all managerial perks 
packages have gradually trended upwards. For instance, SALARY is nearly doubled 
from SAR754,268 in 2008 to SAR1,398,213 in 2015. Furthermore, bonus perquisites 
have increased by nearly 76% from 377,547 SAR in 2008 to 664,487 SAR in 2015. Figure 
3.2 demonstrates that BONUS had almost similar trend to that of SALARY. Thus, BONUS 
might be used as another means of increasing executive compensation even without any 
consideration of firm performance 
Table 3.5: Average of Executive Compensation Variables by Year 
Year TOTAL PAY TOTAL CASH SALARY BONUS 
2008 1,084,231 1,082,405 754,268 325,693 
2009 1,188,071 1,181,591 783,944 397,568 








General Industrials General Retailers Utilities Services Real Estate
Total pay Total cash Salary Bonus
Figure 3.1: Executive Compensation Variables by Sector 
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2011 1,403,069 1,388,081 879,909 512,877 
2012 1,586,649 1,583,990 973,803 612,806 
2013 1,664,908 1,659,918 1,003,428 654,856 
2014 1,677,972 1,671,500 1,130,717 538,629 
2015 2,007,184 1,974,729 1,398,213 573,286 
 
This argument is supported by the data highlighted in Figure 3.3, which shows the 
performance of firms during the eight years; i.e. there was a fluctuation in firm 
performance, whereas executive BONUS has shown an upward trend during the same 
period. In contrast, TOTAL PAY and TOTAL CASH also show a very similar trend and 
magnitude which means that non-cash compensation is not significant in the Saudi 
context and that executive compensation is predominantly granted in cash. 
 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total pay Total cash Salary Bonus
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3.5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance and Ownership Variables 
Table 3.6 presents the descriptive statistics for all independent variables of the 
first empirical study. As can be seen, nearly 46% of Saudi boards’ members are 
independent (BRDIND). The finding is consistent with the SCGR which requires at least 
one third of the seats of boards of directors to be occupied by independent members 
(CMA, 2010). However, the result is still significantly lower than the situation in 
developed countries where boards of directors consist mainly of independent members. 
For example, Armstrong et al. (2012) uses a sample from the US in 2006 and found that 
71% of boards of directors’ members were outsiders. Moreover, Alagla (2012), which is 
based on a UK sample for the years 2004-2008, states that the independence level of 
boards of directors is nearly 51%.  
Furthermore, only 15% of Saudi firms appear to endorse role duality (DUAL). In 
other words, 85% of board chairpersons are not affiliated with any executive functions. 
This proportion (15%) is significantly lower than the situation in the US where Petra and 
Dorata (2008), who use a sample from the US market in 2004, found that 52% of 
chairpersons act as CEOs simultaneously. These statistical findings provide reliable 
evidence and support the research argument that the practical governance norms in the 
Anglo-American contexts are significantly different from the ones that exist in Saudi 











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Return on assets Return on equity
Figure 3.3: Firm Performance (%), 2008-2015 
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of corporate governance in emerging economies, such as the KSA, which is subject to 
different institutional and ownership structure. 
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
BRDIND % 45.96 42.86 0 100 0.83 3.28 
DUAL 0.15 0 0 1 1.99 4.94 
CHRBLK 0.69 1 0 1 -0.85 1.72 
CHRMDs 0.70 1 0 1 -0.87 1.76 
RCEXIST 0.92 1 0 1 -3.11 10.69 
DIROWN % 9.18 1.88 0 95.84 2.75 12.30 
PFOWN % 3.24 0 0 35.10 2.38 9.30 
STATEOWN % 7.44 0 0 81.21 2.56 8.74 
FSIZE (‘000,000) 12,600 2,110 54 358,000 6.18 44.21 
LEV % 37.41 34.95 0.41 463.09 5.64 91.66 
FAGE 2.52 2.83 0 4.11 -0.52 2.31 
ROA % 6.73 5.66 -67.81 49.27 -0.30 12.20 
 
Regarding the variables related to board chairpersons, Table 3.6 highlights that 
69% of board chairmen are blockholders (CHRBLK) and 70% serve on other boards 
(CHRMDs). With respect to the ownership structure in the Saudi market, directors 
(DIROWN) are found to be the largest investors since they own over 9% of the Saudi 
stock market, whereas the ownership of state (STATEOWN) and pension funds 







General Industrials General Retailers Utilities Services Real Estate
Directors' ownership Pension funds' ownership State ownership
Figure 3.4: Ownership Variables by Sectors 
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Across industrial sectors, Table 3.7 highlights that Utilities, Services and Real Estate 
are the most affected by role duality (DUAL) since roughly 25% of their chairpersons are 
executives. Table 3.7 also confirms that directors (DIROWN) are the largest and most 
dominant investors in three industries, namely General Industrials, General Retailers and 
Services, whereas state investment (STATEOWN) is concentrated in and dominates the 
Utilities and Real Estate sectors. In contrast, pension fund investments (PFOWN) appear to 
be smaller than those of directors (DIROWN) and state (STATEOWN), showing a well-
structured diversification across market industries. 









BRDIND % 44.03 48.47 45.32 43.12 52.70 
DUAL 0.14 0.08 0.23 0.25 0.23 
CHRBLK 0.68 0.71 0.62 0.85 0.67 
CHRMDs 0.78 0.71 0.30 0.69 0.64 
RCEXIST 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.91 
DIROWN % 8.38 11.95 1.84 19.25 5.23 
PFOWN % 4.67 1.18 3.88 0.51 2.42 
STATEOWN % 6.97 3.18 23.49 0.90 11.09 
Table 3.8 represents the changes that occurred in the governance and ownership 
variables during the eight-year period. The independence level of board of directors 
(BRDIND) has increased slightly from 46.3% in 2008 to 48.3% in 2015. The Table also 
highlights a significant reduction in the number of chairmen who perform executive 
duties simultaneously (DUAL). That is to say, 24% of corporate boards had executive 
chairpersons in 2008; in contrast, only 9% of firms had them in 2015  
Table 3.8: Average of Governance and Ownership Variables, by Year 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BRDIND % 46.28 44.80 43.68 44.76 44.46 47.33 47.68 48.25 
DUAL 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.09 
CHRBLK 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.69 
CHRMDs 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 
RCEXIST 0.55 0.77 0.95 0.99 1 1 1 1 
DIROWN % 10.28 10.87 10.62 10.21 9.08 8.04 7.86 7.25 
PFOWN % 2.66 3.21 3.22 3.31 3.42 3.41 3.36 3.20 
STATEOWN % 6.96 8.03 7.57 7.61 7.16 7.16 7.21 7.81 
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Overall, it can be argued that the general attitude of Saudi firms shows a high 
degree of compliance with the recommendations of SCGR during the years under review. 
This argument is demonstrated in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.5, which show a gradual 
increase in the independence of board of directors (BRDIND) and a downward trend in 
the role duality (DUAL) over the eight-year period of 2008-2015. Furthermore, there was 
a strong adherence with respect to the establishment of remuneration committee 
(RCEXIST), while in 2008 only 55% of firms have established a sub-committee related to 
remuneration matters, in 2015 all firms are found to have the committee. 
 
3.5.2 Correlation Coefficients 
According to Table 3.9, the results of the correlation matrix show that no serious 
collinearity problem exists between the regressors i.e. all pairwise correlations between 
explanatory variables are lower than 80% (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006). Even though 
some of the dependent variables are highly correlated with each other, there are no 
concerns about the collinearity problem, since multicollinearity is relevant only between 
the independent variables, as the dependent variables are analysed in separate models. 
Table 3.9 shows that the highest correlation (0.40) is between the firm size (FSIZE) and 
pension fund ownership (PFOWN). Firm size (FSIZE) is also found to have the highest 
correlations with other independent variables, although the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. Accordingly, it can be concluded that all correlations of independent 
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variables lie in the acceptable range of pairwise correlation 0<0.80 (Gujarati, 2003; Hair 
et al., 2006). In this sense, the diagnostic test of Spearman’s rank-order correlation 
demonstrates that the model in general does not suffer from the multicollinearity 
problem. 
However, Belsley et al. (2005), Kutner et al. (2004), and Kleinbaum et al. (2013) 
argue that the technique of the correlation matrix suffers from a number of limitations. 
First, the correlation matrix only examines the pairwise correlation between 
independent variables, although collinearity is highly likely to involve more than two 
regressors simultaneously. In addition, there is no specific criterion to decide what 
degree of correlation should be considered too high. In order to overcome such 
limitations, the authors suggest a more elaborate approach to detect multicollinearity, 
namely the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). 
The VIF test allows researchers to regress each predictor on all other independent 
variables and to produce an R2 value for each. By doing so, the test examines the existence 
of the multicollinearity problem in each predictor with other regressors jointly rather 
than only through pairwise correlation. Therefore, this study also employs the VIF test to 
make further checks on the existence of collinearity. Statistically, it is suggested that if 
any predictor has a VIF exceeding 10 or a tolerance (1/VIF) below 0.10, the regression 
model suffers from multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2006; O’brien, 2007). 
It can be seen from Table 3.10 that the mean of VIF is 1.40, which lies within the 
acceptable levels of 0-10 suggested by Hair et al. (2006) and O’brien (2007). In line with 
the findings of the Spearman’s correlation test, firm size (FSIZE) is found to have the 
highest VIF (1.89) which is well below the value of 10. Moreover, no single variable 
tolerance (1/VIF) is below 0.10. Consequently, the outcomes of VIF test confirm the 
findings of the Spearman’s test that multicollinearity does not seriously influence the 
coefficient estimates of the predictors of the first empirical model 
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Table 3.9: Correlation Matrix 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[1] TOTAL PAY  0.99* 0.89* 0.46 -0.29* -0.13* 0.13* 0.06* 0.14* 0.11* 0.17* 0.17* 0.59* 0.25* -0.19* 0.18* 
[2] TOTAL CASH 0.99*  0.89* 0.46* -0.29* -0.13* 0.14* 0.06* 0.14* 0.11* 0.17* 0.17* 0.59* 0.25* -0.20* -0.18* 
[3] SALARY 0.90* 0.90*  0.23* -0.26* -0.15* 0.17* 0.09* 0.13* 0 0.15* 0.23* 0.56* 0.22* -0.17* 0.09* 
[4] BONUS 0.75* 0.76* 0.47*  -0.16* -0.09* 0.10* 0.09* 0.13* 0.14* 0.23* 0.04* 0.30* 0.12* -0.09* 0.27* 
[5] BRDIND -0.29* -0.30* -0.25* -0.22*  -0.01 -0.30* 0.01 -0.05* -0.11* -0.17* -0.07* -0.35* -0.16* 0.26* -0.09* 
[6] DUAL -0.11* -0.12* -0.13* -0.09* 0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.10* -0.05* 0 -0.01 -0.10* 
[7] BLKCHR 0.16* 0.17* 0.22* 0.07* -0.24* -0.03  0.08* 0.11* 0.27* -0.19* 0.06* 0.15* 0.12* -0.32* -0.02 
[8] CHRMDs 0.10* 0.10* 0.14* 0.05* 0 -0.03 0.08*  0.05* -0.14* 0.11* 0.04* 0.10* 0.09* -0.07* 0.12* 
[9] RCEXIST 0.16* 0.16* 0.15* 0.14* -0.02 -0.07* 0.11* 0.05*  0.08* -0.01 -0.04* 0.03 0.02 -0.04* -0.01 
[10] DIROWN 0.04* 0.04* -0.04* 0.11* -0.02 -0.07* 0.22* -0.01 0.10*  -0.22* -0.23* -0.04* 0.02 -0.34* 0.08* 
[11] PFOWN 0.25* 0.25* 0.24* 0.26* -0.12* -0.04* -0.16* 0.09* 0 -0.21*  0.22* 0.35* -0.04* 0.16* 0.26* 
[12] STATEOWN 0.11* 0.11* 0.16* 0.04* -0.04* -0.06* -0.06* 0.06* -0.06* -0.41* 0.38*  0.51* 0.07* 0.13* 0.04* 
[13] FSIZE 0.59* 0.59* 0.62* 0.40* -0.27* -0.04* 0.12* 0.15* 0.03 -0.15* 0.48* 0.38*  0.29* -0.10* -0.02 
[14] LEV 0.40* 0.39* 0.36* 0.30* -0.21* 0.01 0.13* 0.10* 0.03 0 -0.05* -0.02 0.40*  -0.20* -0.17* 
[15] FAGE -0.17* -0.18* -0.16* -0.09* 0.23* -0.03 -0.30* -0.07* -0.03 -0.27* 0.29* 0.27* -0.04* -0.30*  -0.01 
[16] ROA 0.19* 0.19* 0.06* 0.33* -0.06* -0.14* -0.03 0.08* 0.03 0.28* 0.23* 0.01 -0.07* -0.24* 0.01  
Spearman rank correlations are reported below the diagonal, and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal. 
* denotes significance at 0.05 level 
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Table 3.10: VIF Test 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FSIZE 1.89 0.528 
STATEOWN 1.53 0.655 
PFOWN 1.46 0.685 
DIROWN 1.34 0.745 
FAGE 1.34 0.746 
BRDIND 1.34 0.747 
BLKCHR 1.34 0.748 
LEV 1.19 0.840 
ROA 1.18 0.848 
CHRMDs 1.10 0.910 
DUAL 1.04 0.965 
RCEXIST 1.03 0.974 
Mean VIF 1.40  
 
3.5.3 Discussion of Research Findings 
Table 3.11 presents the results of the regression analysis for the variables of 
corporate governance and ownership structure and their effects on each component of 
executive remuneration. The R-squares of the models demonstrate that 25%, 24%, and 
22% of the variations in the dependent variables TOTAL PAY, TOTAL CASH, and 
SALARY, respectively, are explained by the variations of the included independent 
variables. These proportions of explanatory power (R2) are consistent with many 
previous studies. For example, the R-squared statistics of Ramaswamy et al. (2000), 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003), Li et al. (2007), and Edwards et al. (2009) were 36%, 27%, 
26% and 17%, respectively. Others also found similar R-squared statistics around 30% 
(Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2011; 2012; Rashid, 2013).  
However, these moderate explanatory powers indicate that there are other, 
omitted variables that influence the practice of setting executive remuneration packages. 
In the context of the KSA, where personal connections and tribal ties can play a significant 
role in the process of hiring employees and determining their wages (Budhwar and 
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Debrah, 2013), such moderate R-squared statistics are not surprising. These behavioural 
factors, which are beyond the scope of this study, are not statistically measurable. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive and significant relationship 
between the level of independence of board of directors (BRDIND) and executive pay, 
the results in Table 3.11 reveal that the presence of independent directors on the board 
(BRDIND) is significantly associated with all variables of executive compensation except 
BONUS packages. The positive link between outsider directors and managerial pay is in 
line with several previous findings (Hearn, 2013; Rashid, 2013; Shah et al., 2009). 
However, these findings are not consistent with those of Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2009) and Fahlenbrach (2009), who report that outsider directors negatively and 
significantly impact executive perks. Moreover, others find no significant relationship 
between independence level of board of directors and executive remuneration (Chen et 
al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2012; Sapp, 2008). 
Although the agency theories argue that board independence is an effective 
mechanism for mitigating agency costs by aligning the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders, this assumption does not seem to explain the causes of or solve all agency 
problems, particularly in emerging economies. In this context, institutional theory 
appears to provide more reliable and reasonable interpretations for the attitudes of pay 
settings in the likes of the KSA (Young et al., 2008) where personal factors and family 
names are strongly involved in such decisions.  
The weak role of independent directors in monitoring management activities, in 
particular managerial pay, found by this study can be attributed to the control and 
presence of large shareholders on most Saudi corporate boards. According to 
institutional theory, a firm might appoint outsider members to the board of directors 
ostensibly to claim that it is complying with regulations, thereby legitimising its existence 
among its competitors (Young et al., 2008). In other words, a firm might allow external 
members to sit on the board of directors solely to satisfy minority shareholders and 
regulators, while in fact, these members are not involved in the decision-making process. 
Another potential interpretation for the ineffectiveness of independent directors 
is that as these blockholders control the decision-making, outsider members may prefer 
not to challenge their decisions in order to retain their own jobs and ensure their re-
nominations (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012), since the approval of decisions related to 
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managerial pay has almost no repercussions for independent directors (Walkner, 2004). 
In addition, the close supervisory role played by blockholders over managerial activities 
may make outsider members feel more relaxed and under less pressure to perform their 
stewardship duties. 
With respect to BONUS packages, the outcome supports the findings of Chalmers 
et al. (2006), Cheng and Firth (2006), and Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) who did not find 
significant relationship between the board independence and bonus compensation. 
However, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) observe a negative and significant 
relationship between the level of board independence and bonus perks. 
Table 3.11 also shows a negative but not statistically significant relationship 
between role duality (DUAL) on the one hand and all the components of executive pay on 
the other. Therefore, Hypothesis 2, which expects a significant negative relationship, is 
not accepted. According to the managerial power model, the determination of executive 
compensation is subject to the extent of the influence that managers are able to exert over 
related decisions (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). However, the findings provide strong 
support for the stewardship theory, which suggests that combining the positions of CEO 
and chairman in the hands of a single individual is not harmful for the company 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The theory posits that the manager as the shareholders’ 
steward acts in the best interests of the company as a whole rather than opportunistically 
exploiting the company’s resources, as alleged by agency theory (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). Empirically, the results are in line with Ntim et al. (2015), Conyon and He (2011), 
Chalevas (2011), and Shah et al. (2009), who observe similar relationships; i.e. when an 
executive serves as board chairperson at the same time, this does not affect his/her pay-
related decisions.  
However, this evidence does not match the outcomes reported by some other 
studies which documented that role duality is associated with higher executive 
compensation (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Conyon and He, 2012; Chen et al., 2011; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Sapp, 2008; Core et al., 1999). In fact, these studies support the 
standpoint of agency theory, which predicts higher managerial remuneration when the 
CEO also holds the position of board chairperson.  
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Table 3.11: Regression Analysis: Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation 
It is not surprising to find no significant association between role duality and 
managerial pay in a context of the KSA since the executives’ activities are controlled and 
monitored by large shareholders who perform a close supervisory role through their 
presence on the board of directors and its sub-committees. Furthermore, these 
blockholders frequently appoint their relatives and friends to executive positions; hence, 
the relationship between the controlling shareholders and these top managers is strong, 
close, and based on trust. This close relationship may be sufficient to align the interests 
of top senior executives with those of shareholders in a way that benefits the organisation 
as a whole. 
 TOTAL PAY TOTAL CASH SALARY BONUS 
 Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Tobit 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. z-value  
BRDIND 0.003 2.56** 0.004 2.82*** 0.004 2.95*** 0.014 0.87 
DUAL -0.079 -1.27 -0.086 -1.39 -0.122 -1.88* -0.383 -0.54 
CHRBLK 0.171 2.14** 0.175 2.21** 0.269 3.26*** -0.474 -0.62 
CHRMDs -0.061 -1.13 -0.046 -0.86 -0.070 -1.24 0.465 0.79 
RCEXIST 0.113 2.35** 0.108 2.24** 0.072 1.43 1.561 2.59** 
DIROWN -0.004 -1.59 -0.004 -1.45 -0.007 -2.49** 0.049 2.08** 
PFOWN 0.040 3.73*** 0.041 3.90*** 0.039 3.56*** 0.102 1.57 
STATEOWN 0.003 0.58 0.003 0.57 0.001 0.16 -0.058 -2.16** 
FSIZE 0.321 4.93*** 0.340 5.26*** 0.256 3.79*** 1.319 4.38*** 
LEV 0.002 3.19*** 0.002 3.32*** 0.002 3.33*** 0.018 2.30** 
FAGE 0.201 4.32*** 0.175 3.79*** 0.210 4.35*** 0.262 0.75 
ROA 0.011 5.01*** 0.011 5.12*** 0.004 1.97** 0.100 3.90*** 
         Constant 5.852  4.31*** 5.469 4.06*** 6.950 4.94*** -23.515 -3.62*** 
         














61.04*** 58.65*** 89.43*** 
  
All variables are defined in Table 3.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Relatedly, the study finds that when the position of board chairperson is occupied 
by a blockholder (CHRBLK), top managers are more likely to earn greater pecuniary 
incentives. Hence, Hypothesis 3, which predicts a negative and significant association 
between blockholder chairman and managerial pay, is not accepted. Despite the lack of 
studies examining the role of blockholder chairperson in the enhancement of governance 
quality, Alagla (2012), who uses another proxy to measure the power of chairperson 
through his/her voting rights (ownership), obtains a contrary result. That is to say, the 
author observes that the higher the number of shares held by the chairman, the lower the 
remuneration earned by the CEO. The study’s finding is inconsistent with the supposition 
of the agency model, which states that the presence and close supervision of large 
shareholders helps to mitigate the agency costs resulting from the separation between 
ownership and management.  
In the KSA, blockholders, particularly those who carry out the chairperson’s 
functions, do not seem to be performing their supposed monitoring duties effectively. The 
positive association between blockholder chairman (CHRBLK) and executive 
compensation supports the study’s argument that there is principal-principal conflict in 
emerging countries where certain individuals control the decision-making within the 
organisation without consideration of minority interests. In other words, blockholder 
chairmen, who combine both dimensions of powers through voting rights and the 
chairing of the board of directors, can use their power to influence the decisions on the 
remuneration of executives, who are often their relatives and close friends, in a way that 
extracts greater pay. 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 4, the study did not find evidence that chairman 
multi-directorships (CHRMDs) have any significant relationship with managerial perks 
packages. Although no previous study has investigated the relationship between 
chairman multi-directorships and the practices of executive compensation, a number of 
researchers (Armstrong et al., 2012; Core et al., 1999; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Sapp, 
2008) use a broader variable that captures the other directorships of the entire board of 
directors and have obtain a different result. They document that when the members of a 
board of directors are simultaneously on other corporate boards, their monitoring role is 
significantly reduced; thus, executives receive greater remuneration. 
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The regression analysis presented in Table 3.11 supports Hypothesis 5 and 
provides evidence that the existence of remuneration committee (RCEXIST) does not 
play its supposed role effectively in controlling executive compensation. In contrast, it 
does significantly increase managerial pay packages. In other words, it exacerbates the 
agency problem rather than mitigates it. Empirically, this conclusion is consistent with 
Conyon and He (2012) and Chen et al. (2010b) who also found in the Chinese context that 
the existence of remuneration committee is significantly associated with higher 
managerial remuneration packages.  
This finding can be attributed to different reasons. First, this study finds that the 
presence of large shareholders on board is related to higher executive remuneration. 
Therefore, the committee members, who know that their renewal decisions are subject 
to the satisfaction of the dominant shareholders, might prefer to go along with any 
decision approved by those controlling shareholders rather than to oppose them since 
this approach might lead to an undesirable consequence i.e. losing their directorship 
(Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). Another potential interpretation is that owner-managers 
may perceive the remuneration committee as an effective tool to legitimise their high 
compensation, arguing that the pay plan emanates from a specialised committee 
following the recommendations of the SCGR. This interpretation is supported by the 
implied view of institutional theory that there is a strong potential scenario in a context 
such as the KSA, where family ownership is predominant and their control over decision-
making process is evident, of a remuneration committee being ostensibly established 
solely to fulfil SGCR requirements and legitimate the firm’s existence (Young et al., 2008).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the results demonstrate that when the members of 
board of directors hold more equity (DIROWN), top executive are paid lower fixed 
compensation (SALARY). In fact, their ownership enhances the link with firm 
performance since Table 3.11 highlights a positive and significant impact on BONUS 
perks. However, there is no significant relationship between director ownership 
(DIROWN) and TOTAL PAY and TOTAL CASH, implying that the prime concern of board 
directors is the components of compensation rather than the total package. This evidence 
confirms the perspective of agency theorists who argue that when the members of board 
of directors own more shares, their role will be transformed from delegated directors to 
shareholders (Minow and Bingham, 1995). Thus, their main objective will be aligned with 
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shareholders’ objectives, i.e. to increase company market value and to yield more 
dividends (Banghøj et al., 2010; Jensen, 1993). As a result of this alignment of interests, 
the owner-directors will have greater incentives to protect their own equity through 
constraining managerial remuneration (Lin, 2005; Zald, 1969; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
Empirically, many studies document similar results (Méndez et al., 2011; Ntim et 
al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008). That is, they observe a negative and significant 
relationship between shareholding level of directors and executive perks. However, other 
research fails to find any significant effect of either ownership of the entire board (Hearn, 
2013; Rashid, 2013) or ownership of individual independent directors (Chalmers et al., 
2006; Cheng and Firth, 2006; Core et al., 1999) on managerial pay settings. 
Surprisingly, Table 3.11 manifests that pension fund investments (PFOWN) have 
a positive and significant impact on all executive compensation except BONUS packages. 
This outcome nullifies Hypothesis 7 which presumes that such ownership should help to 
significantly diminish managerial pay levels. The interesting finding also does not match 
the argument of agency-based view which suggests that the presence of institutional 
investors can improve supervisory functions over managerial activities and therefore, 
reduce executive compensation (Chalevas, 2011; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003; Lin et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000).  
To the author’s best knowledge, no previous empirical research observes a positive 
and significant relationship between pension fund investment and managerial 
remuneration arrangements. In contrast, most studies find that institutional investment 
significantly curbs top managers’ remuneration (Chalevas, 2011; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Lin 
et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000). However, Rashid 
(2013) and Shah et al. (2009) find no relationship between the two variables in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively, which share many common cultural features with 
the KSA. 
The rationale behind the positive impact of pension fund ownership over executive 
compensation can be attributed to the fact that pension funds are growth-seekers rather 
than profit-seekers (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Colpan et al., 2011; David et al., 2010). 
Basing on this view, those investors may compensate their top employees generously in 
order to incentivise them to do their best and expand the firm activities. Furthermore, as 
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public pension funds are controlled and administrated by the Saudi state (GOSI, 2000; 
PPA, 2004), Conyon and He (2012) argue that state representatives can get confused 
between their duties as investors’ stewards and as state administrators. Accordingly, they 
may be less concerned about executive compensation, especially as there are practically 
no repercussions if they approve such payments (Chalevas, 2011).   
Even though the Saudi state owns almost 20% of the market value of the SSE 
(Aleqtisadiah, 2014), the results show that state investment (STATEOWN) does not 
enhance the protection of shareholders’ interests through limiting executive perks. That 
is to say, the findings do not observe any significant relationship between state equity 
and any components of executive compensation, except a negative and significant 
association with BONUS. Consequently, the study does not accept Hypothesis 8. This 
finding is in line with Conyon and He (2012), Li et al. (2007), and Ramaswamy et al. 
(2000), who conclude that state investment does not influence the practices of 
managerial pay in Asia. However, Chen et al. (2011) and Firth et al. (2007) find that state 
ownership negatively and significantly impacts the level of top managers’ remuneration, 
while, Hearn (2013) reports that when the state holds more shares, top employees are 
more likely to earn higher remuneration packages. 
Conyon and He (2012) attribute the ineffective monitoring role played by the state 
to the difficulty encountered by state representatives on board of directors who cannot 
distinguish between their functions as shareholders’ representatives and their 
administrative tasks. Furthermore, the low supervisory performance of state investors 
might be a consequence of the divergent objectives between the state and regular 
shareholders (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Olson, 1973). That is to say, state investment can 
have other non-profit aims, such as stabilising the stock market and controlling certain 
sensitive operational sectors for security purposes (Olson, 1973). Therefore, state 
investors do not always seek to maximise their income; hence, their efforts may not 
concentrate on improving firm performance and controlling managerial activities. In 
other words, the state may have other primary objectives rather than monitoring the 
opportunistic actions of top management with regards to their remuneration packages 
(Olson, 1973). The latter argument seems to be a reasonable interpretation in the case of 
the KSA, since the data show that the Saudi state investment is restricted to certain giant 
corporations in the energy and telecommunication sectors. 
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With regards to the control variables, Table 3.11 demonstrates that firm size 
(FSIZE) is a key determinant of executive compensation in the KSA and has a positive and 
significant relationship with all components of managerial pay. This means that 
executives who serve in larger firms are compensated more generously than their 
counterparts in smaller firms. The positive relationship between firm size and executive 
pay can be attributed to the fact that larger firms have more complicated operational 
activities (Cheng and Firth, 2006; Core et al., 1999). Hence, there is a need to hire more 
skilled and experienced executives, who demand higher remuneration packages in 
exchange for their services (Chalevas, 2011; Baker et al., 1988). This conclusion is one of 
the few for which there is conclusive evidence in the literature (Méndez et al., 2011) since 
numerous previous studies observes similar findings either in developed or in emerging 
economies (Conyon, 2014; Hearn, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 
2012; Conyon and He, 2012; Banghøj et al., 2010). 
Leverage ratio (LEV), which reflects the financial structure of the firm, is widely 
used with respect to its association with executive pay arrangements (Chalevas, 2011; 
Banghøj et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2007). The results show that debt ratio (LEV) 
significantly and positively impacts three constituents of executive compensation namely 
TOTAL PAY, TOTAL CASH, and SALARY. In other words, top managers are found to be 
rewarded with higher remuneration when the firm has high financial leverage. This 
evidence does not support the notion of the theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) that 
corporates with high financial leverage have higher interest payment commitment, thus, 
they have less ability to pay high remuneration to top managers. Empirically, the outcome 
is also opposite to the findings of a number of previous studies (Basu et al., 2007; Bryan 
et al., 2000; Cyert et al., 2002; Firth et al., 2007), which document negative correlations 
between debt ratio and managerial pay levels. The finding for the KSA can be attributed 
to several potential reasons. First, as business transactions including access to bank loans 
in the KSA are highly dependent on personal connections, managers may be highly 
compensated because of their networks. Another potential interpretation is that as these 
firms have higher risks, managers may demand higher remuneration against the 
possibility of higher dismissal risks. 
The regression analysis reveals that firm age (FAGE) has a positive and significant 
impact on all components of executive compensation. This outcome supports the 
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argument that older firms are more efficient and more profitable than their younger 
counterparts; hence, they are more able and more likely to compensate their executives 
generously (Rashid, 2013). The result is consistent with Rashid (2013) who uses a sample 
of Bangladeshi firms and finds that the more the number of years the firm has been listed 
in the stock exchange, the greater the compensation the executives receive.  
Even though some researchers suggest using accounting and market based proxies 
when measuring firm performance, the study adopts only an accounting measure, namely 
return on assets (ROA) to control for firm performance. This is due to the fact that using 
market measures depends on market efficiency level (Richard et al., 2009), and the 
efficiency of the SSE is found to be weak (Asiri and Alzeera, 2013; Harrison and Moore, 
2012; Onour, 2009). The Kenexa High Performance Institute (KHPI) states that “using 
market measures in countries with non-efficient financial markets could give misleading 
conclusions” (KHPI, 2012). In this context, firms are expected to rely on accounting 
measures, which have a greater reliability when making decisions related to performance 
(Banker and Datar, 1989; Sloan, 1993; Murphy, 1999). The regression analysis shows a 
positive and significant correlation between firm performance (ROA) and all components 
of executive compensation. These results are consistent with the findings reported by 
previous studies which conclude that firm performance positively and significantly 
impacts executive compensation (Ntim et al., 2015; Conyon and He, 2012; Colpan and 
Yoshikawa, 2012; Sakawa et al., 2012). 
3.5.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to check how robust the findings are, further analyses are carried out. 
Even though the results of correlation matrix and VIF test show that the models’ variables 
are not affected by multi-collinearity problems, these tests may have limitations. Thus, to 
ensure the findings are reliable, the research re-runs the main regressions after 
eliminating any variable that has a likelihood of overlapping with another variable in the 
same model. In this sense, there is potential overlapping between chairman blockholder 
variable (BLKCHR) and director ownership (DIROWN). This is because BLKCHR is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the chairman owns at least 5% of the company’s 
outstanding shares, while at the same time, DIROWN is defined as the total shares held 
by board members including chairman. In this sense, if chairman is a blockholder, 
axiomatically director ownership will be somewhat high. However, there is also a 
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possibility that director ownership is high even if the chairman is not a blockholder. 
Therefore, the elimination of the problematic variable will ascertain if this variable has 
affected the primary findings.  
Table 3.12: Robustness Tests: Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation, 
excluding the Blockholder Chairman  
Table 3.12 displays the regression results after excluding BLKCHR. As can be seen, 
the findings are qualitatively similar with a slight difference in the significance levels of 
few results. For example, while the main regression in Table 3.11 shows that DIROWN 
has a negative and significant (p<0.05) association with SALARY, the relationship after 
eliminating BLKCHR is still negative but with slight difference in the significance level 
(p<0.10). Accordingly, it is clear from comparing the results in Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 
 TOTAL PAY TOTAL CASH SALARY BONUS 
 Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Tobit 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. z-value  
BRDIND 0.003 2.16** 0.003 2.41** 0.003 2.31** 0.016 1.04 
DUAL -0.089 -1.43 -0.096 -1.55 -0.137 -2.11** -0.368 -0.52 
CHRBLK -0.069 -1.27 -0.054 -10 -0.082 -1.45 0.459 0.78 
RCEXIST 0.121 2.51** 0.115 2.41** 0.084 1.66* 1.530 2.54** 
DIROWN -0.003 -1.06 -0.002 -0.88 -0.004 -1.67* 0.046 1.99** 
PFOWN 0.040 3.71*** 0.041 3.88*** 0.039 3.53*** 0.109 1.7* 
STATEOWN 0.001 0.27 0.001 0.25 -0.001 -0.31 -0.058 -2.16** 
FSIZE 0.326 4.99*** 0.345 5.32*** 0.263 3.87*** 1.296 4.35*** 
LEV 0.002 3.14*** 0.002 3.27*** 0.002 3.24*** 0.018 2.3** 
FAGE 0.210 4.52*** 0.185 4.00*** 0.224 4.63*** 0.266 0.76 
ROA 0.011 4.93*** 0.011 5.04*** 0.004 1.85* 0.101 3.93*** 
         Constant 5.880 4.32*** 5.497 4.07*** 6.993 4.94*** -23.426 -3.62*** 
         






  .24 
19.69*** 
 




  65.43*** 
All variables are defined in Table 3.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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that the findings are significantly robust and reliable, even after eliminating the potential 
overlapping problems among the model’s variables. 
3.5.5 Sensitivity Tests  
The main objective of the sensitivity analysis is to investigate how sensitive the 
findings of the primary test towards other econometrical methods. In this section, two 
different analyses are employed namely random effect regression (GLS) and pooled OLS 
regression with robust standard error, since the data are not normally distributed as 
demonstrated earlier by the descriptive statistics.  
3.5.5.1 Random Effect Regression 
As discussed in the method section, the results of the Hausman test suggest that 
the fixed effect regression is the most appropriate approach by which to examine the 
models, TOTAL PAY, TOTAL CASH, and SALARY. While, BONUS is primarily tested using 
Tobit regression since the data are censored with zeros that exceed one-fifth of the total 
observations. However, in order to check the findings sensitivity to alternative estimation 
techniques, random effect regression and pooled OLS regression are employed. 
Table 3.13 presents the findings of the random effect regression. The R-squares 
are almost similar to those of the primary analysis with a  slight increase, indicating 
that the explanatory power of independent variables under both techniques is 
convergent. The directions of the relationships are similar, except for the variable 
STATEOWN, which has a positive but statistically insignificant relationship with 
executive compensation variables in the primary analysis, but has a negative and 
significant association under random effect regression. 
Generally, the outcomes are consistent across all models and have the same 
implications, with a number of differences in the significance levels. For example, DUAL 
is negatively but insignificantly associated with the remuneration variables in the fixed 
effect regression. However, in the random effect model, all these relationships are found 
to be statistically significant. The opposite scenario occurs with PFOWN. In the primary 
regression PFOWN shows a positive and significant relationship with managerial pay, 
but under the random effect regression the relationship is found to be insignificant. 
Although, there are very few changes between the results of the two tests, especially in 
the significance levels, the two regressions in general demonstrate that the findings of the 
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fixed effect regression are consistent, reliable, and not significantly sensitive to the 
random effect estimation.  
Table 3.13: Sensitivity Analysis (GLS): Corporate Governance and Executive 
Compensation 
3.5.5.2 Pooled OLS Regression with Robust Standard Error 
As shown in the Descriptive Statistics section and due to the nature of the study’s 
data, the assumptions of parametric test have not been met, especially in relation to the 
prerequisite that data is normally distributed. Therefore, after adopting different 
diagnostic checks, the results reveal that non-parametric test with fixed effect is the most 
relevant technique to estimate the empirical models. Despite the fact that both fixed effect 
and random effect deliver similar results, the study employs OLS regression for further 
 TOTAL PAY TOTAL CASH SALARY BONUS 
 Random effect Random effect Random effect Random effect 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value  
BRDIND 0.003 2.29*** 0.003 2.5*** 0.003 2.55*** 0.011 0.92 
DUAL -0.144 -2.42*** -0.149 -2.52*** -0.192 -3.2*** -0.237 -0.43 
CHRBLK 0.127 1.85* 0.134 1.96* 0.229 3.4*** -0.460 -0.78 
CHRMDs -0.033 -0.65 -0.022 -0.44 -0.033 -0.66 0.318 0.69 
RCEXIST 0.186 3.88*** 0.179 3.77*** 0.150 3.04*** 1.243 2.63*** 
DIROWN -0.002 -0.74 -0.001 -0.61 -0.005 -2.33** 0.039 2.08** 
PFOWN 0.008 1.21 0.009 1.36 0.006 0.94 0.084 1.64* 
STATEOWN -0.007 -2.66*** -0.007 -2.64*** -0.006 -2.2** -0.047 -2.27** 
FSIZE 0.348 10.93*** 0.347 10.94*** 0.274 9.46*** 1.125 4.83*** 
LEV 0.002 3.51*** 0.002 3.55*** 0.002 3.41*** 0.015 2.39** 
FAGE 0.102 3.08*** 0.090 2.74*** 0.087 2.76*** 0.220 0.81 
ROA 0.011 5.34*** 0.011 5.42*** 0.005 2.28** 0.083 4.15*** 
         
Constant 5.652 8.37*** 5.662 8.41*** 6.982 11.29*** -17.838 -3.55*** 
         











All variables are defined in Table 3.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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checks. Table 3.14 shows that the findings of the primary regression are sensitive to the 
OLS estimation. For example, while the fixed effect regression demonstrates that PFOWN 
and FAGE have a positive and significant relationships with executive compensation, the 
OLS findings show negative and significant associations. Furthermore, while CHRBLK 
has a positive and significant impact on managerial remuneration in the primary 
regression, the OLS estimate shows a negative but insignificant impact. The opposite 
scenario occurs with STATEOWN. It has a positive association with the compensation 
constituent in the fixed effect estimate; however, it shows negative and significant 
relationship under OLS regression. 
Table 3.14: Sensitivity Analysis (OLS): Corporate Governance and Executive 
Compensation 
 TOTAL PAY TOTAL CASH SALARY BONUS 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value  Coef. t-value 
BRDIND -0.002 -1.14 -0.001 -1.11 -0.001 -0.70 0.007 0.65 
DUAL -0.196 -3.27*** -0.206 -3.44*** -0.228 -4.21*** -0.541 -1.17 
CHRBLK -0.057 -1.08 -0.042 -0.81 0.069 1.46 0.511 1.26 
CHRMDs -0.051 -1.08 -0.048 -1.02 0.002 0.04 0.212 0.57 
RCEXIST 0.314 4.01*** 0.308 3.94*** 0.235 3.32*** 1.958 3.24*** 
DIROWN 0.002 1.17 0.002 1.18 -0.003 -2.29** 0.035 2.93*** 
PFOWN -0.009 -2.40** -0.009 -2.29** -0.008 -2.25** 0.092 3.03*** 
STATEOWN -0.007 -4.83*** -0.007 -4.81*** -0.003 -2.49** -0.040 -3.53*** 
FSIZE 0.325 18.56*** 0.322 18.43*** 0.244 15.46*** 0.992 7.34*** 
LEV 0.003 3.06*** 0.003 3.05*** 0.001 1.39 0.017 2.48** 
FAGE -0.052 -2.17** -0.055 -2.29** -0.055 -2.52** 0.018 0.10 
ROA 0.019 8.05*** 0.019 8.00*** 0.009 4.21*** 0.142 7.58*** 
         Constant 6.716 16.84*** 6.771 17.01*** 8.209 22.81*** -16.024 -5.21*** 
         





  .40 
57.36*** 
  .37 
41.11*** 
  .21 
  19.68*** 
All variables are defined in Table 3.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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The divergence between the findings of the two regressions may be attributed to 
the fact that the OLS regression does not capture the variation of time in the study’s 
observations (Habbash, 2010) and also OLS treats the different observations as one unit 
without distinguishing between the different groups of data in contrast to the panel data 
(Iskander, 2008). Furthermore, since the OLS assumptions are not met, the test may have 
generated misleading and unreliable results (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008). It can be 
concluded that even though the pooled OLS regression provided inconsistent results 
when compared with those of the main regression, the findings of the latter are still 
reliable and consistent with the other approach that deals effectively with panel data, 
random effect regression. As discussed earlier, the OLS regression has to meet a number 
of assumptions, which the data in this research fails to do; therefore, it is inappropriate 
to rely on its results and these cannot be utilised to assess the findings of the main 
regression. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This research contributes to the extant knowledge in several ways. One key 
contribution is that it studies the effectiveness of the agency-based governance model in 
constraining executive compensation in an emerging economy, Saudi Arabia which has a 
unique institutional setting. Saudi Arabia is an interesting context since the ownership 
concentration is high and dominated by state and family investments, its political system 
is based on an absolute monarchy in which the legal setting is derived from the sharia, 
and its business environment is significantly influenced by wasta. These characteristics 
represent the key divergences between the KSA as an emerging economy and developed 
economies. Thus, the research enhances the understanding of cross-cultural and 
institutional settings and proves empirically whether or not models developed in other 
contexts are generalizable across the globe. Furthermore, while most literature 
concentrates on the principal-agent model (Al-Najjar, 2017; Conyon, 2014; Core et al., 
1999), this research extends the understanding of agency problems that exist among 
other parties (controlling and minority shareholders) and provides insights into 
principal-principal conflict which exists to a considerable degree in emerging economies. 
Finally, the study provides evidence that the absence of effective formal institutions 
encourages companies to pay lip service to corporate governance regulations (form over 
substance). 
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Using data on Saudi listed firms during the period 2008 to 2015, the study finds 
that when the board of directors is chaired by a blockholder, top executives are more 
likely to receive more generous compensation. This finding invalidates the assumption of 
agency model that the participation of large shareholders in the monitoring function 
reduces managerial expropriation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). This outcome can be 
attributed to large shareholders’ connivance since the employment culture in Saudi 
Arabia is influenced by nepotism and cronyism (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). In other 
words, those generously paid managers might be relatives or friends of blockholder 
chairmen. Furthermore, board independence and the remuneration committee, which 
are key elements in international corporate governance (Ntim et al., 2015; Méndez et al., 
2011; Fama and Jensen, 1983b), are found to be ineffective in controlling managerial 
incentives. On the contrary, they are found to boost executive compensation. This implies 
that corporate governance regulations in the KSA are followed in form but not in 
substance for regulatory and legitimating purposes. In contrast, CEO/Chairman role 
duality is low and negligible in Saudi Arabia and has no significant influence on 
managerial incentives. This is because Saudi corporate governance regulations prohibit 
the combination of the positions of CEO and board chairman in a single individual.  
With regards to the impact of investor type on decisions related to executive pay, 
the findings show that board directors are key shareholders in the Saudi market. 
However, their ownership only has a partial impact on managerial pay. Although their 
equity holdings show no relationship with total executive compensation, it significantly 
reduces fixed compensation and expands the use of variable bonus packages. This 
indicates that when members of board of directors hold stakes in the company, they 
become more incentivised to protect their own wealth; therefore, they perform their 
supervisory roles more stringently. Furthermore, pension fund investment, which is akin 
to institutional investment and is believed to promote governance quality (Colpan and 
Yoshikawa, 2012; Ozkan, 2007), is surprisingly found to escalate the pecuniary rewards 
of top management. A potential cause of ineffective role played by pension funds in the 
KSA is that these institutions are semi-government and their representatives on the 
companies’ boards are government officials who find difficulty in distinguishing between 
their functions as shareholders’ representatives and their administrative tasks (Conyon 
and He, 2012).  
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This interpretation is supported by the additional finding that state ownership is 
not related to executive pay-setting. This, despite the state being a dominant investor in 
the SSE, the results demonstrate that state equity in general has no significant 
relationship with the levels of executive remuneration. This poor supervisory role of the 
state might be a consequence of the divergent objectives between state and regular 
shareholders (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Olson, 1973). This is because state investment 
may have non-profit aims such as stabilising the stock market and controlling certain 
sensitive operational sectors for security purposes (Olson, 1973). Therefore, such 
investors do not always seek to maximise their income; hence, their efforts may not focus 
on improving firm performance or controlling managerial activities. In other words, the 
state may have other primary duties rather than monitoring the opportunistic actions of 
top management with regards to their remuneration packages (Olson, 1973). 
Accordingly, the research provides evidence that Saudi companies comply to 
regulatory requirements of corporate governance but with no real conviction. This 
situation supports the institutions-based view which argues that the adoption of the 
Western governance model in emerging economies, where formal institutions are weak, 
will lead to an adherence to governance requirements in form rather than in substance 
(Young et al., 2008). However, certain informal institutional arrangements such as 
personal connections (wasta) play a more significant role than individual merit in the 
design of executive compensation. That is to say, the board of directors, which is 
controlled by blockholders, rather than the remuneration committee, retains the right to 
reward top managers, who are usually appointed on the basis of nepotism and cronyism 
(Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). This situation leads to the emergence of principal-principal 
conflict, which results in minority shareholders’ equity being threatened with 
expropriation. Consequently, it is evident that the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance lacks generalizability in emerging economies such as Saudi Arabia and must 
be contextualised in a way that considers and captures the domestic cultural and 
institutional settings, otherwise, it will not function as intended. 
In practice, the research has significant implications that may assist firms and 
regulators in their efforts to improve the current practices of corporate governance 
towards the design of executive compensation. First, the best practice recommendations 
of corporate governance suggest that ownership concentration and the presence of 
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controlling shareholders in board of directors would mitigate agency costs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). However, this research demonstrates that ownership concentration in 
the hand of certain investors and the presence of blockholders on companies’ boards, 
especially in economies with weak formal institutions, may lead to principal-principal 
conflict and the incurrence of further agency costs. Consequently, governance regulations 
should acknowledge and consider potential conflict among shareholders and create tools 
that ensure the prevention of blockholders’ opportunism and strong protection for 
shareholders’ rights, particularly minority shareholders. Second, the findings show that 
independent directors are ineffective in controlling managerial perks, making the 
independence of board of directors questionable. This provides an opportunity for 
parties in charge to re-define the independent member and generate an appropriate 
periodic assessment for the member. Finally, although firms have shown high compliance 
with current regulations of corporate governance, executive compensation has followed 
upward trend even in years of poor company performance. This indicates to regulators 
and firms that governance regulations are not practised as intended and should stimulate 
the redesign of compensation packages in line with firm performance.  
Although the research outcomes have a high degree of generalizability in emerging 
economies that share similar political, institutional and cultural characteristics with 
Saudi Arabia such as other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), there are a number of limitations that should 
be considered when interpreting the findings. First, the research analyses a limited set of 
corporate governance mechanisms and their relationship to executive compensation 
settings. However, other board characteristics such as the audit committee, which are not 
expected to have a direct influence on executive pay, are not included in the research. 
Second, the investigation scope is limited to one governance mechanism namely 
executive compensation, while other governance characteristics and practices are not 
examined. Third, the research is based on a sample from a single context namely Saudi 
Arabia and does not use multi-country samples. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
research utilises a sample of non-financial companies only and does not investigate 
financial firms since they are subject to different regulations and accounting practices 
(Wang and Shailer, 2015; Méndez et al., 2011).  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent research shows that corporate political connections are a global 
phenomenon with complex economic consequences (Civilize et al., 2015; Guerra Pérez et 
al.; Zhang et al., 2015). That is to say, political relationships are key in shaping the 
business environment, especially in less-developed countries (Faccio, 2010). The absence 
of effective property rights and the weakness of formal institutions in such immature 
economies leads to uncertainty in business sustainability (Zhang et al., 2015). Therefore, 
and in order to reduce such uncertainties, firms tend to build networks of connections, in 
particular with governments, which control the lifeline of any economy (Faccio, 2010). In 
other words, political connections act as a substitute for the weak legal framework. In 
this sense, firms that fail to build political relationships may encounter barriers to their 
survival. In contrast their connected-counterparts can obtain preferential advantages 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Furthermore, many studies demonstrate that political ties add 
value for the company since they provide benefits, such as increasing its value and 
performance (Civilize et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 2009), investment diversification (Li et 
al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015), privileged access to bank financing (Faccio, 2010; Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005), regulatory protection (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) and government 
bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006). This evidence highlights the importance of the phenomenon 
of political connections and how they play a key part in the business policy in developing 
countries. 
The previous chapter shows that the adoption of corporate governance regulations 
in Saudi Arabia, which is a network-oriented economy, was not as effective as when 
implemented in the West. Hence, this research discusses the role of other informal 
drivers that influence business policy in Saudi Arabia. In other words, while formal 
institutions are found to be weak in the Saudi context like other emerging economies 
(Young et al., 2008), there is a high likelihood that other informal institutions will emerge 
to play a substitutive role and fill the gap. Wasta significantly influences employment 
culture and levels of wages in Saudi Arabia (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013; Tlaiss and 
Kauser, 2011). Thus, political connections, which are based on the wasta principle, are a 
key channel to obtain private benefits. Accordingly, this research analyses the 
relationship between political connections and the practices of executive compensation 
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in Saudi Arabia. In this setting, the investigation of political connections is derived from 
a governance framework rather than the economic dimension.  
The study is motivated by the boom in executive compensation in Saudi Arabia 
from 2008 to 2015, which may be an indication of managerial exploitation, especially if it 
is not synchronous with superior firm performance. The statistical trends among the 
highest-compensated executives reveal that executive compensation has increased by 
more than 100% in most listed firms, while the growth in certain firms was threefold, 
such as the Etihad Etisalat Co (Mobily) (Arqaam, 2014). Even though many studies 
investigate the value that political connections can add to a firm (Civilize et al., 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 2009), to the best of our knowledge, the research of 
Chizema et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. (2017) are the only ones that clearly looked at the 
role of political connections in controlling executive incentives. Accordingly, the research 
aims to answer this question: Do political connections enhance governance quality through 
controlling executive compensation? 
In contrast to Chizema et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. (2017), this research 
contributes significantly to the growing body of literature of political connections and 
managerial pay-settings in several ways. First, the study uses a sample from Saudi Arabia, 
which has unique characteristics, i.e. an absolute monarchy system, existence of the Shura 
Council, and the domination of businesses through family and state investment. Second, 
the distinct sample enables a view of the relationship between political connections and 
managerial pay through the lens of principal-principal conflicts of interest. This provides 
an understanding of the interaction between controlling shareholders and politically 
connected members and shows the implications on governance quality, in particular 
executive compensation. Third, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no such 
research has yet been conducted in the Gulf region in general, and in Saudi Arabia in 
particular. Hence, this study is generalizable to Gulf countries, which have many cultural, 
institutional, and economic characteristics in common with Saudi Arabia. Last, since the 
study context is significantly different from most other emerging economies, a new 
definition of political connections, that suits monarchical countries, is developed. This 
definition can be used to examine the phenomenon of political connections on different 
governance and economic characteristics in the GCC countries. 
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The remainder of this research is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the 
theories related to the phenomenon of political connections; section 3 reviews critically 
the literature and shows the literature gap; section 4 develops the research hypotheses 
and method; and section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results; finally, section 6 
provides the research conclusion and limitations. 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to understand how political connectedness influences corporate 
governance quality and the consequences of its existence on executive compensation, the 
research uses the aforementioned theories that directly relate to corporate governance 
and the Saudi context, namely agency theory and institutional theory. In this context, the 
institutional model explains why and how informal institutions such as political 
connections emerge and their influence on business policy in general and governance 
norms in particular. In addition to this, the study also adopts resource dependence theory 
(RDT) due to its direct relevance to political connections attributes. In fact, the RDT 
provides a decent understanding of the motivations leading boards of directors to recruit 
politically connected members and what benefits such members can obtain for the firm. 
In this context, the RDT, along with the agency and institutional models, helps to build a 
comprehensive view towards the behaviours of politically connected members in terms 
of whether they enhance governance quality or increase agency costs. Even though there 
are other models related to political connections, they consider different issues that are 
not related to the research scope. 
4.2.1 Resource Dependence Theory  
RDT came to prominence in 1978 by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Since then, it has 
been extensively employed in organizational theory and strategic management (Boyd, 
1990; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory stands on well-
developed research which generally argues that an organisation is susceptible to external 
contingencies; therefore, its operational effectiveness and continuity depend on external 
factors (Hillman et al., 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that to understand 
organisational behaviour, it is essential to acknowledge and recognise the external 
surrounding environment of that organisation which constrains its strategic decisions.  
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The central argument of RDT is that the success and continuity of an organisation 
is primarily subject to environmental uncertainty and dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). To illustrate, each organisation depends on others in providing basic 
services needed for operational activities e.g. raw material supply, financing, regulatory 
restrictions and so on. Consequently, the more vital resources that the organisation 
controls, the more power that the organisations can exercise over others and vice-versa. 
Based on this assumption, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest five actions that an 
enterprise can take to control their vital resources and thereby diminish resource 
dependence: “a) mergers/vertical integration, (b) JVs [joint ventures] and other 
interorganizational relationships, (c) boards of directors, (d) political action, and (e) 
executive succession” (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 2). However, this study concentrates only 
on the ability of board of directors and political action since these two mechanisms are 
the most related to political connectedness which is the main focus of this study. 
Although the research around boards of directors is predominantly dominated by 
agency theory (Core et al., 1999; Cubbin and Leech, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
RDT emphasises that boards of directors are a key mechanism for bringing critical 
resources to the organisation (Hillman et al., 2009). For example, while agency theories 
argue that large boards in some environmental conditions are less effective than small 
boards (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996), RDT sheds light on the role of ‘resource-rich’ 
directors in securing vital resources for the firm (Boyd, 1990). In other words, 
composition of boards should primarily built on directors’ type not on numbers of 
directors (Hillman et al., 2009). From the perspective of RDT, directors are expected to 
bring four advantages to firms: “(a) information in the form of advice and counsel, (b) 
access to channels of information between the firm and environmental contingencies, (c) 
preferential access to resources, and (d) legitimacy” (Hillman et al., 2009, p. 6).  
However, organisations find difficulties in diminishing uncertainty and 
dependence on large institutions such as government (Hillman et al., 2009). Hence, they 
tend to undertake other means i.e. via recruiting and inviting current or former senior 
government officers to take a seat on the board of directors (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, pp. 189-190) state that “the organization, through political 
mechanisms, attempts to create for itself an environment that is better for its interest” 
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and that “organizations may use political means to alter the condition of the external 
economic environment”.  
Typically, politically connected members are explicitly considered as ‘valuable’ due 
to the benefits that they can add to the firm through their significant interlocking 
connections with government, regardless of whether or not they have experience in the 
sector (Menozzi and Vannoni, 2014). For example, the organisation may gain preferential 
access to key resources including, but not limited to, government contracts, tax benefits, 
lower regulatory constraints, warnings of government policy changes, and government 
bailout and subsides (Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2009; You and Du, 2012; Wang, 2015; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Menozzi and Vannoni, 2014). 
Although the literature on RDT emphasises the role of board of directors as 
resource-access (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Menozzi and Vannoni, 2014; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003), RDT argues that politically connected directors help to reduce the 
regulatory oversight of government bodies (Guerra Pérez et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010). The 
absence of government oversight, however, is not an advantage for all stakeholders. For 
example, related-party transactions are found to be significantly higher when a politically 
connected member serves on board (Berkman et al., 2010; Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015). 
However, such transactions benefit controlling shareholders, while minority 
shareholders are the most influenced party.   
Faccio (2010) finds political connections to play a more active role in transitional 
economies than in developed counterparts. In this context, political ties play a significant 
role in the business environment in Saudi Arabia. The economy of Saudi Arabia is 
dominated by family and state investments and the relationship between control and 
ownership is almost total (Rashid, 2013). Thus, according to RDT, small shareholders rely 
primarily on the resources of larger shareholders. In other words, since RDT measures 
individual power basing on resource dependency, minority shareholders, who have less 
voting rights and less involvement in decision-making, are considered as the weakest 
party in the organisation, especially if top managers are family members (García-Meca, 
2015).  
Some argue that a politically connected director benefits the company as a whole. 
However, when conflicts of interests occur among shareholders, the loyalty of that 
director tilts to blockholders (Conyon and He, 2011), who have the power of appointing 
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him/her to the board. In this sense, controlling shareholders may exploit director’s ties 
to protect them from legal liability resulting from expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
wealth. For instance, family related managers can extract higher non-merit compensation 
or establish higher negative related-party transactions (Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015). 
4.2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory argues that agency costs are subject to the balance of power 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Additionally, it 
implicitly assumes that a manager’s behaviour is influenced by human nature that is self-
interested (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Therefore, the manager acts opportunistically to 
maximise his/her utilities. Since the relationship between managers and shareholders is 
framed by the criterion of power (Finkelstein et al., 2009), political ties may strengthen 
one of the two sides; for this, political connection matters. Consequently, well politically 
connected manager may exploit this connection for private benefits. In particular, he/she 
may use this advantage to extract higher non-merit perks with less consideration to 
regulatory sanctions (García-Meca, 2015).  
However, in Saudi Arabia the situation is different. Most politically connected 
individuals serve on boards of directors rather than becoming top managers; this feature 
may be attributed to prestige and leadership reasons. For instance, all boards of directors 
that have a royal family member, are chaired by a royal family member. Hence, Saudi 
politically connected members appear to prefer to be a board member rather than to 
serve in management which is perceived as subordinate by board of directors’ ‘supreme 
authority’. Moreover, since ownership is highly concentrated in Saudi Arabia (The World 
Bank, 2009) and blockholders are present in the majority of boards, there is reason to 
argue that the presence of the conventional principal-agent conflict is lower in Saudi 
Arabia than in most other countries (Young et al., 2008). It is also arguable that top 
managers in Saudi Arabia have less discretion and power than, for example, their 
counterparts in Western region (Rashid, 2013), unless they are blockholders. 
Initially, agency theory argued that concentrated ownership is an effective 
mechanism to mitigate agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, scholars 
came to recognise that concentrated ownership transforms the conflict from principal-
agent to a conflict among shareholders themselves (principal-principal) (Young et al., 
2008). In this situation, blockholders may use their voting rights to control decision-
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making and extract resources, assets and profits at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Sun et al., 2016). 
The severity of principal-principal conflict is dependent on two external 
governance mechanisms: the legal system and market efficiency (Sun et al., 2016). La 
Porta et al. (2000) point out that the strength of legal investor protection can play a 
crucial instrument in curbing blockholder opportunism. That is to say, the enforcement 
of effective sanctions acts as a deterrent to blockholders from abusing their power and 
vice-versa. Second, blockholders can be constrained by efficient markets, because 
committing any opportunistic activities sends a negative signal to the market, which in 
turn affects the stock price (Gomes, 2000) and limit opportunities of future equity 
financing (Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
Accordingly, the immature economy of Saudi Arabia may suffer significantly from 
principal-principal conflict, because it has neither an effective legal regime (Al-Twaijry et 
al., 2003) nor an efficient stock market (Asiri and Alzeera, 2013). Although, regulatory 
bodies have imposed mechanisms to curb rent appropriation by controlling shareholders 
e.g. requiring one third of board members to be independent and enforcing the adoption 
of cumulative voting system in board elections (CMA, 2010), controlling shareholders and 
their representatives still comprise the majority of boards. Furthermore, the principal-
principal problem is exacerbated if a blockholder is well connected politically. In such a 
situation, even if the two aforementioned instruments become effective, a politically 
connected blockholder is less likely to be affected by external sanctions. His/her political 
ties will protect him/her from any legal consequences and will also open alternative 
channels for equity financing when needed. 
With regards to executive compensation, even though politically connected 
members are not usually managers, their relatives and close friends are. This 
phenomenon is demonstrated by the fact that the employment environment in Saudi 
Arabia is significantly influenced by nepotism and cronyism (wasta) (Tlaiss and Kauser, 
2011). Therefore, those politically connected blockholders may exercise their 
stewardship for the benefit of their related and unqualified-managers and set high non-
merit compensation. However, this will be at the expense of minority shareholders, since 
their equity is poorly managed by unqualified managers and their resources are 
expropriated (Young et al., 2008). 
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4.2.3 Institutional Theory 
Recently, studies related to political connectedness, conducted in emerging and 
transition economies, have been widely influenced by the institutional-based perspective 
(Zhang et al., 2015; Chizema et al., 2015; You and Du, 2012). This theory argues that each 
context has a unique institutional environment. Therefore, an effective mechanism that 
works properly in one country, might not be applicable to another country (Young et al., 
2008). For example, concentrated ownership is suggested as a remedy to diminish agent-
principal conflict. However, this instrument is a root cause of principal-principal conflict 
in immature economies, such as Saudi Arabia, which are characterised by weak formal 
institutions (Faccio et al., 2001; Young et al., 2008). 
Basically, when “formal institutions such as laws and regulations regarding 
accounting requirements, information disclosure, securities trading, and their 
enforcement are either absent, inefficient, or do not operate as intended” (Young et al., 
2008, p. 198), informal institutions play a substitutive role in addressing organisational 
behaviour (Peng and Heath, 1996). One of these informal instruments is wasta, which is 
an important factor in emerging Arab economies (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). In Saudi 
Arabia, wasta plays a significant role in daily transactions among individuals, 
government, and business organisations (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). In this sense, wasta 
is considered to be one of the key determinants of organisational culture in the KSA.  
For legitimacy and survival purposes, firms in emerging economies seek to build 
strong connections with the external surrounding environment, in particular with 
government which enables them to gain preferential treatment (Suchman, 1995; Faccio, 
2010). To do so, firms tend to attract government investment or to offer directorship 
seats for directors who have strong connectedness with top government. Such directors 
are usually current or former senior government officials (Wang, 2015), or related to the 
ruling party (Sun et al., 2016; Fisman, 2001). From the resource dependence perspective, 
the power of these directors may balance or outweigh shareholders’ power if the firm 
significantly depends on the resources that these directors have (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Hence, the politically connected directors may not be as influenced by large 
shareholders as are regular independent directors who are accused of being a ‘rubber 
stamp’ for dominant shareholders (Young et al., 2008).  
158 | P a g e  
 
Typically, political members are influenced by the general orientation of the 
government; therefore they may act to reinforce government expectations with regards 
to top executive compensation (Chizema et al., 2015). Moreover, since these directors are 
usually cautious, they are seriously concerned about the political costs that would arise 
if they collude either with top managers or controlling shareholders for private interests 
(Goldman et al., 2009). Put differently, the legitimacy of these members and of the 
political organisations to which they belong will be significantly affected if they are 
caught engaging in any corruption scandals. However, the situation might be different if 
that politician holds a block of shares concurrently. In such a scenario, the blockholder 
politician may act as a normal investor who seeks rent; thereby, his relationship with 
other small shareholders will be framed by principal-principal theory (Young et al., 
2008).   
4.3 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The economic effects of political connections have attracted increasing scholarly 
attention in recent years (Faccio, 2010; Civilize et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). Numerous 
academic studies focus on the contribution of political connections to a firm’s survival, 
especially in immature economies characterised by high levels of corruption (Faccio, 
2010; Civilize et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015). The existing literature reports evidence of 
certain benefits that political connections can add to the enterprise, such as increasing its 
value and performance (Civilize et al., 2015; Guerra Pérez et al.), investment 
diversification (Zhang et al., 2015; Li et al., 2012), privileged access to bank financing 
(Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), regulatory protection (Kroszner and Stratmann, 
1998) and government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006). However, few look at the role of 
political connections in controlling over executive incentives (Chizema et al., 2015; 
García-Meca, 2015).  
Although the body of literature on political connections and their relationship to 
executive pay is small, executive compensation is found to be significantly affected by 
firm characteristics such as firm value and performance (Ntim et al., 2015; Conyon and 
He, 2012) and leverage level (Chalevas, 2011; Banghøj et al., 2010). Hence, it is essential 
to understand how political connections can affect these factors in order to build a 
perception of the indirect relationship between political connection and executive 
compensation (Ding et al., 2015), before analysing the direct relationship between the 
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two variables. To the best of my knowledge, no research has yet been conducted in the 
Arab region or in the Gulf countries into the relationship between political ties and 
managerial pay. Thus, the literature review focuses on global experiences with a spotlight 
on the emerging economies. 
4.3.1 Definition of Political Connections 
The literature demonstrates that there is no single conclusive definition of political 
connections that fits all contexts. The existing definitions vary significantly since they are 
subject to different contextual and legal characteristics. For example, while the 
government system in China is significantly influenced by communism and the sole major 
political party is the Communist Party of China (Sun et al., 2016), the political system in 
the US is democratic and there are two major political parties, the Republican party and 
Democratic party (Goldman et al., 2009). Consequently, the variations between the 
different political systems leads to diverse definitions of political connections. Arguably, 
the definitions of political connections not only vary across countries but also within the 
same country. For instance, Ding et al. (2014) classify a firm as politically connected f 
there is Chinese government ownership, while Wang (2015) and Chizema et al. (2015) 
consider a firm to have political ties if one of its board members is a former government 
officer, a member of the Chinese People’s Congress or a member of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. 
The dimensional level of impact and specification of political connections also vary 
from one definition to another. For example, in Hong Kong, Wong (2010) acknowledges 
a firm as having a political relationship if one of its board members is concurrently 
serving on the Election Committee. In addition, Khwaja and Mian (2005) consider a 
person as a politician in Pakistan if he/she ran in an election, regardless of whether they 
won the election. In contrast, Fisman (2001) classifies an Indonesian corporation as 
politically connected according to its links with the family of the Indonesian President 
Suharto. Undoubtedly, there is a significant difference between having strong links to a 
family that controls a government and having ties to a political committee. 
Thus, it can be concluded that, in order to develop a definition of political 
connections, contextual characteristics require to be taken into consideration, such as the 
type of political system and the level of authority. Accordingly, this study uses the 
presence of a royal family member, a Shura Council member, or a state representative on 
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a board of directors as a proxy for determining that an enterprise has political 
connections. Since the political system in Saudi Arabia is based on absolute monarchy, a 
royal family member is expected to have a strong link to senior government officers. 
Undoubtedly, members of the appointed Shura Council or state representatives are 
officially and directly connected to senior government officers through their positions. 
However, minsters are not included in the definition because the Saudi Law of the Council 
of Ministers forbids ministers from accepting memberships in private corporate boards 
(BECM, 1993). 
4.3.2 Political Connections and Firm Performance 
The literature shows that political connections can benefit the firm and increase its 
value through various channels (Goldman et al., 2009). For instance, politically connected 
enterprises might directly obtain favours through an allocation of lucrative government 
contracts (Goldman et al., 2009). Moreover, governments may tolerate and exempt 
connected firms from certain regulations (Imai, 2006). Another example is related to the 
market share; i.e. firms which receive government favour might enjoy a monopolistic 
environment and be protected from competitors (Civilize et al., 2015), while tariffs are 
imposed on foreign competitors (Goldman et al., 2009). All these favours might ultimately 
result in higher firm value and a better performance and thereby increase managerial 
incentives. This section is a review of studies offering evidence that political connections 
are valuable for firms’ operations. 
Goldman et al. (2009) investigate the relationship between political connections 
and firm value in the US. In order to analyse the value of the political connections, they 
classify the firms into two categories; those related to the Republican Party and those 
affiliated to the Democratic Party. Their sample is based on the S&P 500 for the period 
1996-2000, and they focus on two aspects: the 2000 presidential election and the 
nomination of politically connected members to the board. The study finds that 
approximately 31% of firms are politically connected, and after the announcement of the 
Republican win, the return was significantly positive for firms connected to the 
Republican Party and significantly negative for those connected to the Democratic Party. 
Additionally, the announcement of the board nomination for a politically connected 
member is found to be related to a positive and significant stock-price response.  
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Using a sample of 115 non-financial Spanish companies for the years 2003-2012, 
Guerra Pérez et al. (2015) corroborated the findings of Goldman et al. (2009). They report 
that board members who have previously held political office significantly increase firm 
performance. The study, however, uses a single proxy, namely Tobin’s Q, to measure firm 
performance. This limits the robustness of the results and their generalizability. 
Moreover, it uses a Probit model which is basically designed to deal with binary variables, 
which represent experiments with a fixed number of possible outcomes e.g. dummy 
variable (one or zero). However, using Tobin’s Q is not valid since its figures have 
different values that not limited to certain possible outcomes. 
In Far East Asia, Wong (2010) examined the relationship between political 
connections and multi-performance measures in Hong Kong. The study defines political 
connection as a shareholder or director who sits on the election committee, and it finds 
that nearly 16% of the election committee’s members are affiliated to listed firms. In 
order to answer the study’s main question on whether or not collusion exists between 
government and business in Hong Kong, the author utilises a sample from the years 1997-
2000 and obtains mixed results. For example, while return on equity was found to be 
higher when a shareholder or director participates in the election committee, there was 
a negative effect on market-to-book ratio. This might be an indication that political 
connections only influence firm performance in accounting terms. Arguably, however, the 
relationship between political connections and firm performance may be a misleading 
proxy by which to identify if there is collusion between government and business elites. 
That is to say, the performance may have been improved by other factors such as the 
experience of politically connected individuals or the amount of information known 
about future government plans such as new projects or regulations. 
Although the above studies were applied in developed contexts which have mature 
economies and low levels of corruption compared to emerging countries (Faccio, 2010), 
they highlight that political connections have a significant influence on firm value and 
performance. Given the fact that the benefits from political connections are limited in 
developed economies, the results might therefore be expected to be statistically 
significant were such a study conducted in an emerging country such as Saudi Arabia. 
In an emerging context, Civilize et al. (2015) conducted a study with a sample of 
653 Thai listed companies that were operating between 1987 and 2008. The study 
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considers a firm to be politically connected if a board member is connected with the 
prime minister, a cabinet member, or a member of parliament. The findings demonstrate 
that 65% of Thai firms are politically connected and that politically connected firms are 
associated with higher stock realised returns than their counterparts. 
Faccio (2010) argues that political connections operate strongly in highly corrupt 
countries. This argument is supported by studies carried out in China (Wang, 2015; Zhang 
et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014), which are ranked 83rd of 168 countries in 2015 by 
Transparency International with regard to corruption (Transparency International, 
2015). For example, Ding et al. (2014) adopts two proxies (state ownership and 
management connections) to measure the influence of political connections on firm 
performance. Their findings show that only state ownership is associated with superior 
firm performance. This finding is consistent with that of Wang (2015), who uses a 
different proxy for political connections—independent directors—but documents 
similar results; i.e. he observes a positive and significant relationship between political 
connections and firm value. Furthermore, Conyon et al. (2015) examine the role of 
politically connected CEOs and firm performance and report that when the CEO has 
political connections, the firm produces a better performance. Zhang et al. (2015) also 
examine the association between political connections and firm diversification in China. 
They provide evidence that, in general, politically connected enterprises have greater 
diversification opportunities than non-politically connected ones. 
In contrast, Faccio (2010), who uses a sample from across 47 countries, produced 
a different result. It finds that when a firm is politically connected, the accounting 
performance declines. Faccio (2010) attributes this negative correlation to the possibility 
that such firms may be managed by politician managers who may lack the skills required 
to run a successful business. The study by Faccio (2010), however, has two 
methodological limitations. First, the analysis is based only on OLS regression, which has 
several statistical drawbacks if certain assumptions are not met (Gujarati, 2003). Second, 
it uses a cross-sectional analysis rather than panel data, which limits the robustness of 
the findings.  
4.3.3 Political Connections and Access to Credit 
Access to external debt financing gives a firm an advantage in its efforts to expand 
its operations and comprehensively outperform its competitors. However, such access is 
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a thorny issue for many enterprises. Therefore, firms tend to establish connections with 
politicians as a mean of opening channels to greater bank credit, especially those 
controlled by the government (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Since this relationship occurs 
actively in emerging countries, the majority of studies (Civilize et al., 2015; Ding et al., 
2014; Wang, 2015) examining the relationship between political ties and long-term 
finance have been conducted in developing economies. They conclusively document that 
politically connected firms enjoy preferential treatment with respect to accessing credit. 
For example, Khwaja and Mian (2005), which utilises a large sample of borrowers 
from government and private banks between 1996 and 2002 in Pakistan, recording 
nearly 10,890 firm-year observations, find that firms with political connections receive 
substantial preferential treatment from government banks. The findings show that 
connected firms receive 45% higher bank lending than their non-connected 
counterparts. Interestingly, this preferential treatment was entirely related to 
government banks, as privately-owned bank lending show no significant association with 
political ties. This finding confirms the argument that government banks are more prone 
to captured and influence by politicians than private financial institutions (Wang, 2015). 
Sun et al. (2016) and Wang (2015) obtain similar results in China. Wang (2015) 
uses a random sample of 827 non-financial firms operating between 2003 and 2011. The 
results show that the larger the percentage of politically connected independent directors 
on the board, the higher degree of access to external financing. This finding is supported 
by Sun et al. (2016), who document that politically connected directors help to obtain 
higher long-term debt financing in privately owned enterprises, although their study was 
limited to 1,046 manufacturing firms operating between 2008-2011. 
Using a sample of Malaysian top-500 non-finance listed firms for the period 2001-
2004, Bliss and Gul (2012) investigate the relationship between politically connected 
firms and access to bank lending. The authors conclude that when a firm has political ties 
with government officers, there is a high likelihood of it enjoying firm-specific political 
favours from banks with respect to credit. Although this study adopted the OLS approach, 
which has several limitations (Gujarati, 2003), its findings are qualitatively consistent 
with the literature. 
In contrast, Claessens et al. (2008) use contributions to election campaigns as an 
indirect proxy to measure the effect of political connections. In particular, the authors 
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investigate if firms’ contributions to campaigns related to the Brazilian elections of 1998 
and 2002 led to future firm-specific favours. The findings show that firms that made 
campaign contributions to the winning party received preferential treatment from banks 
during the four years following the election. 
However, establishing political connections through election campaign 
contributions is not compatible with the context of Saudi Arabia, since the political 
system is an absolute monarchy. Therefore, direct connections is the most appropriate 
way to establish political relationships with government, i.e. by appointing directors 
related to the government to the board of directors or by establishing personal 
connections with government officers. However, the latter tactic is in fact 
incommensurable.  
The conclusive outcome, that political connections increase access to bank 
financing, is also reinforced by the comprehensive study of Faccio (2010), who examines 
the impact of political connections on firm leverage in 47 different countries. The 
conclusion confirms the notion that when the company has stronger political ties, there 
is a higher likelihood of it gaining extra financing.  
4.3.4 Political Connections and Corporate Governance 
Although political connections provide favours to certain firms, they also have a 
negative impact that enables blockholder rent appropriation (Sun et al., 2016). In other 
words, political ties may strengthen the position of controlling shareholders and provide 
them with the required authority and legal protection to expropriate the wealth of 
minority shareholders through various means, e.g. via related-party transactions (Wang, 
2015). Recently, this on-going debate has stimulated academics (Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 
2015; García-Meca, 2015) to carry out studies in order to address the relationship 
between political ties and rent-seeking behaviour. 
Sun et al. (2016) investigate the situation of having politically connected directors 
on the board and its consequences for shareholders’ interests in 1,046 Chinese 
manufacturing firms operating between 2008 and 2011. The results reveal that political 
connections increase transactions related to controlling shareholders. However, the 
study finds no relationship between political ties and firm performance. Linking the two 
conclusions indicates that the presence of politically connected directors benefits only 
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the large shareholders at the expense of small investors. In other words, minority 
shareholders neither gain advantage from superior firm performance nor benefit from 
party-related transactions, while controlling shareholders maximise their own wealth by 
channelling the firm’s resources to their privately-owned enterprises. 
Similarly, but based on a wider sample consisting of 827 Chinese firms from 
manufacturing and other non-financial sectors for the years 2003-2012, Wang (2015) 
find that appointing independent directors who have political connections is significantly 
associated with higher related-party transactions. This finding demonstrates that 
controlling shareholders pretend to comply with corporate governance requirements 
related to board independence; however, they actually appoint politically connected 
members to protect them from the regulators in the event that they engage in rent 
appropriation behaviour. Therefore, those independent members do not seem to enjoy 
real independence from large shareholders. 
Cheung et al. (2010) analyse 187 related-party transactions reported by Chinese 
firms in 2001-2002. The study adopts a unique definition for political connections, which 
distinguishes between firms affiliated with central government and their counterparts 
connected to the local authority. Interestingly, the final results demonstrate that the local 
government ownership or the presence of their affiliated directors are significantly 
associated to negative related-party transactions. In contrast, firms affiliated with the 
central government obtain benefit from related-party transactions. To be more specific, 
minority shareholders in firms related to local government are expropriated through 
such transactions; however, their counterparts which have political connections with the 
central government benefit from positive related-party. The evidence indicates that the 
objectives and governance quality are different across government institutions. 
Therefore, each institution may have unique orientations and goals. 
With regards to the avoidance of regulations enforcement, Berkman et al. (2010) 
investigate the consequences of three regulatory changes introduced to improve the 
protection of small shareholders in China. The research observes that the newly enforced 
regulations benefit minority shareholders only in non-politically connected firms. 
However, if a firm has ties with government, these regulations are not effective. That is to 
say, firms that have close relationships with government are found to be less affected by 
the new regulations and blockholders in these firms still expropriate the wealth of 
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minority shareholders through related-party transactions. Although the research mainly 
relies on cross-sectional analysis i.e. only for 1999, the findings show consistency with 
other findings (Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015).  
Political connections are also accused of having a negative influence on the 
composition of boards of directors. For instance, Ding et al. (2014) in the context of China 
between 2004 and 2006 find that politically connected firms are associated with fewer 
independent directors than their non-connected peers. Moreover, using a Chinese sample 
of 1,546 firms over the years 2005-2008, You and Du (2012) examine the consequences 
of poor firm performance for the status of CEOs. The findings show that politically 
connected CEOs are less likely to be fired in the event of poor performance. This is 
because politically connected CEOs can use their political ties to prevent termination of 
their contract resulting from poor firm performance. Both politically connected CEOs and 
board members who have political ties are significantly associated with a lower 
compulsory turnover of CEOs.  
With respect to the transparency level, (Al-Hadi et al., 2016), which uses a sample 
of financial listed-firms from the GCC markets, found that the presence of ruling family 
members on the board of directors is associated with lower disclosure of risk, especially 
in firms that are experiencing financial distress or high levels of risk. In other words, 
politically connected members do not enhance transparency which is considered as a key 
issue in governance. Although this research partly investigates the Saudi context, it is 
important to note that the scope is limited to the relationship between political 
connections and risk disclosure. Furthermore, the sample is only based on financial firms 
which are subject to various supervisory bodies and different disclosure requirements. 
Lastly, the research adopts a specific definition of political connections that is limited to 
the ruling family members. In contrast, my study uses a wider definition of political 
connections that considers other influential parties such as Shura Council members and 
state representatives. 
4.3.5 Political Connections and Executive Compensation 
Research around the relationship between political ties and corporate governance 
has increased significantly (Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015; Ding et al., 2014), although only 
a small number of studies investigate their impact on executive incentives (Chizema et 
al., 2015; Conyon et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2015). This might be attributed to the data 
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accessibility, because the majority of studies examining the role of political connections 
are conducted in emerging economies, which are characterised by low transparency, and 
therefore lower data. Studies find mixed results regarding the influence of political 
connections according to whether the connected person is an executive or a director on 
board of directors. If the person is a beneficiary such as CEO, there is a high likelihood 
that he/she will exercise his/her political ties to influence his/her own compensation, as 
suggested by managerial power hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2009). However, if the 
person who has the political connections is a board member with a supervisory function, 
the impact might be more desirable. In this section, the study reviews prior evidence 
related to the association between the political connectedness and managerial incentives. 
Conyon et al. (2015) conducted a study to address the question if political 
connections in management level matter when setting their compensation. Using data 
from 572 Chinese firms operating in the period 2000-2010, the findings show that when 
CEOs have political ties, their compensation is more likely to be higher in comparison to 
non-connected counterparts in other firms. In this sense, CEOs exploit their political 
connections to strengthen their control over decisions related to their own compensation 
and thereby extract high non-merit rewards. In other words, political connections help 
CEOs to expropriate shareholders’ wealth. However, the study uses a definition of 
political connections that is not widely accepted, since it considers CEOs who have 
military experience to be politically connected, neglecting the fact that not all military 
individuals have political ties, especially enlisted and low ranking officers. 
In the same context, Ding et al. (2015), who investigate all listed firms in China’s 
two stock exchanges between 2005-2006, document that politically connected managers 
cannot increase their own compensation if there is a controlling politically connected 
owner. However, if managers are the only party who enjoy political connections, their 
remuneration is found to be significantly higher. This indicates that political connections 
help to balance between the power of agents and principals. In other words, political ties 
act as a supportive instrument for controlling shareholders to thwart any managerial 
opportunistic behaviours, even if those managers have political relationships as well. 
Notably, the study uses board chairman to refer to the executive managers. The authors 
justify this by arguing that board chairmen always act as executives in China; thereby, 
their positions are ranked higher than CEOs. However, this classification is not widely 
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generalizable; e.g. board chairpersons in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to hold the post of 
CEO or any other key executive positions concurrently (CMA, 2010). 
Furthermore, in Spain, García-Meca (2015) investigates if boards of directors in 
financial institutions are self-interest when designing their own remuneration packages. 
The investigation is based on a sample consisting of 44 savings banks that operated 
between 2004 and 2009. It finds that politically connected chairmen are significantly 
associated with higher board remuneration, suggesting that political connections are not 
always to the benefit of the enterprise, especially when the matter is related to personal 
interest of board or management members. 
To the best of my knowledge, Chizema et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. (2017) are the 
only research that clearly examine the role of political connections from a supervisory 
perspective in constraining executive compensation. Chizema et al. (2015) carried out 
their study in the context of China and observe the political impact on 964 listed firms for 
seven years starting from 2008. The study outcomes demonstrate that politically 
connected directors can be a substitute for weak governance. That is to say, they find that 
directors with political experience play a significant role in curbing the opportunism of 
top executives through reducing their compensation packages. Chizema et al. (2015) 
suggest that politically connected members may enhance adherence to the primary 
government objective, such as achieving a harmonious society. Furthermore, they argue 
that politically connected directors may act informally as a government representative to 
ensure that the government expectations are met with regards to executive 
remuneration. 
Similarly, in the context of Saudi Arabia, politically connected directors such as 
Shura Council members and state representatives may informally represent the 
government’s view with respect to the enhancement of corporate governance. Even royal 
family members are expected to primarily comply with corporate governance regulations 
in form and in substance for the purposes of legitimacy. If this is the case, it will lead to 
higher transparency and low opportunistic behaviours.  
Hearn et al. (2017), who use a sample of 119 initial public offering (IPO) listed firms 
for the period 2000 to 2014, also find similar results. The authors observe a negative and 
significant relationship between the presence of social elites on the board of directors 
and managerial fixed remuneration. However, the research scope is limited to IPO listed 
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firms in 17 African economies with only a few observations in each context. Furthermore, 
their main independent variable namely ‘social elites on board’ is based on a wide 
definition since it includes parties that do not necessarily have political connections, such 
as university professors or directors with commercial background. However, my 
research uses a more specific definition for political connections that ensures political-
classified members have direct ties with government. 
According to the literature survey, there is evidence that political connections are 
a two-edged sword (Ding et al., 2015; García-Meca, 2015; Faccio, 2010). That is to say, 
while they are beneficial for the firm in obtaining vital resources such as access to bank 
financing (Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), they also have a negative impact from 
the perspective of minority shareholders, since they are found to be associated with 
higher third-party transactions which only benefit large shareholders (Sun et al., 2016; 
Wang, 2015). Furthermore, although much research investigates the role and behaviours 
of political connections on certain firm characteristics (Civilize et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 
2015; Bliss and Gul, 2012), only two studies, (Chizema et al., 2015; Hearn et al., 2017) 
connect this phenomenon with executive pay-settings. Consequently, the literature has 
some significant gaps. For example, there is no investigation into countries governed by 
monarchical regime where royal family members are powerful politically connected 
members. Furthermore, while the research of Chizema et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. 
(2017) are centred on the traditional agency model (principal-agent), no research 
focuses on the influence of political connections in the presence of large shareholders. 
Accordingly, my study adds a valuable contribution to the literature by filling these gaps. 
In doing so, the study extends the understanding of the relationship between political 
connectedness, using a contextual-based definition of political connections, and 
managerial pay arrangements, particularly in contexts that suffer from principal-
principal conflict. Table 4.1 presents summary of main research to date 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Key Research 
Study Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variable(s) Sample 
characteristics 
Analysis 
Technique Main Findings 
Goldman et al. 
(2009) 
- Stock return 
- Stock price 
1. Connections to the Republican 
Party 
2. Connections to the Democratic 
Party 
A sample from S&P 
500 firms for the 
period 1996 to 2000 
 
- N/A 1) Firms connected to the Republican Party (the Democratic Party) have a positive (negative) and 
significant association with stock return. 
2) Stock price of firms connected to the Republican Party (the Democratic Party) showed a 
positive (negative) response after the result of the US presidential election 2000. 
Guerra Pérez 
et al.  
- Firm performance 1. Politically connected directors 
2. Family related directors 
3. Banks related directors 
A sample of 115 non-
financial Spanish-
listed firms for the 
period 2003 to 2012 
- Probit 1) Directors with a former political post have a positive impact on firm performance. 
2) Family directors are associated with higher firm performance. 
3) There is a negative and significant relationship between banks related directors and firm 
performance. 
Hearn et al. 
(2017) 
- Executive salary 1. Social elites on the board A sample of 119 IPOs 
from 17 African 
countries for the 
period 2000 to 2014 
 
- Fixed effect 
- Random effect 
1) Boards that have social elites significantly increases executive fixed compensation. 
Civilize et al. 
(2015) 
- Stock returns  1. Political connections A sample of 653 
Thai-listed firms for 
the period 1987 to 
2008 
- Fixed effect  
- 2SLS 
1) There is a positive and significant relationship between the presence of politically connected 
firms and realised stock returns. 
Jackowicz et 
al. (2014) 
- Operational performance 1. Politically connected directors A sample of 105 non-
financial Polish-listed 
firms for the period 
2001 to 2011 
- GMM 
- GLS 




- Firm performance 1. Politically connected directors A sample of 
Slovenian-listed 
firms for the period 
2000 to 2010 
- OLS 
- GMM 
1) Politically connected directors are significantly associated with lower firm productivity.  
Wong (2010) - Firm performance 1. Politically connected 
shareholders 
2. Politically connected directors 
A sample from Hong 
Kong firms for the 
period 1997 to 2000 
- OLS 
- Fixed effect 
- Logit 
1) Both shareholders and directors who have political ties are associated with higher accounting 
firm performance (ROE). 
2) However, they have a negative impact on market related firm performance (market to book 
ratio)  
Ding et al. 
(2014) 
- Firm performance 
- Board independence 
1. Political connections A sample from 
Chinese-listed firms 
for the period 2004 
to 2006 
 
- 2SLS 1) Political connections positively and significantly affect firm performance. 
2) Political connections have a negative and significant relationship with independence level of 
board of directors.  
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Wang (2015) - Firm leverage 
- Firm value 
- Blockholders appropriation 
1. Independent politically 
connected directors 
A sample of 827 non-
financial Chinese-
listed firms for the 
period 2003 to 2012 
- Fixed effect 1) Private firms benefit from independent politically connected directors via access to external debt 
financing and more subsidies from the government. 
2) The larger fraction of independent politically connected directors, the higher the firm value. 
3) Having more independent directors with political ties increase the magnitude of related-party 
transactions of the controlling shareholders in private firms. 
Conyon et al. 
(2015) 
- Firm performance 
- CEO cash compensation 
1. Star CEO 
2. Politically connected CEO 
A sample of 572 
Chinese-listed firms 




- Fixed effect 
1) Firms that have politically connected CEOs perform much better than firms that hiring CEOs 
with no political ties. 
2) When CEOs have political connections, their compensation is more likely to be higher.  
Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) 
- Firm leverage 
 
1. Politically connected directors A sample of Pakistani 
firms for the period 
1996 to 2002 
 
- Fixed effect 1) Politically connected firms receive larger bank credit than non-connected counterparts. 
2) Political connections operate in government banks only; however, privately owned banks have 
no such ties with politicians. 
Sun et al. 
(2016) 
- Firm leverage 
- Firm performance 
- Blockholders appropriation 
1. Politically connected directors A sample of 1046 
manufacturing 
Chinese firms for the 
period 2008 to 2011 
- Fixed effect  
- 2SLS 
1) Political connections are associated with higher long-term debt. 
2) There is no significant relationship between political connections and firm performance. 
3) The larger fraction of politically connected directors on board, the higher related-party 
transaction of large shareholders. 
Bliss and Gul 
(2012) 
- Firm leverage 
 
1. Political connections A sample of top 500   
non-financial 
Malaysian-listed 
firms for the period 
2001 to 2004 
- OLS 1) Politically connected firms enjoy preferential treatment with regards to access to credit. 
Claessens et al. 
(2008) 
- Firm performance 
- Firm leverage 
 
1. Campaign contributions A sample of 238 
firms contributed in 
the Brazilian 
elections in 1998 and 
2002    
- Fixed effect  
 
1) Companies that provided contributions to elected federal deputies had a higher stock returns 
than firms that did not in the 1998 and 2002 elections. 
2) Firms that made campaign contributions to the winner party, received preferential treatments 
from banks during the four years following the election. 
 
You and Du 
(2012) 
- Firm performance 
- Forced CEO turnover 
 
1. Politically connected CEO A sample of 1546 
Chinese-listed firms 





1) Politically connected CEOs is less likely to be fired even if they show poor performance. 
2) Politically connected CEOs are positively and significantly associated with higher future 
performance only if the firm ROA is lower than the industry median. 
García-Meca 
(2015) 
- Board remuneration 1. Politically connected chairman A sample of 44 
Spanish saving banks 
for the period 2004 
to 2009 
- N/A 1) There is a positive and significant relationship between politically connected chairman and 
board remuneration level. 
 
Yeh et al. 
(2013) 
- Abnormal returns 
- Firm leverage 
 
1. Political connections All Taiwanese-listed 
firms for the period 




1) Politically connected firms are associated with higher abnormal returns. 
2) Politically connected firms are more likely to have preferential bank lending.  
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Fan et al. 
(2007) 
- First-day stock return 
- Board professionalism 
1. politically connected CEO A sample of 790 IPOs 
Chinese firms for the 
period 1993 to 2001 
- OLS 
- Fixed effect 
- Random effect 
1) Firms with politically connected CEOs are significantly related with poor accounting and stock 
return performance in contrast to their unconnected counterparts. 
2) Politically connected CEOs tend to appoint more bureaucrats on board of directors which reduces 
the board professionalism. 
Ding et al. 
(2015) 
- Chairman remuneration 1. Politically connected chairman 
2. Politically connected owner 
All Chinese-listed firms 
in the two stock 
exchanges for the years 
2005 and 2006 
 
- OLS 1) Politically connected managers have a positive and significant impact on executive compensation 
if there is no politically connected owner. 
2) Political connections make a balance of power between agents and principals. 
Chizema et al. 
(2015) 
- Top executive pay 1. Politically connected directors A sample of 964 
Chinese-listed firms 
for the period 2002 
to 2008 
- GMM 1) Politically connected directors have a negative and significant effect on key executive 
remuneration. 
Berkman et al. 
(2010) 
- Blockholders appropriation 
- Effectiveness of new 
regulation related to minority 
shareholders’ protection 





1) Minority shareholders benefit from the new regulations designed to protect their interests only 
in non-politically connected firms. 
2) Politically connected blockholders expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders via related-
party transactions. 
Cheung et al. 
(2010) 
- Expropriation of minority 
shareholders 
1. Political connections to local 
government  
2. Political connections to central 
government 
A sample of 187   
related-party 
transactions 
reported by Chinese 
firms in 2001-2002 
- Cross-sectional 
regression 
1) The ownership of local government or the presence of their affiliated directors are significantly 
associated with negative related-party transactions. 
2) Firms affiliated with the central government have got benefit from positive related-party 
transactions 
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4.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
4.4.1 Hypotheses Development 
4.4.1.1 Political Connections 
It has been widely recognised that political connections can influence and explain 
economic outcomes (Chen et al., 2010a; Ding et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015). However, as discussed earlier, this phenomenon is 
difficult to generalize because there is no single generally accepted definition for political 
connections, due to the cross-country differences of political systems (Guerra Pérez et al., 
2015). Hence, in order to develop a valid definition of political connectedness in a 
particular context, the political regime should be taken into consideration. Following 
earlier literature (Faccio et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2009; Guerra Pérez et al., 2015), this 
study considers the presence of a politician on a board of directors as a proxy for the 
existence of a political relationship. More specifically, the firm is recognised as politically 
connected if at least one member of board of directors is a member of the royal family, is 
a current or a former member of the Shura Council, or is a representative of state 
investments. 
With respect to the activity of political connections in Saudi Arabia, Faccio (2010) 
conducted a cross-country analysis and documents that political connections are 
significantly active in emerging economies, particularly in the most corrupt countries. 
The author argues that political relationships emerge as a result of the weak enforcement 
of laws and thus create a network of power between business elites.  
In terms of corruption levels in Saudi Arabia, the country is not considered as one 
of the most corrupt economies since it is ranked as 48th out of 168 countries in the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2015). Saudi Arabia obtained 
a score of 52 out of 100 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean), whereas two-
thirds of the surveyed countries scored less than 50. According to the Index, Saudi Arabia 
is less corrupt than other large or emerging economies such as Turkey (66th), Brazil 
(76th), China (83rd), Indonesia (88th) and Russia (119th). Furthermore, in comparison 
to developing countries, it is ranked as less corrupt than Croatia (50th) and Italy (61st).  
Although Saudi Arabia is not recognised as one of the most corrupt countries, there 
is a strong likelihood that political connections are heavily influential in business 
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transactions. This is due to the fact that the demography in Saudi Arabia is mainly based 
on a tribal structure, in which personal relationships play a significant role in daily life. 
The report of The Hofstede Centre (2014) supports this argument, since it has assesses 
Saudi Arabia at 75% collectivist and having a power distance of 95%. Thus, political 
connectedness is considered to be a substantial element in the power networks among 
business elites, which would even affect decisions related to the appointment of key 
executives. 
Views on the consequences of political connections in general are mixed. From an 
optimistic view, RDT perceives political relationships as an important channel that can 
bring vital resources to an enterprise (Civilize et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 
2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, firms are encouraged to build political ties 
with other parties in order to survive and compete. For instance, Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
find evidence in Pakistan that politically connected firms enjoy more substantial and 
preferential treatment from government banks than firms that have no such connections. 
This favour also exists in China according to Wang (2015) and Sun et al. (2016), who 
observe that companies with higher numbers of politically connected directors are more 
likely to receive higher external debt financing.  
The privileges of political ties are not limited to bank financing; they also extend to 
other benefits such as improving firm performance (Goldman et al., 2009; Guerra Pérez 
et al., 2015), increasing market share (Civilize et al., 2015; Claessens et al., 2008), and 
being exempted from regulations (Imai, 2006). For example, Goldman et al. (2009) 
highlight that after the announcement of the Republican win in the 2000 US presidential 
election firms connected to the Republican Party experienced significantly positive 
returns, whereas their counterparts associated with the Democratic Party faced negative 
returns. Civilize et al. (2015) also demonstrate that in Thailand politically connected 
firms are associated with higher stock realised returns than their counterparts. 
Moreover, Guerra Pérez et al. (2015) report that board members who had previously held 
political office significantly increased firm performance. (Civilize et al., 2015; Conyon et 
al., 2015; Faccio, 2010) support this finding and assert the notion that politically 
connected enterprises can produce better operational performance than non-connected 
firms. 
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Board political capital is also found to bring preferential treatment from 
government bodies. For instance, Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) conclude that when an 
enterprise has political relationships it can be protected from restricting regulations. 
Faccio et al. (2006) add that such connected firms are often more eligible for government 
bailouts than their non-connected counterparts. This empirical evidence demonstrates 
that political ties can be a blessing for an organisation. They also explain the recent and 
remarkable trend of firms building political relationships, particularly in emerging 
economies, where property rights’ protection is underdeveloped (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Ding et al., 2014) and where business contracts depending 
strongly on connections with other parties, especially governments (Goldman et al., 
2009). 
Despite the fact that much literature posits that the advantages of building political 
relationships outweigh their costs and disadvantages (Faccio, 2010), political 
connections also have a negative impact that can lead to harmful consequences for an 
enterprise (Sun et al., 2016). From the perspective of agency theory, well connected 
shareholders may exploit political ties for their own interests, which can lead to higher 
agency costs (García-Meca, 2015). In this context, the political connections of controlling 
shareholders can provide the required power to expropriate firm resources at the 
expense of smaller shareholders, thereby exacerbating the principal-principal problem. 
For instance, Chen et al. (2010a) document that political connections increase 
information asymmetry problems since connected enterprises are found to disclose less 
accurate analyst forecasts than non-connected ones.  
Principal-principal conflict evidently exists in contexts that have a high 
concentration of ownership (Young et al., 2008). Private controlling shareholders usually 
seek personal rent appropriations; however, to do so, they need protection from 
regulatory oversight and sanctions. One effective means by which to obtain such 
protection is through recruiting politically connected members to the board of directors 
(Sun et al., 2016). Wang (2015) observes in China that when a firm has a strong board 
and political capital the related-party transactions with dominant shareholders are 
increased significantly, implying that political ties benefit one party, at the expense of the 
other. In support of the adverse role that board political capital can play, Menozzi et al. 
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(2014) find that politically connected directors had a significant negative impact on the 
accounting performance of Italian public utilities firms from 1994 to 2004. 
However, the impact of political connections on corporate governance in general, 
and on executive compensation in particular, is still inconclusive and shows mixed 
results. For example, on the one hand, political connections are found to harm the 
interests of minority shareholders since they enable rent appropriation. As such, Sun Sun 
et al. (2016) and Wang (2015) observe a positive and significant relationship between 
the presence of politically connected members and related-party transactions. 
Meanwhile, Sun et al. (2016) do not observe any relationship between political ties and 
firm performance. Political connections are also found to have a negative impact on the 
composition of boards of directors in China, since they were associated with fewer 
independent directors than their non-connected peers (Ding et al., 2014).  
On the other hand, Ding et al. (2015) observe that, when there is a controlling 
politically connected owner, politically connected managers cannot increase their own 
compensation. This indicates that political connections can create a balance of power 
between agents and principals. In other words, political ties are a supportive instrument 
for controlling shareholders, which allows them to thwart managerial opportunistic 
behaviours, even if those managers have political relationships as well. To the best of my 
knowledge, Chizema et al. (2015) is the only research that has clearly examined the role 
of political connections in constraining executive compensation. The findings 
demonstrate that politically connected directors can be a substitute for weak governance. 
That is to say, the authors find that directors with political experience play a significant 
role in curbing the opportunism of top executives by reducing their compensation 
packages.  
However, as mentioned earlier, since the employment process in Saudi Arabia is 
significantly influenced by wasta, there is a strong likelihood that this influence also 
extends to executive positions. Thus, politically connected members may exercise their 
stewardship duties in favour of their relatives and close friends and appoint them to key 
managerial posts. As a result of this favouritism, the managers expect to receive higher 
perks and packages than their non-supported counterparts. Due to the fact that the bonus 
component of executive compensation is treated as another means by which to increase 
fixed pay (no link to firm performance) as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the 
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research develops the same hypothesis for all constituents of executive compensation as 
follows: 
H1: The presence of a politically connected member on the board of directors has a positively 
significant impact on executive compensation. 
However, each type of politically connected member can have different motives 
and goals. Therefore, their behaviours and stewardship role will not necessarily be the 
same. In order to ascertain the effects and attitudes of each type of politically connected 
member separately, board members who have political relationships are classified into 
three categories. The first includes members of the royal family, the second consists of 
members of the Shura Council, and the third consists of state representatives. 
a) Members of the royal family 
The behaviours of members of the royal family are influenced by two dimensions: 
political and economic. On the one hand, institutional theory argues that such types of 
members are cautious regarding the political costs that may result from involvement in 
any corruption issues since scandals may cause serious harm to their political situation 
(Goldman et al., 2009). Even if the member has no official position in the government, he 
is still concerned about the reputation of the ruling family to which he/she belongs. 
Accordingly, the member of the royal family who serves on a board of directors should 
perform his stewardship role towards shareholders effectively. In doing so, he will 
enhance the monitoring function over managerial activities, which means that top 
executives are less likely to extract higher pay. 
However, on the other hand, in Saudi Arabia the majority of royal family members 
who serve on boards of directors are either blockholders or representatives of other royal 
family blockholders. In other words, these directors have a high stake in the company. 
Therefore, arguably the main reason for their presence on a board of directors is to 
manage and protect their own business, not because they have been recruited by a 
company’s owners to obtain advantages for the firm, as claimed by RDT. In this situation, 
such owner-directors will act as rational investors who primarily seek profitability.  
Even though the presence of blockholders helps to control opportunistic 
managerial activities and thereby reduce principal-agency conflict, Young et al. (2008) 
argue that, in such a situation, relationships among shareholders are framed by principal-
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principal theory. That is to say, the conflicts of interest will be between large and minority 
shareholders. In this case, controlling investors may take decisions that benefit them at 
the expense of small shareholders. This argument is supported by the findings of Sun et 
al. (2016) and Wang (2015) who demonstrate that having politically connected members 
on the board of directors significantly increases the transactions related to controlling 
shareholders. 
Consequently, as the majority of royal family members who serve on firms’ boards 
are blockholders or representatives of other related blockholders, they are assumed to 
be influenced more by economic factors than by the political dimension. However, they 
will also be concerned about the political dimension and hence will avoid issues that may 
lead to a corruption scandal. Against this, granting generous compensation for top related 
managers is not considered to be a serious scandal in the business field in Saudi Arabia, 
unless it leads to serious consequences such as a collapse or bankruptcy of the company. 
Therefore, the presence of members of the royal family on a board of directors is expected 
to increase the executive compensation of their related-managers significantly. 
Accordingly, the research develops the following hypothesis: 
H2: The presence of a member of the royal family on the board of directors has a positively 
significant impact on executive compensation. 
Typically, the presence of politically connected members on boards of directors 
shows the direct impact of political capital on the level of executive pay. However, this 
proxy does not capture the dimension of each member’s stake in the firm. In order to do 
so, the research uses size of ownership of the connected member as an additional proxy 
to measure their stake. 
The agency model argues that when a board director holds higher shares of the 
company, his/her interests are more likely to align with the firm’s owners (Randøy and 
Nielsen, 2002). In other words, if a board member has a large stake in the firm, he will be 
concerned about his own investment; thus, his supervisory performance will be more 
effective. However, since most of royal family members who serve on boards of directors 
are also blockholders, the principal-principal model argues that there will be a conflict of 
interest between large and small shareholders (Young et al., 2008). Therefore, dominant 
shareholders may take decisions that are not necessarily in the best interests of the 
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company as a whole; for example, granting top related managers high non-merit perks. 
Accordingly, the research develops the following hypothesis: 
H3: If the member of the royal family has a higher level of ownership, top executives will 
receive generous compensation. 
b) Shura Council members 
A board member, who has a current or a former membership in the Shura Council, 
is expected to have stronger motives than members of the royal family to exercise his 
stewardship role towards all shareholders without discrimination. This is because, in 
practice, it is rare that Shura Council-related board members hold blocks of shares in 
firms in which they serve, implying that these politically connected members have been 
recruited by companies primarily to obtain political privileges. If this is the case, such 
directors will be primarily concerned about their political legitimacy since the political 
costs in this case outweigh the economic benefits that they may gain from the firm.  
That is to say, unlike royal family blockholders, Shura Council members have a low 
stake in firm equity. Therefore, they have less power and discretion to place their 
relatives into senior executive positions. In this scenario, it can be assumed that Shura 
Council-related directors will not be loyal to top executives; hence, they are more likely 
to restrict any non-merit pay settings.  
However, since the majority of listed firms are controlled by certain families, 
principal-principal theory argues that there is another potential scenario, whereby 
Shura-related members have been granted board memberships by controlling 
shareholders in order to extract private benefits (Wang, 2015). One of these benefits is 
protection from regulatory sanctions that will be imposed if large shareholders seek rents 
at the expense of minority shareholders (Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2009). In this 
scenario, political capital would allow, even indirectly, dominant shareholders to take 
decisions that increase their own wealth, but harm other stakeholders. This potential 
attitude is reinforced by the fact that Saudi Arabia is ranked 12th in terms of ‘public trust 
in politicians’ by the Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017(World Economic Forum, 
2016). Hence, family shareholders prefer the presence of a politician on a board of 
directors as it gives legitimacy to the decisions being made and reassures minority 
shareholders that their interests are being taken into account (Yu et al., 2015). 
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A number of studies (Faccio, 2010; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) find evidence 
that politically connected firms face less regulatory oversight than their non-connected 
counterparts. Furthermore, Sun et al. (2016) and Wang (2015) observe a positive and 
significant relationship between board political capital and party-related transactions in 
China. These findings support the potential scenario in which Shura Council members are 
recruited by dominant shareholders to extract private economic rents. 
Intuitively, Shura-related members will avoid clashing with controlling 
shareholders who appoint the former to the board and who also control the decisions 
about continuing their directorships. Guerra Pérez et al. (2015) point out that politicians 
usually prefer to build relations and exchange benefits with blockholders because they 
have a higher stability than small shareholders and control decision-making. 
Consequently, political appointees are expected to approve any decisions raised by 
blockholders, providing that these decisions do not incur unacceptable political costs. 
One decision that Shura Council-related members may perceive as not seriously harmful 
is top related-managers being granted generous pecuniary incentives, especially as there 
are practically no repercussions for connected directors if they approve such payments 
(Chalevas, 2011). Accordingly, the research formulates the following hypothesis: 
H4: The presence of a Shura Council member on the board of directors has a positively 
significant impact on executive compensation. 
However, unlike royal family members, Shura Council-related directors are less 
influenced by the economic dimension since they are not blockholders. On the contrary, 
they are driven by political legitimacy and if they have a stake in the company will be 
motivated to perform their monitoring function effectively. In support of this argument, 
agency theory suggests that when a board member has a higher stake in the firm’s equity 
through holding shares, he/she will act as a shareholder and will be concerned about his 
own investment (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002). This will be reflected in the decisions 
related to executive compensation in a way that prevents non-merit pay setting. 
Accordingly, the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H5: If the Shura Council member has a higher level of ownership, top executives will receive 
less compensation. 
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c) State representatives 
Government institutions are dominant investors in the SSE since they own 
approximately 20% of the market value (Aleqtisadiah, 2014). Therefore, they have 
numerous representatives on corporate boards. The high voting rights in addition to the 
direct relationship to the government, give state representative directors massive power, 
allowing them to influence corporate decisions. RDT argues that directors related to 
government could provide vital privileges to the enterprise including less regulatory 
oversight (Guerra Pérez et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010). However, because ownership in Saudi 
Arabia is highly concentrated, agency theory concerns that controlling shareholders may 
exploit this protection and seek private rents at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Young et al., 2008). However, this argument is refuted since government institutions 
usually hold block of shares; thus, their representatives are less likely to be influenced by 
individual or institutional large shareholders. 
However, this type of directors is perceived as indifferent to achieving the firm’s 
objectives. For example, Li et al. (2007) argue that top executives can waste time in 
pleasing government officials rather than concentrating on achieving the firm’s goals. 
This may negatively affect minority interests and hence lead to the emergence of the 
principal-principal conflict or agency problem Type II (Conyon and He, 2012). 
Furthermore, the authors add that state representatives on firms’ boards have difficulty 
in distinguishing between their functional duties as investors’ representatives and their 
administrative tasks. Relatedly, Menozzi and Vannoni (2014) point out that government 
officials are influenced by bureaucratic behaviour and political ideology. Hence, they may 
seek to achieve goals other than profitability, which may lead to unfavourable 
consequences for the enterprise.  
The OECD (2015b) warns that boards connected to governments may find it 
difficult to balance between its duties as a representative of the shareholders and its 
commitment to achieving government goals, which may lead to interference in the 
management of the company. The OECD (2015b, p. 35) also suggests that: 
“in order to minimise possible conflicts of interest, the ownership entity should 
avoid electing an excessive number of board members from the state 
administration. This is particularly relevant for SOEs engaged in economic 
activities, where limiting board membership by representatives of the 
ownership entity or by other state officials can increase professionalism, help 
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prevent excessive government intervention in SOE management and it may 
help limit the state’s responsibility for decisions taken by SOE boards”. 
However, the situation in Saudi Arabia is different from the above arguments. 
Unlike other countries, the controlling role of financial institutions is totally absent in 
Saudi market due to regulatory restrictions, as the Saudi Banking Control Law prevents 
financial institutions from owning in excess of 10% of a company’s shares (SAMA, 1966). 
Therefore, government bodies and their representatives are presumed to fill this 
significant gap and play a substitutive monitoring role that is supposed to be carried out 
by financial institutions. In addition, the Saudi government attempts to be a role model 
for other large investors in protecting minority interests from malicious decisions made 
by large shareholders or their related management.  
Furthermore, Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) argue that government institutions 
may have other objectives such as long-term growth rather than seeking to earn 
immediate profits. In other words, state investments can be classified as growth-seeking 
rather than profit-seeking. Hence, they prefer to link executive compensation to long-
term rather than short-term performance (David et al., 1998). Moreover, Chizema et al. 
(2015) suggest that state representatives may adhere to the primary government 
objective, such as achieving a harmonious society. Thus, the authors argue that state 
representatives will ensure that government expectations are met with regards to 
executive remuneration. 
Most studies (Conyon and He, 2012; Li et al., 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Chen 
et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2007; Hearn, 2013) that examine the role of state ownership are 
conducted in emerging countries, because the structure of ownership in developed 
contexts is usually based on institutional and foreign investments (Khan, 2006; Li, 1994). 
Various academic research on China, where the state has a dominant share of the stock 
market, find that state ownership is negatively and significantly associated with 
managerial rewards (Firth et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). Consequently, this study 
formulates two hypotheses as follows: 
H6: The presence of a state representative on the board of directors has a negatively 
significant impact on executive compensation. 
H7: If government institutions have a higher level of ownership, top executives will receive 
less compensation. 
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4.4.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This section provides details about the sources of data used in the thesis and the 
sample’s time frame. Because there is no electronic database for the information on Saudi 
firms as there is in the developed countries such as the US and the UK, the procedures of 
collecting Saudi data need more effort and time. All data are collected manually from 
company annual reports through Tadawul database (www.tadawul.com.sa). 
The study is based on a sample from the SSE. The context of Saudi Arabia is chosen 
for several reasons. First, the political regime in Saudi Arabia is stable; hence, there is no 
concern about the effect of political instability on the results. Second, since the study 
analyses the role of political connections on the practices of executive compensation, the 
political system and ownership structure in Saudi Arabia enable this goal to achieved 
Third, the context contains unique types of politically connected members namely royal 
family members and Shura Council members which enables a significant contribution to 
the related literature to be made. Last, data are accessible; the transparency of 
information in Saudi Arabia is much higher than in other emerging monarchical 
countries.   
The initial sample contains all 160 listed firms in the SSE in 15 different industries 
from 2008 to December 2015 (Tadawul database). This period was chosen for two key 
reasons. First, data are available and accessible since the enforcement of corporate 
governance regulations and their disclosing requirements began in 2008. Moreover, this 
period provides the most recent investigation in the literature with respect to the 
determinants of executive compensation, which helps to fill the gap and improve the 
understanding of pay setting practices. 
However, due to the characteristics of heterogeneity between financial and non-
financial firms and being subject to different regulatory requirements (Wang and Shailer, 
2015), the study uses only non-financial firms. This method is supported by prior studies 
such as (Sakawa et al., 2012; Rashid, 2013; Méndez et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; Shah et 
al., 2009). After the exclusion of the financial firms, the total examinable sample is 114 
firms over the eight-year period 2008-2015. Additionally, some firm-year observations 
were excluded as follows: 13 were missing disclosure, 56 firms not listed yet, and 24 firms 
facing bankruptcy issues. Consequently, the final unbalanced sample is 819 firm-year 
observations. 
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4.4.3 Models’ Specifications 
The research develops a model to investigate the hypotheses of the relationship 
between political connections and executive compensation settings. The model contains 
three dependent variables which allow the examination of the effect on various 
constituents of executive compensation packages namely SALARY, BONUS and finally 
TOTAL PAY (see Table 4.2). Since the data do not meet the assumptions of OLS, especially 
normality assumption (see the descriptive statistics section 4.5.1 p.186), the study does 
not use OLS regression; otherwise, the results would be biased and misleading (Baltagi, 
2008; Greene, 2008). Consequently, and in order to overcome such bias and problems, 
this study employs non-parametric tests following prior studies (Elston and Goldberg, 
2003; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon and He, 2011; Ntim et al., 2015).  
Based on the results of the Hausman tests (see regression tables pp. 197, 200, 201), 
the fixed-effect model is the most appropriate technique to investigate the study 
hypotheses for the dependent variables SALARY and TOTAL PAY. However, as the 
dependent variable BONUS has censored data because the number of zeros (no bonus) 
exceed 20% of the total observations, the study employs the Tobit model which is 
designed to deal with such censored data (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). The use of Tobit 
regression is consistent with prior studies that faced similar limited dependent variables 
such as option packages (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Sakawa et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2007). 
Consequently, the research formulates the firm-year fixed-effect model for the dependent 
variables SALARY and TOTAL PAY as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑷𝑨𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊 
where; 
𝜷𝟎  = Intercept 
𝜷𝒊𝒕   = Coefficient of slope parameters 
𝑿𝒊𝒕   = Independent variable i at time t 
𝒖𝒊   = Error term 
 
While, the Tobit model for the BONUS component can be formed as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺𝒊𝒕 = {  
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗ =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊         𝒊𝒇     𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺  𝒊𝒕
∗ > 𝟎
𝟎                                                                         𝒊𝒇     𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺  𝒊𝒕
∗ ≤ 𝟎
 
185 | P a g e  
 
where 𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕  is the observed dependent variable; and 𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗  is a latent 
dependent variable that is observed for values greater than 0 and censored otherwise.  
Table 4.2: Variable Definitions 
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables 
ln_PAY it The natural logarithm of average compensation per executive for firm i 
in year t, including two different components (variables): 
- TOTAL PAY (salary, bonus & non-cash compensation) 
- SALARY 
ln_BONUS it The natural logarithm of average bonus compensation per executive 
for firm i in year t (for more details see p. 117). 
Independent variables 
PM A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a royal family 
member, a Shura Council member, or a state representative in the 
board of directors and 0 otherwise 
RFM  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a royal family member 
in the board of directors and 0 otherwise 
SCM A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a Shura Council member 
in the board of directors and 0 otherwise 
RSI A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a state representative in 
the board of directors and 0 otherwise 
RFMOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the royal family members 
SCMOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the Shura Council 
members 
STATEOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the government and 
general pension funds. 
Control variables 
FSIZE The natural logarithm of the total assets 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
FAGE The natural logarithm of total number of years since the firm has been 
listed on the stock exchange. 
ROA Net profit in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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4.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.6 provide evidence that the data in general do not meet the 
normality assumption required by the parametric tests. For example, Table 4.3 shows 
that all skewness and kurtosis values of executive compensation variables exceed the 
value of 1.96 and 3, respectively, even after the transformation of remuneration 
variables into their natural logarithm. Additionally, Table 4.6 demonstrates that some 
independent variables such as RFM, SCM, RFMOWN, SCMOWN, STATEOWN, FSIZE, LEV 
and ROA have higher kurtosis and skewness values than suggested. 
These findings support and justify the usage of non-parametric techniques, which 
are discussed in the Chapter Three, Section 3.4.2.2, as an alternative approach to 
overcome the condition of meeting the normality assumption required by parametric 
tests. The following sub-sections discuss the state and trend of each variable in detail. 
4.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Executive Compensation 
Table 4.3 displays the descriptive statistics of all the executive remuneration 
variables (i.e. TOTAL PAY, SALARY and BONUS). All compensation components are 
presented in SA Riyals which in practice has a fixed exchange rate equal to approximately 
0.267 US dollars. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the average of total compensation (TOTAL 
PAY) is SAR1,511,352 (approximately USD403,530) with a median of SAR1,029,433 and 
a range from SAR12,000 to SAR28,100,000. This demonstrates that managers in the KSA 
are rewarded significantly higher compensation than their counterparts in China, who 
earn nearly US$66,336, as reported by (Conyon and He, 2012, p. 580). This can be 
attributed to the socialist system applied in China which significantly reduces the 
variance in labour wages. It can also be attributed to the oil revenues in KSA which have 
encourage higher levels of wages. 
However, the level of executive remuneration in KSA is significantly lower than in 
Western countries such as the US, UK and Spain where managers on average earn nearly 
USD3.0 million (Conyon, 2014, p. 76), USD2.4 million (Alagla, 2012), and USD1.1 million 
(Méndez et al., 2011, p. 62) respectively. This significant difference between managerial 
pay in KSA and Western region can be attributed to factors such as the existence of a 
highly competitive labour market, the usage of benchmark standards, different living 
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costs, and linking incentives to firm performance. Table 4.3 also shows details of other 
compensation components. As can be seen, the average (median) SALARY, and BONUS 
compensation are SAR983,414 (SAR800,275) and SAR515,067 (SAR170,000) 
respectively.  
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Executive Compensation Variables 






1,511,352 1,029,433 12,000 28,100,00
0 
6.53 77.85 6.05*** 
SALARY  983,414 800,275 9,000 28,100,00
0 
16.15 370.08 -7.34*** 
BONUS  515,067 170,000 0 12,900,00
0 
6.30 59.32 -3.44*** 
 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 display the mean of executive compensation variables 
based on the industry type. The study follows the industrial classification reported in 
Thomson One Banker database which classifies Saudi firms into five main sectors, namely 
General Industrials, General Retailers, Utilities, Services and Real Estate. As can be seen, 
managers in the utilities sector receive the highest remuneration (TOTAL PAY) 
compared with their counterparts in the other sectors. This sector also appears to use 
pay-for-performance criteria, because only in this sector do BONUS packages exceed the 
fixed compensation (SALARY). The ownership structure in Figure 4.4 reveals that the 
state investment (STATEOWN) is the dominant investor in the utilities sector; hence, this 
could be an indication that the greater the state investments, the stronger the link 
between managerial pay and firm performance.  









TOTAL PAY 1,386,594 1,469,802 2,460,424 1,505,968 1,399,638 
SALARY 989,688 857,489 1,122,364 1,038,310 1,083,685 
BONUS 385,290 587,546 1,343,997 468,785 310,993 
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 In contrast, the real estate sector pays the lowest BONUS perks but the second 
highest SALARY compared to the other sectors. According to Table 4.7, 82% of firms that 
operate in the real estate sector have at least one politically connected director. 
Therefore, this may indicate the existence of an agency problem resulting from the 
political capital in the board of directors which leads to a significant reduction in the link 
between firm performance and executive compensation in this sector. Finally, and in 
general, the other sectors show a slightly similar trend and magnitude of executive 
remuneration variables for the pooled sample over the period 2008-2015. 
Table 4.5 highlights the change in the average of executive remuneration 
variables during the period 2008-2015. As shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2, there was 
a significant upward trend in all managerial perks packages. For instance, SALARY is 
nearly doubled from SAR754,268 in 2008 to SAR1,398,213 in 2015. Furthermore, 
BONUS payments have increased by nearly 76% from SAR377,547 in 2008 to 
SAR664,487 in 2015. 
Table 4.5: Average of Executive Compensation Variables by Year 
Year TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 
2008 1,084,231 754,268 325,693 
2009 1,188,071 783,944 397,568 
2010 1,276,917 820,435 437,031 








General Industrials General Retailers Utilities Services Real Estate
Total pay Salary Bonus
Figure 4.1: Executive Compensation Variables by Sector 
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2012 1,586,649 973,803 612,806 
2013 1,664,908 1,003,428 654,856 
2014 1,677,972 1,130,717 538,629 
2015 2,007,184 1,398,213 573,286 
  
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that BONUS showed an almost similar trend to that of 
SALARY; therefore, BONUS might be used as another means of increasing executive 
compensation without any consideration of firm performance. This argument is 
supported by Figure 4.3, which shows the performance of firms during the study period; 
i.e. there was a fluctuation in firm performance, whereas executive BONUS showed an 








2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total pay Salary Bonus
Figure 4.2: Trend of Executive Compensation Variables (in SAR), 2008-2015 
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4.5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Political Connections and Ownership Variables 
Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics for all the independent variables of this 
study. As can be seen, political connections are significant in Saudi Arabia since 60% of 
corporates’ boards have at least one politically connected member (PM). This high 
proportion means that the majority of listed firms in Saudi Arabia have built political 
channels to ease their operations and to gain other benefits. This finding supports the 
conclusion of Faccio (2010), who states that the phenomenon of political relationships 
plays a significant role in the business field in emerging economies. Furthermore, the 
interaction between business elites and politicians in Saudi Arabia is consistent with the 
situation in Taiwan where majority of firms are observed to have political relationships 
(Civilize et al., 2015). This interaction, however, is found to be significantly higher than 
other immature economies such as China and Pakistan where only 29% and 23%, 
respectively, of firms are politically connected (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zhang et al., 
2015). This divergence between the existence of political connectedness in the business 
field in Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and China and Pakistan on the other, could be 
attributed to various reasons.  
First, the demographic structure in Saudi Arabia is unique outside the GCC and 
mainly based on a tribal system which is significantly influenced by an orientation to 
collectivism; thus, personal connections play a significant role in accomplishing everyday 











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Return on assets Return on equity
Figure 4.3: Firm Performance (%), 2008-2015 
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Kauser, 2011). This argument is supported by the fact that Saudi Arabia has been 
assessed at 75% collectivist and having a power distance of 95% (The Hofstede Centre, 
2014). Another potential cause for the difference is the adoption of dissimilar definitions 
of political connections. For instance, this study is using a definition of connectedness that 
includes the existence of the royal family and Shura Council which are not available either 
in China or in Pakistan. 
After classifying the sources of political connections, it is clear that state 
representation (RSI) on the board of directors is the most common way to build political 
connections since 39% of corporate boards have at least one state representative, while 
royal family members (RFM) are found to serve on one-fifth of the boards of Saudi listed 
companies. Last, almost 16% firms build political relationships through members of the 
Shura Council (SCM), which is a very high proportion in comparison to the number of 
members of the Shura Council. The Shura Council only has 150 members, each serving for 
three years; however, they are recruited by 18 of the listed firms. 
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 




PM 0.60 1 0 1 -0.41 1.17 
n/a 
RFM 0.20 0 0 1 1.49 3.22 
SCM 0.16 0 0 1 1.86 4.44 
RSI 0.39 0 0 1 0.45 1.21 
RFMOWN % 3.39 0 0 95.00 5.32 36.29 
SCMOWN % 0.05 0 0 3.18 7.17 55.19 
STATEOWN % 10.68 0 0 83.60 2.14 6.76 
FSIZE (‘000,000) 12,600 2,110 54 358,00
0 
6.18 44.21 -13.90*** 
LEV % 37.41 34.95 0.41 463.09 5.64 91.66 -1.45 
FAGE 2.52 2.83 0 4.11 -0.52 2.31 -6.81*** 
ROA % 6.73 5.66 -67.81 49.27 -0.30 12.20 -1.40 
 
Importantly, the magnitude level of political ties is significantly different across the 
different sectors. As shown in Table 4.7, political connections (PM) are highest in the real 
estate and utilities sectors with 82% and 79%, respectively, of companies politically 
connected. These relationships seem to be built mainly through representatives of the 
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state (RSI) since these representatives are on 74% and 68% of the corporate boards in 
the real estate and utilities sectors, respectively. 
Meanwhile, members of the royal family (RFM) and the Shura Council (SCM) are 
mostly concentrated in the services and general industrials sectors. Royal family 
members (RFM) dominate the services sector being present in about half of its corporate 
boards, due to the high equity (22%) that they have in this sector. Shura members (SCM) 
are found in the services and general industrials sectors equally. It is worth noting that 
members of the royal family (RFM) and Shura Council (SCM) are also present in non-state 
dominated sectors. This demonstrates that companies resort to alternative means of 
opening political channels if there is no direct contact with government through state 
representatives. 
Across industrial sectors, Table 4.7 highlights that each source of political 
connections has different levels of stake (see Figure 4.4). For example, the Saudi state 
(STATEOWN) concentrates its investments in the utility sector; probably as a means of 
control rather than seeking profitability, as the utility sector provides the most vital 
services for the public, including electricity, energy and telecommunications. In contrast, 
royal family members (RFM) invest in the services sector which is generally dominated 
by family investments. Interestingly, ownership of Shura members is found to be trivial 
i.e. their average ownership does not exceed 5% of any industry.  










PM 0.63 0.39 0.79 0.56 0.82 
RFM 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.44 0.12 
SCM 0.23 0.05 0.07 0.20 0.13 
RSI 0.40 0.19 0.68 0.13 0.74 
RFMOWN  % 1.82 2.62 0.56 21.69 1.95 
SCMOWN % 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 
STATEOWN % 11.64 4.36 27.37 1.42 13.50 
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 This finding supports the notion that Shura members are recruited by firms to 
benefit from their political connections, rather than serving on the board of directors to 
manage their own investment as royal family members and state representatives do. The 
importance of building political relationships through the three sources appears to be 
highly significant over the whole period 2008 to 2015 (see Table 4.8). This confirms the 
argument that political connections play a significant role in the business environment in 
less-developed economies (Faccio, 2010) 
 
Table 4.8: Average of Political Connections and Ownership Variables by Year 
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PM 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.62 
RFM 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 
SCM 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.13 
RSI 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
RFMOWN  3.81 3.50 3.37 3.54 3.31 3.24 3.25 3.23 
SCMOWN 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 
STATEOWN 9.63 11.12 10.79 10.92 10.58 10.57 10.57 11.01 
 
4.5.2 Correlation Coefficients 
According to Table 4.9, the results of the correlation matrix show that no serious 








General Industrials General Retailers Utilities Services Real Estate
RFMOWN SCMOWN STATEOWN
Figure 4.4: Ownership of Politically Connected Investors by Sectors 
194 | P a g e  
 
explanatory variables are lower than 80% (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006). According 
to Spearman’s correlation, the data in the Table reveals that there is a high correlation 
(0.87) between state representatives (RSI) and state ownership (STATEOWN), although 
the results of Pearson’s test show a lower correlation (0.66). The same situation is found 
between members of royal family (RFM) and their ownership (RFMOWN), where the 
correlations according to Spearman’s and Pearson’s are 0.78 and 0.48, respectively. 
Consequently, in order to avoid serious multicollinearity problem, the research 
investigates the effect of political members and their related ownership variables in two 
separate regression models. Furthermore, there are moderately positive correlations 
between firm size (FSIZE) and STATEOWN (0.57) and RSI (0.56). Consequently, it can 
be concluded after splitting up the highly-correlated variables into different separate 
regressions estimates, the study’s models do not suffer from the multicollinearity 
problem. 
For further checks, the study emplys the VIF test for each model. Statistically, it is 
argued that if any predictor has a VIF exceeding 10, the regression model suffers from 
multicollinearity (Hair et al., 2006; O’brien, 2007). Accordingly, the outcomes of VIF tests, 
reported in Table 4.10, Table 4.11, and Table 4.12, confirm the findings of the Spearman’s 
test that multicollinearity does not seriously influence the coefficient estimates of the 
predictors of the second empirical model. 
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Table 4.9: Correlation Matrix 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
[1] TOTAL PAY  0.89* 0.46* 0.19* 0.09* 0.10* 0.21* 0.15* 0.02 0.20* 0.59* 0.25* -0.19* 0.18* 
[2] SALARY 0.90*  0.23* 0.22* 0.08* 0.13* 0.25* 0.10* 0.05* 0.25* 0.56* 0.22* -0.17* 0.09* 
[3] BONUS 0.75* 0.47*  0.07* 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* -0.01 0.04* 0.11* 0.30* 0.12* -0.09* 0.27* 
[4] PM 0.21* 0.26* 0.12*  0.40* 0.36* 0.65* 0.21* 0.13* 0.43* 0.45* 0.05* 0.21* 0.07* 
[5] RFM 0.11* 0.10* 0.10* 0.40*  -0.09* -0.06* 0.48* -0.08* 0.01 0.04* -0.04* 0.01 0.13* 
[6] SCM 0.10* 0.14* 0.04* 0.36* -0.09*  0.06* -0.06* 0.36* 0.01 0.15* 0.14* -0.08* -0.08* 
[7] RSI 0.21* 0.26* 0.11* 0.65* -0.06* 0.06*  -0.07* 0.03 0.66* 0.54* -0.03* 0.28* 0.11* 
[8] RFMOWN 0.10* 0.06* 0.08* 0.34* 0.78* -0.09* 0.00  -0.04* -0.06* 0.11* 0.05* -0.13* -0.16* 
[9] SCMOWN 0.03* 0.05* 0.04* 0.20* -0.12* 0.56* 0.09* -0.11*  -0.07* 0.01 0.04* -0.02 -0.07* 
[10] STATEOWN 0.25* 0.28* 0.17* 0.59* 0.00 0.02 0.87* 0.03* -0.04*  0.56* 0.04* 0.16* 0.12* 
[11] FSIZE 0.59* 0.62* 0.40* 0.49* 0.04* 0.17* 0.56* 0.04* 0.03* 0.57*  0.29* -0.10* -0.02 
[12] LEV 0.40* 0.36* 0.30* 0.05* -0.08* 0.19* -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.40*  -0.20* -0.17* 
[13] FAGE -0.17* -0.16* -0.09* 0.24* 0.04* -0.13* 0.32* 0.02 -0.07* 0.31* -0.04* -0.30*  -0.01 
[14] ROA 0.19* 0.06* 0.33* 0.05* 0.17* -0.11* 0.04* 0.03* -0.05* 0.05* -0.07* -0.24* 0.01*  
Spearman rank correlations are reported below the diagonal, and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal. 
* denotes significance at 0.05 level 
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4.5.3 Discussion of Research Findings 
Table 4.10 presents the results of the regression analysis for the variables of 
political connections and their effects on each component of executive remuneration. The 
R-squared of models 1 and 2 demonstrate that 22% and 18% of the variation in the 
dependent variables (TOTAL PAY) and (SALARY), respectively, are explained by the 
variations of the included independent variables. These moderate proportions of 
explanatory power (R2) are consistent with previous studies. For instance, the R-squared 
statistics of García-Meca (2015) and Chizema et al. (2015) are 31% and 27%, 
respectively. However, these moderate explanatory powers indicate that there are other, 
omitted variables that influence the practices of setting executive perks packages. In the 
context of KSA, where personal connections and tribal ties play a significant role in the 
process of hiring top managers and determining their wages (Budhwar and Debrah, 
2013), such moderate R-squared statistics are not surprising. However, these 
behavioural characteristics, which are beyond the scope of this study, are not statistically 
measurable. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive and significant relationship 
between the presence of political members on boards of directors (PM) and executive 
pay, the results in Table 4.10 show that the presence of political members on the board 
(PM) is significantly associated with higher TOTAL PAY and SALARY. However, their 
presence is found to have a negative relationship with BONUS perks which is the only 
variable compensation that could be linked to firm performance in the Saudi context.  
The positive association between political connections (PM) and TOTAL PAY and 
SALARY supports the conclusion of Faccio (2010) that political ties in general play a 
significant role in shaping business decisions in less-developed economies. However, 
with regards to executive compensation, the outcome does not match the finding of 
Chizema et al. (2015) who observe a contrasting outcome, i.e. top executives are less 
likely to receive higher compensation when the board of directors has at least one 
politically connected director. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the study of Chizema 
et al. (2015) is the only one that directly investigates the relationship between political 
connections and executive compensation. However, García-Meca (2015), who examines 
the impact of political ties on the decisions related to board remuneration in Spain, 
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observes a negative and significant reduction in remuneration level if the firm is 
politically connected. 
Although politically connected members are susceptible to serious political loss if 
their names are involved with financial scandals (Goldman et al., 2009), as mentioned 
earlier they may perceive that granting managers generous pay is unlikely to lead to a 
serious scandal as long as the financial position of the company is stable. Therefore, they 
would not mind benefiting their related managers with high compensation packages. 
Since controlling decisions related to executive compensation is considered a reflection 
of good corporate governance and vice-versa, this result implies that political 
connections might not be beneficial for governance purposes. 




This argument is supported by several studies (Ding et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; 
Wang, 2015), which find that political relationships weaken the quality of corporate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF 
 TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 
 Fixed effect Fixed effect Tobit 
    



























































    












Mean VIF    1.23 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
67.13*** 67.71***   
All variables are defined in Table 4.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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governance in emerging economies. For example, Ding et al. (2014) conducted empirical 
research in China in order to examine the role of political connections in structuring 
boards of directors. Their study documents that the existence of political ties is 
significantly associated with lower levels of board independence. However, this 
contradicts the suggestions of good practice of corporate governance, which encourage 
the independence of corporate boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Ozdemir and Upneja, 
2012). Furthermore, Sun et al. (2016) and Wang (2015) also observe a negative 
relationship between political relationships and blockholder appropriation in China. The 
authors find that when a firm is politically connected, related-party transactions, which 
primarily benefit controlling shareholders, are significantly increased. 
In terms of political connections, Table 4.11 shows the impact of each type of 
politically connected member on executive compensation. Inconsistent with Hypotheses 
2 and 4, the findings reveal that when political connections are classified into different 
categories according to the source of connections, neither royal family members (RFM) 
nor Shura Council members (SCM) have any significant relationship with executive 
compensation packages. Additionally, the research does not accept Hypothesis 6 which 
predicts a negative and significant relationship with the presence of state representatives 
on board of directors and managerial pay. On the contrary, the results show a positive 
and significant relationship between the presence of state representatives (RSI) and 
TOTAL PAY and SALARY.  
With regards to BONUS perks, all types of political connections are found to have 
a negative but not statistically significant, except RSI, association with BONUS perks. This 
evidence supports the previous conclusion that politically connected members do not 
consider components of pay that are supposed to link remuneration with improved firm 
performance. The finding indicates that the presence of a politically connected director 
does not enhance the effectiveness of governance standards, in particular the ones 
related to the decisions on executive compensation. The outcome is consistent with the 
finding of Cheung et al. (2010) who finds that directors affiliated with the Chinese central 
government increase the amount of related-party transactions. In other words, their 
presence weakens governance quality and allows for blockholders appropriation. This 
finding somewhat confirms the argument that top managers are treated preferentially 
when the firm is protected from regulatory oversight (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998). 
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Overall, it can be concluded that all types of political connections—namely, royal 
family members (RFM), Shura Council members (SCM) and state representatives (RSI)—
are not effective in controlling managerial opportunism, in particular executive 
compensation. In contrast, their presence appears to provide protection for controlling 
shareholders and their related managers from any regulatory surveillance. This does not 
necessarily mean that these connected directors are directly colluding with decisions 
related to executive compensation. However, their political connections might be 
exploited by related-parties to achieve personal benefits, such as extracting high non-
merit perks, with no concern for any legal liability.  
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Table 4.11: Regression Analysis: Type of Political Connections and Executive compensation 
 Royal family members Shura council members State representatives 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF 
(4) (5) (6) 
VIF 
(7) (8) (9) 
VIF  
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 
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Mean VIF    1.08    1.08    1.39 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
54.50*** 108.18***  54.59*** 513.56***  64.34*** 53.42***   
All variables are defined in Table 4.2.        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Meanwhile, Table 4.12 reveals the outcomes of the further analysis which 
investigates the relationship between stake magnitudes in the corporate equity related 
to each type of political connections and the levels of executive compensation. As can be 
seen, contrary to Hypothesis 7, ownership by the state (STATEOWN) is found to have a 
positive and significant association with TOTAL PAY and SALARY. The positive 
relationship between state investment and executive pay-settings confirms the data in 
Table 4.11 that the state ownership exacerbates agency costs by raising the levels of 
executive compensation. A potential interpretation is that government representative 
directors, who usually work in government, have difficulty in distinguishing between 
their functional duties as investors’ representatives and their administrative tasks 
(Conyon and He, 2012).  
Table 4.12: Regression Analysis: Ownership by Type of Politically Connected 
Member and Executive compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF  TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 
 Fixed effect Fixed effect Tobit 
    












































































    












Mean VIF    1.27 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
70.18*** 41.23***   
All variables are defined in Table 4.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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In contrast, neither the ownership of royal family members (RFMOWN) nor the 
ownership of Shura Council members (SCMOWN) are found to have any significant 
association with executive remuneration decisions. Therefore, Hypotheses 3 and 5 are 
not accepted. These findings, in addition to those shown in Table 4.11, indicate that, 
unlike the situation of state ownership, ownership by the royal family and Shura Council 
are observed to have no direct influence on the decisions related to executive pay. 
In terms of the impact of firm characteristics on managers’ remuneration, all 
regression estimates demonstrate that firm size (FSIZE) is a key determinant of executive 
compensation in KSA and has a positive and significant relationship with all components 
of managerial pay. This means that top managers who serve in larger companies are 
compensated more generously than their counterparts in smaller companies. The 
positive relationship is because larger companies have more complicated operational 
activities (Cheng and Firth, 2006; Core et al., 1999). Hence, there is a need to hire better 
qualified and skilled managers, who will demand higher compensation packages in 
exchange for their services (Chalevas, 2011; Baker et al., 1988). This conclusion is one of 
the few for which there is conclusive evidence in the literature (Méndez et al., 2011) since 
numerous studies document similar findings, both in developed and less-developed 
economies (Conyon, 2014; Hearn, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 
2012; Conyon and He, 2012; Banghøj et al., 2010). 
The relationship between the leverage ratio (LEV), which reflects the financial 
structure of the company, and executive pay settings has been extensively researched 
(Chalevas, 2011; Banghøj et al., 2010; Firth et al., 2007). The results in almost all the 
relevant tables show that the debt ratio (LEV) is significantly and positively associated 
with higher executive compensation. In other words, top managers are found to be 
rewarded with higher remuneration when the firm has high financial leverage. This 
evidence does not support the notion of the theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) which 
states that corporates with high financial leverage have a greater interest in curtailing 
their payments; thus, they have less ability to pay high remuneration to top managers. 
Empirically, the outcome is also opposite to the findings of previous studies (Basu et al., 
2007; Bryan et al., 2000; Cyert et al., 2002; Firth et al., 2007), which document negative 
correlations between debt ratio and managerial pay levels. This interesting finding in the 
Saudi context can be attributed to several potential reasons. First, as business 
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transactions including access to bank loans depend significantly on personal connections, 
managers may be highly compensated in exchange for their connections and efforts. 
Another potential interpretation is that as these firms have higher risks, managers may 
demand for higher compensation in order to offset future dismissal risks 
All tables reveal that firm age (FAGE) has a positive and significant impact on 
compensation variables, namely TOTAL PAY and SALARY. This conclusion confirms the 
notion that older companies are more efficient and more profitable than their younger 
counterparts; thus, they have a greater ability and more likelihood to pay their managers 
generously (Rashid, 2013). The result is consistent with Rashid (2013) who uses a sample 
of Bangladeshi firms and finds that the longer the firm has been listed on the stock 
exchange, the greater the compensation the executives received.    
The regression analysis in all models shows that firm performance (ROA) is 
positively and significantly correlated to TOTAL PAY and BONUS. This evidence matches 
the findings reported by international research which documents that firm performance 
has a positive and significant effect on managerial pay (Ntim et al., 2015; Conyon and He, 
2012; Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Sakawa et al., 2012). 
4.5.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to check how robust the findings are, further analyses is carried out. First, 
another proxy is used to measure the variable of political connections (PM). Instead of 
using a dummy variable to capture the influence of politically connected members on a 
board of directors as shown in Table 4.10, their presence has been measured as 
proportion to the total number of board members. Interestingly, Table 4.13 shows that 
in general the variation of politically connected members as a proportion of total board 
membership does not affect the decisions related to executive compensation. However, it 
does so on variable compensation since it shows a negative impact on BONUS 
component. That is to say, the results demonstrate that the higher the proportion of 
politically connected members, the lower the link between executive compensation and 
firm performance. Although there are differences in statistical levels of the relationships 
between political connections and executive compensation between Table 4.10 and Table 
4.13, the direction of the relationships are similar, confirming that political connections 
in general are not effective in constraining managerial incentives.  
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Table 4.13: Robustness Tests: Ratio of Political Connections to Total Board 
Membership and Executive Compensation 
Additionally, the study adopts various definitions of political connections to ensure 
that the findings are robust in terms of different definitions. The original definition 
consists of three types of political connections, namely royal family members, Shura 
Council members and state representatives. However, in this stage, the sources of 
political connections are classified into different variables as follows: PM3 is defined as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a royal family member or a Shura 
Council member on the board of directors and 0 otherwise; PM4 equals 1 if the firm has 
either a royal family member or a state representative on the board of directors and 0 
otherwise; PM5 equals 1 if the firm has either a Shura Council member or state 
representative on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Each new variable is 
investigated in a separate regression analysis, as can be seen in Table 4.14. The Table 
shows that definitions of political connections include state representatives (PM4 and 
 (1) (2) (3) 
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Mean VIF    1.32 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
56.86*** 921.76***   
PM2 is defined as the total number of politically connected members divided 
by board size. All other variables are defined in Table 4.2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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PM5) lead to the same finding of the original definition of political connections (Table 
4.10). On the other hand, PM3, which represents individual political members (i.e. 
excludes state representatives), shows no significant relationship with the settings of 
executive compensation. However, the direction of relationships between political 
connections and executive compensation in the two tables (Table 4.10 and Table 4.14) is 
almost identical. This evidence demonstrates that the findings of the main model are 
significantly robust to other definitions of political connections, which implies the validity 
of the definition of political connections in Saudi Arabia  
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Table 4.14: Robustness Tests: Various Definitions of Political Connections and Executive Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF 
(4) (5) (6) 
VIF 
(7) (8) (9) 
VIF  TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 
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Mean VIF    1.08    2.6    1.30 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
54.50*** 213.74***   61.90*** 57.43***   65.45*** 60.28***   
PM3 is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a royal family member or a Shura Council member in the board of 
directors and 0 otherwise; PM4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a royal family member or a state representative in the 
board of directors and 0 otherwise; PM5 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a Shura Council member or state representative 
in the board of directors and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 4.2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
This research contributes to the extant body of literature related to political 
connections and their implications on managerial incentives in several ways. First, 
although Chizema et al. (2015) and Hearn et al. (2017) investigate the relationship 
between political ties and executive pay-setting in China and various African economies 
respectively, this research investigates this phenomenon in the context of Saudi Arabia 
which has unique characteristics, i.e. rule by an absolute monarchical regime, the 
existence of the Shura Council, and a high domination of family and state investment in 
listed companies. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this context with its distinct 
institutional settings has not been previously studied, implying that the research findings 
fill a significant gap in the related literature and enhance the understanding of the 
interaction between political connections and the practices of executive compensation. 
Second, since the ownership concentration in Saudi Arabia is high in general, this 
highlights the interaction between political connectedness and executive pay-settings 
through the lens of the principal-principal model. In particular, it shows how political 
capital interacts in a context with a dominance of certain controlling shareholders. Third, 
unlike prior related studies that have been conducted in Africa and East Asia (Chizema et 
al., 2015; Hearn et al., 2017), this research enjoys a high generalizability in the Arab Gulf 
countries which have many cultural, institutional, and economic characteristics in 
common with Saudi Arabia. Last, this research develops a novel definition of political 
connections that captures different political channels namely royal family, Shura Council 
and the state. 
The previous chapter demonstrates that the adoption of the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance is not sufficient to control executive remuneration in the 
emerging economy Saudi Arabia, due to the heterogeneity of institutional settings 
between the two contexts. Therefore, this chapter goes beyond the formal institutions 
and investigates informal institutions to provide a complete picture of executive pay-
settings. In essence, this research considers the consequences of having political 
connections, which is a vital source of wasta, on the practices of managerial 
compensation. Based on a sample from Saudi listed companies for the period 2008-2015, 
the study finds that the phenomenon of political connections exists significantly in Saudi 
Arabia since the majority of firms are politically connected. This evidence supports the 
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conclusion of Faccio (2010) that political ties are prevalent in emerging economies. The 
results also show that if firms do not have a direct relationship with the state, they tend 
to build connections through inviting members of the royal family or Shura Council to 
serve on their boards of directors. Therefore, it is clear that board political capital is a 
pillar of doing business in Saudi Arabia. The latter finding is consistent with institutional 
theory, which argues that political relationships act as a substitute for the absence of 
effective formal institutions to protect the interests of related parties and make business 
smooth-running (Faccio, 2010; Young et al., 2008). 
Although political relationships are found to enable access to vital resources for 
the enterprise (Civilize et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), this 
research demonstrates that they could also be costly in less developed economies. That 
is to say, politically connected firms are observed to be more generous with their senior 
managers. Since the Saudi market is dominated by family firms, the process of choosing 
and remunerating top managers is influenced by nepotism and cronyism (Budhwar and 
Debrah, 2013). This leads to higher incurred agency costs which might result from the 
appointment of unqualified-managers in leading positions. Thus, political connections 
may be utilised to provide regulatory protection for blockholders’ abuse of power. This 
outcome, however, is subject to the type of political connections. Only state 
representatives are found to boost executive pay. However, royal family and Shura 
Council affiliated directors show no significant association with decisions related to 
managerial incentives. This evidence demonstrates that none of political connections 
types is effective in enhancing governance quality, in particular the ones related to 
executive pay-setting.  
However, these results should not be interpreted as a conspiracy between 
dominant shareholders or top managers and politically connected directors against small 
investors (Sun et al., 2016). The results do not necessarily mean that these connected 
members implicitly approve the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth through 
paying top related-managers with high non-merit compensation. However, their political 
power might be exploited by dominant shareholders or senior executives to achieve 
private benefits, such as extracting high non-merit perks for executives, who are often 
family-affiliated, with less concern for accountability. 
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The study findings have practical benefits for related stakeholders such as firms 
and regulators in several ways. First, although the Saudi Law of the Council of Ministers 
forbids ministers from accepting memberships in private corporate boards (BECM, 
1993), the results show that firms are still able to establish political connections through 
other means. Thus, the political connectedness is significant in the Saudi context. The high 
dependence of business on political relationships increases uncertainty and creates a 
challenging environment for foreign investment. Consequently, as Saudi government is 
seeking foreign investment to achieve the objectives of the ‘Saudi Vision 2030’, further 
efforts are necessary to minimise dependence on political connections in order to make 
the Saudi context more attractive for external investors. Second, the results provide an 
overview of how political connections interact with governance mechanisms. The 
understanding of this interaction helps bodies in charge to reform governance 
regulations, taking into consideration board political power. Thus, it helps to re-balance 
the power among stakeholders fairly and ensure that no single party is disadvantaged 
due to lack of control. Finally, the research develops a novel contextualised definition for 
political connections which can be employed by researchers to establish the implications 
of political relationships on other economic and governance characteristics in Saudi 
Arabia or in the other GCC economies. 
However, it is worth noting that the scope of the research and the interpretation of 
its findings are limited to the relationship between political connectedness and the 
practices of executive compensation which is only one of the mechanisms of corporate 
governance. Furthermore, the sample does not capture the impact of such connections 
on the settings of managerial pay in financial firms, which are subject to further and 
different regulatory supervision (Wang and Shailer, 2015; Méndez et al., 2011). Last, 
although the research findings enjoy high generalizability in the Gulf region, the research 
population is based on a sample from Saudi Arabia only and does not use multi-country 
samples.  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Family business is ubiquitous and is a dominant business form in global economies 
(De Cesari et al., 2016). Such dominance also exists in emerging markets where 
ownerships are concentrated in the hands of certain families (Young et al., 2008). This 
high dependence of the economy on family business concerns governments. This disquiet 
is derived from the warnings of many researchers that privately-owned family 
enterprises, which are mainly dependent on the founders, may encounter survival 
challenges after the founders’ retirement (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Ibrahim et al., 
2001; Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). Consequently, in order to make these firms more 
sustainable, governments encourage privately-owned family firms to go public (Ehrhardt 
and Nowak, 2003). This transition ensures that other parties, such as representatives of 
minority shareholders, become involved in an internal monitoring process, while 
externally, the enterprise will become subject to different regulatory institutions. 
Enhancing the governance structure assists family firms to survive and thereby avoid 
negative, and potentially serious, consequences for the national economy (Ehrhardt and 
Nowak, 2003). 
However, being publicly traded does not ensure business sustainability. For 
example, any conflict of interest among family successors may become one between 
dominant shareholders and minority investors (Young et al., 2008). The conflict between 
the two parties is worse in immature economies, where investor legal protection is fairly 
weak. In such contexts, other informal institutions (such as family ties, nepotism, 
cronyism and political connections) play important substitutive roles in shaping business 
policy (Faccio, 2010). Relatedly, Sitthipongpanich and Polsiri (2015) argue that in 
emerging economies families may prefer to retain blocks of shares and to be involved 
directly in management for two reasons: to control cash flow rights and to prevent any 
potential managerial opportunism. The authors attribute these behaviours to the absence 
of effective formal institutions. 
During the past two decades, the government of Saudi Arabia has made 
considerable efforts to convince privately-owned firms to become publically traded. The 
result of this effort has resulted in the number of listed firms which has been doubled 
from 73 in 2000 to nearly 160 in 2015 (Tadawul, 2015). However, these developments 
require parallel legal reforms. Therefore, the CMA set out the first set of Corporate 
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Governance Regulations in late 2006 (CMA, 2010). However, similar to other emerging 
economies, the Saudi corporate governance code appears to be significantly influenced 
by the Anglo-American model which has been developed for Western contexts (Fallatah 
and Dickins, 2012). Its direct adoption disregards the institutional and political 
differences between Saudi Arabia and developed countries. For example, while Western 
economies are market-oriented and their business ownership structure is diffuse; the 
market in Saudi Arabia is network-oriented and mostly closed to foreign investment, with 
a high concentration of family-owned firms (Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015). Furthermore, 
the political systems are dissimilar, which has different consequences for business policy. 
Accordingly, ignoring these contextual differences is likely to lead to the enforcement of 
an inappropriate template of governance regulations (Young et al., 2008). 
In an attempt to reduce family control over the board of directors and to support 
minority shareholders, the Saudi code states that all companies should use a cumulative 
voting system (CMA, 2010). Although a cumulative voting system is not commonly 
applied in Anglo-Saxon countries, the recommendation to use it in Saudi Arabia 
demonstrates the need for special regulations. However, the enforcement of this rule is 
fairly poor, for example the majority of companies did not meet this requirement in 2010 
(four years after release of legislation). Most companies attribute their use of a statutory 
voting system, rather than the cumulative voting system, to the fact that the Companies 
Law allows the use of a statutory system. Thus, firms have found a legal loophole in the 
use of voting system, which allows controlling shareholders to maintain their control. 
These limited efforts by the authorities will not reduce the domination of family members 
over a board of directors and strategic decisions, as long as regulations do not explicitly 
recognise principal-principal conflict. For example, the Taiwanese Security and Exchange 
Act 2006 explicitly forbids board members who have second-degree kinship ties from 
occupying more than half of the seats on a board of directors (Wu, 2013).  
Chapter Three demonstrates that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 
is incompatible with a family firm-dominated economy and inadequate to control 
executive compensation. Furthermore, Chapter Four shows how other informal 
institutions, in particular political connections, can influence policy towards executive 
compensation. Although the principal-agent model is predominant in the growing 
literature on executive compensation, this chapter sheds light on principal-principal 
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conflict by using a novel data set of Saudi family and non-family controlled firms. The 
main hypothesis of this chapter is that the concentrated ownership is not the only 
difference between family and non-family firms (Martin et al., 2016; De Cesari et al., 
2016). Differences are also evident in the structure of internal governance and the need 
to build political connections, both of which implications for policies over executive 
compensation. Unlike firms with diffuse ownership patterns, the decisions in family-
controlled firms primarily consider family interest and concern less the interests of other 
stakeholders including minority shareholders (Ding and Pukthuanthong, 2013). 
Accordingly, the research answers two key questions: a) Do the structures of 
corporate governance and the need for political connections differ between family and non-
family firms? and b) What are the implications of this variation for executive compensation 
practices in family and non-family firms? The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature; section 3 develops the related 
hypotheses and illustrates the research design; and section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results; section 5 provides the research conclusion and limitations. 
5.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Family business topics are one of the most prominent areas in management and 
finance literature (De Cesari et al., 2016). Their importance is derived from the fact that 
family firms represent a significant share of the global economy, with a particularly high 
presence in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). During the past two decades, 
scholars have given considerable attention to behaviours and attitudes of family firms 
and the implications for different issues; for example, firm performance (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015), capital structure (Morresi 
and Naccarato, 2016; Schmid, 2013), shareholder conflict (Martin et al., 2016; Morck and 
Yeung, 2003), governance systems (Martin et al., 2016; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 
2006), and executive compensation (Subekti and Sumargo, 2015; Cheng et al., 2015; 
Michiels et al., 2013). These studies indicate that family influence is widespread and 
affects corporate policy decisions. 
The body of literature that investigates differences in executive compensation 
practices between family and non-family firms is small but growing (Wu, 2013; Chen et 
al., 2014; Tsao et al., 2015). The lack of research could be attributed to the difficulties of 
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data accessibility and the lack of information about executive compensation, especially in 
emerging countries, where transparency and disclosure is very weak (Michiels et al., 
2013). Accordingly, this section reviews the findings of prior studies related to the 
behaviours of family firms and non-family firms with a focus on emerging economies. It 
also sheds light on the literature gap.   
5.2.1 Identification of Family Firms 
Due to cross-country differences, the literature on family business has various 
definitions for the term ‘family firm’. For example, Miller et al. (2007) document 28 
definitions for ‘family firm’ that are used in prior studies. In other words, there is no 
consensus on a widely-accepted definition of family firm in the literature. Indeed, the use 
of different definitions is a key problem in family firm research. Kraiczy (2013) states that 
although many studies analyse the phenomenon of family business, the different 
definitions make comparability between the research challenging and less effective. He 
attributes the use of diverse definitions to the heterogeneity of family firms, not only on 
a country level, but also on an organisation level. That is to say, even though family firms 
are recognised as a distinct group from other organisations, they are also dissimilar in 
the ownership structure and the involvement level of family members in management. 
Typically, a family business refers to an organisation that is owned and controlled 
by an individual or multiple family members (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; Miller et al., 
2007; Young and Tsai, 2008), often by multiple family generations (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). A review of family business definitions in the literature shows that a firm is 
characterised as family-controlled according to two key factors: ownership and 
management (Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015; Young and Tsai, 
2008; Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno, 2014). On the one hand, Sitthipongpanich and 
Polsiri (2015) and Croci et al. (2012) consider a family business as any firm in which the 
largest shareholder is a family member who with other related family members own 
more than 10% of company shares. Similarly, Amoako-Adu et al. (2011) and Young and 
Tsai (2008) recognise a firm as a family business according to the level of ownership. In 
this setting, the definitions mainly depend on ownership criteria, which this research 
refer to as the equity approach.  
In contrast, others, such as (Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno, 2014) and (Al-
Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015) consider a firm to be family-controlled if two conditions are 
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met: a) family members hold at least 10% of firm equity and b) family members are 
involved directly in the management or on the board of directors, which this research 
refers to as an internal-influence approach. The latter approach means that family 
members are an influential party in two dimensions: having voting rights and taking part 
in the decision-making process. In Saudi Arabia, the majority of family members are 
involved or have relatives in management or on the board of directors. Therefore, this 
research adopts an internal-influence approach to identify family-controlled firms. 
5.2.2 Role of Family and Executive Compensation 
During the past three decades, executive compensation issues have received a 
great deal of attention from scholars in management and finance literature (Jensen et al., 
2004; Petra and Dorata, 2008; Young and Tsai, 2008 ). The majority of corporate 
governance studies are conducted and developed in the west, where principal-agency 
conflict is important (Core et al., 1999; Conyon, 2014). However, in emerging economies 
such studies, although growing, are still underdeveloped (Young and Tsai, 2008). The 
scarcity of research makes understanding corporate governance practices in emerging 
countries unclear. It also leads regulators to adopt inappropriate governance regulations, 
arguing that these regulations have worked effectively in developed economies (Rashid, 
2013). The scarcity of research might be attributed to problems with data accessibility in 
emerging countries, which prevents scholars from studying the phenomenon of 
corporate governance. Furthermore, markets in such contexts are still emerging and have 
only recently received the attention of interested researchers.  
One can argue that corporate governance regulations are generalizable; thereby, 
the Western model of corporate governance can be used globally. However, several 
studies (Young et al., 2008; Jiang and Peng, 2011) demonstrate that emerging economies 
have unique characteristics that differ significantly from the ones present in developed 
counterparts. One key difference is the ownership structure of companies in emerging 
economies, which see a high concentration of ownership in the hands of certain families 
(Rashid, 2013). Furthermore, legal enforcement and investor protection are still poor in 
emerging countries, in contrast to the legal systems in developed economies (Faccio, 
2010). Consequently, the norms of corporate governance should consider and capture 
these differences in order to develop an appropriate model of corporate governance that 
fits the domestic situation appropriately (Young et al., 2008). This section reviews the 
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literature related to the impact of family members on executive compensation and shows 
how corporate governance practices vary between family and non-family firms. 
Most studies that examine executive compensation practices in family firms 
operating in emerging economies are carried out in East Asia (Wu, 2013; Chen et al., 
2014; Tsao et al., 2015), partly due to better data availability; the results are mixed. For 
example, Wu (2013) investigates the relationship between boards that have family ties 
and excessive board compensation in Taiwan. Based on a sample over the period 2007-
2010, the researcher observes that when a board of directors has a strong relationship 
with family dominant shareholders, board members are more likely to be paid excessive 
compensation. This excessive non-merit compensation is granted at the expense of 
minority shareholders, which indicates the existence of principal-principal conflict. 
Although board compensation is not within the scope of this study, it reveals how family 
involvement influences board members, who are supposed to consider all shareholders’ 
interests, not only certain shareholders.  
In the same context and based on a sample from the period 2005-2010, Chen et al. 
(2014) analyse the influence of family characteristics on the ratio of variable managerial 
pay. The study finds evidence that the number of family members on the board of 
directors and the level of ownership held by family members are significantly associated 
with lower variable executive compensation. In other words, the existence of family elites 
reduces the link between firm performance and executive compensation, which may lead 
to higher agency costs. However, the research findings are limited to the ratio of variable 
managerial pay. The results do not explain the role of family on the amounts granted to 
executives. 
Furthermore, Tsao et al. (2015) use a sample from Taiwan, in particular from R&D-
intensive industries, between 1996 and 2009. Their research focuses on how CEO 
compensation is influenced by the involvement of family members and their ownership. 
The findings reveal that families are significant shareholders since they hold 
approximately 26% of their firms’ shares. The study document that CEOs are less likely 
to earn higher compensation if family members are present and their ownership is fairly 
high. However, this study suffers from a number of limitations. For example, the sample 
reflects firms that operate in R&D-intensive industries only; thus, it lacks generalizability 
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to other industries. However, my research is more generalizable since the sample covers 
all non-financial industries in Saudi Arabia. 
The findings discussed demonstrate that the excessive involvement of family 
members in corporate decisions is not always beneficial, especially in contexts that lack 
effective formal institutions. As can be seen from Wu (2013) and Chen et al. (2014) family 
presence, in fact, increases directors’ compensation and reduces the link between firm 
performance and executive compensation. This evidence highlights how the presence of 
large family shareholders may lead to another conflict of interest, principal-principal, and 
thereby higher agency costs.  
Using a sample of Chinese firms that operated between 2002 and 2008, Cheng et 
al. (2015) investigate the impact of family characteristics on executive cash 
compensation. They find that family members hold 46% of their companies’ shares. This 
concentration of ownership is high compared with developed countries such as the US 
and the UK (Rashid, 2013). Moreover, the study observes that when ownership of the 
largest family shareholder increases, executives receive less cash remuneration. 
However, ownership of other family members show a positive and significant impact on 
executive compensation. These findings indicate that behaviours vary even among family 
members. In this sense, the decisions are different if there is only one controlling family 
shareholder and when there are multi-family shareholders. In contrast, neither family 
founders nor family CEOs are found to influence executive compensation practices. 
Relatedly, Theeravanich (2013) analyses the characteristics of boards of directors 
and their relationship with board cash compensation in Thailand. The sample consists of 
two groups: family and non-family firms, which provides the possibility of comparison. 
The author observes that director compensation is higher in family firms. Although the 
proportion of outside directors on the board of family firms is significantly higher than 
their counterparts in non-family firms, outside directors are not significantly associated 
with board compensation either in family firms or in non-family firms. Furthermore, the 
author finds that splitting the positions of CEO and board chairperson, which is strongly 
suggested by agency theory (Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), does not affect 
directors’ pay packages. 
Outside Asia, Gallego and Larrain (2012) use a longitudinal sample of three Latin 
American markets to investigate the role of three types of ownership, namely family, 
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foreign and state, in reducing managerial compensation. The researchers state that 
professional CEOs in family-controlled firms earn 30% higher compensation than their 
counterparts in non-family controlled firms. Additionally, the study finds evidence that 
family-controlled firms have a positive and significant relationship with executive total 
compensation. In terms of pay-for-performance, the findings show that family-controlled 
firms are less likely to pay bonus packages for executives. In other words, there is low 
link between managerial pay and firm performance. Foreign and state ownership are not 
associated with decisions related to executive compensation, except when foreign 
investors control a firm, executives are found to be paid higher bonus packages. It is 
worth mentioning that Latin American economies have many market features in common 
to the Saudi context including development level, family domination and weakness of 
legal regulations. 
It can be deduced from the studies that the adoption of the traditional agency 
model of corporate governance in emerging economies is not as effective as its adoption 
in developed countries. That is because agency theory argues that the presence of large 
shareholders reduces the gap of interests between principal-agent. However, in emerging 
economies the presence of large shareholders leads to a different conflict of interest 
among principals themselves (large and small shareholders). The agency costs that result 
from principal-principal conflict, in certain cases, may exceed the ones caused by 
principal-agent conflict (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Young et al., 2008). 
The literature also shows that the influence of family in firms is significant, even in 
the West. For instance, Croci et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between family 
control and CEO compensation in 14 European countries. Their findings reveal that when 
there is family control or when a CEO is a family member, CEOs are less likely to earn high 
compensation. Surprisingly, the results also show that independent directors and 
institutional ownership are significantly associated with higher CEO compensation. This 
latter finding is inconsistent with the agency model of corporate governance, which 
argues that board independence and institutional investments are effective mechanisms 
in constraining CEO compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Lin et al., 2011). 
In Canada, Amoako-Adu et al. (2011) analyse the role of family on various 
components of executive compensation. Family directors are found to occupy nearly 15% 
of board seats. This significant presence of family members on boards of directors 
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enables them to curb managerial pay since the results show a negative and significant 
association between the two variables. Furthermore, board independence and 
institutional ownership is shown to have a negative and significant impact on executive 
compensation. These findings are consistent with the shareholder model of corporate 
governance which argue that shareholder presence, independent directors and 
institutional ownership are effective tools in constraining managerial opportunism 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Lin et al., 2011). However, the results are out of date, because 
the study examined the phenomenon between 1998 and 2006; hence, the impact of the 
latest reforms of corporate governance are not assessed.   
The US context has the lion’s share of studies that examine the association between 
family role and executive compensation in the West. One empirical studies is Combs et al. 
(2010), who examine two scenarios of family influence on CEO compensation. Based on 
a sample from the S&P 500 for the period 2002 to 2005, the study finds that when a CEO 
is family member and he/she is the only representative of the family, he/she is more 
likely to be paid generously. However, if there are multiple family members serving in the 
executive team, a family CEO earns less perks in their package. This indicates that other 
executive family members observe CEO activities and constrain his/her opportunism. 
However, when there are no family executives, a family CEO feels free and acts in his/her 
own interests.  
In the same context, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) use a sample of family-controlled 
firms and find evidence to support agency theory. That is to say, the research outcomes 
demonstrate that when family ownership is high and when a CEO is a family member, 
CEOs receive less compensation. Furthermore, the direct involvement of family members 
on boards of directors and compensation committees is found to have no influence CEO 
pay. However, the study sample is out of date since it covers firms operating between 
1995 and 1998. Thus, the sample does not capture the developments and reforms of 
corporate governance regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the Dodd–
Frank Act (2010), which introduce new legislation related to executive compensation. 
However, my research provides evidence using recent data sets from 2008 to 2015. This 
enables the investigation of the latest corporate governance regulations that control 
executive compensation practices. 
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Nevertheless, Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno (2014), who use a more updated 
sample (2005-2009) from 2,679 US publically listed family firms, reach a similar 
conclusion. Their research analyses the role of family on board compensation. They 
examine three family related variables, namely the presence of family director, level of 
family equity, and proportion of family directors on board of directors, and their effect on 
the level of total and variable board members’ compensation. The findings demonstrate 
that family presence have a negative and significant impact on board compensation. This 
evidence is consistent with the agency assumption that the presence of shareholders 
diminishes agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983b); however, as mentioned earlier this 
assumption is not generalizable to emerging economies. 
Relatedly, Michiels et al. (2013) do not find any significant relationship between 
blockholders and CEO cash compensation. Analysing 529 privately held US family firms, 
the study documents that CEO compensation is unrelated to how many shareholders the 
firm has. Furthermore, even if the CEO is a family member, CEO compensation is still 
unaffected. However, the research results lack robustness since it employs cross-
sectional analysis that only investigates the variation in 2003. In addition, 2003 is prior 
to the changes introduced by the Dodd–Frank Act (2010) which can affect executive 
compensation. 
It is clear from the literature that the role of family varies according to the context 
and its institutional development. While the presence of families in developed economies 
is associated with higher governance quality since it significantly reduces managerial 
remuneration (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Croci et al., 2012; Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-
Bueno, 2014), their role in emerging counterparts has the opposite effect (Gallego and 
Larrain, 2012; Wu, 2013). That is to say, when a family takes part in the process of 
decision-making in developing countries, they seem to extract personal benefits through 
compensating their related managers generously. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
evidence of the relationship between family role and executive compensation in Arab 
countries in general, and in Saudi Arabia in particular, despite their unique 
characteristics. For example, Saudi Arabia is characterised as a network-oriented 
economy since there are strong family ties, high ownership concentration, and a closed 
business environment. Therefore, this research is expected to add a significant 
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contribution to the extant literature and provides evidence from the Saudi context, which 
has a high generalizability to other Arab economies. 
In terms of political connections in family and non-family firms and their 
implications regarding executive compensation practices, there is a dearth of literature 
on the subject. Although political connections have received a considerable attention in 
recent years (Goldman et al., 2009; Faccio, 2010; Wang, 2015; Sun et al., 2016), to the best 
of my knowledge, no single study has yet investigated the behaviours of political 
connectedness in both family and non-family firms simultaneously, in particular with 
respect to compensation arrangements. Intuitively, as norms and behaviours of family 
business differ from non-family enterprises, the need to build political ties and the 
implications of this relationship may also differ in the two types of organisations. The gap 
in family business and political connections literature motivates this research to analyse 
how the role and presence of political connections vary between family and non-family 
firms with a focus on executive compensation practices. 
In general, the literature on political connections shows that political relationships 
can benefit the firm and increase its value through various channels (Goldman et al., 
2009). For instance, politically connected enterprises can obtain favours through the 
allocation of lucrative government contracts (Goldman et al., 2009). Moreover, 
governments may tolerate and exempt connected firms from certain regulations (Imai, 
2006). Another example is related to market share; i.e. firms which receive government 
favour might enjoy a monopolistic environment and be protected from competition 
(Civilize et al., 2015), while tariffs are imposed on foreign competitors (Goldman et al., 
2009). All these benefits can ultimately result in higher firm value and better 
performance.  
However, the evidence for the impact of political connections on corporate 
governance in general, and on executive compensation in particular, is still inconclusive. 
For example, political connections are found to harm the interests of minority 
shareholders since they enable rent appropriation. As such, Sun Sun et al. (2016) and 
Wang (2015) observe a positive and significant relationship between the presence of 
politically connected members and related-party transactions. Political connections are 
also found to have a negative impact on the composition of boards of directors in China 
since they were associated with fewer independent directors than their non-connected 
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peers (Ding et al., 2014). On the other hand, Hearn et al. (2017) and Chizema et al. (2015) 
find that politicalled connected directors play a significant role in curbing the 
opportunism of top executives through reducing their compensation packages. Table 5.1 
presents summary of main research to date. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Key Research 
Study Dependent Variable(s) Independent Variable(s) Sample 
characteristics 
Analysis 
Technique Main Findings 
Cheng et al. 
(2015) 
- Executive cash compensation 1. Ownership of Largest family 
shareholder 
2. Ownership of other family members 
3. Family founder 
4. Family CEO 
A sample of 
Chinese family 
firms for the 
period 2002  to 
2008 
- Fixed effect 
- 2sls 
1) Family members own 46% of their firms. 
2) Highest family shareholder has negative (positive) and significant impact on executive 
compensation (pay-for-performance). 
3) Neither family founder nor family CEO have any relationship with executive 
compensation practices. 
Croci et al. 
(2012) 
-  CEO cash 
-  CEO total 
-  CEO equity-based-compensation 
1. Family control 
2. Family CEO 
3. Board size 
4. Board IND 
A sample of 754 
listed firms from 
14  European 
countries  for the 
period 2001  to 
2008 
- Fixed effect 
- Tobit 
1) Family control is negatively and significantly associated with CEO compensation. 
2) The presence if family CEO leads to less CEO compensation. 
3) Board size, independent directors, institutional ownership are significantly associated 
with higher CEO compensation. 
Combs et al. 
(2010) 
- CEO cash compensation 
- CEO stock options 
1. Lone-family CEO member  
2. Multi-family executive members 
 
A sample from 
S&P 500 for the 
period 2002  to 
2005 
- Random effect 1) When there are multiple family representatives, family CEOs receive lower compensation. 
2) However, if family CEO is the only representative of family members, he/she earns higher 
compensation. 
Gomez-
Mejia et al. 
(2003) 
- CEO total compensation 1. Family on board 
2. Family ownership 
3. Family on compensation committee 
4. Family CEO 
5. CEO ownership 
6. CEO on comp committee 
7. CEO founder 
8. Institutional ownership 
A sample of 253 
US family –
controlled firms 
for the period 
1995  to 1998 
- N/A 1) Neither the presence of family member on board of directors nor on compensation 
committee affects CEO compensation. 
2) When family ownership increases and when the CEO is a family member, CEO receives 
lower remuneration packages.  
Amoako-
Adu et al. 
(2011) 
- Various components of executive 
compensation 
1. Board size 
2. Board Independence 
3. Institutional Ownership 
4. Family directors 
5. CEO Duality 
A sample of 140 
single and dual 
class Canadian  
firms  for the 
period 1998  to 
2006 
- Fixed effect 
- 2SLS 
 
1) Family directors occupy nearly 15% of board seats and they are significantly associated 
with less executive compensation. 
2) Board independence and institutional ownership also have a negative and significant 
impact on managerial pay. 
3) When board size is large and CEO serves as chairman simultaneously, executives are more 
likely to be paid generously.  
Tsao et al. 
(2015) 
- CEO cash compensation 
- CEO equity-based compensation 
1. Existence of a family member 
2. Family ownership 
A sample of 375 
Taiwanese firms 
in R&D-intensive 
industries from  
for the period 
1996  to 2009 
- N/A 1) Families own approximately 26% of their firms’ equity. 
2) The presence of a family member and the greater family ownership have a negative and 
significant effect on CEO remuneration packages. 






- Total compensation  
- Bonus 
1. Family controlled firms 
2. Foreign controlled firms 
3. State controlled firms 
A sample from 
three Latin 
American markets  
for the period 
1997  to 2007 
- Fixed effect 1) Professional CEOs in family controlled firms earn 30% compensation than their 
counterparts in non-family controlled firms. 
2) Family controlled firms have a positive and significant relationship with executive total 
compensation. 
3) Family-controlled firms are less likely to pay bonus packages for executives. In other 
words, there is a weak link between managerial pay and firm performance. 
Wang and 
Xiao (2011) 
- Performance-based compensation 1. Controlling shareholders’ tunnelling A sample of 1286 
Chinese firms  for 
the period 1999  
to 2005 
- Fixed effect 
- 2SLS 
1) There is a negative and significant association between controlling shareholders’ 
tunnelling and performance-based compensation. In other words, the more the tunnelling 
activities that dominant shareholders do, the weaker the link to executive compensation. 
Wu (2013) - Adjusted board compensation 
- Excessive board compensation 
1. Board with family ties All Taiwanese 
listed firms 
between 2007 and 
2010 
- Fixed effect 
- 2SLS 
- Logit 






- Board total compensation 
- Ratio of board variable 
compensation 
1. Family director 
2. Family equity  
3. Ratio of family directors 
 
A sample of 2679 
US publically 
listed family firms  
between 2005 and 
2009 
- Tobit 
- Random effect 
1) Average directors’ compensation in family firms is 18% higher than in non-family firms. 
2) If there is a family director, board members earn less total compensation and have a 
lower ratio of variable compensation. 
3) Family equity and ratios of family director also have a negative and significant impact on 
board total pay and variable compensation. 
Chen et al. 
(2014) 
- Ratio of variable executive 
compensation 
1. Family members on board 
2. Family member’s ownership 
 




2005 and 2010 
- Fixed effect 1) When the number of family members on board and family ownership increases, 
executives receives a lower ratio of variable compensation 
Michiels et 
al. (2013) 
- CEO cash compensation 
 
1. Number of shareholders 
2. Family CEO 
3. Firm performance 
A sample of 529 
privately held US 
family firms 
- Fuller’s LIML 1) Neither number of shareholders nor family CEO have any relationship with CEO cash 
compensation. 
2) Firm performance has a positive and significant impact on CEO cash compensation. 
Theeravanic
h (2013) 
- Total director cash compensation 1. Firm performance 
2. Independent directors 
3. Directors’ ownership 
4. Split CEO/Chairperson positions 
A sample of 363 
Thai firms 2002-
2008 
- Fixed effect 1) Director compensation is greater in family firms. 
2) The proportion of outside directors on the board of family firms is significantly higher than 
their counterparts in non-family firms. However, outside directors are not significantly 
associated with board compensation neither in family firms nor in non-family firms. 
3) Directors’ ownership has a negative and significant impact on board remuneration. 
4) Firm performance has a positive and significant impact on total director cash 
compensation. 
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5.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As mentioned earlier, the economy of Saudi Arabia has unique cultural and 
religious characteristics that differ from other countries, which increases the importance 
of developing an appropriate theoretical landscape that suits the Saudi context. The 
process of setting executive compensation in Saudi Arabia is affected by several factors 
including culture, personal connections, regulations and religion. As this study considers 
the relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation, the same 
models of Chapter Three are adopted due to the same aforementioned reasons; however, 
with significant emphasis on the principal-principal conflict. Since the data sets have both 
family and non-family firms, the theoretical development requires appropriate 
perceptions for each firm type: family and non-family firms in terms of governance norms 
and practices. Moreover, the conflicts between family controlling shareholders and 
minority investors need to be carefully addressed and understood, since the conflicts are 
among one party (investors) and go beyond the opportunism of individual managers. The 
following sub-sections discuss the theoretical thoughts that frame the conflict of interests 
between family large shareholders and minority investors in family-controlled firms: 
moreover, the conflicts between shareholders and non-family managers in non-family 
firms. 
5.3.1 Agency Theory 
Jensen et al. (2004, p. 50) argue that “while remuneration can be a solution to 
agency problems, it can also be a source of agency problems”. The traditional agency 
model (principal-agent conflict) assumes that ownership concentration is diffuse and 
managers have considerable discretion and control over decision-making (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b). However, these assumptions are not relevant in the majority of cases in 
Saudi Arabia where many firms are family controlled. In these firms, which represent 
nearly 60% of Saudi listed firms, there is no real effective separation of ownership and 
control. Therefore, non-family managers are less likely to have the discretionary ability 
to expropriate the firm’s resources, especially in family-controlled firms. Thus, the 
principal-agent model is only adequate to explain the opportunism phenomena in non-
family firms (Young et al., 2008).  
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The model considers concentrated ownership as an effective mechanism through 
which to mitigate agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, scholars came to 
recognise that concentrated ownership transforms the conflict from principal-agent to a 
conflict among shareholders themselves (principal-principal) (Young et al., 2008). Since 
ownership in family-controlled firms is highly concentrated, the principal-principal 
conflict is likely to represent the reality in such firms (Young et al., 2008). In this setting, 
blockholders may expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by extracting tangible and 
intangible private benefits (Basu et al., 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For instance, 
controlling families may appoint unqualified family members or close relatives to key 
positions and overlook better qualified non-family managers (Faccio et al., 2001; Gilson, 
2006; Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Thus, small shareholders are unable 
either to access these intangible benefits or obtain higher financial returns due to the 
poor performance of family-related managers (Young et al., 2008).  
Sun et al. (2016) state that the severity of conflict between large and small 
shareholders is sensitive to the effectiveness of the legal system in which the firm is 
operating and the efficiency of the market. First, the enforcement of effective sanctions 
acts as a deterrent to blockholders from abusing their power and vice-versa (La Porta et 
al., 2000). Second, blockholders can be constrained by efficient markets, because 
committing opportunistic activities sends a negative signal to the market, which, in turn, 
affects the stock price (Gomes, 2000) and limits opportunities for future equity financing 
(Durnev and Kim, 2005). Applying these two factors in the Saudi context, which has 
neither an effective legal regime (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003) nor an efficient stock market 
(Asiri and Alzeera, 2013), means that family-controlled firms in Saudi Arabia are 
susceptible to principal-principal conflict. Although, regulatory bodies have imposed 
mechanisms to curb rent appropriation by controlling shareholders (e.g. requiring one-
third of board members to be independent and enforcing the adoption of a cumulative 
voting system in board elections (CMA, 2010)), controlling shareholders and their 
representatives still comprise the majority on company boards 
Therefore, it can be argued that although concentrated ownership plays a 
substitutive role for the poor external governance mechanisms and mitigates the Type I 
agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Li et al., 2007; Lin, 2005; Banghøj et al., 2010; 
Conyon and He, 2012), principal-principal conflict can arise. In certain cases, the agency 
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costs of the principal-principal conflict are higher than those resulting from principal-
agent conflict (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Young et al., 2008). From this perspective, there 
is a concern that family-related managers in Saudi firms may extract higher non-merit 
compensation at the expense of minority shareholders. This expropriation becomes 
worse if the firm is politically connected. That is to say, in such situations, blockholders 
may take actions that maximise their private wealth at the expense of minority 
shareholders, i.e. extract higher compensation for their related managers with less 
concern to any possible legal sanctions. Thus, even if the two aforementioned 
instruments become effective, a politically connected blockholder is less likely to be 
affected by external sanctions. His/her political ties will protect him/her from any legal 
consequences and will also open alternative channels for equity financing when needed. 
5.3.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory argues that adopting the Western corporate governance 
model, which is based on principal-agent conflict, in emerging economies with less 
consideration to the institutional cross-country differences would make the situation 
more costly and problematic (North, 1990; Wright et al., 2005). For example, ownership 
concentration, which is considered to be an effective mechanism by which to enhance 
governance quality in developed economies (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), is a root cause of principal-principal conflicts in emerging countries. 
Therefore, instead of resolving the issue in the Saudi context, the Western corporate 
governance model may exacerbate the principal-principal problem (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Young et al., 2008).   
The agency model implicitly assumes that the formal underpinning institutions in 
relation to corporate governance found in developed countries also exist in emerging 
economies (Young et al., 2008). However, this is not the case in Saudi Arabia, where the 
“formal institutions such as laws and regulations regarding accounting requirements, 
information disclosure, securities trading, and their enforcement are either absent, 
inefficient, or do not operate as intended” (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). The main objective 
of an enterprise is to survive; however, economic success is not sufficient to achieve this. 
Furthermore, firms need to establish legitimacy with the surrounding institutions 
(Suchman, 1995; Zucker, 1987). Therefore, there is a potential scenario that firms may 
228 | P a g e  
 
ostensibly comply with corporate governance requirements as a response to the 
institutional change, i.e. only for legitimating purposes (Dacin et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, since external governance in emerging economies is still weak (Peng, 
2004; Peng et al., 2003), families prefer to retain controlling shares in order to play a 
substitutive internal role (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). This, in turn, may explain the high 
ownership concentration found in Saudi Arabia (The World Bank, 2009). In this context, 
the board of directors (the most prominent internal control mechanism) is often 
considered to be a ‘rubber stamp’ for dominant shareholders; thus minority 
shareholders’ rights are constrained and may be abrogated (Young et al., 2008). 
Therefore, in the Saudi context, the informal institutional environment tends to 
play a greater role in addressing corporate governance norms than the formal 
institutional environment (Peng and Heath, 1996; Young et al., 2008). These informal 
institutions include “relational ties, business groups, family connections, and government 
contacts” (Young et al., 2008, p. 198). Given the fact that human resource management in 
KSA is influenced by tribal ties and family connections (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013), 
there is reason to believe that the controlling shareholders may appoint relatives or close 
friends to key positions; these, in turn, are able to extract high non-merit-compensation 
(Young et al., 2002).  
With regards to political connectedness, RDC argues that the success of an 
organisation is primarily subject to dependences on others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The culture and the trade in general in Saudi Arabia are influenced by wasta; in this sense, 
both family and non-family firms need to build political connections, albeit on different 
levels. That is to say, family-controlled firms, which are owned by politically-connected 
family members, already have personal connections with high profile and senior 
government officials (Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Alzharani and Che-Ahmad, 2015). Thus, their 
need to have politically connected members on their board of directors is less than their 
non-family counterparts. However, both types firms are expected to employ such 
connections for their own private benefits. For example, firms may use political 
connections to reduce regulatory oversight and therefore take decisions that may not be 
in the best interests of the company, e.g. hiring non-qualified family managers. 
In contrast, Young et al. (2008) argue that non-family political members, who are 
less influenced by large shareholders as opposed to regular independent directors who 
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are accused of being a ‘rubber stamp’ for dominant shareholders, are driven by the 
general orientation of the government. Thus, Chizema et al. (2015) explains that such 
politically connected directors may act to reinforce government expectations with 
regards to top executive compensation and control non-merit extraction. Moreover, since 
these directors are usually cautious, they are seriously concerned about the political costs 
that would arise if they collude either with top managers or controlling shareholders for 
private interests (Goldman et al., 2009). Put differently, the legitimacy of these members 
and of the political organisations to which they belong will be significantly affected if they 
caught engaging in any corruption scandals. However, the situation might be different if 
that politician holds a block of shares concurrently. In such scenario, the blockholder 
politician may act as a normal investor who seeks rent; thereby, his relationship with 
other small shareholders will be framed by principal-principal theory (Young et al., 
2008). 
5.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
Family business topics are one of the most prominent areas of research in 
management and finance literature (De Cesari et al., 2016). Their importance is derived 
from the fact that family firms represent a significant share of the global economy, with a 
particularly high share in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008). During the past two 
decades, scholars have paid considerable attention to behaviours and attitudes of family 
firms and the implications for different issues; for example, firm performance (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015), capital structure 
(Morresi and Naccarato, 2016; Schmid, 2013), shareholder conflicts (Martin et al., 2016; 
Morck and Yeung, 2003), governance systems (Martin et al., 2016; Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006), and executive compensation (Subekti and Sumargo, 2015; Cheng et al., 
2015; Michiels et al., 2013). These studies indicate that family influence is widespread 
and affects corporate policy decisions. 
The literature which investigates the differences in executive compensation 
practices between family and non-family firms is small but growing. This could be 
attributed to the difficulties of data accessibility and the lack of information about 
executive compensation, especially in emerging countries where transparency and 
disclosure is very weak (Michiels et al., 2013). In order to employ the findings of the 
previous chapters optimally, this chapter determines the behavioural differences in 
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corporate governance and the political connections between family and non-family firms 
and their ultimate impact on compensation policy. The following sub-sections develop 
appropriate hypotheses and illustrate the research method.   
5.4.1 Hypotheses Development 
5.4.1.1 Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation 
A stream of family business literature documents that family investors may have 
non-financial objectives that could lead to a collision with non-family shareholders in 
terms of corporate governance (Martin et al., 2016). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) provide 
an example of such non-financial goals when they find that a family executive is less likely 
to be dismissed even in situations of poor performance. In addition, other studies observe 
that the average tenure of family managers is triple those of non-family counterparts 
(Chrisman et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2003). These facts confirm the prevalence of 
favouritism in family firms.  
The perspective of the agency model is predominant in corporate governance 
literature (Hillman et al., 2009), which is probably because most governance studies are 
conducted in the West. Agency theorists suggest three key mechanisms to mitigate the 
conflict of principal-agent “(1) optimizing risk bearing properties of principals and 
agents, (2) increasing incentive alignment between principals and agents, and (3) 
effective principal monitoring of agents” (Dharwadkar et al., 2000, p. 651). However, as 
discussed earlier, such solutions have been developed to deal with traditional agency 
problems in efficient governance contexts such as developed economies. Immature 
economies, which are characterised by weak governance and underdeveloped 
institutions (Young et al., 2008), have a different set of agency problems related to 
expropriation of small investors’ wealth (Cho, 1999). In recent years, institutional theory 
has shown greater ability than other theories in explaining economic phenomena in 
emerging and transition economies (Zhang et al., 2015). With respect to corporate 
governance, institutional theory raises a key argument that the agency governance model 
does not fit every context because of differing cultural and institutional characteristics 
(Young et al., 2008). Disregarding these differences may lead to the adoption of an 
inappropriate model of corporate governance. 
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The agency concerns in Saudi Arabia are unlike those in developed countries but 
similar to other emerging countries. Saudi Arabia suffers from a conflict between 
controlling investors and minority shareholders, commonly known as principal-principal 
conflict (Young et al., 2008). Principal-principal conflict is clear and severe in family-
controlled firms where families control the process of decision-making and there is a 
likelihood of the expropriation of minority shareholder wealth (Martin et al., 2016). In 
essence, such control is derived from the high concentration of ownership in the hands 
of families, by which they influence the appointment of both board members and top 
executives. Saudi Arabia is a network-oriented society where wasta play a significant role 
in normal life as well as in the process of employment (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). Family 
altruism is a key feature of Saudi culture which is assessed as 75% collectivist by The 
Hofstede Centre (2014). Therefore, in family-controlled firms it is expected to find family 
members at all top levels of the organisation—owners, board of directors and top 
management (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). As family business represents 95% of the 
private sector in Saudi Arabia (Alriyadh, 2013) and the majority of listed firms, it can be 
argued that in general there is no real separation between ownership and control in Saudi 
Arabia, except in diffusely-owned enterprises. 
In terms of executive compensation, the principal-agent model suggests that 
managerial incentives could bridge the gap between shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The suggestion implicitly assumes that 
compensation is designed according to performance criteria (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Jensen et al., 2004). However, the principal-principal perspective argues that executive 
pay might be exploited to extract private benefits with no improved performance (Cheng 
et al., 2015). In Saudi Arabia, controlling shareholders monitor top managers closely; 
hence managers are less likely to influence their compensation packages (Young et al., 
2008). However, there is another potential scenario in which a manager is a family 
member. In this situation, executive compensation may be used as a tunnelling for 
expropriation of small investors’ wealth (Chen et al., 2014). 
a) Board composition 
▪ Family directors 
Shareholders rely on the board of directors to set long-term strategic plans and 
delegate to them the functions of appointing, supervising, compensating and dismissing 
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top managers (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Lin, 2005; Basu et al., 2007). These vital 
functions demonstrate the importance of boards of directors in global governance 
regulations and literature. A board of directors derives its authority and legitimacy from 
shareholders, who are the firm’s highest authority, and from Companies Law of the 
relevant country (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Lin, 2005). Hence, all related parties strive to 
dominate this board in order to control the main source of decision-making including 
executive pay (Ramaswamy et al., 2000).  
Traditional agency theory assumes that the greater the separation between 
ownership and control, the higher the agency costs and vice-versa (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). In this context, the presence of family directors on a 
board of directors is expected to reduce executive compensation (Combs et al., 2010). In 
support of this assumption, studies, such as (Sapp, 2008; Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-
Bueno, 2014; Tsao et al., 2015), find that the involvement of family members on a board 
of directors curbs managerial incentives. However, the situation in emerging countries is 
different because the main conflict exists between major investors and minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). The principal-principal model argues that in contexts 
where ownership is concentrated in the hands of certain investors, small shareholders 
will be unable to protect their interests (Li et al., 2007). For example, Amoako-Adu et al. 
(2011) and Wu (2013) observe that top executives are more likely to receive higher 
compensation if the board has family-related directors. The latter evidence does not 
support the argument of the principal-agent model but demonstrates the existence of 
principal-principal conflict in developing economies. Relatedly, stewardship theory 
argues that family members may perceive the generous compensation for their family-
managers as a family obligation (Vallejo, 2009). In this sense, family-related managers 
are expected to gain higher remuneration packages than their non-family counterparts 
in emerging economies (Vallejo, 2009). 
Saudi Arabia is a network-oriented economy and wasta is influential in business 
contracts in general and human resource practices in particular (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011; 
Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). Given that the majority of firms are family-controlled, there 
is a high likelihood that top management is also family-affiliated. Kinship loyalty may 
outweigh the need to meet the requirements of the position. In other words, a top 
executive post may be granted to a family member who does not have necessary 
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qualifications and experience. Thus, the appointment of an unqualified family-manager 
could lead to higher direct agency costs such as high non-merit compensation and higher 
indirect agency costs that result from poor performance (Young et al., 2008). Therefore, 
it can be argued that if family members are involved in executive pay decisions, family-
related managers would be compensated generously. Accordingly, the study formulates 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positively significant relationship between the presence of family members on 
a board of directors and executive compensation. 
▪ Board independence 
Board independence is a key mechanism of internal governance and one of the 
most discussed issues in governance literature (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Core et al., 
1999; Sapp, 2008). The reliance on outsider directors is based on the notion that such 
directors are less influenced and controlled by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
Hence, they should assess managers’ performance objectively, including the deserved 
level of compensation. The optimal contracting model argues that independent directors 
ensure that executives are compensated according to an arm’s-length principal 
(Janakiraman et al., 2010). This theory assumes that outsider directors are totally 
independent and have no joint interests with management.  
However, as argued by the managerial power model, the situation is different if the 
firm is family-controlled where the board of directors and management are occupied by 
the same persons or persons belonging to the same family (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 
Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). In this context, independent directors are not free from 
family influence, which could threaten the re-nomination their directorship (Ozerturk, 
2005). Therefore, if family shareholders arrange high non-merit compensation for their 
family-related managers, outsider directors may avoid collisions with family 
shareholders and thus approve the compensation (Chalevas, 2011). This approach is 
relevant to Saudi family-controlled firms in which family members control the board of 
directors, including the nomination process. 
Furthermore, the institutions-based perspective suggests that independent 
directors in emerging economies are not as effective as in institutionally developed 
countries (Young et al., 2008). In network-oriented economies, even outsider directors 
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need to build connections with dominant parties inside the firm; thus, such directors 
appear independent in form but not in substance (Young et al., 2008). In other words, 
outside directors may not enjoy full independence even in non-family firms. Empirically, 
the findings are mixed, with some finding that board independence is ineffective in 
curbing executive compensation, i.e. board independence is associated with higher 
executive pay (Ozkan, 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Croci et al., 
2012). Based on these arguments, the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H2: Board independence has a positively significant impact on executive compensation in 
family and non-family firms. 
▪ Role duality 
Role duality (CEO/chairman) is another crucial dimension in governance literature 
and involves two related but contrasting arguments. On the one hand, stewardship theory 
argues that the combination of both positions in the hands of a single individual is 
advantageous for the company since it gives the CEO sufficient discretion to take 
decisions easily and in appropriate time (Davis et al., 1997). Proponents of this theory 
perceive a CEO as a company steward; thus, he/she will not exploit his/her power to 
extract private benefits (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Ramaswamy et al., 2000). In this 
view, family controlled-firms may prefer to pay an owner-manager less compensation 
since he/she will receive dividends through his/her ownership in the company (Banghøj 
et al., 2010). In addition, signalling theory suggests that a family CEO/chairman would 
accept a lower level of managerial pay in order to send a message that minority 
shareholders are not exploited by family managers (Ding and Pukthuanthong, 2013). For 
instance, (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) and (Croci et al., 2012) find that when the CEO is a 
family member, he/she is paid less than non-family counterparts. Furthermore, other 
studies (Chalmers et al., 2006; Rashid, 2013) document that if a CEO serves as board 
chairperson at the same time, top executives are less likely to receive high compensation. 
On the other hand, the managerial power model, which is derived from agency 
theory, argues that role duality increases CEO power and enables him/her able to boost 
his/her own compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Core et al., 1999). This assumption 
may exist in non-family firms where CEOs usually do not hold shares in the company; 
hence, their wealth is based on and obtained mostly from managerial compensation. 
Despite the fact that previous studies do not reach a consensus, the dominant view is that 
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role duality is significantly associated with higher agency costs (Combs et al., 2010; 
Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2015). Accordingly, the research posits the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Role duality has a negatively significant impact on executive compensation in family-
controlled firms and a positive and significant impact in non-family firms. 
▪ Blockholder chairman 
The board of directors is at the top of the pyramid of power in a firm; therefore, the 
position of board chairperson is considered as the highest office (Brickley et al., 1997). 
The board chairperson sets board meeting agendas (Jensen, 1993) and has the right to 
cast an additional vote if the board voting results in a tie (Douma, 1997). Furthermore, 
the position provides other incorporeal advantages such as prestige, honour and pride 
(Nada and Andrew, 2007), which are important in Saudi Arabia which is ranked as 95% 
in power distance (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). Hence, it stands to reason that dominant 
shareholders will use their voting rights to chair a board of directors. 
The principal-agent model suggests that the presence of large shareholders on a 
board of directors will reduce the gap between shareholders’ and managers’ interests 
and, therefore, lead to lower executive compensation (Méndez et al., 2011). However, as 
the Saudi context is significantly affected by principal-principal conflict, there is a 
possibility that if a board of directors is chaired by a family member, family-related 
managers will be able to extract higher non-merit executive compensation (Young et al., 
2008). Since the literature lacks empirical evidence, this research depends on the 
theoretical arguments and develops the following hypothesis:  
H4: A blockholder chairman has a positively significant impact on executive compensation 
in family-controlled firms and a negative and significant impact in non-family firms. 
▪ Chairman multi-directorships 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that when a director holds multi-memberships of 
other corporate boards, he/she will gain more knowledge and experience. In so doing, 
his/her monitoring performance will be greatly improved; therefore, this will lead to a 
reduction in the level of executive compensation. Moreover, sitting on other companies’ 
boards gives the director more opportunities to use benchmarking criteria which may 
justify decisions on managerial rewards. In contrast, Ozdemir and Upneja (2012) and 
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Petra and Dorata (2008) argue that serving on other corporate boards leads to reduced 
supervisory efficiency as multi-directorships reduce the time and effort allocated to each 
company. Empirically, Core et al. (1999) find that when outside directors have seats on 
four or more boards, the CEO receives higher remuneration packages. This outcome is 
also supported by the findings of other studies (Armstrong et al., 2012; Ozdemir and 
Upneja, 2012; Sapp, 2008). 
In Saudi Arabia where the majority of corporate boards are chaired by large 
shareholders, approximately 70% of board chairmen are members of other companies’ 
boards. This enhances chairmen’ knowledge and enables to use benchmarking criteria. 
Therefore, their decisions related to executive compensation are expected to prevent 
excessive compensation. Consequently, this study formulates the following hypothesis: 
H5: A negatively significant relationship exists between chairmen with multi-directorships 
and executive compensation in family and non-family firms. 
▪ Existence of a remuneration committee  
Good corporate governance regulations recommend corporate boards transfer the 
responsibility for pay-setting to a remuneration committee comprised wholly or mainly 
of independent members (Girma et al., 2007; Méndez et al., 2011). According to the 
optimal contracting model, the negotiation process between board of directors and top 
executives is assumed to be rational and unbiased (Chen et al., 2010b). Therefore, the 
remuneration committee is expected to enhance the design and effectiveness of 
managerial incentives and, therefore, diminish the gap between managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests (Chen et al., 2010b).  
However, in Saudi Arabia, there is no independency requirement for the 
composition of remuneration committee. Furthermore, CEOs and other senior executive 
are allowed to part in the remuneration committee. From the view of managerial power 
model, the presence of affiliated directors or executive members will lead to higher levels 
of executive pay and, in general, poorly structured incentives packages (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2009). However, institutional theory argues that emerging economies often are 
dominated by certain families and have weak institutional settings. Hence, there is a 
likelihood that a remuneration committee is established only to meet regulatory 
requirements, while, in practice, the board of directors is solely responsible for decisions 
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related to executive pay (Young et al., 2008). This arguement is supported by the findings 
of previous studies which find that remuneration committees facilitate higher executive 
compensation (Conyon and He, 2012; 2011; Chen et al., 2010b). Therefore, according to 
the discussion, the study develops the following hypothesis: 
H6: A positively significant relationship exists between the existence of a remuneration 
committee and executive compensation in family and non-family firms. 
b) Ownership structure 
▪ Director ownership 
Internally, the board of directors is considered to be the most effective governance 
mechanism for reducing agency costs (Ramaswamy et al., 2000). However, the principal-
agent model argues that if a board’s interest is different from that of shareholders, this 
may lead to increased agency costs (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). To ensure an optimal 
alignment of interests between shareholders and members of a board of directors, board 
members should also become shareholders. Minow and Bingham (1995, p. 497), cited by 
Muth and Donaldson (1998), state that “nothing makes directors think like shareholders 
more than being shareholders”. In this sense, directors view their equity in a similar way 
to other shareholders; hence, this will increase their supervisory effectiveness over 
management. 
However, (Young et al., 2008) warn that high ownership levels held by board 
members in weak institutional settings can exacerbate principal-principal conflict and 
lead to increased exploitation of minority shareholders. The majority of studies find that 
director ownership increases governance effectiveness and curbs managerial pay 
(Méndez et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2011; Sapp, 2008). However, a number fail to find any 
significant impact from director ownership on executive compensation arrangements 
(Rashid, 2013; Hearn, 2013). As directors’ interests vary between family and non-family 
firms, the hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H7: Director ownership has a positively significant impact on executive compensation in 
family-controlled firms; and a negatively significant impact in non-family firms. 
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▪ Pension fund ownership 
Pension funds are one of the largest investors in the Saudi stock market, which 
allows them to influence governance policies. The agency-based view suggests that 
pension funds can enhance the monitoring function of board of directors and hence they 
can contribute in controlling managerial incentives (Lin et al., 2011). Colpan and 
Yoshikawa (2012) state that institutional investors, such as pension funds, are frequently 
growth-seekers. In this context, such investors may prefer to link executive compensation 
to long-term rather than short-term performance (David et al., 1998). Public pension 
funds are considered “pressure-resistant” investors because they have no direct business 
relationships with corporate management (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012). In addition, 
unlike ordinary individual investors, representatives of institutional investors are 
appointed according to their skills and usually have experience in the business industry 
(Qi et al., 2000). Accordingly, the presence of pension funds is supposed to increase 
shareholders’ protection from managerial opportunism in relation to compensation 
arrangements. 
The literature lacks studies investigating the effect of pension funds’ investments 
on compensation policies. However, a number of scholars examine the role of 
institutional ownership, of which pension funds are a part, and find that institutional 
investments are significantly associated with lower executive pay (Ozkan, 2007; 
Chalevas, 2011; Lin et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015). However, (Rashid, 2013) and (Shah et 
al., 2009) observe no significant relationship between institutional equity and managerial 
compensation in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. Taking the latter evidence into 
consideration and as pension funds do not have high investment stakes in family-
controlled enterprises, their governing role over managerial compensation in such firms 
is expected to be weak. Thus, the hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H8: Investments of pension funds have a negatively significant impact on executive 
compensation in non-family firms, while, they have no significant relationship with 
executive compensation in family-controlled firms. 
▪ State ownership 
Agency theory argues that the domination of the state in firm equity may negatively 
affect minority interests and hence lead to the emergence of the principal-principal 
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conflict (Conyon and He, 2012). Li et al. (2007) add that top executives may waste time 
attempting to please government officers rather than concentrating their efforts on 
achieving the firm’s goals. Furthermore, Conyon and He (2012) support this argument 
and suggest that state representatives on firms’ boards have difficulty in distinguishing 
between their functional duties as investors’ representatives and their administrative 
tasks. Firth et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011) find that state ownership is significantly 
associated with lower executive remuneration packages in China 
State investment in Saudi Arabia is more focused on non-family firms than family-
controlled firms. This means that the state has less influence on the boards of family-
controlled firms. Therefore, its control and impact over family-controlled firms is 
expected to be insignificant in general. Saudi state investment is concentrated in certain 
giant corporations that are provide essential facilities for the nation, such as in the energy 
and telecommunications sectors. This indicates that the state does not always seek 
profitability; sometimes it has other objectives such as maintaining national security. 
Consequently, the supervisory function over decisions related to executive compensation 
even in non-family firms may have a lower priority from the state’s perspective. Hence, 
this research formulates the following hypothesis: 
H9: State investment has a negatively significant impact on executive compensation in non-
family firm, while it has no significant relationship with executive compensation in 
family-controlled firms. 
5.4.1.2 Political Connections and Executive Compensation  
Political connections have a significant influence on economic outcomes (Chen et 
al., 2010a; Ding et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 
2015). Nevertheless, their influence and presence on family and non-family firms is still 
not clear because, as to the best of my knowledge, no single study examines this 
phenomenon in family and non-family firms. However, Faccio (2010) analyse a cross-
country sample and find that political connections are active in emerging economies, 
especially in the most corrupt ones. The author states that political ties emerge as a result 
of the weak enforcement of laws and thus create a balance of power among business 
elites. In this context, the business environment in Saudi Arabia, which is network-
oriented, is more likely to be affected by political connections. 
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Although Saudi Arabia is not recognised as one of the most corrupt countries 
(Transparency International, 2015), there is a high likelihood that political connections 
are important for business transactions. This is because the demography in Saudi Arabia 
is based around a tribal structure, in which personal relationships play a significant role 
in normal daily life. The report of The Hofstede Centre (2014) supports this argument, 
assessing Saudi Arabia at 75% collectivist and  power distance at 95%. Thus, political 
connectedness is considered as a substantial element in balancing power among business 
elites and will affect decisions related to the appointment of key executives and their 
compensation. 
Although much of the literature shows the advantages of building political 
relationships outweighs their costs (Faccio, 2010), political connections also have a 
negative aspect that can harm an enterprise (Sun et al., 2016). From the perspective of 
agency theory, well connected shareholders may exploit political ties for their own 
interests, which can lead to higher agency costs (García-Meca, 2015). Thus, political 
affiliations of controlling shareholders can provide them with the required power to 
exploit firm resources at the expense of small shareholders, thereby exacerbating the 
principal-principal problem. For instance, Chen et al. (2010a) document that political 
connections increase information asymmetry problems since connected enterprises are 
found to disclose less accurate analyst forecasts than non-connected ones. Principal-
principal conflict evidently exists in contexts that have a high concentration of ownership 
(Young et al., 2008). Private controlling shareholders usually seek personal rent 
appropriation; however, to do so, they need protection from regulatory oversight. One 
effective means to obtain such protection is through recruiting politically connected 
members to the board of directors (Sun et al., 2016).  
However, the impact of political connections on corporate governance in general, 
and on executive compensation in particular, is still unclear from the research. For 
example, on the one hand, political connections are found to harm the interests of 
minority shareholders since they enable rent appropriation. As such, Sun Sun et al. 
(2016) and Wang (2015) observe a positive and significant relationship between the 
presence of politically connected members and related-party transactions. In terms of 
executive compensation, to the best of my knowledge, Chizema et al. (2015) is the only 
241 | P a g e  
 
research that examine the role of political connections in constraining executive 
compensation.  
As discussed earlier, since the employment process in Saudi Arabia is significantly 
influenced by wasta in general, there is a likelihood that this influence also extends to 
executive positions. Thus, controlling shareholders may exercise their stewardship 
duties in favour of their relatives and close friends and appoint them to key managerial 
posts. As a result of this favouritism, these related managers are expected to receive 
generous, higher remuneration and packages than their non-supported counterparts. 
Furthermore, there is no concern about regulatory sanctions as the controlling 
shareholders expect protection from politically connected members. On the view of this, 
the research expects similar relationships between political connections and executive 
compensation in family and non-family firms as follows: 
H10: Political connections have a positively significant impact on executive compensation 
in family and non-family firms. 
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5.4.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The study is based on a sample from the SSE. The context of Saudi Arabia is chosen 
for several reasons. First, the political regime in Saudi Arabia is stable; hence, there is no 
concern about the effect of political instability on the results. Second, since the study 
analyses the practices of executive compensation in family and non-family firms, the 
ownership structure in Saudi Arabia enable this goal to be achieved. Lastly, data are 
accessible, because the transparency of information in Saudi Arabia is much higher than 
other monarchical emerging countries.  
The initial sample contains all 160 listed firms in the SSE in 15 different industries 
between 2008 and 2015 (Tadawul database). This period has been chosen for two key 
reasons. First, data are available and accessible since the enforcement of corporate 
governance regulations and their disclosure requirements began in 2008. Moreover, this 
period is the most recent investigation with respect to the determinants of executive 
compensation, which helps to fill the gap and improve the understanding of pay setting 
practices 
However, due to the characteristics of heterogeneity between financial and non-
financial firms and being subject to different regulatory requirements (Wang and Shailer, 
2015), the study uses only non-financial firms. This method is supported by other studies, 
such as (Sakawa et al., 2012; Rashid, 2013; Méndez et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; Shah et 
al., 2009). Therefore, after excluding the financial firms, the total sample is 114 firms. 
Furthermore, some firm-year observations are excluded as follows: 13 missing 
disclosure, 56 firms not listed yet, and 24 firms facing bankruptcy issues. Therefore, the 
final unbalanced sample is 819 firm-year observations. 
5.4.3 Models’ Specifications 
The research develops two empirical models. The first model investigates the 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between corporate governance and executive 
compensation setting in family-controlled and non-family firms. The second model 
examines the association between political connections and executive compensation 
arrangements in family-controlled and non-family firms. Both models contain three 
dependent variables which allow an examination of the effect on various constituents of 
executive compensation packages, namely SALARY, BONUS, and finally TOTAL PAY (see 
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Table 5.2). Since the data do not meet the assumptions of OLS, especially normality 
assumption (see the descriptive statistics section 5.5.1 p.245), the study will not use OLS 
regression; otherwise, the results will be biased and misleading (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 
2008). Consequently, in order to overcome such bias, this study employs non-parametric 
tests following other key studies (Elston and Goldberg, 2003; Chen et al., 2010b; Conyon 
and He, 2011; Ntim et al., 2015).  
Based on the results of Hausman tests (see the regression tables in pp.256, 263), 
the fixed-effect model is the most appropriate technique by which to investigate the study 
hypotheses for the dependent variables SALARY and TOTAL PAY. However, as the 
dependent variable BONUS has censored data because the number of zeros (i.e. no 
bonus) exceed 20% of the total observations, the study employs the Tobit model which 
is designed to deal with such censored data (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). The use of Tobit 
regression is consistent with studies that face similar limited dependent variables such 
as option packages (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Sakawa et al., 2012; Ozkan, 2007). 
Consequently, the research formulates the firm-year fixed-effect model for the dependent 
variables SALARY and TOTAL PAY as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑷𝑨𝒀𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊 
where; 
𝜷𝟎  = Intercept 
𝜷𝒊𝒕   = Coefficient of slope parameters 
𝑿𝒊𝒕   = Independent variable i at time t  
𝒖𝒊   = Error term 
 
The Tobit model for the BONUS component can be formed as follows: 
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺𝒊𝒕 = {  
𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗ =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝒕 𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝒖𝒊         𝒊𝒇     𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺  𝒊𝒕
∗ > 𝟎
𝟎                                                                         𝒊𝒇     𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺  𝒊𝒕
∗ ≤ 𝟎
 
where 𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕  is the observed dependent variable, and 𝒍𝒏_𝑩𝑶𝑵𝑼𝑺 𝒊𝒕
∗  is a latent dependent 
variable that is observed for values greater than 0 and censored otherwise  
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Table 5.2: Variable Definitions 
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables 
ln_PAY it The natural logarithm of average compensation per executive for 
firm i in year t, including two different components (variables): 
- TOTAL PAY (salary, bonus & non-cash compensation) 
- SALARY 
ln_BONUS it The natural logarithm of average bonus compensation per 
executive for firm i in year t (for more details see p. 117). 
Independent variables 
FAMDIRs  The proportion of family member directors to total board members.  
BRDIND The proportion of independent directors to total board members 
DUAL  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chairman simultaneously holds 
an executive position and 0 otherwise. 
BLKCHR A dummy variable that equals 1 if the board chairman is a blockholder 
and 0 otherwise. 
CHRMDs A dummy variable that equals 1 if the board chairman has 
membership on board of directors of other firms. 
REXIST A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration 
committee and 0 otherwise 
DIROWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the members of board of 
directors. 
PFOWN  The proportion of ordinary shares owned by general pension funds. 
STATEOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned by the government and 
general pension funds. 
PM A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has either a royal family 
member, a Shura Council member, or a state representative in the 
board of directors and 0 otherwise 
PMOWN The proportion of ordinary shares owned or represented by the 
politically connected members 
Control variables 
FSIZE The natural logarithm of the total assets 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets 
FAGE The natural logarithm of total number of years since the firm has 
been listed on the stock exchange. 
ROA Net profit in year t-1 divided by total assets in year t-1. 
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5.5 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Executive Compensation Variables 
Table 5.3 displays the descriptive statistics of the executive remuneration 
variables (i.e. TOTAL PAY, SALARY and BONUS) in family and non-family firms. All 
compensation components are presented in SA Riyals which in practice has a fixed 
exchange rate equal to approximately 0.267 US dollars. As can be seen in Table 5.3, top 
managers in family firms receive slightly lower TOTAL PAY (SAR1,477,190) than their 
counterparts in non-family firms (SAR1,556,675). This finding is consistent with Croci et 
al. (2012) who find that family firms provide less total compensation for their senior 
executives than do non-family firms in Europe. However, the table reveals that executive 
compensation in family firms tends to be based on SALARY. For example, the maximum 
compensation in family firms (SAR28,100,000) is granted on a fixed basis, while in non-
family firms the maximum pay was SAR12,900,000 on a variable basis (BONUS).   
Although the compensation amounts are different in form, they are similar in 
substance since the variance in TOTAL PAY between the family and non-family firms is 
insignificant. This finding is supported by the results of the Mann-Whitney test (see Table 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Family firms (FF) vs. non-family firms (NFF)
Toal pay-FF Total pay-NFF Salary-FF Salary-NFF Bouns-FF Bouns-NFF
Figure 5.1: Executive Compensation in Family and Non-Family Firms, 2008-2015 
246 | P a g e  
 
compensation variables in family and non-family firms. Moreover, Figure 5.1 and Figure 
5.2 demonstrate that in general executive compensation variables took a similar upward 
trend in family and non-family firms from 2008 to 2015, although there were fluctuations 
in the performance of family and non-family firms during the period. This might be an 
indication that non-family firms prefer to use a variable form of compensation to reassure 
shareholders that managers are paid according to performance-based criteria. However, 
family firms have less need to provide this assurance because controlling shareholders 
are involved at the board and management levels. Accordingly, it can be inferred that 
executive compensation practices in Saudi Arabia differ in form but not in substance 
between family and non-family firms, with only a weak link to firm performance. 
5.5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance and Political Connections 
Variables 
Table 5.3 presents also the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used 
in this chapter. The data show that practices and norms of corporate governance are 
different in family and non-family firms. For instance, 85% of family firms have at least 
one blockholder on the board of directors, while only one-half of non-family firms have a 
large shareholder on their boards. Furthermore, family directors occupy nearly one-fifth 
of total boards seats in general, but almost one-third of family first in particular. Members 
of boards of directors are also found to own approximately 15% of family companies’ 
shares. This evidence highlights how individual and family shareholders dominate and 
influence the Saudi economy. Therefore, it is essential that governance mechanisms 
should acknowledge the role of controlling shareholders in influencing policy and norms 
within and across organisations. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable 




Kurtosis Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
TOTAL PAY (‘000) 1,511,352 6.53 77.85 1,477,190 12,000 28,100,000 1,556,675 149,859 14,400,000 -0.79 
SALARY (‘000) 983,414 16.15 370.08 989,364 9,000 28,100,000 975,521 118,324 5,026,080 -0.47 
BONUS (‘000) 515,067 6.30 59.32 477,119 0 4,844,800 565,413 0 12,900,000 0.13 
FAMDIRs % 17.50 0.87 2.94 29.38 0 100 - - - n/a 
BRDIND % 45.96 0.83 3.28 44.31 0 91.67 48.16 0 100 1.91* 
DUAL 0.15 1.99 4.94 0.17 0 1 0.12 0 1 -1.79* 
BLKCHR 0.69 -0.85 1.72 0.85 0 1 0.49 0 1 -10.96*** 
CHRMDs 0.70 -0.87 1.76 0.77 0 1 0.61 0 1 -5.12*** 
RCEXIST 0.92 -3.11 10.69 0.95 0 1 0.89 0 1 -3.15*** 
DIROWN % 9.18 2.75 12.30 14.98 0 95.84 1.48 0 15.31 -15.35*** 
PFOWN % 3.24 2.38 9.30 2.04 0 35.10 4.84 0 32.50 5.30*** 
STATEOWN % 7.44 2.56 8.74 2.03 0 55.20 14.61 0 81.21 7.84*** 
PM 0.60 -0.41 1.17 0.49 0 1 0.74 0 1 7.28*** 
POWN 14.12 1.81 5.43 9.54 0 95.00 20.20 0 83.60 5.594*** 
FSIZE (‘000,000) 12,600 0.56 3.43 4,170 58 50,700 23,900 54 358,000 3.60*** 
LEV % 37.41 5.64 91.66 38.62 0.41 463.09 35.80 1.85 118.91 -1.88* 
FAGE (in years)  19 -0.52 2.31 16.89 1.00 61.00 20.64 1.00 61.00 4.81*** 
ROA % 6.73 -0.30 12.20 6.81 -58.98 34.36 6.61 -67.81 49.27 -2.65*** 
All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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In terms of government and pension fund investments, they are found to be 
concentrated in non-family firms. The outcomes show that government and pension 
funds jointly own 20% of the shares of non-family firms. Political connections also have 
a significant presence in the Saudi business field. The outcomes reveal that 60% of listed 
firms are politically connected. More specifically, 49% of family firms and 74% of non-
family counterparts have at least one politically connected member on their board of 
directors. This finding supports the conclusion of Faccio (2010) who states that the 
phenomenon of political relationships plays a significant role in the business field in 
emerging economies. The significant interaction between business elites and politicians 
in Saudi Arabia is consistent with the situation in Taiwan where 65% of firms are 
observed to have political relationships (Civilize et al., 2015). However, this interaction 
is found to be significantly higher than in other immature economies such as China and 
Pakistan where only 29% and 23%, respectively, of firms are politically connected 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zhang et al., 2015). 
The high dependence of non-family firms on political connections as well as the 
earlier results related to the significant presence of family shareholders indicate that 
business policy in Saudi Arabia is driven by interlocking relationships. On the other hand, 
Table 5.3 indicates that family firms have less need for political connections, although half 
of them have members with a political background. Hence, it can be argued that the roles 












2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Family firms Non-family firms
Figure 5.2: Firm Performance of Family and Non-Family Firms, 2008-2015 
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family affiliated members have strong connections with regulators and the business elite. 
Indeed, the wide existence and need for political connections or family ties demonstrate 
that the Saudi economy is subject to and significantly influenced by non-economic 
characteristics. These influential informal institutions provide evidence that emerging 
economies have different key drivers compared to developed economies. 
5.5.2 Correlation Coefficients 
In order to verify that the data are not violated by collinearity problems, the study 
employs the test of Spearman rank correlations as a primary approach to analyse the 
pairwise correlation among the model’s independent variables. The Spearman’s test is 
the most appropriate for non-parametric data (Knack and Keefer, 1995). However, 
Pearson’s correlation is also reported to produce greater robustness. According to the 
rule of thumb, the model can be harmed by multi-collinearity if the degree of correlation 
between two independent variables exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006). 
Table 5.4 displays the results of the correlation matrix and shows that no serious 
collinearity problem exists between regressors, i.e. all pairwise correlations between 
explanatory variables are lower than 80% (Gujarati, 2003; Hair et al., 2006). According 
to Spearman’s correlation, Table 5.4 reveals that there is a moderately positive 
correlation (0.74) between the presence of politically connected members (PM) and their 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Political connections
Family firms Non-family firms
Figure 5.3: Presence of Political Connections in Family and Non-Family Firms, 2008-
2015 
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(0.49). However, this outcome does not violate the data validity since the correlations do 
not exceed 0.8 and therefore the models do not suffer from a serious collinearity problem. 
However, Belsley et al. (2005), Kutner et al. (2004) and Kleinbaum et al. (2013) 
criticise the correlation matrix since it only examines the pairwise correlation between 
independent variables, although collinearity is highly likely to involve more than two 
regressors simultaneously. In order to overcome this limitation, the authors suggest a 
more elaborate approach to detect multi-collinearity, namely the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF).  
The VIF test allows researchers to regress each predictor against all other 
independent variables and to produce an R-square value for each. By doing so, the test 
examines the existence of the multi-collinearity problem in each predictor with other 
regressors jointly rather than only through pairwise correlation. Therefore, in addition 
to the correlation matrix test, this study employs the VIF test for each model to make 
further checks on the existence of collinearity. Statistically, it is suggested that if any 
predictor has a VIF exceeding 10, the regression model suffers from multi-collinearity 
(Hair et al., 2006; O’brien, 2007). According to the outcomes of the VIF tests (reported in 
Table 5.5 and Table 5.6), the findings confirm the conclusions of Spearman’s and 
Pearson’s tests that multi-collinearity does not seriously influence the coefficient 
estimates of the predictors. 
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Table 5.4: Correlation Matrix  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1] TOTAL PAY  0.89* 0.46 -0.01* -0.29* -0.13* 0.13* 0.06* 0.14* 0.11* 0.17* 0.17* 0.19* 0.26* 0.59* 0.25* -0.19* 0.18* 
[2] SALARY 0.90*  0.23* -0.04* -0.26* -0.15* 0.17* 0.09* 0.13* 0 0.15* 0.23* 0.22* 0.27* 0.56* 0.22* -0.17* 0.09* 
[3] BONUS 0.75* 0.47*  0.09* -0.16* -0.09* 0.10* 0.09* 0.13* 0.14* 0.23* 0.04* 0.07* 0.09* 0.30* 0.12* -0.09* 0.27* 
[4] FAMDIRs 0.04* 0.00 0.05*  -0.23* -0.03* 0.43* -0.01* 0.09* 0.46* -0.26* -0.34* -0.38* -0.36* -0.18* 0.09* -0.34* 0.13* 
[5] BRDIND -0.29* -0.25* -0.22* -0.22*  -0.01 -0.30* 0.01 -0.05* -0.11* -0.17* -0.07* -0.01 -0.12* -0.35* -0.16* 0.26* -0.09* 
[6] DUAL -0.11* -0.13* -0.09* -0.09* 0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.06* -0.06* -0.10* -0.03 -0.08* -0.05* 0 -0.01 -0.10* 
[7] BLKCHR 0.16* 0.22* 0.07* 0.07* -0.24* -0.03  0.08* 0.11* 0.27* -0.19* 0.06* -0.12* 0.07* 0.15* 0.12* -0.32* -0.02 
[8] CHRMDs 0.10* 0.14* 0.05* 0.05* 0 -0.03 0.08*  0.05* -0.14* 0.11* 0.04* 0.12* 0.02 0.10* 0.09* -0.07* 0.12* 
[9] RCEXIST 0.16* 0.15* 0.14* 0.14* -0.02 -0.07* 0.11* 0.05*  0.08* -0.01 -0.04* -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.04* -0.01 
[10] DIROWN 0.04* -0.04* 0.11* 0.11* -0.02 -0.07* 0.22* -0.01 0.10*  -0.22* -0.23* -0.19* 0.05* -0.04* 0.02 -0.34* 0.08* 
[11] PFOWN 0.25* 0.24* 0.26* 0.26* -0.12* -0.04* -0.16* 0.09* 0 -0.21*  0.22* 0.40* 0.40* 0.35* -0.04* 0.16* 0.26* 
[12] STATEOWN 0.11* 0.16* 0.04* 0.04* -0.04* -0.06* -0.06* 0.06* -0.06* -0.41* 0.38*  0.35* 0.82* 0.51* 0.07* 0.13* 0.04* 
[13] PM 0.21* 0.26* 0.12* 0.12* 0.02 -0.03 -0.12* 0.12* -0.01 -0.26* 0.48* 0.43*  0.49* 0.45* 0.05* 0.21* 0.07* 
[14] POWN 0.29* 0.30* 0.21* 0.21* -0.08* -0.04* -0.01 0.07* 0.01 -0.31* 0.60* 0.70* 0.74*  0.56* 0.06* 0.08* 0.02 
[15] FSIZE 0.59* 0.62* 0.40* 0.40* -0.27* -0.04* 0.12* 0.15* 0.03 -0.15* 0.48* 0.38* 0.49* 0.53*  0.29* -0.10* -0.02 
[16] LEV 0.40* 0.36* 0.30* 0.30* -0.21* 0.01 0.13* 0.10* 0.03 0 -0.05* -0.02 0.05* 0.07* 0.40*  -0.20* -0.17* 
[17] FAGE -0.17* -0.16* -0.09* -0.09* 0.23* -0.03 -0.30* -0.07* -0.03 -0.27* 0.29* 0.27* 0.24* 0.22* -0.04* -0.30*  -0.01 
[18] ROA 0.19* 0.06* 0.33* 0.33* -0.06* -0.14* -0.03 0.08* 0.03 0.28* 0.23* 0.01 0.05* 0.03 -0.07* -0.24* 0.01  
Spearman rank correlations are reported below the diagonal, and Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal. 
* denotes significance at 0.05 level 
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5.5.3 Discussion of Research Findings  
Table 5.5 presents the results of the regression analysis for the variables of 
corporate governance and their effects on each component of executive remuneration in 
family and non-family firms. The Table also shows the results for the entire sample, which 
allows for the analysis of the differences of governance practices between family firms 
and non-family counterparts. The R-squared of all models of TOTAL PAY and SALARY 
range between 22%-28%, which demonstrates that the independent variables used are 
able to explain roughly one-quarter of the variation in the executive compensation 
settings within firms and over time. In comparison, the R-squared statistics of Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2003), Tsao et al. (2015) and Wu (2013) are 33%, 26% and 23% respectively. 
Others also find similar R-squared statistics around 30% (Combs et al., 2010; Chen et al., 
2014). These outcomes confirm that the explanatory power of the study models relies on 
the acceptable range found by literature. Nevertheless, these moderate explanatory 
powers indicate that there are other omitted variables that influence the practices of 
setting executive remuneration packages.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the table reveals that when a greater number of 
family members serve on the board of directors (FAMDIRs), top managers are more 
likely to earn greater TOTAL PAY and BONUS. However, there was no significant 
association between family directors and SALARY. This can be seen as a sign that family 
firms prefer to compensate their executives according to their performance rather than 
by a fixed salary. However, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 reject this argument. That is to say, 
TOTAL PAY in family firms has shown the same upward trend of firm performance from 
2008 until 2014; however, SALARY in 2015, and TOTAL PAY accordingly, have shown a 
sharp increase although firm performance continues on a downward trend. This could be 
an indication that total compensation is the primary issue for family firms. Thus, they 
follow performance criteria only when the firm achieves a superior performance. 
Otherwise, they extract higher compensation on a fixed basis. 
This interesting outcome neither matches the findings of Sapp (2008) and Croci et 
al. (2012), who report a negative and significant link between family control and 
managerial compensation in Canada and Continental Europe, respectively, nor with 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), who find no evidence of such a relationship in the US. Although 
agency theory argues that the close participation of shareholders in the decision-making 
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process helps to reduce the agency costs in general and executive compensation in 
particular, this assumption may only be valid in developed countries which are 
characterised by diffuse share ownership (Rashid, 2013). Indeed, my findings 
demonstrate a contrary relationship in emerging countries such as KSA, where other 
factors may affect the design of managerial pay packages. The positive and significant 
association between family directors and executive rewards found in Saudi Arabia may 
be a consequence of the strong and close affiliation between the two parties.  
As mentioned earlier, the recruitment process in the Saudi context is highly 
dependent on wasta (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013); thus, family members often appoint 
their relatives and close friends to executive posts. Accordingly, large shareholders may 
grant their related executives higher compensation. Moreover, these family members, 
who own and dominate listed firms, are usually extremely rich; hence, according to the 
Saudi culture, they are supposed to be generous to their surrounding community; for 
example, assisting relatives, employees, the neighbourhood where they live and needy 
people, for which they receive honour, prestige and legitimation.  
The results in Table 5.5 also demonstrate that independent members on the board 
of directors (BRDIND) are significantly associated with managerial pay in both family 
and non-family firms, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The role of independent 
members in family firms are found to have similar impact to family directors on executive 
compensation. In non-family firms, independent directors are also ineffective in 
constraining executive compensation since the findings reveal that their presence is 
associated with higher TOTAL PAY and SALARY. Generally, these findings demonstrate 
that such members lack real independence in practice whether in family-controlled firms 
or in non-family firms. It also supports the study argument that firms in Saudi Arabia may 
follow governance recommendations in form but not in substance. 
The positive relationship between outsider directors (BRDIND) and executive 
compensation support the findings of previous studies (Ozkan, 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Croci et al., 2012), which observe that independent directors 
do increase managerial pay. This evidence also rejects the assumption of agency theory 
that board independence is an effective mechanism for mitigating agency costs, 
particularly those related to managerial pay. However, institutional theory offers a more 
reliable interpretation for the attitudes of pay settings in a context such as KSA (Young et 
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al., 2008), in which personal characteristics and family names are strongly involved in 
such decisions.  
The weak role of independent directors in controlling managerial pay in family and 
non-family firms can be attributed to the control and presence of large shareholders on 
most Saudi corporate boards. According to institutional theory, a firm might appoint 
outsider members to the board of directors in order to pretend that it is complying with 
regulations, thereby legitimising its existence among its competitors (Young et al., 2008). 
In other words, a firm might allow external members to sit on the board of directors solely 
to satisfy minority shareholders and regulators, while, in fact, these members are not 
really involved in the process of decision-making. In such a scenario, independent 
directors may prefer not to challenge the decisions of the large shareholders in order to 
retain their jobs and ensure their re-nomination (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012), since the 
approval of decisions related to managerial pay has almost no repercussions for 
independent directors (Walkner, 2004). Furthermore, the close supervisory role played 
by blockholders over managerial activities may make outsider members feel more 
relaxed and under less pressure to perform their stewardship duties.  
In terms of role duality (DUAL), Table 5.5 shows no significant relationship 
between DUAL and all the components of executive pay in both family and non-family 
firms. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not accepted. In contrast, and more interestingly, the 
results reveal a negative but not statistically significant impact of the role duality (DUAL) 
variable on all constituents of managerial remuneration except for the BONUS in family 
firms, which shows a positive direction relationship. This evidence does not support the 
managerial power model which argues that the determination of executive compensation 
is subject to the influence that managers are able to exert over related decisions (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004). Thus, the findings provide strong support for the stewardship theory, 
which suggests that combining the positions of CEO and chairperson in the hands of a 
single individual is not harmful for the company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
Empirically, the results are in line with the findings of Li et al. (2007), Conyon and 
He (2011), Chalevas (2011), and Ntim et al. (2015). These studies observe similar 
relationships i.e. when a CEO serves as board chairperson at the same time, this does not 
affect his/her pay-related decisions. Actually, it is not surprising to find no significant 
association between role duality and managerial pay in a context such as KSA since 
255 | P a g e  
 
blockholders already have control over decisions-making and have less need to access 
the power gained through positions such as CEO/chairman. Furthermore, as the majority 
of Saudi firms are chaired by blockholders, such owner-directors receive higher 
dividends than managerial compensation. 
The findings also show that when position of board chairperson is occupied by a 
blockholder (BLKCHR), top managers in family firms are more likely to earn greater 
pecuniary rewards. Hence, the first part of Hypothesis 4, which predicts a positive and 
significant association between blockholder chairman and managerial pay in family 
firms, is accepted. However, the role of blockholder chairman (BLKCHR) in non-family 
firms are found to have no impact on executive compensation. Therefore, the related 
hypothesis, which assumes that a blockholder chairman in a non-family firm will reduce 
executive compensation, is not accepted. Despite the lack of studies examining the role of 
blockholder chairperson in the enhancement of governance quality, Alagla (2012), who 
uses a different proxy (chairperson ownership) to measure the power of chairperson 
through his/her voting rights (ownership), obtains a contrary result. That is to say, the 
author observes that the higher the number of shares held by the chairperson, the lower 
the remuneration earned by the CEO. My finding is also inconsistent with the notion of 
the agency model, which states that the presence and close supervision of large 
shareholders help to mitigate the agency costs resulting from the separation between 
ownership and management.   
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Table 5.5: Regression Analysis: Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation 
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF 
(4) (5) (6) 
VIF 
(7) (8) (9) 
VIF  TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 
































































































































































































































































































































































Mean VIF    1.40    1.36 
 
   1.65 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
71.48*** 50.25***   78.22*** 42.48***   28.76*** 53.76***   
All variables are defined in Table 5.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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In the KSA, blockholders, particularly those who carry out the chairperson’s 
functions, do not seem to be performing their supposed monitoring duties effectively. 
This positive association between blockholder chairman (BLKCHR) and executive 
compensation in family firms supports the study’s argument that there is a principal-
principal problem in emerging countries where certain individuals control the decision-
making within the organisation without taking in consideration minority shareholders’ 
interests. In other words, blockholder chairmen, who combine both dimensions of 
powers through voting rights and chairing the board of directors, might use their power 
to influence the decisions on remuneration of executives, who in many cases are their 
relatives or close friends, in a way that extracts greater pay. 
In line with Hypothesis 5, which presumes a negative and significant association 
between chairman business (CHRMDs) and managerial pay, the study finds evidence that 
in family firms when a chairman serves on more than one board of directors, top 
employees receive lower TOTAL PAY and SALARY. Fama and Jensen (1983b) justify this 
result by stating that serving on more than one board extends the knowledge and 
expertise of the director with respect to the function of supervision. They also argue that 
sitting on other corporate boards gives the decision-maker greater opportunity to utilise 
benchmarking criteria, which helps to ensure that the compensation is within the 
reasonable wage range of the labour market.  
However, chairman multi-directorships in non-family firms are found to have a 
positive and significant effect on executive fixed compensation (SALARY). Although no 
study has investigated the relationship between chairman multi-directorships and the 
practices of executive compensation, a number of researchers (Armstrong et al., 2012; 
Core et al., 1999; Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012; Sapp, 2008) use a more comprehensive 
variable that captures the directorship of the entire board of directors and obtain the 
opposite result. In other words, they find that when the members of a board of directors 
are simultaneously serving on other corporate boards, their monitoring role is 
significantly reduced; as a result, the executive team members receive greater 
remuneration. In the case of the KSA, chairman multi-directorships in non-family firms 
are not effective in constraining executive salary probably because one-half of the board 
chairpersons are government representatives. These representatives are busy with their 
administrative tasks in government in addition to representing government investment 
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in other companies’ boards. Thus, the overload caused by the different tasks leads to 
weak supervision quality.  
With respect to the reumeration committee (RCEXIST), the regression analysis 
presented in Table 5.5 supports Hypothesis 6 and shows evidence that the remuneration 
committee does not play its role effectively in controlling executive compensation. On the 
contrary, it does significantly increase managerial pay packages in non-family firms. In 
other words, it exacerbates the agency problem rather than mitigates it. Empirically, this 
conclusion is consistent with Conyon and He (2012) and Chen et al. (2010b) who also 
find in the Chinese context that the existence of a remuneration committee is significantly 
associated with higher managerial compensation packages.  
This study finds earlier that the presence of large shareholders on board is related 
to higher executive remuneration. Therefore, the committee members, who know that 
their reappointment is in the hands of the dominant shareholders, might prefer to go 
along with any decision approved by those controlling shareholders rather than oppose 
them because opposition might lead to a loss of their jobs (Ozdemir and Upneja, 2012). 
Furthermore, the institutions-based view argues implicitly that there is a strong potential 
scenario in a context such as KSA, where family ownership is predominant and their 
control over decision-making process is strong, of a remuneration committee being 
established only to fulfil SGCR requirements and legitimate the firm’s existence (Young et 
al., 2008). 
Inconsistent with Hypothesis 7, the results demonstrate that when the members 
of board of directors hold more equity (DIROWN), top executive are paid lower TOTAL 
PAY and SALARY in family firms. However, in non-family firms, director ownership 
(DIROWN) is found to be positively and significantly associated with only BONUS perks. 
This evidence indicates that directors’ behaviours in family firms are influenced by their 
level of holdings of the company’s equity; thus, they perform more effective control over 
executive compensation. However, this is not the case in non-family firms where the 
results show that their ownership does not influence managerial pay arrangements in 
general. The difference of roles can be attributed to the fact that board directors hold 
block of shares in family firms since they own nearly 15% of total equities of family 
companies (see Table 5.3). In contrast, board directors are less influential in non-family 
firms as they own less than 2% of the shares in such companies. This finding indicates 
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that the level of shareholding is the rationale behind the diverse impacts of directors’ 
equity between family and non-family firms. 
The findings confirm the perspective of agency theorists who argue that when the 
members of board of directors own more shares, they will be transformed from delegated 
directors to shareholders (Minow and Bingham, 1995). As a result, their main objective 
will be aligned with shareholders and thereby will have greater incentives and 
motivations to protect their own equity through constraining managerial remuneration 
(Lin, 2005; Zald, 1969; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Empirically, a number of studies document similar results (Méndez et 
al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; Ozkan, 2007; Sapp, 2008), when they observe a negative and 
significant relationship between shareholding level of directors and executive 
remuneration. 
Surprisingly, the findings show that investment by pension funds (PFOWN) has a 
positive and significant impact on TOTAL PAY and SALARY in family firms, but generally 
no effect in non-family firms, except a significantly positive impact on BONUS. This 
outcome is an opposite of the Hypothesis 8 in relation to family firms which presumes 
that such ownership would help to significantly diminish managerial pay levels. 
Furthermore, the finding does not match the agency-based argument, which suggests that 
the presence of institutional investors can improve supervisory functions over 
managerial activities and therefore, reduce executive compensation (Chalevas, 2011; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Lin et al., 2011; Ozkan, 2007; Ramaswamy 
et al., 2000). However, the findings support the part of the Hypothesis related to non-
family firms, which expected that pension funds’ investments would perform a less 
effective monitoring role over managerial incentives. To the author’s best knowledge, no 
previous empirical research observes a positively significant relationship between 
pension fund investment and executive compensation arrangements. To the contrary, 
most studies state that institutional investment significantly curbs top managers’ 
compensation (Chalevas, 2011; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015; 
Ozkan, 2007; Ramaswamy et al., 2000). In addition, Rashid (2013) and Shah et al. (2009) 
do not find any relationship between the two variables in Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
respectively, which share many in common cultural features with the KSA. 
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The rationale behind the positive impact of pension fund investment on executive 
compensation is because institutional investors are growth-seekers rather than profit-
seekers (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Colpan et al., 2011; David et al., 2010). Based on 
this view, those investors may compensate their top employees generously in order to 
incentivise them to expand the firm activities; in Saudi Arabia, stock options cannot be 
used to incentivise for long-term performance. Alternatively, because in the KSA pension 
funds are controlled and administrated by the Saudi state (GOSI, 2000; PPA, 2004), the 
reason for the findings might follow the logic of Conyon and He (2012). They argue that 
state representatives can experience tensions between their duties as investors’ 
stewards and as state administrators. Accordingly, they might be less concerned about 
executive team compensation, especially as there are practically no repercussions if they 
approve such payments (Chalevas, 2011).   
Although the Saudi state owns virtually 20% of the market value of the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Aleqtisadiah, 2014), the results show that state investment (STATEOWN) 
does not enhance the protection of shareholders’ interest by limiting executive 
remuneration. State investment is only associated with lower BONUS. However, no 
significant relationships are found between state equity and other components of 
executive compensation. This evidence is in line with Conyon and He (2012), Li et al. 
(2007), and Ramaswamy et al. (2000), who conclude that state investment does not 
influence the practices of managerial pay in Asia. However, Chen et al. (2011) and Firth 
et al. (2007) find that state ownership negatively and significantly impacts the level of top 
managers’ remuneration.  
Conyon and He (2012) attribute the ineffective monitoring role played by the state 
to the difficulty encountered by state representatives on board of directors who cannot 
distinguish between their functions as shareholders’ representatives and their 
administrative tasks. Furthermore, the low supervisory performance of state investors 
might be a consequence of the divergent objectives between state and regular 
shareholders (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Olson, 1973). That is to say, state investment may 
have non-profit aims such as stabilising the stock market and controlling certain sensitive 
operational sectors for security purposes (Olson, 1973). Therefore, state investors do not 
always seek to maximise their income; hence, their efforts may not focus on improving 
firm performance and monitoring the opportunistic actions of top management with 
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regards to their remuneration packages (Olson, 1973). Olson’s argument is a more 
reasonable interpretation as the data show that Saudi state investment is restricted to 
certain giant corporations in the energy and telecommunication sectors. 
In terms of political connections and their influence on executive compensation 
practices in family and non-family firms, the findings are shown in Table 5.6. As can be 
seen, all models are statistically significant with R-squared figures ranging between 19%-
24%. These moderate proportions of explanatory power are in line with the literature; 
for example, the R-squared statistics of García-Meca (2015) and Chizema et al. (2015) are 
31% and 27%, respectively. In the context of KSA, where personal connections and tribal 
ties play a significant role in the process of hiring top managers and determining their 
wages (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013), such moderate R-squared statistics are not 
surprising. These behavioural characteristics, which are beyond the scope of this study, 
are not measurable. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 10, the findings show that the presence of a politically 
connected member on boards of non-family firms is significantly related to higher TOTAL 
PAY and SALARY. The positive link between political connections (PM) and TOTAL PAY 
and SALARY in non-family firms does not match the finding of Chizema et al. (2015) who 
observe a contrary outcome. They find that top executives are less likely to receive higher 
compensation when the board of directors has at least one politically connected director. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has yet examined the differences of roles 
of political connections in family and non-family firms separately, while Chizema et al. 
(2015) is the only study that directly investigates the relationship between political 
connections and executive compensation. In turn, García-Meca (2015), who examines the 
impact of political ties on the decisions related to board remuneration in Spain, observes 
a negative and significant reduction in remuneration level if the firm is politically 
connected. Although politically connected members are susceptible to serious political 
loss if their names are involved with financial scandals (Goldman et al., 2009), they may 
perceive generous managerial compensation as unlikely to be considered to be a serious 
scandal as long as the financial position of the company is stable. Hence, this may account 
for the ineffective role of politically connected directors in curbing managerial pay. 
The results also show that the magnitude of ownership of the politically connected 
members has a positive impact on executive compensation in non-family firms. In other 
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words, the higher the ownership that politically connected members hold in non-family 
firms, the higher the compensation paid to the top managers. Since controlling decisions 
related to executive compensation is considered a reflection of good corporate 
governance, this result implies that political connections might not be beneficial for 
governance purposes, particularly in non-family firms. This argument supports several 
prior studies (Ding et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2016; Wang, 2015), which find that political 
relationships do weaken the quality of corporate governance in emerging economies. 
In contrast, although political connections have shown no significant association 
with TOTAL PAY and SALARY in family firms, they are found to perform an effective role 
in reducing BONUS remuneration. This is probably because managers’ bonus 
compensation in family firms is high in general, compared with their counterparts in non-
family firms. Thus, when politically connected directors use benchmarking criteria, they 
find that the suggested bonus compensation exceeds market bonus average. Another 
potential interpretation is that most politically connected directors on boards of family 
firms are royal family members, who have high stakes in the company equity, and 
therefore they perform supervision function more effectively. However, politically 
connected directors in non-family firms are usually government representatives with few 
stakes in the company’s equity. Thus, they are less likely to perform an effective 
monitoring role in controlling managerial opportunism. 
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Table 5.6: Regression Analysis: Political Connections and Executive Compensation 
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VIF 
(4) (5) (6) 
VIF 





























































































































































































            


























Mean VIF    1.38    1.32 
 
   1.97 
Hausman’s Chi2  
 
71.15*** 68.26***   40.24*** 32.56***   41.54*** 48.44***   
All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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5.5.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to check how robust the findings are, further analyses is carried out. 
Although the results of correlation matrix and VIF test show that the models’ variables 
are not affected by the multi-collinearity problem, these tests may have limitations in 
their accuracy. Thus, to ensure the findings are reliable, the research re-estimates the 
main regressions after eliminating any variable that has a likelihood of overlapping with 
another variable in the same model.  
For the model that examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
executive compensation, there is potential for overlapping between chairman 
blockholder variable (BLKCHR) and director ownership (DIROWN). This because 
BLKCHR is a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman owns at least 5% of the 
company’s outstanding shares, while at the same time, DIROWN is defined as the total 
shares held by board members including chairman. In this sense, if a chairman is a 
blockholder, then director ownership is likely to be high. However, there is also a 
possibility that director ownership is high although chairperson is not a blockholder. 
Therefore, the elimination of the problematic variable shows whether or not this variable 
affects the primary findings. Table 5.7 displays the regression results after excluding 
BLKCHR. As can be seen, the findings are qualitatively the same with a slight difference 
in the significance levels of few results.  
With respect to the model of political connections and executive compensation, 
there is a potential overlap between the politically connected member (PM) and his/her 
ownership (PMOWN). This potential overlap is expected because if there is a politically 
connected member, the ownership variable (PMOWN) will be increased and vice versa. 
However, there is also a possibility that politically connected institutions or individuals 
are shareholders in the company, but are not members of the board of directors. After 
excluding the ownership of the politically connected member (PMOWN), Table 5.8 shows 
that the findings of the relationship between political connections and executive 
compensation are also qualitatively the same as the original analysis. Accordingly, it is 
clear from Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 that the findings are significantly robust and reliable 
even after eliminating the potential overlapping problems among the variables. 
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Table 5.7: Robustness Tests: Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation, excluding the Blockholder Chairman 
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 
TOTAL 
PAY SALARY BONUS 































































































































































































































































All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5.8: Robustness Tests: Political Connections and Executive Compensation, excluding Ownership Variable  
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 


























































































































         

























All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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5.5.5 Sensitivity Tests  
As discussed in the method section, the results of the Hausman test suggest that 
the fixed effect regression is the most appropriate approach by which to examine the 
models with dependent variables namely TOTAL PAY and SALARY. In contrast, BONUS 
is tested using the Tobit regression since the data are censored with many zeros that 
exceed 30% of the total observations. However, in order to check the findings’ sensitivity 
to alternative estimation techniques, random effect regression (GLS) and pooled OLS 
regression are employed in this section. 
5.5.5.1 Random effect regression 
Using the random effect regression, Table 5.9 and Table 5.11 present the findings 
of the models related to corporate governance and executive compensation and political 
connections and executive compensation. Generally, the R-squares are virtually similar 
to those of the primary analysis, except for the model of SALARY which shows a 
significant increase in the random effect approach. In general, the directions of the 
relationships are similar and the outcomes are consistent across all models, with some 
differences in the significance levels. For example, according to the fixed effect regression, 
FAMDIRs and BRDIND are positively and significantly associated with SALARY in family 
firms. Furthermore, PFOWN has a positive and significant impact on TOTAL PAY and 
SALARY in the full sample and in family firms. However, Table 5.9 shows that these 
relationships are found to be non-significant under the random effect model. A similar 
scenario occurs with the model of political connections and executive compensation (see 
Table 5.10). While the fixed effect approach reveals that political connections have 
positive and significant association with TOTAL PAY in the full sample, the results of the 
random effect estimate show no significant relationship between the two variables. 
Although there are a few changes between the results of the two tests, especially in the 
significance levels, the two regressions in general demonstrate that the findings of fixed 
effect regression are consistent, reliable, and not sensitive to random effect estimation 
for all models.  
5.5.5.2 Pooled OLS regression with robust standard error 
As discussed in the descriptive statistics section, due to the nature of the study’s 
data, the assumptions of parametric testing are not met, especially in relation to the 
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requirement that data is normally distributed. Therefore, after adopting different 
diagnostic checks, the results reveal that the fixed effect approach is the most relevant 
technique by which to estimate the empirical models. Although both approaches, the 
fixed effect and random effect, have delivered roughly similar results, the study employs 
OLS regression with robust standard error for the pooled data for further checks. In 
general, Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 show that the findings of the primary regression are 
sensitive to the OLS estimation. For example, while the fixed effect regression 
demonstrates positive and significant relationships between BRDIND and LEV on one 
hand, and the dependant variables namely TOTAL PAY and SALARY on the other, the 
OLS findings show negative and significant associations. PM and POWN variables in 
political connections’ models also suffer from similar contradictory results (see Table 
5.12). In summary, the fixed effect regression shows a number of positive and significant 
effects on managerial pay, whereas, the OLS delivers opposite findings. 
The divergence between the findings of the two regressions may be attributed to 
the OLS regression not capturing the variation of time in the study’s observations 
(Habbash, 2010) and OLS treats the different observations as one unit without 
distinguishing between the different groups of data as does the panel data (Iskander, 
2008). Furthermore, since the OLS assumptions are not met, the test may generate 
misleading and unreliable results (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008). It can be concluded that 
even if the pooled OLS regression provides inconsistent results with those of the main 
regression, the findings of the main regression are still reliable and consistent with the 
random effect regression approach which properly deals with panel data. As mentioned 
previously, the OLS regression is conditioned by the meeting of a number of conditions; 
therefore, it is inappropriate to rely on its results and it cannot be utilised to assess the 
findings of the main regression. 
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Table 5.9: The Sensitivity Tests (GLS): Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in Family and Non-Family Firms 
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 TOTAL 
PAY 
SALARY BONUS TOTAL 
PAY 
SALARY BONUS TOTAL 
PAY 
SALARY BONUS 













































































































































































































































































All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5.10: The Sensitivity Tests (OLS): Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in Family and Non-Family Firms 
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS TOTAL PAY SALARY BONUS 













































































































































































































































































All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
271 | P a g e  
 
Table 5.11: The Sensitivity Tests (GLS): Political Connections and Executive Compensation in Family and Non-Family Firms  
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 

































































































































































All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5.12: The Sensitivity Tests (OLS): Political Connections and Executive Compensation in Family and Non-Family Firms   
 Full Sample Family firms Non-family firms 


































































































































































All variables are defined in Table 5.2 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This research uses a unique set of data from family and non-family firms operating 
in Saudi Arabia between 2008 and 2015. This allows the investigation of the behavioural 
differences between family and non-family firms towards executive compensation. 
Specifically, it shows how corporate governance practices and the need for political 
connections vary between these two types of firms and their implications for the practice 
of executive compensation. The research contributes significantly to the literature on 
family business in several ways. First, it extends the understanding of the behaviours of 
family firms, illustrating the challenges and conflicts of interests among shareholders. 
Second, it provides evidence that the practices of corporate governance and the need for 
political connections differ between family-controlled firms and non-family firms. Third, 
as the majority of corporate governance literature focuses on managerial opportunism 
and its consequences on the agency problem (Type I), this research sheds light on how 
controlling shareholders and politically connected members also exacerbate agency 
conflict (Type II). Finally, previous studies of political connections prove that political 
connectedness benefits organisation; however, this research extends the understanding 
of this phenomenon and shows that political connections are not always advantageous. 
The study findings in general demonstrate that implementing corporate 
governance based on the traditional agency model does not resolve agency problems in 
Saudi Arabia. For example, agency theory suggests that the presence of large 
shareholders will reduce the separation between ownership and control and thereby 
reduce agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, the study finds that the 
presence of family members on the board of directors, in fact, increases agency costs 
through granting higher managerial remuneration. Large shareholders are also found to 
chair most companies’ boards indicating significant direct involvement in monitoring 
management. This denotes that the separation between ownership and control is low in 
Saudi Arabia in contrast to the West. Furthermore, appointing independent directors, 
which is a key recommendation in global best practice of corporate governance, is also 
found to increase executive compensation in family and non-family firms in the KSA. 
These outcomes indicate the significant presence of principal-principal conflict in Saudi 
Arabia. The principal-principal problem results from the high concentration of 
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ownership in hands of certain bodies (families and government agencies) and the 
absence of effective formal institutions (Young et al., 2008). 
Indeed, adopting governance mechanisms developed in the West with no 
consideration to the cross-cultural and institutional differences will lead to unfavourable 
consequences. For instance, business policy in Saudi Arabia is significantly influenced by 
wasta (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). Wasta is a key cultural characteristic of the Arab world 
and is widely used in the employment process, in business and government contracts, 
and in general daily transactions (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011; Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). 
Therefore, there is a high likelihood of appointing unqualified managers, especially in 
family-controlled firms. As a result, the firm may perform poorly and incur higher agency 
costs at the expense of minority shareholders. Wasta is also practised through political 
connections as it provides many benefits for the organisation including government 
subsidies, contracts and protection from regulatory sanctions (Goldman et al., 2009; 
Faccio, 2010; Wang, 2015; Sun et al., 2016). Even though Saudi Arabia's National Anti-
Corruption Commission considers the use of wasta to be a form of corruption (National 
Anti-Corruption Commission, 2016), the scope of the Commission’s authority is limited 
to government bodies. The Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI) and the CMA, 
which supervise publicly traded firms, do not explicitly criminalise wasta practices within 
and across organisations. Accordingly, without considering these domestic cultural and 
institutional challenges, corporate governance regulations will not be effective in 
protecting shareholders’ rights especially those of small investors. 
Surprisingly, the study also finds that executive compensation practices in family 
and non-family firms are different in form but not in substance. Given that non-family 
firms are observed to grant higher bonus packages to their managers than their 
counterparts in family firms, the total compensation in family and non-family firms have 
shown similar upward trends from 2008 to 2015. This implies that non-family firms 
confirm their legitimacy by using such signalling tools to reassure shareholders that 
managers are paid according to their performance. However, this is not totally accurate 
since the results reveal that in some years, such as 2009 and 2011 (see Figure 5.2), firm 
performance was poor while the total compensation continued in an upward direction. 
To put differently, both family and non-family firms grant their managers similar levels 
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of total compensation; however, executive compensation in non-family firms is mostly 
consisted of bonus component, though there is less link to firm performance. 
Practically, the research has significant implications that can assist firms and 
regulators to enhance governance quality and executive compensation arrangements. 
First, the findings show that board characteristics are key determinants of executive 
compensation both in family and non-family firms. Therefore, it is important to develop 
mechanisms and regulations that enhance the authority and independence of board of 
directors. Second, the role of independent directors is found to be ineffective in reducing 
managerial pay levels. This finding makes the independence of board of directors 
questionable and provides an opportunity for regulators to revise criteria and process of 
appointing outsider directors. Third, even if family and non-family firms show high 
compliance with the current regulations of corporate governance, executive 
compensation has followed upward trend, even in years of poor performance. This 
finding indicates to regulators and firms that governance regulations are not practised as 
intended. Fourth, the study illustrates how political connections are inextricably involved 
in business policy and exist in the majority of listed firms. Indeed, the informal 
requirement of building political connections in order to obtain competitive privileges, 
allied to weak governance practices will not attract investors, especially foreign 
investment. Finally, the findings demonstrate that executive compensation is paid with 
no consideration to firm performance in both family and non-family firms. This finding 
should encourage regulators and firms to design and develop optimal means that ensure 
a strong link between managerial pay and firm performance. 
  














  CONCLUSION 
  
277 | P a g e  
 
This chapter is the final part of the thesis and highlights the conclusions of the three 
studies. After restating the research problem and questions, the chapter provides a 
summary of the findings of each of the empirical studies and draws the final conclusions. 
Furthermore, it shows the implications of the studies and how they benefit interested 
parties such as companies, regulators and practitioners. Finally, the potential limitations 
of the research are acknowledged and thoughts for future research are recommended.  
Executive compensation is one of the most controversial topics in the literature 
related to corporate governance (Conyon, 2014; Jensen et al., 2004). Although executive 
compensation is treated as a solution for the divergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers, it can be a problematic if abused (Méndez et al., 2011). 
Studies conducted in the West find that the adoption of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms controls managerial opportunism and produces well-structured executive 
compensation (Core et al., 1999; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, the success of such 
mechanisms is conditioned by the effectiveness of other formal institutions (Young et al., 
2008). Despite the implementation of such regulations in less developed economies, such 
as the KSA, which lack effective formal institutions and therefore may lead to adverse 
results, the majority of emerging economies including Saudi Arabia have imported and 
adopted the Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Fallatah and Dickins, 
2012).  
The development of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still immature since 
it only started to be developed in late 2006. Therefore, this has enabled the thesis to 
investigate the effectiveness of the recommendations of international best practice of 
corporate governance from the first stage of enforcement, when only few firms complied, 
to full compliance at present. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is assessed as being 75% 
collectivist and having a power distance of 95% (The Hofstede Centre, 2014). In addition, 
government investment in the Saudi market is significantly influential. These domestic 
norms of the Saudi context have led to the emergence of the phenomenon of political 
connections and make this a key influence in terms of business policy. Furthermore, the 
collectivist-oriented context results in wasta (i.e. interpersonal relationships) playing a 
significant role in business policy in general and in human resource practices in particular 
(Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011; Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). This leads to family 
considerations outweighing qualification criteria when appointing top executives.   
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Therefore, in order to investigate to which extent these characteristics may 
influence the decisions in relation to executive compensation, three empirical studies 
have been conducted. The studies are integrative and collectively analyse the effects of 
both formal and informal institutions on executive compensation practices. More 
specifically, four related dimensions over executive compensation arrangements are 
examined: effectiveness of board of directors; ownership structure; phenomenon of 
political connections; and family control. Methodologically, the studies adopt panel data 
analysis through employing fixed effect and Tobit model techniques in order to analyse a 
sample of 114 non-financial firms that operated between 2008 and 2015 in the Saudi 
Stock Exchange.The first empirical study (Chapter Three) investigates the relationship 
between corporate governance and executive compensation. More specifically, it 
analyses the effect of two dimensions of corporate governance: board of directors and 
ownership structure. The study addresses the two questions: a) Do corporate governance 
mechanisms restrain the opportunism of top managers in Saudi Arabia by reining in their 
compensation? and b) Is the Anglo-American model of corporate governance generalizable 
in emerging countries?  
With respect to the board of directors, the study finds that when the board is 
chaired by a blockholder, top executives are more likely to receive more generous 
compensation. This finding invalidates the assumption of the agency model that the 
participation of large shareholders in the monitoring function reduces managerial 
expropriation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The outcome can be attributed to large 
shareholders’ connivance because the employment culture in Saudi Arabia is influenced 
by nepotism and cronyism (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). In other words, those 
generously paid managers are likely to be relatives or friends of blockholder chairmen. 
Furthermore, board independence and the remuneration committee, which are key 
elements in international corporate governance (Ntim et al., 2015; Méndez et al., 2011; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b), are found to be ineffective in controlling managerial incentives. 
Indeed, they are found to boost executive compensation. This implies that corporate 
governance regulations in the KSA are followed in form but not in substance for 
regulatory and legitimating purposes. In contrast, the impact of CEO/Chairman role 
duality is low and negligible in Saudi Arabia and has no significant influence on 
managerial incentives. This is because Saudi corporate governance regulations prohibit 
the combination of the positions of CEO and board chairman in a single individual.  
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In terms of ownership structure and its influence on decisions related to executive 
pay, the findings show that board directors are key shareholders in the Saudi market. 
However, their ownership only has a partial impact on managerial pay. Although their 
equity holdings show no relationship with total executive compensation, it significantly 
reduces fixed compensation and expands the use of bonus packages. This indicates that 
when members of board of directors hold stakes in the company, they become more 
incentivised to protect their own investment; therefore, they perform their supervisory 
roles more stringently. Furthermore, pension fund investment, which is akin to 
institutional investment and is believed to promote governance quality (Colpan and 
Yoshikawa, 2012; Ozkan, 2007), is surprisingly found to escalate the pecuniary rewards 
of top management. A potential cause of the ineffective role played by pension funds in 
the KSA is that these institutions are semi-government. Their representatives on the 
companies’ boards are government officials who find difficulty in distinguishing between 
their functions as shareholders’ representatives and their administrative tasks (Conyon 
and He, 2012).  
This interpretation is supported by the additional finding that state ownership is 
not related to executive pay-setting. This result, despite the state being a dominant 
investor in the SSE, demonstrates that state equity in general has no significant 
relationship with the levels of executive remuneration. This poor supervisory role of the 
state might be a consequence of the divergent objectives between state and regular 
shareholders (Ramaswamy et al., 2000; Olson, 1973). This is because state investment 
can have non-profit aims, such as stabilising the stock market and controlling certain 
sensitive operational sectors for security purposes (Olson, 1973). Therefore, state 
investors do not always seek to maximise their income; hence, their efforts may not focus 
on improving firm performance or controlling the opportunistic actions of top 
management with regards to their remuneration packages (Olson, 1973). 
Accordingly, the first empirical research provides evidence that Saudi companies 
comply with regulatory requirements of corporate governance but with no real 
conviction. This situation supports the institutions-based view which argues that the 
adoption of the Western governance model in emerging economies, where formal 
institutions are weak, leads to an adherence to governance requirements in form rather 
than in substance (Young et al., 2008). However, certain informal institutional 
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arrangements such as wasta play a more significant role than individual merit in the 
design of executive compensation. That is to say, the board of directors, which is 
controlled by blockholders, rather than the remuneration committee, retains the right to 
reward top managers, who are usually appointed on the basis of nepotism and cronyism 
(Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). This situation leads to the emergence of principal-principal 
conflict, which results in minority shareholders’ equity being threatened with 
expropriation. Consequently, it is evident that the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance lacks generalizability in emerging economies such as Saudi Arabia and must 
be contextualised in a way that considers and captures the domestic cultural and 
institutional settings; otherwise, it will not function as intended. 
Based on this finding, the second empirical study (Chapter Four) goes beyond the 
formal institutions and investigates other informal institutions to complement the 
findings and complete the picture on executive pay-settings. This study considers the 
consequences of having political connections, which is a vital source of wasta, on the 
practices of managerial compensation. Chapter four addresses the following question: Do 
political connections enhance governance quality through controlling executive 
compensation? Using the same sample, the study finds that the phenomenon of political 
connections is prevalent in Saudi Arabia and most firms are politically connected. This 
evidence supports the conclusion of Faccio (2010) that political ties are significant in 
emerging economies. The results also show that if firms do not have a direct relationship 
with the state, they tend to build connections through inviting members of the royal 
family or Shura Council to serve on their boards of directors. Therefore, it is clear that 
board political capital is a pillar of business policy in Saudi Arabia. This supports the view 
of institutional theory, which argues that political relationships act as a substitute for the 
absence of effective formal institutions to protect the interests of related parties and 
ensure the smooth running of business (Faccio, 2010; Young et al., 2008). 
Although studies find that political relationships assist enterprises to access vital 
resources (Civilize et al., 2015; Goldman et al., 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), this 
study finds evidence that they could also be costly. That is to say, politically connected 
firms facilitate higher executive compensation. Since the Saudi market is significantly 
dominated by family companies, the process of designating top managers is influenced 
by nepotism and cronyism (Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). Indeed, the appointment of 
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unqualified-managers in leading positions is likely to increase agency costs resulting 
from weak firm performance. Furthermore, political connections can be utilised to 
provide regulatory protection for blockholders, if the latter abuse their power. However, 
the outcome is subject to the type of political connection. This is because after re-
classifying affiliated directors into three categories based on connection type—royal 
family member, Shura Council member and state representative—the findings show that 
only state representatives are found to boost executive pay. In contrast, royal family and 
Shura Council affiliated directors show no significant association with decisions related 
to managerial incentives. This evidence demonstrates that none of political connections 
sources is effective in enhancing governance quality, in particular the ones related to 
executive pay-setting.  
However, these results should not be interpreted as a conspiracy between 
dominant shareholders or top managers and politically connected directors against small 
investors (Sun et al., 2016). To illustrate this point, the results do not necessarily mean 
that these connected members explicitly approve the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by rewarding top related-managers with high non-merited compensation. 
However, their political power might be exploited by dominant shareholders or senior 
executives to achieve private benefits, such as extracting high non-merited compensation 
for the executive team, who often are family-affiliated, without concern for any legal 
liability.  
Since Saudi Arabia is a family-firm-dominated economy, it is essential to 
understand the role and impact of family involvement in decisions making and the 
consequences on executive compensation. The dataset allows an analysis of the 
differences between family-controlled firms and their non-family counterparts in terms 
of corporate governance attitudes and the need for political connections and their 
implications on executive pay arrangements. Thus, Chapter Five investigates the roles of 
corporate governance and political connections in designing managerial incentives, but 
with a focus on the role of family and the principal-principal conflict. The third empirical 
study addresses the following questions: a) Do the structure of corporate governance and 
the need for political connections differ in family and non-family firms? and b) What are the 
implications of this variation for executive compensation practices in family and non-family 
firms? 
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Confirming the conclusions of the first empirical study, the findings of the third 
study demonstrate overall that the traditional agency model does not resolve agency 
problems in Saudi Arabia in either family-controlled firms or their non-family 
counterparts. For example, agency theory suggests that the presence of shareholders in 
management reduces the gap between ownership and control and thereby lowers agency 
costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, the study finds that the presence of family 
members, in fact, increases agency costs through granting higher managerial 
remuneration. Large shareholders are also found to chair most companies’ boards 
indicating a significant direct involvement in monitoring management. This highlights 
that the separation between ownership and control is low in Saudi Arabia in contrast to 
the West. Furthermore, appointing independent directors, which is a key 
recommendation in the global best practice of corporate governance, is also found to 
increase executive compensation in family and non-family firms. These outcomes 
indicate the significant presence of principal-principal conflict in Saudi Arabia. Principal-
principal conflict results from the high concentration of ownership in hands of certain 
bodies, families and government agencies and the absence of effective formal institutions 
(Young et al., 2008). 
Indeed, adopting governance mechanisms developed in the West with no 
consideration for the cross-cultural and institutional differences leads to unfavourable 
consequences (Young et al., 2008). For instance, business policy in Saudi Arabia is 
significantly influenced by personal connections (Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011). Wasta is a key 
cultural characteristic of the Arab world and is widely used in the employment process, 
in the awarding of business and government contracts and in normal daily transactions 
(Tlaiss and Kauser, 2011; Budhwar and Debrah, 2013). Therefore, in the KSA, there is a 
strong likelihood of appointing unqualified managers, especially in family-controlled 
firms. As a result, the firm may perform poorly and incur higher agency costs at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Wasta is also practised through political connections 
as it provides many benefits for the organisation including government subsidies, 
contracts and protection from regulatory sanctions (Goldman et al., 2009; Faccio, 2010; 
Wang, 2015; Sun et al., 2016). Although the Saudi National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(NACC) considers wasta to be a form of corruption (NACC, 2016), the scope of the 
Commission’s authority is limited to government bodies. In contrast, MCI and CMA, which 
supervise publicly traded firms, do not explicitly criminalise wasta practices within and 
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across organisations. Accordingly, without considering these domestic cultural and 
institutional challenges, corporate governance regulations will not be effective in 
protecting shareholders’ rights, especially small investors. 
Surprisingly, the study also finds that executive compensation practices in family 
and non-family firms are different in form but not in substance. Although non-family 
firms grant higher bonus packages to their managers than do their counterparts in family 
firms, the total compensation in family and non-family firms show a similar upward trend 
during the years 2008-2015. This implies that non-family firms confirm their legitimacy 
by using such signalling tools to reassure shareholders that managers are paid according 
to their performance. However, this is not totally accurate since the results reveal that in 
2009 and 2011 (see Figure 5.2) firm performance was weak but total compensation 
continued to increase.  
Overall, several conclusions can be drawn from the thesis findings. In terms of 
corporate governance regulations, the current situation in Saudi Arabia indicates that 
there is lack of effectiveness in practice. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
governance regulations have not taken into account the influence of the domestic 
institutional settings of Saudi Arabia, such as sharia, political economy and the strong use 
of wasta in the business field. In other words, the current practices imply that corporate 
governance regulations in the KSA are followed in form but not in substance for 
regulatory and legitimating purposes. As long as the corporate governance regulations 
do not recognise the domestic challenges and explicitly acknowledge the conflict of 
interest among the three most influenced parties (top management, controlling 
shareholders and minority investors) within the regulations, they will not function as 
intended. Adopting the Anglo-American model of corporate governance which has been 
developed according to a specific institutional background (e.g. a strong and effective 
legal system) will not necessarily lead to the same success when adopted elsewhere while 
the fundamental institutions are absent. 
It is obvious that Saudi Arabia is attempting to follow the best practice of other 
developed economies; however, the divergence of the institutional characteristics 
between the Saudi context and the other Anglo-American counterparts will not lead to 
the desired destination, i.e. homogeneous regulations. For instance, how would the CMA 
require firms to link executive compensation with long-term firm performance, while the 
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stock options, which are the main instrument of the long-term link, are not allowed under 
the Saudi sharia-based regulations? The regulations should acknowledge that the 
available methods of paying top management are restricted to fixed and short-term 
compensation. Therefore, instead of adopting full regulations that developed in other 
contexts, the regulators should create new techniques that fit with sharia principles and 
local laws, in order to provide proper executive compensation recommendations that can 
be linked to long-term performance. 
Another dimensional point is that the political economy of Saudi Arabia is 
significantly different from the West. That is to say, while the economy in the West is 
market-oriented, it is network-oriented in Saudi Arabia with high involvement of state 
investments. This, indeed, leads to the emergence of the phenomenon of political 
connections. The presence of politically connected members in companies’ boards is 
significantly prevalent since the majority of firms have board political capital. Even 
though such directors can bring vital benefits to the firm, their presence also has a dark 
side from the economic point of view. That is to say, the high dependence on political 
connectedness affects the shape and custom of the business norms and exacerbates the 
network-orientation of the economy in general. This, indeed, threatens the ambitious 
Saudi plans, namely Saudi Vision 2030, which aims to diversify Saudi Arabia's sources of 
income and attract further foreign investments. The threat comes from uncertainty and 
the fact that in such a situation equal competition is less attainable, which increases 
investment risks. Foreign investors are rational and seek stable and transparent markets 
that provide equal opportunities for all investors, rather than for certain parties, i.e. those 
which are politically connected. 
Moreover, as the majority of inflow cash of the Saudi economy emerges from oil 
revenues, this means the structure of the economy is based on government expenditure 
rather than on a contributing private sector. In this context, while the tendency of market-
oriented economies is centred on privatisation, the investment and involvement of 
government and semi-government in the Saudi market are significantly high, implying 
that the enforcement of governance regulations is unlikely on these parties. The OECD 
(2015b) warns that boards connected to governments may find it difficult to balance 
between their duties as a representative of the shareholders and their commitment to 
achieving government goals, which may lead to interference in the management of the 
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company. The OECD (2015b, p. 35) also suggests that: “in order to minimise possible 
conflicts of interest, the ownership entity should avoid electing an excessive number of 
board members from the state administration. This is particularly relevant for SOEs 
engaged in economic activities, where limiting board membership by representatives of 
the ownership entity or by other state officials can increase professionalism, help prevent 
excessive government intervention in SOE management and it may help limit the state’s 
responsibility for decisions taken by SOE boards”. Therefore, the regulators should 
acknowledge this fact and find governance techniques that help to govern dominant 
shareholders rather than just focusing on one issue: managerial opportunism. 
Alternatively, the government may minimise the influence of political connections by 
reducing its ownership levels in publicly-traded firms and electing limited numbers of 
board members from the state administration to prevent excessive intervention in firms’ 
management (OECD, 2015b). 
The absence of the role of financial institutions is another critical issue in the Saudi 
economy. Such institutions have an influential contribution in the governance matters in 
developed economies, while their presence in the Saudi market is almost negligent due 
to regulatory restrictions, as the Saudi Banking Control Law prevents financial 
institutions from owning in excess of 10% of a company’s shares (SAMA, 1966). The 
neutralisation of the financial institutions should be altered at least by involving other 
interested parties to fill the gap of this absence, e.g. other stakeholders’ parties such as 
employees (German Model). 
6.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
Practically, the thesis findings have several significant implications that may assist 
firms and regulators to understand the current practices of corporate governance, the 
phenomenon of political connections and the determinants of executive compensation.  
First, the thesis sheds light on the practices of executive compensation in Saudi 
listed firms and illustrates the challenges that boards of directors encounter when 
designing managerial incentives. It shows that boards of directors have very limited 
methods by which to compensate top managers namely salary, bonus and other non-
pecuniary compensation which are linked to short-term incentives. However, long-term 
incentive plans such as stock options are not possible in the Saudi context because of 
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regulatory constraints. Hence, the findings highlight the need for creating new 
contextualised means by which to strengthen the link between managerial pay and long-
term performance. 
Second, even though the SCGRs state that managers should be paid according to 
firm performance, the study demonstrates that executive compensation increased faster 
than firm performance between 2008 and 2015. The upward trend of executive pay with 
a weak correlation with firm performance indicates that firms have a low level of 
compliance with the SCGRs; thus, the SCGRs need stronger enforcement. 
Third, the study highlights the potential conflict of interests that may result from 
the combining the nomination and remuneration committees in Saudi Arabia. Unlike in 
developed economies, which require a separate remuneration committee comprised 
entirely of independent directors, under the SCGRs members of the executive team 
including the CEO can participate in the nomination and remuneration committee. As this 
committee is responsible for two vital functions i.e. designing managerial pay and 
nominating members of board of directors, there is a possibility that the CEO can directly 
influence his/her own compensation. Furthermore, CEOs may use his/her position on the 
committee to pressurise and control independent directors, who rely on the CEO to be 
re-appointed. In this context, the study assesses the legal setting that frames executive 
compensation and highlights the legal loopholes; thereby enabling regulators to resolve 
the issue. 
Fourth, with regards to corporate governance, the study finds evidence that the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance lacks transferability to emerging 
economies such as the KSA and is inadequate in constraining executive compensation in 
these settings. For example, although Saudi corporate governance regulations have been 
enforced since 2006, there was a boom in executive compensation between 2008 and 
2015. Furthermore, international best practice of corporate governance suggests that 
ownership concentration and the presence of controlling shareholders on boards of 
directors mitigate agency costs (Combs et al., 2010; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). However, 
this research demonstrates that ownership concentration in the hand of certain investors 
combined with the presence of blockholders on companies’ boards, especially in 
economies with weak formal institutions, leads to principal-principal conflict and higher 
agency costs. Consequently, governance regulations should acknowledge and consider 
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the potential conflict among shareholders themselves and create tools that prevent 
blockholders’ opportunism and provide strong protection for all shareholders.  
Fifth, the outcomes show that independent directors are ineffective in controlling 
managerial perks, making the independence of board of directors questionable. This 
helps regulatory bodies to review their definition of independent members and 
encourages firms to undertake periodic assessments in relation to the status of 
independent directors. Additionally, the role of remuneration committee, which is 
assumed to control the levels of executive pay and set well-structured pay packages 
(Girma et al., 2007; Méndez et al., 2011), is found to be weak in controlling executive 
compensation. This evidence confirms the argument of Young et al. (2008) that firms in 
emerging economies only comply in form with regulatory requirements of corporate 
governance rather than in substance. Accordingly, the study findings provide an 
opportunity for the authorities to review current regulations of corporate governance 
taking into consideration the domestic cultural and institutional challenges in the KSA. 
Sixth, in terms of political connections, Saudi law forbids ministers from being 
members of corporate boards in order to reduce the abuse of political power in the 
business field (BECM, 1993). However, this study shows that firms are still able to 
establish political connections by other means and provides evidence that most Saudi 
listed firms are politically connected. As the Saudi government is reliant on foreign 
investment to achieve the objectives of the ‘Saudi Vision 2030’, the study sheds light on 
the obstacles that may repel foreign investment from entering the Saudi market. 
Typically, foreign investors look for low risk markets and avoid countries where there is 
a high degree of uncertainty. However, if business is highly dependent on political 
connections, then foreign investors are required to establish political ties to enjoy a 
competitive environment. Undoubtedly, the norms of political connections are seen as a 
risk for foreign investors.  
Seventh, from the governance perspective, politically connected directors are 
found to be ineffective in enhancing the quality of corporate governance. On the contrary, 
their presence on board of directors is associated with higher executive remuneration. In 
contexts that are strongly influenced by principal-principal conflict such as the KSA, there 
is a concern that controlling shareholders may exploit minority shareholders and use 
political connections to prevent any regulatory sanctions. Thus, the study provides an 
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overview of how political connections interact with corporate governance mechanisms. 
Indeed, an understanding of this interaction assists the authorities to reform corporate 
governance regulations, taking into consideration boards’ political power. This enables a 
re-balancing of power among the parties to ensure that no single party is exploited due 
to a lack of control.  
Finally, the third empirical study demonstrates that most Saudi listed firms are 
family dominated and almost 85% of corporate boards have at least one blockholder 
member. Furthermore, it provides a comparison of attitudes between family and non-
family firms in terms of corporate governance practices, the use of political connections 
and the policies of corporate governance. This comprehensive overview of the key 
distinctions between family and non-family firms offers a solid basis for regulators and 
practitioners to specify the needs of both type of firms in the aforementioned aspects. It 
also highlights the need for regulations that reduce family control and decreases the 
likelihood of their interference in company management. Furthermore, it provides 
evidence that, unlike the diffused ownership structure in the West (Rashid, 2013), the 
ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is highly concentrated with a low level of separation 
between ownership and control. Therefore, the finding should stimulate regulators to 
reconsider the validity of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, which 
disregards the weak institutional settings in emerging economies. 
6.2 POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Although the thesis findings have a high degree of objectivity, there are a number 
of theoretical and methodological limitations that should be taken into account when 
interpreting the results. First, the results are analysed and interpreted as an aggregate 
for the entire sample based on the contextual setting. However, some firms might have 
different internal characteristics that make them subject to other theoretical 
interpretations. For example, when the discussion concentrates on principal-principal 
conflict in most firms, this does not mean that all the firms are affected to the same degree 
by principal-principal conflict. 
Second, the study is based on a sample from a single country, namely Saudi Arabia. 
Although the findings enjoy a high degree of generalizability to other economies that have 
similar institutional features in common with Saudi Arabia, such as the GCC countries and 
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some other Arab economies, the study findings may lack generalizability outside the 
MENA region. Additionally, the study sample is limited to non-financial listed firms 
operating between 2008 and 2015 and does not cover financial firms. This is because 
financial firms are subject to different accounting practices, governance regulations and 
supervisory bodies (Wang and Shailer, 2015). Moreover, unlisted firms are not included 
in the study sample. Thus, the reader should be careful when interpreting results and 
should not assume that their implications are the same for the financial sector or in 
unlisted firms. 
Third, with regards to the dependent variable, the scope of the investigation is 
limited to one governance mechanism, namely executive compensation. Thus, other 
governance characteristics and practices are not examined. Relatedly, it is also worth 
noting that the thesis uses only the three components of executive compensation existing 
in the KSA, namely salary, bonus and non-pecuniary packages. Therefore, it does not 
analyse other pay forms that are used internationally such as long-term incentive plans, 
because stock options are not allowed for regulatory reasons. That is to say, there is no 
legislation in Saudi Arabia that permits firms to repurchase their own stock from the market. 
Fourth, an important limitation is related to the independent variables of corporate 
governance, political connections and family members. In terms of corporate governance, 
the study uses a very limited set of variables that mainly focus on certain internal 
governance mechanisms, the board of directors and the type of investor. However, other 
particularities of the political economy and internal and external governance 
mechanisms, such as the effectiveness of the legal framework, takeover activities, market 
efficiency and so on, are not examined. Hence, the findings should be interpreted within 
the context of the selected areas of internal corporate governance. With respect to 
political connections, the research uses a context-based definition for political 
connectedness that consists of certain types of connections, namely royal family 
members, Shura Council members and state representatives. However, there might be 
other potential channels to establish political ties that are not observed by this study. In 
addition to this, the study focuses only on the influence of the presence of politically 
connected members in the board of directors over governance quality; however, there 
are many particularities of political economy that may have a political impact on 
corporate governance and are not investigated in this thesis. Furthermore, with regards 
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to family-controlled firms, the study investigates the influence of family members on 
governance quality according to certain criteria, i.e. level of ownership and the presence 
in the board of directors. However, other related variables that measure the family 
influence, which considers other factors such as generations, family-related managers 
and family altruism, are beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, the reader should 
be cautious when generalising the findings to other countries which have different 
political regimes and institutional settings.  
Fifth, it is also worth noting that the study does not capture the influence of sharia, 
which is a key contextual characteristic of Saudi Arabia, on governance quality due to two 
reasons. First of all, although there are some attempts to model ICG, they are limited to 
financial institutions such as Islamic banks. Thus, no well-developed model is available 
for non-financial firms which have different structures and nature of business from those 
of banks. Second, sharia influence cannot be precisely measured using secondary data 
and perhaps needs an alternative methodological approach, e.g. qualitative investigation. 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that even theoretical perceptions of sharia are 
not considered in this thesis due to its irrelevance to the adopted model of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, which is mainly based on the Anglo-American model 
(shareholder model). 
Sixth, in terms of control variables, the study employs the most common variables 
of firm characteristics that are found to influence executive compensation, namely firm 
size, firm age, firm performance and firm leverage. However, there is a possibility that 
other unobserved firm characteristics may affect executive compensation. It is also 
essential to mention that human capital characteristics of executive members such as 
education, age and years of experience are not included in the study models due to lack 
of disclosure. 
Seventh, the study adopts a quantitative approach through secondary data, which 
are collected from the financial statements and the reports of boards of directors, to 
answer the research questions. Thus, statistical analysis is the most appropriate 
technique to analyse the effects of corporate governance and political connections on the 
setting of executive compensation. However, it is necessary to be aware that the study 
does not investigate the phenomena qualitatively. In other words, the data cannot 
provide answers for why and how these behaviours, attributes and practices occur. 
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Finally, Chalevas (2011) and Chen et al. (2010b) report that the endogeneity 
problem exists between the variables of firm performance and executive compensation. 
In other words, there is a reverse causality between the two variables i.e. firms with a 
better performance offer higher executive compensation; at the same time, generous 
executive compensation incentivises managers to increase firm performance. One of the 
best suggested solutions for this problem is to use instrumental variables methods such 
as Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) (Chen et al., 2011; Murray, 2006). To do so, such 
models are conditioned by the use of a valid instrumental variable that is correlated with 
the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the error (Chen et al., 2011). However, 
this study failed to find a valid instrumental variable because the relationship between 
firm performance and executive compensation is very interlocked and most variables 
that affect firm performance also impact executive compensation. Furthermore, adopting 
an invalid instrumental variable produces biased and misleading outcomes (Murray, 
2006). In order to address the endogeneity problem between the two variables, the study 
follows other research (Colpan and Yoshikawa, 2012; Méndez et al., 2011; Chen et al., 
2010b; Weir et al., 2002) and uses lagged value of firm performance. Typically, managers 
are compensated according to their past performance (Chen et al., 2010b). Therefore, lag 
firm performance is expected to affect current and future executive compensation; 
however, it is irrational to believe that current or future compensation influences past 
performance. 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The research only uses a sample of non-financial firms in the KSA. Thus, it is worth 
investigating the same phenomena in financial firms which have different accounting 
practices and are subject to different supervisory bodies and different corporate 
governance requirements. This will enable a comparative analysis between the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, the impact of political connections and the 
practices of executive compensation between financial and non-financial firms. 
Additionally, there is a gap in the literature related to private business firms which 
needs attention. Private family firms are closed businesses and have norms and cultural 
behaviours that differ from listed firms. Hence, studying private family businesses would 
enhance the understanding of the roles of corporate governance and political connections 
on determining executive incentives in both family and non-family firms.  
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Furthermore, this study relies on a quantitative method to investigate the impact 
of corporate governance and political connections on the levels of executive 
compensation. However, the process of designing executive compensation and the roles 
of corporate governance and political connections can be also investigated qualitatively 
using interviews in order to obtain the perceptions of all the main stakeholders. This 
would make a worthwhile contribution to the understanding of this area and increase the 
reliability and validity of previous empirical findings. 
Although the findings of this research reflect the role of a number of chosen 
variables in constraining executive compensation, this does not mean that these variables 
have the same implications for other firm characteristics. Therefore, it is worth 
investigating the effects of these attributes on other business aspects such as firm 
performance and earnings management. This would provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of corporate governance and political connections in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Finally, the research develops a contextualised definition for political connections. 
This definition can be employed to analyse the implications of political relationships on 
other economic and governance characteristics in Saudi Arabia or in countries, such as 
the GCC economies, which share similar institutional settings. This would enhance the 
understanding on the interaction between the phenomenon of political connections and 
business elites. 
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